Is there a democratic deficit in the EU? What are its implications and how could it be reversed?
Is there a democratic deficit in the EU? What are its implications and how could it be reversed?
When the Santer Commission resigned in 1999 many political commentators thought that the EU's key areas of democratic deficit would be addressed. However, 7 years later with the Andreasen scandal still in progress, little seems to have been done. Within the EU there is only one directly elected body, the European Parliament, whilst the two other main legitimising institutions, the Council of Ministers (CoM) and the Commission (Com) remain unelected. The implications upon the functions and roles of these institutions and their need to be reformed, especially in relation to the weakness of the European Parliament in relation to the Commission, has urged many commentators argue that there are issues of transparency and accountability which need to be reformed for the democratic deficit (D.D.) to be resolved. This is recognised and solutions are offered by the Constitutional Treaty (C.T.) which is in the process of being ratified by all member states.
Despite being the only fully elected body in the EU the supranational European Parliament often deals with criticism for having a democratic deficit for many reasons. One of these reasons is that the Executive (the Council and the Commission) are not drawn from Parliament and are thus not accountable to it as they would be, for example, in the UK through a vote of no confidence. The two branches are completely separate, which can mean that with there is not an effective check. However Parliament is too weak to hold either executive to account meaning they can pass legislation without the consent of the Parliament, except when co-decision applies on matters pertaining to QMV in the Council of Ministers (for example, environmental policy is an 'EU competency'). This power has grown with each successive treaty since the SEA in 1986 which introduced QMV however key 'red lines' are the preserve of the Council of Minister which retains sovereignty through unanimity on key issues such as taxation when it stays intergovernmental in its nature. The Parliament can only dismiss the whole Commission rather than one member, as almost happened in 1999 (when they jumped before they were pushed) when only 4 out of 20 Commissioners were involved in the scandal, which means the commissioner's accountability is weak. Furthermore the E.P. does not have the same expertise as the Commission and scrutiny is relatively weak. It's only other power is to ratify the budget which it always does despite concerns by the ECA.
Another undemocratic point to make about the European Parliament is that despite being elected, most voters generally have a very low knowledge about the European Union and little interest in it. Election turnout for the Union as a whole has dropped to around 45%, hardly enough to claim full democratic legitimacy and turnout, unless compulsory such as in countries like Luxemburg, is lower than at general elections, especially in the UK. Whilst in 2004 turnout did increase in the UK (39%), this was probably more to it being 'Super Thursday' than any real desire to engage in European ...
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Another undemocratic point to make about the European Parliament is that despite being elected, most voters generally have a very low knowledge about the European Union and little interest in it. Election turnout for the Union as a whole has dropped to around 45%, hardly enough to claim full democratic legitimacy and turnout, unless compulsory such as in countries like Luxemburg, is lower than at general elections, especially in the UK. Whilst in 2004 turnout did increase in the UK (39%), this was probably more to it being 'Super Thursday' than any real desire to engage in European politics and the E.P.'s inability to ignite flames of passion within its citizens can be seen in the appalling turnout in the 10 new member states who had joined only weeks before the 2004 elections.
Furthermore being democratic is about representation for these delegates but at the Parliament there is a debate as to who the MEPs are actually representing. Most voters seem to take the opportunity to give the incumbent national government a 'good kicking' during European elections, as seen in the UK, Spain and France, rather than vote on a broad manifesto of ideas. This is fuelled further by MEPs campaigning on local issues rather than European ones. The MEPs are divided along political, nation and regional lines, making it very unclear who they are representing. They are also elected on the basis of their national allegiance, which in a European election seems unrepresentative of what they are becoming, a Member of the European Parliament. For example in May 2005 Labour MEPs voted against the whip of the UK Labour party by voting to end the UK's 'soft opt out' on the working time directive.
The unique position of the Parliament in being a representative body that has a very limited role in the legislative process is also an area whereby the democratic deficit can be seen to have effect: energies of pressure groups such as the CBI or NFU are more wisely spent if they target and lobby the Commission and the Council of Ministers than they are the Parliament. The disproportionate amount of money and expertise that different pressure groups have, and their knowledge of the workings of the EU far outweigh that of ordinary citizens and can be seen as a hindrance to democracy.
The Commission is a supranational body of civil servants which has been criticised for being undemocratic for many reasons. It is an unelected body, yet it contributes to policy and its actions have been described as 'steering the ship' i.e. it has major influence over policy decisions and the future direction of the EU project. It is also unaccountable to a weak Parliament, though this point can be debated due to the en mass resignation of the Santer commission amid accusations of financial irregularities. Because the process is lengthy and complicated individual corrupt or negligent Commissioners can be protected.It could however been seen as an example of the corrupt behaviour occurring in the European Commission and as it was only discovered of 3 years after the 1996 budget how much corruption may still be happening? Also it is questionable as to how much the Commission has reformed since 1999, the Court of Auditors are very unhappy and refuse to sign off 'the books' suggesting that perhaps there is still financial mismanagement occurring. The present Andreasen Affair shows that reforms have not gone far enough and that stronger checks need to be in place.
The Council of Ministers (which can be both supranational and intergovernmental depending upon voting methods and the issues concerned) is regarded as a more democratic institution of the EU as ministers are supposed to be accountable to their own Parliament but in some member states such as the UK there can be little control over the their ministers due to the electoral system (in the UK the FPTP system usually returns a strong majority despite voter preferences: in 2005 Labour formed a government with a majority of 67 despite winning 36% of the vote against the Tories 33% and having gained only 22% of the total adult vote).
The issue of secrecy and lack of transparency within the Council of Ministers, as with the Commission, is indispensable to the debate of the democratic deficit. The Council in effect is making the law and that being done in secret, with the public only being informed through the media of negotiations which have made between member states. For example the reform of the Public Sector market in the EU which involved France against all the other members, especially the UK who see market liberalisation as the key to a neo-liberal wider EU whilst France would rather retain its version of a social model deeper EU and keeps its markets protected for fear of further 'delocalisation'. (key word, idea that France and Germany is losing jobs to new member states cos they are cheap and is therefore an argument against further enlargement and liberalisation)
As with the European Parliament, the members of the Council of Ministers have no clear mandate, rather member have their own individual mandate. The use of Qualified Majority Voting in the Council entails weighted votes. Larger countries such as the UK, Germany and France all have a lot more votes over countries such as Luxembourg and most of the new members for example Estonia. Though Qualified Majority Voting may come with advantages to the smaller member states, such as forming alliances, it is not truly democratic. If members of the CoM were elected directly this could perhaps reduce the democratic deficit however where QMV applies national sovereignty is lost (according to Eurosceptics) or pooled (according to Europhiles) and so this remains an issue.
The European Court of Justice is perhaps the most respected of all the European institutions as it adheres to its main democratic issue which is that the legislature should be independent. The only qualm there may be with the Court is that the process is highly complex, which costs a lot of money and time, though this could be argued is the cost of democracy.
There are also many general concerns such as having too many EU bodies which are unelected and there is no elected head of state, who would give more democratic direction to the EU. The EU as a whole remains very unpopular which its citizens and the enforcement of human rights and some other legislation can vary from member state to member state. The C.T. would change much of this if accepted: an elected President of the Commision, a Foreign Minister, an elected Head of the European Council with a 2 1/2 year term, more use of QMV in the CoM and thus more power to the E.P.
The implications of these institutions which have problems with their democratic legitimacy have repercussions upon the EU. These repercussions emerge in many guises, whether corruption from the inside such as the financial scandal within the European Commission or a lack of interest from the citizens of the EU. Officials within the EU recognise that this is a problem which needs to be addressed and it must be realised that a path to finding a solution would be littered with potholes. The issue of the democratic deficit was first addressed by a former president of France, Valery Giscard d'Estaing. In 2002 there was a report which lasted 18 months upon the Constitutional Convention, from which sprung the Treaty. The European Constitutional Treaty looks improve the democratic situation in the institutions and in doing so the EU.
The Constitutional Treaty has proposed a new post of a President who will chair the council of ministers. He/she will serve a two and a 1/2 year term, the current President serves a 6 month term and is Prime Minister/president in their respective member states. This President will be elected by Qualified Majority Voting, which will increase democracy with an elected President. European Parliament has recently been gaining a lot of power and the Constitutional Treaty reiterates this. The issues that are being subjected to a Qualified Majority voting system in the Council of Ministers are to also give the European Parliament the powers of 'co-decision'. If the Parliament does not agree to a piece of legislation it will not be passed. It will aid the fight against a democratic deficit in underpinning democracy because the Parliament is the only institution where voters have a direct say, i.e. the members are elected to Europe. The Treaty aims to entrench rights for EU citizens which has been proposed in a charter for 'rights, freedoms and principles'. This will erase the problem of lack of human rights in Europe and the varying implementation of member states.
There have also been many ideas proposed, but not clearly set out such as in the Constitutional Treaty. D'Estaing's Convention in 2002 looked at the reform of Parliament, i.e. making it more representative, accountable and effective. This is a large issue but also a very important one because the European Parliament is the only directly elected institution. To make the Parliament more effective, the council of ministers could be made directly accountable to the Parliament. Also the Parliament could be given the power to appoint and dismiss individual commissioners. This would most certainly improve the relationship between the branches of EU government and make the institutions more accountable to Parliament and in doing so the EU public. The likelihood of this happening however is remote: the CoM members are drawn from their national governments and such governments are unlikely to want to be more accountable to other member states when it is their own electorate who put them into power. If the Democratic Deficit is not tackled future EU devolvement may be stifled as it could lack citizens' support and fuel the rise of European scepticism. With an increasingly powerful yet unaccountable Commission and future enlargements (Romania, Bulgaria 2007, then perhaps Turkey and Croatia in the future) on the horizon the solutions offered to these problems need to be put into action swiftly if the EU dream is not to crumble.