This proved to be very constraining to the remainder of society in political terms, despite having voting rights, the majority of the middle classes and peasantry were still controlled by the Oligarchy in how and who to vote for. This is where ‘the politics of the governors’ was most effective, the local bosses were given the power to use whatever measures necessary to make sure that the state governor received the votes of the middle classes and peasantry. In return for this the bosses were supported by the Oligarchy whose overall control of the state would prove beneficial for the bosses, this is a pattern that would continue right through to 1930. (Lamounier, 1999).
This narrow political and economical structure created by the land owning elites would eventually constrain their own ability to govern. Another factor that contributed to this and restricted the political domination of the land owning elites is that the global economy had experienced rapid economic growth, but, this would change when war broke out in Europe in 1914 and the economy would begin to slow down and make it difficult for export orientated economics to sustain the land owning elites much longer. ( accessed on 1st February 2005)
With the exclusion or control of the majority of the classes from political activity and the political domination of the elite classes, it would be hard to describe democracy in Argentina and Brazil as being liberal; the term restricted democracy would be more applicable at this time. Cammack identifies this from Barrington Moore’s model for economic development, by this, measures required for liberal democracy are not met and the examples that Cammack uses are that export orientated development (despite its success as an economic model) fails to create new social or political structures, there is no emergence of new middle classes, the state remained under the influence of the land owning elites, no moves were made to generate new industry in agriculture which would improve the welfare of the peasantry in Brazil and the urban working class in Argentina. (Cammack P, 1999)
The global economic downturn would result in the Wall Street Crash in 1929 and this would expose the fragile nature of export orientated economics in both countries and a period of economic and political instability would follow. The land-owning elites who had promoted export orientated economics in the previous five decades were now coming under pressure from the emerging ‘counter elites’ (middle classes). The impact of the Wall St Crash resulted in a wide ranging series of economic, political and social failures, there was a fall in demand for exports, financial gain from exchange revenues was greatly reduced, rising unemployment and falling government income would eventually cause the collapse of the Argentinean and Brazilian Governments in 1930. (Tamarin D, 1982).
It is important to stress at this point that with the land owning elites and oligarchy dominating the economic and political situation in Argentina and Brazil during this period, the remainder of society and the class structure was not allowed to develop or grow, this meant that democracy was being constrained by these conditions. With the introduction of Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) would lead to a growing middle and working class that should have allowed liberal democracy to develop with a class structure that was favourable to maintaining liberal democracy, but, this was not the case.
The economic depression following the Wall St Crash had a major impact on Argentina and Brazil and the idea of liberal democracy being a successful political system was being rapidly eroded, the export orientated economics used by both countries could not respond effectively to the economic crisis which had left them vulnerable to external factors.
Argentina and Brazil abandoned their Laissez-faire philosophy that had dominated politics before 1930 and the failure of export orientated economics after 1930 allowed both countries to introduce a new strategy of economic development called Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI). What this did was allow both countries to move away from the dependency of export economics and adopt a strategy of development that was ‘inward looking’; this means that their main focus was the creation of local industries that were destined for the domestic market. This came about because of the Wall St Crash which would restrict Argentina and Brazil’s ability to trade in foreign goods and capital as they had previously done under export orientated economics.
In both countries the ISI system was similar in how it functioned, a structure was created and made up of two distinctive sectors of manufacturing, these were export orientated agriculture and the domestic industrial sector. This type of economics required a balance to be achieved between these two sectors, export and foreign exchange was controlled by the international markets, while the cost of labour and imports determined the price of domestic goods. The aim of this in Argentina and Brazil was that the minimum exchange rate and minimum wage controls enabled them to create an internal and external balance. This strategy would be the pattern of economic development for almost half a century in both countries, but Brazil would manage theirs better and enjoy much greater growth than Argentina during this period. (. Accessed on 29th January 2005)
For ISI to be a successful development model there are three factors that were required, there needed to be a working coalition between the ‘urban working classes and industrial bourgeoisie’ (Blakeley, 2004), the state would have to get involved in the moving of resources from agriculture to industry and the land owning elites who had controlled the economical, political and societal situation in Argentina and Brazil would have to give up some of the privileges they had become used to.
The ISI development model would see the expansion of the middle and working classes, which in turn would build up the potential of civil society and raise their argument for political inclusion. But, in the case of Argentina and Brazil ISI would become an important tool in helping establish populist movements as an alternative to liberal democracy in Argentina and Brazil in the 1940s. (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, & Stephens, 2000, pp 155 – 222)
The next part of this discussion is going to examine populism in Brazil and Argentina under Getulio Vargas and Juan Peron respectively. Before proceeding though we need to ask what is populism? To define what populism is difficult because of its complex nature, no two populist regimes are identical and this is certainly the case for Vargas and Peron, who applied their own styles to the political, economical and societal situation in their respective countries. However, the definition used here is Gary Wynia that describes populism in general, he says that, ‘populism was very much an exercise in personal leadership, always leader centred and heavily dependent on a single person for cohesion. As a result, its strengths and weaknesses were often those of the person in charge’. (Wynia, 1999, p 221).
What can be said is that populism did not just appear overnight and in Argentina early forms of populism can be traced back to Radical populism, this emerged after the introduction of the 1912 Reform Act that allowed all adult males to vote. The main party was the Radical Civic Union (UCR) who won the 1916 general election, their leader Hipolito Yrigoyen was made president. Under Yrigoyen the UCR’s central theme was promoting a modern representative democracy, but their ideological foundations for this were weak and Radicalism was seen more as a ‘moral crusade’ that focused on releasing Argentine society from the ‘positivist materialism of the ruling elites’. (Tamarin D, 1982).
By 1930 the Argentine military initiated a takeover of the Yrigoyen government and the democratisation pursued by the Radicals was abandoned and replaced by Oligarchic rule that was imposed on the masses with high levels of ‘intimidation, repression and fraud. (Van Niekerk A E, 1974 , p 199). Between 1930 and 1943 this would be theme in Argentinean politics, the military was dominant throughout and political activity was conducted outside the institutional framework and political parties became almost non-functional. (Van Niekerk, 1974 pp 194 - 209).
In Brazil from 1925 there was a growing populist movement that had become disillusioned with the ruling land owning elites and the oligarchs who had managed to keep the masses out of politics. They achieved this through a number of ways that included, neglecting a large majority of the population including the large peasantry. Wealthy individuals became responsible for public service projects and land development and there was a growing division that favoured the wealthy elites whose standard of living rose while the lower classes declined. (Conniff, 1982, pp 67 -93).
These divisions caused growing unrest amongst the lower and working classes and reformists organised protests against the ruling elites. The populist movement at this time was led by Pedro Ernesto Baptista and the impact this had led to the lower and working classes being able to participate in voting and debates on issues that affected them. Populism and urban politics continued to grow under Baptista even after the Vargas military coup in 1930; however it would not be long before their political ideologies would clash. Pedro Ernesto promoted social policies that would improve the welfare of the lower classes, while Vargas was in favour of ‘social control and keeping the masses out of political participation’. This conflict of ideologies in 1936 brought about a confrontation which Vargas won easily with the backing of the military. The following year Vargas created a new authoritarian regime, the Estado Novo (New State). (Conniff, 1982).
The Estado Novo was loosely based on the fascist dictatorships that had been emerging in Europe, for the next seven years Brazil would be under the control of Vargas. Censorship and a strong secret police allowed Vargas to remain in power where the framework for liberal democracy was constrained even further, there was no congress, political parties to speak of and no elections during this period. Despite this Vargas adopted the type of politics used by Pedro Ernesto to initiate populist thinking after 1937, but, populism itself did not emerge fully until 1943. (Lamounier, 1999).
The type of politics that Peron and Vargas used were different, Peron stuck to one type of politics which involved the use of the urban working class and nationalism as the central plank for sustaining the economy, unlike Vargas who tried a number of different ways in which to apply his politics.
In Argentina in 1943 Peron was just beginning to lay the foundation for his type of populism following a military coup, the result of this was that for the first time Argentina could be described as being authoritarian. As Minister of Labour Peron used his position to organise support of the middle and working classes that would lead to his election as president in 1946. Once in power he used a state led corporatist approach involving state supported trade unions, these measures guaranteed that strict control could be applied on those who wanted to participate politically. (Cammack, 1999).
Peron was a nationalist who believed that the way forward for Argentinean society was through greater industrialisation and some social reforms, he achieved this by nationalising basic industries, such as the railroad and the banking system, he increased wages, and granted other worker benefits, including vacations and pensions. Peron was particularly skilled at changing the Argentine rules to fit his style of governing. In comparison to Vargas, Peron’s popular status was elevated much more than that of Vargas, this he achieved by challenging the oligarchic landowning elites at every opportunity. The class divisions that emerged before Peron was elected as president in 1946 were key in helping Peron to generate greater support after 1946, by highlighting the hostility between the classes Peron made the urban working classes believe that the Argentinean state was controlled by the oligarchy, this allowed the populism of Peron to grow much greater than that of Vargas, both internally and externally. (Wynia 1999).
Like Peron, Vargas in 1943 introduced a series of social and welfare reforms such as social security, minimum labour standards, even paid vacations and retirement for urban workers. He established the country's first Ministry of Labour and wrote the right to join a union into the constitution of 1934, through state led trade unions in 1943 the working classes were mobilised by Vargas.
In both countries they mobilised the middle and urban working classes which enabled them to use the economic development strategy of Import Substitute Industrialisation (ISI) to great effect, the idea behind this was to nurture popular support for themselves. In Brazil there was a large peasantry that did not feature in the populist coalition and the land owning elites maintained control of the peasantry as an electoral tool against the reforms imposed by Vargas. In Argentina there was no peasantry which made it easier for Peron to control and mobilise the urban working class who would provide him with a mass national support. (Cammack, 1999).
The important thing to understand how populism restricted liberal democracy is that the mobilisation of the middle and urban working classes was achieved under state control, political parties had never really provided a platform for liberal democracy to succeed throughout the century and up to this point in both countries political parties were weak. So the mobilisation of the masses was done so by populism, which at best can be described as a political movement.
The ISI model and populism was successful in mobilising the working classes in both countries, but populism would lose its appeal when economic decline resulted in the relationship between the urban working class and industrial bourgeoisie fell apart. Because of economic decline there was growing instability amongst the working class which meant that populism as a political solution did not work.
By 1950 Argentina was heading towards economic crisis that had been caused by a number of different internal and external factors, internally poor distribution of resources and harvest failure combined with the growing dependency on foreign investment to maintain industrialisation, would eventually have dramatic consequences for those who had aligned themselves to Peron since his election victory in 1946. Their allegiance to Peron would all but disappear during this period and by 1955 with the only mainstay of support coming from the working classes Peron was overthrown and exiled. (O’Donnell, 1978, pp 138 -171)
In Brazil under the leadership of Vargas the populist mandate created in 1943 would be short lived. With fascism overcome in Europe, Vargas was facing political unrest in Brazil, those who had supported Vargas were voicing their concerns at the growing foreign debt and escalating inflation. By October 1945 the military that had once supported Vargas intervened and relieved him of his leadership, unlike Peron who was exiled Vargas was allowed to return to his ranch in Rio Grande do Sul.
For the next twenty years there would be various attempts to consolidate democracy that would fail. In response to a deepening economic crisis Vargas was legally elected to the presidency, but his failure to reverse the crisis would see Vargas commit suicide in 1954. The populism started by Vargas would continue under Kubitschek between 1956 and 1961 who promised radical economic development through a program of modernization, these promises never really materialised and populism would decline further. In 1961 Janio Quadros was elected as president, but this was short-lived when his attempts to increase presidential powers failed and he resigned after just seven months. Quadros was followed into the presidency by his vice-president Joao Goulart whose powers were immediately restricted by congress, for two years Goulart tried to have his powers restored. (Gibson, 1989, 173 – 178)
Opposition to Goularts’ leadership came from two sectors, the military and the land owning elites which was not enough to initiate a takeover. This would change in March 1964 when Goulart presented his supporters with plans to introduce reforms that would increase his presidential powers and bring about radical reform to the economic and social structures in Brazil. To achieve this he looked for their support through protest marches and strike action that would force congress to meet his demands. By mobilizing popular support and proposing structural reforms had a two-fold effect that would prove very constraining for Goulart. (Gibson, 1989).
With Peron thrown out there would be two and half years of military rule in Argentina before presidential elections were held again in 1958. Despite being in exile and all Peronist parties being excluded from political activity, Peron was still able to influence the election outcome. The main opposition party to Peron was the Radical party, but, they had become split into two parties at this time, the UCRP under Ricardo Balbin and the UCRI under Arturo Frondzi would contest the election. Frondzi was elected with the backing of Peronist support that had been exchanged for the lifting of the ban on Peronist parties once Frondzi was in power. (Gibson, 1989, pp 173 – 178)
The military was still strong in Argentina and would become suspicious of Frondzi and his inability to govern, the military would impose further restriction on the regime. In response to this Frondzi tried to form a coalition with the UCRP in an attempt to prevent a military takeover, but this failed and military rule was restored in 1962.
The 1963 presidential elections resulted in the election of Arturo Illia (URCP) and like Frondzi before him, the military were suspicious of his intentions. Despite this Illia went further than any of his predecessors in trying to give liberal democracy a chance, he lifted restrictions on the press, allowed trade union activity, ‘respected the rights of the opposition parties and limited policy making to constitutional decision making channels’. (Gibson, 1989, p 176).
These liberalizing measures introduced by Illia could not prevent him coming under increasing pressure and the lifting of press restrictions would play a part in the downfall of Illia in 1966. The press criticised Illias’ ability to govern and questioned the efficiency of the democratic institutions, they did this whilst promoting potential military leaders to replace Illia. Support for a military takeover was strong and was even supported by some political leaders, ultimately the takeover was complete and Juan Carlos Ongania was made president by the military junta. (Gibson, 1989).
In Brazil the impact of Goularts’ proposals had the opposite impact to what Goulart wanted, economic leaders were threatened by the idea of structural reforms, in the past they had shown no alignment to Goulart or his opposition, but, these measures firmly set the economic leaders against Goularts regime. The middle classes were concerned at the deepening economic crisis and Goularts decision to mobilize popular support for his reforms, this caused a number of factions who were not committed either way to firmly oppose Goularts’ initiatives. The result of this was that previous support for Goularts government had shifted into a position of supporting a military takeover that would severely constrain democratic legitimacy in Brazil. The military takeover would be complete in 1964. (Gibson, 1989).
In similar circumstances to that of Argentina the Brazilian media had a part to play in the downfall of the Goulart government. In the 1891 constitution there was a mandate that allowed the Brazilian military to intervene at anytime if the civilian regime was not performing effectively, this constitutional legitimacy had allowed the military to dip in and out of politics, this they did at regular intervals in the past. This legitimacy gave the main newspapers the right to support a military takeover in response to Goularts attempts at constitutional reform.
These are some of the internal factors that lead to the breakdown of democratic regimes in Argentina (1966) and Brazil (1964). Consideration here will be given to some of the external factors that contributed to these breakdowns.
The Cuban Revolution in 1959 is seen as being pivotal in causing unrest amongst Latin American countries, Argentina and Brazil were no exception. When Fidel Castro removed the highly repressive Batista authoritarian regime, the United States had expected Castro to be compliant to their economic business interests, but Castro had other ideas, he initiated a program of social reform and internal economic regeneration, this included nationalizing US owned industries and seeking advice from the communist Soviet Union which culminated in a trade agreement between Cuba and the USSR in 1960. The further Castro pushed with his reforms the more agitated the US became and the relationship between the US and Cuba had almost disintegrated. (MaCall, 1984, pp 15 – 37)
In response to the defiance of Castro the Kennedy government launched an invasion against Cuba that would fail in 1961, this was followed by the USSR trying to set up missile sites in Cuba that would also fail following intervention by the US military. Castro had failed to inform the US that the revolution was from a socialist platform, the US believed Castro was a communist and the thought that Communism was just next door in Cuba made the US have a major rethink on their policy for Latin America. (McCall, 1984)
The effect that the Cuban revolution had in Brazil and Argentina was twofold, in political terms the left-wing elements in both countries, guerilla groups in Argentina and left wing activists such as, students and peasants were interested because a new ‘foco’ theory of revolution had emerged from the Cuban model. This meant the left wing elements could try and copy the revolutionary path taken by Cuba, but this was unlikely in Argentina and Brazil. There was a greater impact on the military in Argentina and Brazil and this was identified in three ways, first, revolutionaries were seen as being a ‘new’ internal enemy, second , the military were concerned that members of the armed forces might become infected by revolutionary ideas that could cause them to become rebellious and undermine military discipline, finally the civilian regimes in Argentina Frondzi and Illia, Brazil Goulart, were not in a position to counteract a revolutionary attempt. These three factors would leave the military feeling alienated and exposed to the threat of revolution.
The threat perception that this caused is best described by Cohen who states that threat perception is ‘an anticipation on the part of an observer, the decision maker, of impending harm – usually of military, strategic or economic kind – to the state’. ( quoted in Pion-Berlin, p 384). What this did in Argentina and Brazil was for the military to impose the restrictions discussed earlier on civilian regimes.
In response to this uneasiness in Latin America, President Kennedy introduced new measures which identified that social change needed to occur in Latin America, the Alliance for Progress was underpinned by a twenty billion dollar pledge from the United States that was aimed at alleviating the poor social conditions that McCall identifies as ‘a fertile breeding ground for communist insurrections’. (McCall, 1984, p 29). Despite its shortcomings the Alliance for Progress did have some success in containing communism in Latin America; this was achieved through the introduction of the National Security Doctrine (NSD) as being the central plank in controlling communism.
What is the NSD, Pion-Berlin describes it has being an ‘interrelated set of concepts about the state, development, counterinsurgency warfare, and above all security’ (Pion-Berlin, 1988, p 385). What this implies is that national security is put above all politics and those in charge of the state can apply the NSD over the rights of the people, these rights are violated and overlooked by what Pion-Berlin describes NSD as being authoritarian in nature. What is clear is that for the United States to continue with its interests in Argentina and Brazil between 1960s and 1980s, they were better dealing with the authoritarian military regimes that emerged during this period, rather that the weak and unstable civilian democratic regimes that had hampered the social, political and economical progress in the previous decades. As a result of this the control and repression used by the bureaucratic authoritarianism during this period would serious consequences for the military personal who carried this out.
In conclusion there is not one single factor that can explain why Liberal Democracy in Argentina and Brazil was fragile. In the first half of the century the single dominating factor that can be identified is that that land owning elites and oligarchy were never actually in power, but managed to sustain their wealth and land throughout this period, first through export orientated economics and then through ISI, both economic models created a class structure that was unfavorable to democratization and the elites failure to give up on some of the privileges severely constrained liberal democracy. There could be an argument for the idea that through mass mobilization liberal democracy could emerge, but the lack of political parties and democratic institutions allowed for the populism of Vargas and Peron to emerge. The growth of populism from the middle of the century until its demise in the 1960s and 1970s can be seen as offering hope to the masses that they mobilized, but this mobilization was done under state led union control, and not through a democratically elected party system. The failure of populism when economic growth declined in the late 1960s opened up the way for military authoritarianism with the support of the US through the Progress for Alliance and NSD to become a permanent feature in Brazil and Argentina for almost twenty years
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