But the new posture of Blair did not undermine the fact that Britain still saw their “special relationship” with the US to be the right approach, not only for Britain, but for the EU. To that end, Britain has consistently emphasized the importance of NATO in any discussion of EU CFSP and rejected France’s attempts to create totally independent EU military capabilities. By 2003, any feelings of solidarity between the French and the British surrounding the Saint Malo summit were all but gone when Blair stated, “Some want a so-called multi-polar world where you have different centres of power…others believe, and this is my notion, that we need one polar power which encompasses a strategic partnership between Europe and America.”
The difference between France’s “Euro-nationalist” approach to CFSP and Britain’s “Atlanticist” approach represents the fractured nature of the EU as a whole. When a truly contentious issue, like Iraq, arose in 2003, it polarized the EU. Few EU members took a non-committal position. They either lined up in support of Britain or France. The Iraq Crisis did not create this split, it simply was the most recent event to bring the split into focus.
Structural Challenges for CFSP
The development of the EU has been a very creative process. Over several decades the leaders and technocrats of the EU project found new ways to create institutionalized means for sharing power. In terms of the economic integration that has taken place, the European Union can be considered to be a unique supranational entity. However, member states have found surrendering sovereignty in the area of foreign policy and defense to be much more difficult. This is nowhere more apparent than in the Maastricht Treaty. The treaty establishes an EU institution for Common Foreign and Security Policy, through the annexation of EPC. However, this new CFSP is formed as a separate pillar, essentially removed from the supranational EU institutions. The CFSP pillar is intergovernmental. As such, it can be understood as encouraging, but not mandating, cooperation.
The net effect of CFSP’s intergovernmental nature is that at any given time the EU member states may or may not arrive at a common posture. The Iraq Crisis serves as a useful case study because the EU members did not reach an agreement. The fact that member states may or may not arrive at a common position within the CFSP makes it difficult for the EU to project itself into global politics as a single actor.
The most striking example of this is the United Nations Security Council. For historical reasons, both Britain and France are permanent members of the council and empowered with veto rights. Thus the EU has either no votes or two votes in the Security Council, depending on how you look at it. Though the EU by-and-large prefers to work through the UN in matters of war and peace, ironically, it does not exist at the UN as a legal personality. And thus the EU is left to work through a Security Council which invites Britain and France, the respective ringleaders of opposing views for CFSP, to behave as individual nations and not as representatives of the EU.
The EU has recognized the importance of projecting “one face”, but it still has many faces. In addition to each member state’s “face”, the EU has created several other faces that ineffectually attempt to speak for the oft-divided CFSP. This includes the current Council President, the Commission’s representative on external relations, and as of 1999, the Council’s High Representative for CSFP.
Europe’s experience is that solutions come slowly and through gradual steps of institutionalization. However, in the meantime, the rest of the world is confused by the EU’s economic unity (the EU speaks with “one voice” at the WTO), and its diplomatic disunity. Given the importance of foreign policy, and the speed at which discussions often need to happen, it is no wonder that Henry Kissinger’s question has become (in)famous – “When I want to talk to Europe, who do I call?”
Just as the outside world is confused by the EU’s many foreign policy identities, so too is Europe weighed down by its confusing system. Unlike the structures of a traditional nation, the EU contains many duplicate systems – foreign offices, ambassadors, heads of state – all of which attempt to play a role in decision making. This makes the process inevitably long and inefficient. From a tactical standpoint, members often duplicate important segments of a security policy such as military capabilities and intelligence networks.
It further complicates matters that the EU member states are members in other security organizations, such as the UN, NATO and the OSCE. When it comes to the military, member states also have totally separate armed forces, each with its unique set of capabilities, processes, traditions and skill sets. This is not to downplay the efforts of organizations like NATO, which over the years has proven its ability to effectively coordinate multi-national force deployments. But it is yet one additional complicating factor in a long list of challenges.
Resourcing CFSP
One final area challenging CFSP is the resourcing of CFSP activities. In terms of financing, the Maastricht Treaty established that CFSP financing would be determined by the Council on a case by case basis. This inefficient arrangement was replaced by the Amsterdam Treaty which specified that non-military CFSP matters were to be submitted to the Community budget and military costs divided amongst the members in proportion to their relative GDP. The challenge with this arrangement is that many joint actions which the CFSP might decide to implement will likely have civilian and military components, making the costs difficult to separate.
The resourcing of CFSP initiatives is also hampered by the official neutrality of some EU members (Ireland, Austria, Finland, and Sweden). Some members have very little in terms of military capability to offer. In addition, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced the concept of “constructive abstention” whereby a member could abstain from voting on a CFPS matter, and thereby allow the motion to pass, but reserve for itself the right to choose whether it applied the decision or contributed to the action in any form.
The Iraq Crisis
The purpose of the preceding section was to enumerate some of the areas in which CFSP is inherently challenging. These challenges and obstacles were present well before the Iraq Crisis of 2003 took place. We will now look at several challenges specific to the context surrounding the Iraq Crisis that added another layer of difficulty for the EU in attempting to craft any type of common stand towards the situation.
US Elections and the Bush Doctrine
The debate over Iraq’s WMD capabilities and its possible links to terrorist organizations began to heat up at the same time that the US was heading into mid-term elections (November 2002). Although the President himself was not facing a re-election, Democrats and Republicans were fighting for control of the House and Senate. The attacks of September 11, 2001 were still very fresh in the minds of the American public and the “war against terrorism” was a, if not the, major election issue.
In January 2002, President Bush gave his famous “Axis of Evil” speech, which “attracted much hostile comment from Europe…as did both the subsequent US national security strategy, claiming a general right of preventive war, and the continuing cascade of anti-multilateral rhetoric and action emanating from Washington.” In August 2002, Vice-President Dick Cheney gave a speech suggesting that Iraq was close to possessing nuclear weapons. He further asserted that any UN resolution was unlikely to have much effect, thus intimating that a pre-emptive strike was inevitable. Just prior to the November 2002 elections, both the House and the Senate overwhelmingly approved resolutions authorizing the use of force in Iraq. The world’s lone military superpower was thus marching towards war. The EU had little to no influence upon these developments, which were largely internal to the US and spurred on by what Americans considered the gravest attack upon the US since Pearl Harbor.
German Elections
At the same time, another domestic issue was fueling the politicization of the Iraq issue, this time in Germany. John Peterson recounts the situation as follows:
What made the 2003 Iraq crisis…so dramatically different was the position of Germany. To be fair to the Schröder government, the Bush administration effectively suspended all consultation with Germany on US policy towards Iraq in the latter half of 2002. The timing was inopportune as Schröder and his Social Democratic Party (SPD) were trailing badly in the German federal election campaign at the time of Cheney’s [August 2002] speech. Afterwards, Schröder stepped up his anti-war rhetoric, to the delight of both his own SPD and fervently anti-war and (often) anti-American east German voters, many of whom Schröder needed to pry away from the Party of Democratic Socialism (the reformed communist party) in order to win re-election…In a stunning reversal of post-war German policy, Schröder (via his campaign manager) ruled out German support for an attack on Iraq even if sanctioned by the UN.
This hard line was something new for Germany, and it incensed Washington, who then sought to further ostracize Schröder. As we will see, Schröder’s strong posture likely served to embolden the French to be even more outspoken than usual against the US. Ultimately, Germany would contribute modestly towards the war effort, and slowly move towards reconciliation with the US. But in the meantime, there was mutual distrust between the US and Germany at a level not known in the post-WWII era.
The Gaullist French
As we have already discussed, the French have generally followed in the footsteps of their hero, De Gaulle, in their distrust of America hegemony. This was certainly the case during the Iraq Crisis, and perhaps more so given that several other large nations (Germany, Russia, China) also took a stand against the US argument to invade Iraq. France’s President Chirac also had the benefit of a centre-right government, which had come to power in the June 2002 elections.
The support of Germany certainly emboldened France and President Chirac, “who seemed to revel in Schröder’s desperate need for allies.” Together, the two leaders “crafted uncompromising anti-war positions on Iraq and thus made the bitterest of clashes with the Bush administration, and much of the rest of the EU, inevitable.”
Unlike Germany, however, France is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. As a veto wielding member, France was able to leverage its opposition to war (along with Russia and China), to ensure that the US would not receive a UN mandate for invading Iraq. In March 2003, France announced that it would not support any UN resolution that sanctioned an attack upon Iraq.
By March 2003, France’s position was well entrenched as it had all along made clear that it was opposed to the US attempts to justify war. Earlier in 2003, as US Secretary of State Colin Powell (considered by many Europeans as the only “sane” person in the Bush administration) was still attempting a diplomatic resolution, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin announced to the media that France would oppose any further UN resolutions authorizing military action. As this comment was made without Powell’s knowledge, while Powell was having lunch with France’s UN Ambassador, it effectively angered and isolated Powell, thwarting his attempts at consultative agreement. From then on, it was clear that France would be intransigent and that the US would act unilaterally.
New Europe – Old Europe
Not all of Europe agreed with France’s position. Some leaders of Europe took the initiative to express their support of the US by signing what became known as the “Letter of Eight.” The letter was signed by five EU members (Britain, Spain, Denmark, Italy and Portugal) and three countries set to join the EU in 2004 (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic). This letter was followed by another letter supporting the US signed by the “Vilnius 10”, made up of EU candidate countries – Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
This split in opinion caused US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to make the distinction between “old Europe” and “new Europe”, with the former being the anti-war countries of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, and the latter being the letter-signing countries who supported the US.
French President Chirac was incensed by the political maneuvers of the letter-signers, and openly castigated them, saying that they had “missed a good opportunity to shut up.”
The Effect of the Iraq Crisis on CFSP
Earlier in this paper we saw that forging a “common” foreign policy among fifteen (let alone twenty-five) separate nations is inherently difficult. We then noted how the specific circumstances surrounding Iraq – brash rhetoric on both sides of the Atlantic, domestic elections, split allegiances – made CFSP nearly impossible in 2003. The question that remains concerns the fate of CFSP. Is it possible? And if so, how will it be achieved?
It can certainly be argued, based on the EU’s experience thus far, that CFSP is possible. The EU is a story about overcoming odds, developing new and creative solutions, and weathering many storms. It is likely that the Iraq Crisis will ultimately have served as a catalyst for renewed efforts at making CFSP work.
Some positive developments towards more effective CFSP took place in the immediate aftermath of the Iraq Crisis. At the height of tensions over Iraq, leaders of the EU held a summit which drafted a joint position on Iraq. While the statement contained little substance, it represented a desire to find common ground. A second development was the drafting of a European Security Strategy. “For once, the EU showed itself capable of agreeing on something like actual doctrine, as opposed to merely creating yet another institutional framework.” Although the strategy reiterated many of the mundane and oft-repeated views of previous CFSP statements, it also suggested that the EU become more “active and capable,” even giving approval of “preventive engagement” – perhaps not altogether different that the US doctrine of pre-emptive strikes.
Third, in 2003 the EU embarked on several historical military actions. On March 31, the EU took over the NATO-led peacekeeping mission in Macedonia, the first major EU joint military deployment of its kind. In June 2003 it launched its first joint military action outside of Europe, when it sent 1500 troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo to maintain a peace between the government and rebels. Anand Menon writes:
[European Security and Defense Policy] has thus become an operational reality. And it did so at the very moment when intra-European divisions seemed more profound and more bitter than ever. Yet at the same time, in the wake of the Iraq crisis, the member states were forced to confront head-on the various conflicts and tensions among them that had prior to 2003, threatened to undermine its effectiveness.
Fourth, the efforts of Britain, Germany and France to visit Iran and work toward a diplomatic solution in November 2003 showed that key EU players wanted to regroup and seek greater cooperation. Although this diplomatic effort took place outside the scope of official CFSP structures, it embodied the “spirit” of CFSP and was largely welcomed within the EU as a step in the right direction.
A fifth development can be seen in the Draft Constitution. Although the constitution would eventually fail to be ratified, it proposed several important changes to CFSP which represent a desire for greater cooperation. Of notable significance are the proposals to upgrade the High Representative of CFSP to that of EU Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the proposal to create a European External Action service to manage EU diplomatic affairs. The aim is to allow the EU to present the global community with “one face”.
Lastly, in June of 2004, a series of advances were put forward in the form of an agreement called “Headline Goal 2010”. This agreement is noteworthy for its conviction that Europe should “share in the responsibility for global security.” To this end it set up the European Defense Agency, to coordinate the development of military capabilities, armaments, research and technology. It also specifically called for the coordination of joint-lift capabilities, an area in which the EU was typically dependent on US military assets. Seen together, these developments suggest that the Iraq Crisis has not created a paralyzing cynicism about CFSP, but rather has encouraged further effort to find a common EU approach to security.
Conclusion
In the discussion of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy there is room enough for both optimists and pessimists. In many ways, the Iraq Crisis gave a significant nudge to efforts to take CFSP to the next level. Because CFSP issues are so sensitive, member states will naturally move slowly, and hesitate to give up sovereignty unless absolutely necessary. In that sense, the Iraq Crisis helped some new steps appear “necessary.”
But many challenges remain. Even if the EU creates the new position of Minister of Foreign Affairs, such a person will still not represent the EU solely. He or she will be “one face” representing many faces. CFSP will remain intergovernmental. Duplicate systems in both diplomatic and military capabilities will remain. France and Britain can still bring divergent views to the UN Security Council. EU military spending is likely to remain low.
However, it seems that one of the main difficulties with CFSP is that it is not fully comparable to the economic integration which many consider the success story of the EU. Unlike the creative ideas of Monet, Delores and other EU founding fathers, CFSP cannot be easily placed in a supranational sphere governed by technocrats. Thus, the previous method of step-by-step institutionalization may not be as effective in nudging members toward genuine CFSP.
One scholar has made the counter-argument to this claim, namely that more institutionalization is needed urgently. This is the case, he argues, because the current High Representative of CFSP, Javier Solana, uses a method that is highly personal “and relies little on structural or institutional underpinning.” This scholar goes on to suggest, “If Solana’s achievements are not underpinned by such institutionalization by the time he leaves the post, this will represent failure. It will not be easy, because it is not the way he likes to work.”
It is easy to understand the rationality behind this claim. The EU has built itself through incremental institutionalization. Nevertheless, is incremental institutionalization the path for CFSP? Not necessarily. Diplomacy is not economics. Peacemaking is not trade. Matters of global politics often arise instantly and require quick decisions. They are rarely technical matters alone. Furthermore, relationships can matter. It seems that Mr. Solana understands this, and has used his relational gifts to help CFSP move forward. We might conclude, then, that the EU will need yet another “creative solution” in order to bring about meaningful CFSP. The solutions of the 1950’s, or even the 1990’s may prove inadequate to the task.
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