‘By the end of the summer of 1976, the British economy had become so weakened due to the European labelled ‘British Disease’ that the Labour Government had to seek a loan from the International Monetary Fund. This was accompanied by harsh conditions which included deep cuts in public spending. By August 1977, unemployment levels had surpassed 1,600,000. Labour unrest reached a peak in the 'Winter of Discontent' in 1978/9 when a number of major trade unions went on strike’ (BBC news report). The labour party was ousted from Government and as leader of the Conservative Party; Margaret Thatcher won the general election in 1979.
As illustrated trade unions were facing an adverse economic climate throughout Britain from the mid-1970s, as unemployment climbed to higher levels after each recession. Carruth and Disney (1988) argue that deviations in union membership are determined by such economic factors as wage and price inflation, together giving the change in real wages and by unemployment. They suggest that in the short run, changes in membership are positively related to changes in employment and price inflation, and negatively related to wage inflation and unemployment. However there is an apparent contradiction to this argument. Continuing from Carruth and Disney, Hunter argues that ‘the general expectation is of strike frequency falling in recession and rising in boom periods’ (Dickens YEAR) ‘as the unions relative bargaining power is weakened or enhanced by economic conditions’ (Salamon YEAR Pg 431). Workers become less certain about their position in employment. They can be easily replaced from the pool of unemployed workers and so do not have the confidence to challenge their employers. Edwards on the other hand points that ‘workers may have more reason to strike in a recession than in a boom if they have to defend themselves against an employer’s attack, and, in a boom, employers may be willing to grant workers demands without a strike’ (Lewis 1981 pg.316). With regards the UK the evidence put forward by Salamon shows that ‘during periods of economic boom, although strike frequency may increase, most strikes are of short duration. Equally, although strike frequency may reduce during periods of recession, any strike may be more severe (or of longer duration)’ (Salamon YEAR), illustrating that the general trend in Britain supports Carruth and Disney’s argument.
In the business cycle unemployment, is seen as a major constraint on union growth and bargaining power. The long-term unemployed usually leave their union as unemployment raises the costs and lowers the benefits of union membership. Increasing levels of unemployment generally cause strike activity to deteriorate.
If the economy has rising real wages this will similarly lead to a decline in strike activity. As wages are increased the standard of living for workers improves. However if there is a dip in real wages strikes occur more often as employees try to improve their standard of living. ‘The 1980s have in general been a period of rapid real growth in real wages, averaging 2.5 per cent annually and consistent with considerably lower steady-state density’ (Disney & Carruth YEAR Pg).
Carruth and Disney strongly argue that ‘several aspects may affect union density, but it is macroeconomic factors that explain its sharp upturn in the 1970s and the downturn in the 1980s’ making macroeconomics responsible for over 90% of decline in union density.
This argument appears to be valid at least up until the mid 1980s but theorists such as Blyton and Turnbull maintain that the general economic environment is more important as a ‘background’ variable. The influences of economic factors are rarely straightforward and may not have the same effect across all industries. As illustrated by Blyton and Turnbull who claim ‘it is evident that while the same macroeconomic conditions prevail across the economy, some industries experience an increase in strike activity while others display a decline’ (Blyton & Turnbull YEAR Pg ?)
The complex nature of macroeconomics is further illustrated by the ‘recent decline in unemployment; the downturn in unemployment should cause a resurgence in membership and density, and no such upturn has been observed as yet’ (Carruth & Disney YEAR Pg?). This evidence goes against the economic model which states that as unemployment levels decline an upsurge in membership should be witnessed. Lastly this argument fails to account for individual actors behaviour in truth some people do join unions when unemployed, and some trade unions have grown in the supposed decline periods.
COMPOSITIONAL
The UK deregulated product markets and privatised nationalised industries earlier and to a greater extent than any other European country. This Privatisation of traditionally nationalised industries was a major part of the UK reforms and reduced the publicly owned proportion of GDP from 12% in 1979 to 2% two decades later (Internet source). In addition factors such as productivity increases in manufacturing, technological change and, to some extent, globalisation placed pressure on the developed UK economy to shift towards service-based employment. As a result Britain underwent a dramatic manufacturing shake-out in the 1980s and 1990s and is now one of the most service-based economies in the world. The significant shift away from employment in manufacturing towards private service sectors resulted in continuous annual membership decline between 1979 and 1998. Trade unions are less well represented in private sector services and other areas of employment growth. In the public sector 3-employees-in-5 are union members while the corresponding figure for the private sector is less than 1-in-5. If it was not for the relatively high membership in the privatised transport, communications and utilities, private sector density would be even lower at just 16%. ‘Unions then, it is argued, have traditionally been strongest in the staple manufacturing industries that have declined most, whereas new firms tend to be located in non-manufacturing and to have a higher proportion of female and part-time workers — groups that, it is argued, generally have a lower propensity to unionize’(Disney & dfdfdf YEAR,PAGE ). The increasing feminisation of the labour force is also undesirable as female employment is segregated in the labour market and concentrated in areas where unions find it hard to reach. Each of these structural factors, the shift away from areas of high union representation, the increase in female and part time employment and an increase in the proportion of the workforce employed by small companies, tend to be associated with lower levels of unionisation and therefore lower levels of strike activity as it is hard to separate factors that solely influence strike activity and not the industrial relations as a whole. Several strike-prone industries lost jobs, with the result that there were fewer workers to influence strike activity levels. A good example of this is the coal industry. ‘Between 1969 and the end of the miners’ strike in 1985, strikes in coalmining accounted for over 80 per cent of the total number of strikes. The sharp decline in mining employment thereafter meant that there were fewer strikes in mining, thus contributing to the overall decline’ (Waddington & SOMEONE YEAR PAGE).
Most popular commentaries on trade union trends in the 1980s have assumed that the changing structure of employment has been the major cause of decline, accounting for between 25 and 30 per cent of the decline in unionisation during the 1980s. Waddington and Whitston however, argue that ‘workers in private sector services join unions for similar reasons as to those in manufacturing and the public sector’ (Waddington & Whitston 1997), suggesting that the shift in composition of employment is not the only issue. Factors such as employer resistance and the absence of unions at workplaces are also influential. This is illustrated below in the data presented by Sully. ‘Employers in private sector services have been resistant to unionisation for many years. Where management is pro-union over 60 per cent of workers are unionised, but where management opposes unionisation the level falls to 7 per cent’ (Waddington YEAR PAGE ) And ‘so it seems that employer resistance has prevented unions from securing a presence at many workplaces’ (Waddington YEAR PAGE)
Further counter-arguments against compositional effects determining density in the 1980s are very persuasive. Public-sector employment, where density levels are high, began to decline during the strike prone years of the late 1970s. Much of the decline in employment in union-dominated manufacturing industry, such as steel-based products, therefore occurred before the decline in unionisation, ‘whereas the precipitate falls in employment in the early 1980s occurred in industries such as textiles, clothing and footwear, where, if anything, unions were rather weak’ (Disney & someone YEAR PAGE).
‘A shift-share analysis of disaggregated industrial composition of employment and union membership between 1980-6 carried out by Freeman and Pelletier (1990) confirms that industry composition has had no significant effect on union density in the 1980s’ (Disney & Someone YEAR DATE). ‘The increased share of employment among historically weakly unionised female, white-collar workers or among part-time workers are of insufficient magnitude to explain more than a slight proportion of the 1980s drop in density’ (Freemen and Pelletier 1990 Pg144). ‘The shift from manual to non-manual labour appears to be associated with a larger drop in union density. According to The New Earnings Survey, the non-manual share of employment grew by 47 per cent of all employees in 1979 to 55 per cent in 1987’ (Freemen and Pelletier 1990 Pg 144). However these authors argue that such an analysis explains at most 0.4 percentage points of the 8.6 percentage point drop in density between 1980 and 1986 (Freeman and Pelletier 1990). Furthermore, they argue, that compositional effects offer a description rather than an "explanation' of changes in membership, leaving the question of why some workers are able and willing to unionise while others are not, unresolved.
In contrast Freeman and Pelletier's preferred explanation of the decline in density in the 1980s in the UK is the 'Thatcher government's labour laws' (1990)
Prior to the Winter of Discontent the close relations between the Labour party and Unions had always been an asset to the British government, enabling them to deal with unions effectively. In the late 1970s however this relationship became a liability as the number of strikes by public sector workers peaked in that decade. Following this the labour party was ousted from Government in the same year and as leader of the Conservative Party; Margaret Thatcher won the general election and thus began over a decade of radical change in Britain.
‘Institutions of the post-war consensus were dismantled by the successive conservative governments, which implemented economic and political policies that forced unions on to the defensive, often against redundancy, attacks on trade union organisation or erosion of real income. No fewer than nine separate pieces of legislation were enacted in the UK to curtail union organisation and activity’ (Waddington Year Page). Developing workplaces were gradually trying to exclude trade unionism as employers exploited the opportunities the Conservative Government had provided. The impact of these policies was damaging to trade unions, which unlike unions in other Western European countries, were not legally supported.
The three principal objectives of the Conservative Government according to Waddington (YEAR) were the exclusion of unions from any role in national policy making, to regulate union decision-making and electoral procedures and to encourage management to assume greater control within the workplace. Secondary industrial action was one of the first areas to be tackled by the Conservative party. ‘The intention was to stop industrial action spreading to organisations which had no connection with or influence over the primary dispute’ (Salamon YEAR Pg 440). The 1980 Employment Act limited lawful secondary action to employers buying from or selling to primary employers and restricted the aggressive picketing which accompanied it. This act was amended in 1982 by Norman Tebbit. The 1982 Employment Act drastically reduced Trade Union immunity from legal action, employers were able to obtain injunctions against unions and instigate legal proceedings for damages.
‘The Trade Union Act 1984 removed immunity from industrial action which was not supported by a ballot. This has been further amended by the Employment Act 1990 and the Trade Union reform and Employment Rights Act 1993’ (Salamon YEAR Pg.442).
The legislation brought in after the election of the Conservative Government in 1979 can summarised as achieving the following; ‘the definition of strikes which unions can call without penalty has been narrowed, secret postal ballots are needed in all cases. Strikes and limited picketing must be confined to the employer with whom the union is in dispute. Employers and trade union members can go to the courts and get injunctions if these conditions are not met. If union members choose not strike, despite a majority vote in favour, they cannot be punished by the union. No secondary action is legal’ (Kessler and Bayliss 1998 Pg 252). McCarthy summed up these proceedings by saying that ‘while the British workers freedom to strike has not been extinguished or fatally damaged, it can be deployed only in a more structured way and at greater risk’ (McCarthy 1992 Pg.71). This suggests that legislation shaped the way workers were allowed to strike but didn’t directly affect strike activity.
‘It is evident that the legislation very much followed the Conservative ideology of individualism, legislating for the individual and stripping collectives of their powers’ (source). This is evidenced by the ‘number of working days lost in 1978, standing at 9405000 but in 1995 that number was just 415000’ (SOURCE). ‘Secondary action, which was expressly targeted by legal restrictions, almost disappeared by the end of the 1980s and in a number of disputes the law was used to great effects’ (Blyton and Turnbull YEAR Pg.338). A good example of legislative effects on strike activity is given by Blyton and Turnbull in the form of the 1989 ambulance workers’ disputes. ‘Employers sought, and obtained, injunctions prohibiting action in five separate regional health authorities’ (Blyton and Turnbull YEAR Pg 338). ‘In other cases, union representatives called off strike action after employers threatened to use the law, and union members have, in some cases, been unwilling to strike through fear of entanglement with the law’ (Blyton and Turnbull YEAR Pg338). The strike threat, a fundamental source of union power, was therefore weakened by a succession of laws which permitted a union to be prosecuted, introduced ballots prior to a strike, and outlawed both secondary and unofficial action. This legislation both raised the cost of organising and reduced the costs employers faced in opposing unions (Metcalf 2004). Contrary to this evidence other researchers have argued that ‘the law may have acted to increase worker solidarity in the event of a strike, given that action will have been approved by a majority of the workforce in a democratic way’ (Blyton and Turnbull YEAR Pg 338), therefore strengthening collectivism.
It is argued that balloting has been one of the most influential changes in the legislation post-1980. Waddington suggests that ‘The requirement of pre-strike ballots has changed the phase of the negotiation process that precedes the calling of a strike. The period within which employers can improve their offer to forestall a strike is now more clearly defined’ (YEAR). This argument deploys that ballots may resolve industrial action which may otherwise result in a strike. Employers find the alternative of meeting unions’ demands more appealing, therefore the threat of action on behalf of unions is sufficient. This piece of legislation then has directly impacted on curbing strike action and has been largely successful throughout the twenty year period. Union power and militancy, won't always translate into increased strike activity, since strikes are no more than a weapon to achieve union objectives. Unions may be able to improve wages and conditions more by the threat of strikes than the reality of carrying out that threat making balloting advantageous to unions as well as industry.
Certain factors undermine the legislation explanation however; Disney’s argument states that ‘the decline in union density preceded the initial legislation. The decline in density may thus have facilitated then enactment of legislation, not vice versa’ (WADDINGTON Pg 221). Secondly Disney states that there is some debate as to whether ‘the legislation uniformly had the intended effect of weakening union power’ (Disney 1990 Pg 171). This is further amended by Waddington who adds ‘the effects of legislation enacted during the 1980s are contradictory and closely related to other developments’ (Waddington YEAR), illustrating his point using the examples of the closed shop. Freeman and Pelletier claim that legislation on closed shop had a marked effect on membership decline. In truth however ‘almost all of the steep decline was due to compositional and structural effects, rather than legislative reform’ according to Millward and Stevens (1986).
The legal explanation however should not be dismissed. Freeman and Pelletier’s index of the favourableness of labour laws to unionism found a ‘marked change favourable to unionism in the 1970s, followed by a sharp decline in the 1980s’ (Freeman and Pelletier 1990 Pg 150). Disney goes on to claim that ‘this index is the major reason for the fall in density in the 1980s’ (Disney 1990). He adds that ‘unlike compositional effects, this explanation in terms of labour legislation has the merit of explaining the upturn in density in the 1970s as well as the downturn in the 1980s’ (Disney 1990 pg 170).
There are many factors involved in the decline of strike activity. Due to the limited word count several of these alternative factors will be summarised here. The initial argument is based on social attitudes.
‘The propensity to strike will be effected by the attitude of society towards the use of industrial action’ (Salamon 2000 Pg 435). This attitude can be summarised by Frayns’ quote ‘public opinion… unquestioningly concedes the right of men in a free society to withdraw their labour. It just draws the line at strikes’ (Salamon 2000). Current attitudes towards strikes are feelings of hostility, in an argument deployed by Hyman hostility is based on three assumptions; ‘First, industrial conflict is outdated, unnecessary and irrational. Second, that strikes result directly in severe economic disruption. Third, that they are evidence of excessive trade union power’ (Hyman 1989). These attitudes have altered from, for example the 1984/5 miners strike in which half of Britain's 187,000 miners’s downed tools and collectively stood against the Government, to modern day attitudes illustrated in the quote above shown by the example of the fire fighters strike in 2003 where the British public turned against the workers after bad media publicity. The mentality of people today is not to strike but to deal with qualms at work using union tribunals or individually with the employer thus eradicating the need for strike action.
