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The Courts and Rule of Law - A nationwide judicial system in Iran was first implemented and established by Ali Akbar Davar and some of his contemporaries such as Abdolhossein Teymourtash under Reza Shah, with further changes during the second Pahlavi era. After the 1979 overthrow of the Pahlavi Dynasty by the Islamic Revolution, the system was changed drastically. The legal code is now based on Shi'a Islamic law or sharia. According to the constitution of the Islamic Republic, the judiciary in Iran "is an independent power." The entire legal system - "from the Supreme Court to regional courts, all the way down to local and revolutionary courts" - is under the purview of the Ministry of Justice, but in addition to a Minister of Justice and head of the Supreme Court, there is also a separate appointed head of the judiciary. Parliamentary bills pertaining to the constitution are vetted by the Council of Guardians.
- Division of Power Among Branches of the Government – The executive branch is bifurcated between the president and the supreme leader. The supreme leader is the country’s most powerful political figure and has the authority to overrule or dismiss the president, appoint the head of the judiciary and half of the members of the Guardian Council, and appoint the top echelons of the military. Because of this, the president has rather truncated powers. Within the legislative branch are various councils and assemblies that serve different purposes. The Guardian Council is a 12-member council that is half appointed by the Supreme Leader and half recommended by the head of the judiciary. The Majles is an 86-member male assembly that evaluates the performance of the supreme leader. The Expediency Council is entrusted with the task of resolving any policy disputes in a way that best serves the interest of the entire system.
- Role of the Bureaucracy – Since Iran had, at one point, a 70% state owned economy, the role of the agencies and bureaucracies to efficiently take care of business, provide social securities and welfare practices is by far a key role in the lives of Iranian citizens. However, with a constitutional amendment selling 80% of those assets into private and cooperative hands, we can expect to see how Iran’s bureaucracies will need to become more streamlined to take care of its population.
Section II: History
- State Formation - On January 16 1979, the Shah left Iran. Shapour Bakhtiar as his new prime minister with the help of Supreme Army Councils couldn't control the situation in the country anymore. Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran on February 1. Ten days later Bakhtiar went into hiding, eventually to find exile in Paris. Processes against the supporters of the Shah started, and hundreds were executed. On April 1, after a landslide victory in a national referendum in which only one choice was offered, Ayatollah Khomeini declared an Islamic republic with a new Constitution reflecting his ideals of Islamic government.
- Process of Industrialization - The Islamist groups grew in numbers throughout the late 1960s and the early 1970s. These groups were critical of the Shah's political repression and plan of modernization modeled on the West. In Iran, industrialization and westernization came in a single package. The Shah's regime failed to recognize that the European transition to an industrial society was a very painful one and took over two hundred years, and that that Western-style industrialization would mean Iran would have to abandon its culture and heritage. Iran's economy experienced a major decline in the agricultural sector but the success of its industrialization remained limited. Forced industrialization of a fairly limited scale came with a great deal of political repression that many Iranians, including women, grew increasingly intolerant of. The issue of political freedom became a major issue, and persuaded countless Iranians to turn their backs on the regime.
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Major Leaders of the 20th Century
- Shah Pahlavi (16 September 1941 – 11 February 1979) – monarch of Iran until his overthrow during the Iranian Revolution.
- Mohammed Mossadeq (1951-1953) – major figure in modern Iranian history who served as the Prime Minister of Iran until he was removed from power by a coup d’état. Mossadeq was also an author, administrator, lawyer, prominent parliamentarian, and statesman, famous for his passionate opposition to foreign intervention in Iran, which ultimately brought his demise.
- Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (3 December 1979 – 3 June 1989) – Iranian religious leader and scholar, politician, and leader of the 1979 Iranian Revolution which saw the overthrow of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the late Shah of Iran.
- Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (4 June 1989 – Present)
- Significant Historical Events
- 1906-1911 – Constitutional Revolution
- 1908 – Oil is discovered in Persia
- 1935 – Reza Shah changes the official name of the country from Persia to Iran
- 1949-1951 – Oil Nationalization
- 1979 – Beginning of Islamic Revolution; protests begin to mount tension between rioters and police forces.
- 1980 – Shah completely deposed; constitution adopted by the people.
- 1980-1988 – Iran-Iraq War
- Religious and Cultural Background
- Ethnic composition (% of total population as of 2003)
- Persians: 51
- Azeri: 24
- Gilaki and Mazandarani: 8
- Kurd: 7
- Arab: 3
- Lur: 2
- Baloch: 2
- Turkmen: 2
- Other: 1
- Religious affiliation (%)
- Shi’a Muslim: 89
- Sunni Muslim: 10
- Zoroastrians, Jewish, Christians, and Baha’i: 1
Section III: The Larger State – Politics and Society
- Major Contemporary Political Issues – The main tension in the Iranian political system today is between moderate reformers and the conservative clergy. Views on economic and cultural changes are cross-cutting. Social welfare in Iran, as elsewhere in the Islamic world, has also traditionally been a matter of discussion. The country faces major problems, including a large subculture of drug users (estimated at over two million) and the AIDS infection rate, for which they are mostly responsible. Another pressing issue is Iran’s human rights record, which leaves much to be desired. To this day there are numerous and continued human rights violations, including the lack of an independent judiciary, the use of the death penalty, the use of torture in prisons and other detention centers, the use of amputations and other cruel punishments, a continuing campaign against journalists and intellectuals, and a culture of impunity for vigilantes who commit abuses against regime opponents and ordinary citizens who do not conform to strict Islamic codes of conduct.
- Informal Power Structures – Many factions of political influence exist in Iran that are not necessarily formal power structures. There are numerous important groups located in the gray zone between the regime and civil society which are critical of the regime. These groups constitute a religious "semi-opposition," criticize the regime on a religious basis, and strive for nonviolent reform of the political system within the boundaries established by the constitution. In addition, there are a number of small, militant opposition groups that actively seek the violent overthrow of the regime. These consist of monarchists, the Islamic Marxist Mojahedin-e Khalq, the separatist Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, and the several underground groups that speak for Iran’s discriminated-against Sunni minority.
- Major Political Forces
- United Principlist Front – a coalition of 11 conservative lists that is the dominant force in the new Majlis. The front’s strong conservative undercurrents and innate dislike for the opposition reformist blocs should ensure its close association with the conservative government.
- The Inclusive and Participation Front – a more assertive opposition, comprising of both conservative opponents of the president, and reformist groups. These groups have strongly challenged the government’s expansionary fiscal policies, which they blame for Iran’s mounting inflation.
- The Guardian Council – an upper house of parliament made up of six Islamic clerics and six lay jurists. The body has the right to veto all legislation passed by the Majlis, and to veto any laws that it decides do not comply with Islamic law of Iran’s constitution. It also vetoes candidates standing for election to national office, and is able to reject those it deems to be unqualified or of unsuitable character.
- The Expediency Council and Assembly of Experts – Expediency Council mediates disputes between the Guardian Council and the Majlis, and tends to rule on the side of the Majlis. The Assembly of Experts is an elected 86-member all-clerical body with the primary task of selecting the supreme leader and the members of the Guardian Council. The Assembly can also theoretically dismiss the supreme leader if he fails to meet specific criteria or becomes unable to execute his duties satisfactorily.
- The judiciary – has been based on sharia law since the revolution in 1979. The court structure is broken into a number of components, including the Supreme Court, dozens of Revolutionary Courts, Public Courts, and Courts of Peace. The head of the judiciary is appointed by the supreme leader for a period of five years.
- The Majlis – since 1979 instills the principle of universal suffrage. Its members are elected for four-year terms, and elections are held on a multi-member constituency basis, with candidates being chosen by the Guardian Council. The Majlis is mainly responsible for ratifying legislation, yet it also can propose bills. In addition to its legislative role, the Majlis serves to critique the behavior of ministerial candidates.
- Impact of Government on the Ordinary Citizen – since the government is elected by the people, and thus the policies are created by the people, the Iranian government has much to say about the lives of its people. Social security and health care are perfect examples of this. Iran has an extensive social security network and welfare system. If the government were to cover insurance better, the poorer people would have access to doctors and hospitals. Conversely, if the government cut health care spending, everyone would have less coverage or fewer people would have the same coverage.
- Foreign Policy Concerns and Global Pressures
- The failure of the exportation of the revolution and the collapse of the Soviet Union (1988-1991) – The main pillars of Islamic Iran’s foreign policy collapsed between July 1988 and August 1991. The acceptance by Imam Khomeyni of the cease-fire with Iraq in July 1988 meant that the road to Jerusalem did no more “go through Kerbala.” It was a de facto acceptance of the status quo in the Middle East. But the biggest blow for Iran was certainly the collapse of the Soviet Union in August 1991. Totally unexpected in Tehran, it suddenly opened a vacuum on the northern side of Iran and gave the “Great Satan” (the United States) a quasi-hegemony on world order.
- The status quo in the Middle East and the shift to Central Asia (1992-1997) – Following the fall of the Soviet Union, Iranian isolation was aggravated by the launching of the peace process in 1994. Even the lasting alliance between Iran and Syria would have been threatened in case of a return of the Golan Heights to Damascus, followed by a peace treaty between the two former enemies. In response, Iran adopted from 1995 onward a more moderate policy towards the Middle East.
- The basic tenets of the Iranian policy towards Central Asia – Iran’s policy toward Central Asia evolved from a conservative and cautious attitude towards the newly independent states to a more assertive policy based on the role it would like to play in providing landlocked countries with gas and oil. Iran has from the beginning played down the ideological dimension of this issue. The main aim of Iranian foreign policy has been to prevent the United States and its Turkish and Saudi (on the religious field) allies to fill the vacuum left by the fall of the Soviet Union.
- The reliance on a Tehran-Moscow axis – The departure of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan in February 1989 put an end to the only real bone of contention between Tehran and Moscow, thus allowing the conjunction of interests to appear in open light. The alliance with Moscow has two dimensions: strategic and military.
- The question of the Caspian Sea – The controversy over the Caspian Sea is a good example of Iran’s isolation and of the decreasing reliability of Russian support for Iran. Iran and Russia used to share the same conception of Caspian Sea status. Referring to the treaties of 1921 and 1940 between the Soviet Union and Iran, they considered the Caspian Sea a closed sea which should be administered through an agreement of joint sovereignty.
Section IV: Key Terms
- Supreme Leader – Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
- President – Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
- Head of Presidential Office – Gholam-Hossein Elham
- Key Ministers
- Commerce – Masoud Mir-Kazemi
- Culture & Islamic Guidance – Mohammed-Hossein Saffar-Harandi
- Defence – Mostafa Mohammed-Najjar
- Economy & Finance – Shamseddin Hosseini
- Education – Mahmoud Farshidi
- Energy – Parviz Fattah
- Foreign Affairs – Manouchehr Mottaki
- Industries & Mines – Ali Akbar Mehrabian
- Information – Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei
- Interior – Sadeq Mahsouli
- Justice – Gholam-Hossein Elham
- Oil – Gholam-Hossein Nozari
- Speaker of the Majlis – Ali Larijani
- Head of the Supreme National Security Council – Said Jalili
- Head of the Management & Planning Organization – Amir Mansour Borghei
- Head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization – Gholam-Reza Aghazadeh
- Central Bank Governor – Mahmoud Bahmani
- Islamic Republican Party – most important post-revolutionary political party, established in 1979 and dissolved in 1987 due to factional infighting in its ranks
- Islamic Iran Participation Front – largest reform party, was formed after the victory of President Khatami in 1997 by his reformist colleagues
- Servants of Construction Party – grouping of technocrats who are allied with former president Hashemi Rasfanjani
- Other well-established political entities
- Reformist – Assembly of the Combatant Clerics, Assembly of the Followers of the Imam’s Line, Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization
- Conservative – Society for Militant Clergy, Islamic Coalition Party, Coalition for the Development of Islamic Iran
- Cultural Terms, Especially in the Native Language
- Ayatollah – “Sign of God,” a title conferred upon leading Shi’ite mojtaheds
- Bazaaris – traditional merchants
- Ejtehad – exercise of independent reasoning in the interpretation of Islamic law
- Faqih – jurist, an expert in Islamic jurisprudence
- Fatva – binding religious edict issued by a qualified mojtahed
- Hojjatoleslam – “Proof of Islam,” clerical rank immediately below ayatollah
- Imam – spiritual leader; for Ja’fari Shi’ites one of the 12 infallible heirs to the Prophet descended from Ali
- Jihad – holy war
- Mojtahed – one who exercises ejtehad
- Mullah – a low-ranking cleric trained in traditional law
- Shah – king, the undisputed leader
- Ulema – the collective term for religious leaders
- Umma – the Islamic community
Section V: Comparative Analysis
Iran is in a different position today than it has been in the last 8 years. With the inauguration of Barack Obama, who promised open talks with Iranian President Ahmadinejad during the campaign, can the world expect new Tehran-Washington relations?
In a sense, people should expect new relations, not just because of campaign promises, but because if the United States neglects being open neighbors to Iran, it could forfeit the already weakened position it holds as the leader of the free world. This is something that Barack Obama conveyed in his campaign promises.
Furthermore, it seems as though these sentiments have reverberated in the United States. With the popularity of peace candidates such as Ron Paul and Dennis Kucinich, it can be inferred that the United States is waking up to the idea that it cannot, and should not, go around policing the world, enforcing its will on others. Moreover, our Cold War Diplomacy will not work in the 21st century. The election of President Obama, who called for unconditional talks with Tehran, marks a turning point in United States foreign policy. This is only possible through the democratic feedback mechanism of the election cycle.
There have been many calls for Iran to stand up for itself in the face of the United States and the West, which came after the election of President Ahmadinejad. This represents the democratic process and provocative feedback mechanism in Iran’s political process.
Conclusively, if people leave opinions aside, it can be seen how the election cycle, as a feedback mechanism, promotes positive and peaceful change toward the goals of citizens of a country, and furthermore, we can see these process not only in the United States, but also in Iran.
Section VI: Concepts in Comparative Government
- Relations between the Citizens and the State – Almost surprisingly, the relation between citizens and the state in Iran is quite similar to that of Britain. Both nations exercise a democratic process in electing their government officials, with checks and balances exercised where necessary. This system allows the citizens to create a feedback mechanism through elections in the Majlis and for the President. However, these elections are not strictly democratic. While they must follow in accordance with the Constitution, they must also follow Islamic Sharia law. This highlights a very important part of Iranian civic culture, the role of Islam in the political process.
- Methods of Political Mobilization – Political parties, coalitions, organizations, and other factions of the public that pass influence on political issues offer outlets for citizens frustrated or content with the current political system. Since Iran has a multi-party Republic, these political parties can serve as a way to connect the people and the government.
- The Impact of Economic Development on the State – Economic growth in Iran will remain stable over a forecast period of the next five years or so. However, the slow pace of oil output growth, and consequent stagnation of oil revenue, will force the government to rein in its expansionary fiscal policy. Real GDP growth is expected to average around 4.4% each year over the forecast period.
- Civic Culture – In almost every faction of Iranian government, Islam has a very powerful effect on the practical and theoretical role of government in relation to tradition, history, ethnicity, and religion. The people of Iran have always been proud, favoring conservative and religious traditions over revolutionary concepts. The absence of communists, or any favorable political factions who do not have strong religious roots, illustrates this strongly. From this, it can be determined that the Iranians, much like the British, favor their own cultural traditions and evolutionary government, rather than revolution and foreign intervention.
- Methods of Leadership Selection – The Iranian President and Majlis are elected from the populace, while other political entities, such as the Supreme Leader, are elected from the Assembly of Experts who are elected from the people. In addition, some power structures, such as the Guardian Council, are established through religious institutions and clergy.
Section VII: Media Review
Article 1 – “Pop culture can be bigger bridge between U.S., Iran”
http://www.iranian.ws/iran_news/publish/article_29052.shtml
This article refers to the assumption that the news forecasts that Iranians live a very repressive lifestyle.
Article 2 – “Why Iran Wants Russia in OPEC”
http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2009/03/why_iran_wants_russia_in_opec.html
