The role of the EU on the Cyprus issue

The Cyprus problem has occupied an important place throughout the evolution of relations between Turkey and the European Union. The link between Cyprus and the accession of Turkey to the EU has become especially pronounced since Cyprus and Turkey both became candidates for EU membership. Since then, all developments indicate that the EU’s detached involvement in the Cyprus problem has been replaced by gradual activism. Because of the change in the European orientation of both countries, even the United Nations (UN) came to the conclusion that Cyprus’ EU membership should be considered as a new context in which a settlement of the Cyprus problem could be pursued more effectively. The recent failed attempt of the UN plan for the reunification of the island in the light of its accession into the EU the previous May is confirmatory to this point of view.

Although as a result of the European Council’s 1999 Helsinki decisions the resolution of the Cyprus problem is not a precondition to the accession of the Republic of Cyprus or Turkey to the EU, Turkey was nevertheless expected to play an active role in bringing about a settlement in Cyprus, as all parties concerned perceive it as playing a key role in achieving the resolution of this long standing and problematic situation. Since then, a lot of things have changed, among them the perception that Turkey was the key actor for a resolution of the problem. The recent failure of the UN sponsored “Annan Plan” for the reunification of the island and the Greek-Cypriot responsibility for this failure, has totally changed the climate and the assumptions that one can make, regarding the end of this long standing conflict.

 Aim of this short article is to illustrate: Firstly, The significant change of foreign policies of EU and sequent of Turkey on the Cyprus problem after the 1999 Helsinki summit, and secondly the possible implications of the recent developments of the Cyprus problem and Greek-Cypriot membership, in future EU policy on the issue. Our main argument is that EU over the last years has taken a completely new and more active role, something that does not remind at all, the way it used to treat such issues in the past. This dual foreign policy transformation (on behalf of EU and Turkey) gains a great significance in the light of the recent unpredictable developments and the failure of the reunification of the island whereas Turkey fully supported the idea of a federal Cypriot democracy.

 The 1974 invasion led to the exclusion of 200,000 Greek-Cypriots from their homes, and the division of the island into two autonomous administrations. Since then, Turkey has maintained 36,000 troops on the island. The Greek-Cypriot and international community regard the troops as occupation troops. Since the Turkish invasion, Cyprus has become one of the most problematic elements of Greek-Turkish relations and the reason for international criticism to Turkey. In 1983, the northern (Turkish-Cypriot) part of the island declared itself an independent state-the TRNC-with Rauf Denctash as its President. The TRNC is recognized only by Turkey-which on the other hand does not recognize the Greek-Cypriot state-and is economically dependant upon Ankara, which heavily subsidizes its economy. Since then and until very recently, the Turkish stance over the issue has remained unchanged: for Turkey the problem had been resolved in 1974.  

The Cyprus problem has always been of international concern since it was creating a very dangerous and heavily militarized environment in a highly risky geographical location; it was also a potential source of clash between two important allies of NATO (Greece and Turkey), that USA and other European powers didn’t want to see in war - something like that would jeopardize the very existence of the organization and would destroy the security of the whole region.  

The Cyprus problem emerged as a European problem with the entrance of Greece in the Union in 1981. Of course, since then the Greek Government and Greek MEPs have consistently raised the issue of Cyprus at various levels in the EU. Until 1988, however these attempts remained essentially ineffective in terms of either influencing the EU’s stance on Cyprus or blocking the normalization of EU-Turkey relations. It was not until the Republic of Cyprus applied for membership to the EU in 1990, that the problem of Cyprus became an initial European problem. The fact that until the invasion of 1974, Cyprus was progressively becoming an independent state, far away from the idea of enosis, and the strong European orientation of the Greek-Cypriot part that forced the EU to gradually increase its involvement in the Cyprus problem. When the Republic of Cyprus applied for membership, Turkish leaders were alarmed. Turkey insisted that the Cypriot application should be unacceptable to the EU.  Turkey had hoped that accession negotiations with Cyprus would not be launched before the resolution of the Cyprus conflict. Ankara has stated repeatedly that it neither wants the Union to become involved in the Cyprus question, nor does it approve of the EU having an active role in the negotiations for settlement in Cyprus. As Greece is a member of the EU, Turkey was convinced the Union couldn’t be impartial. When the European Council Luxembourg Summit declared that the EU would start accession negotiations with Cyprus and excluded Turkey from the list of candidates, the TRNC President Rauf Denctas and Mesut Yilmaz, the Turkish Prime Minister at the time, firmly indicated that this decision left them a single option: integration. The TRNC followed Turkey’s path of breaking off all contacts with the EU. The European strategy to make a direct link of Euro-Turkish relations with the problem of Cyprus resulted in a very negative Turkish reaction, indicating that it was resulting in the opposite directions that it had been supposed to lead into.

 The Turkish stand moved further away from the idea that the solution of the Cyprus problem should be through the formation of a federation, a solution that after 1997 the EU has encouraged even more. Prior to the Helsinki summit, the EU strategy had been to pressure Turkey by highlighting that Turkey-EU relation could be improved if, among other things, Turkey contributed to the resolution of the Cyprus question that would reunify the island and lead to the accession of a federal Cyprus to the EU.

The failure of the European Union to emerge as an anchor to Turkey’s foreign policy on the Cyprus issue, and the opposite results that this tactic brought, led to a change of policy on behalf of the EU. One of the reasons that the EU announced official candidateship to Turkey in 1999 in Helsinki was due to the expectation that Turkey’s accession process would also contribute to the resolution of the Cyprus problem. Yet, Turkish politicians still tended to separate the Cyprus problem from the issue of Turkey’s EU membership. When it also became clear that the resolution of the problem is not a precondition for entrance of the island into the EU in 2004, Turkish politicians realized that even if they don’t have to be receptive to the reunification of the island in order for the EU to accept them, Greek-Cypriot membership will become a major obstacle in the Turkish vision for their own accession.

The progressive change of Turkish foreign policy on the Cypriot issue came to a significant turning point following the 2002 Turkish elections. The new government realized that the benefits of a solution to the problem are higher than the “security” and strategic importance of the maintenance of the status quo on the island.

The EU, until very recently, was seeing Turkey as the main cause for the persistence of the Cyprus conflict. This nonetheless, after the remarkable developments of the last five months, seems to have changed. After the UN sponsored “Annan Plan” for the reunification of the divided island, the referendum held in both parts of the island and the rejection of the plan from the Greek-Cypriot side, the European leadership is reconsidering its assumptions of what is the role of each actor on the issue, and how should drew its future strategy on the issue in order to achieve the resolution of the conflict.        

 During the negotiation period of the “Annan Plan”, the EU Commission has strengthened the element of conditionality, with a failure to get a solution viewed as a serious obstacle for a favorable decision over Turkey. However, the outlook is now complicated after the results of the referenda, the (YES) of the Turkish-Cypriot community and the (NO) of the Greek-Cypriots. This mixed (YES-NO) result of the referenda seems to incline towards the following position on behalf of the EU:

Firstly, all 25 member-states do not want to penalize Turkey (particularly Greece and Cyprus after the end of the referendum hurry to enunciate that the failure to reach acceptance of the plan for reunification, will not become an obstacle for the Turkish membership).

The other significant sign indicative of European intentions (at least EU23 or EU24) is the currently made recommendations of how the EU can be helpful to Northern Cyprus, which in practice means finding some way of lifting the trade embargo and putting that part of the island out of international isolation. Such a development would be a reward to Prime Ministers Talat of northern Cyprus and Erdogan of Turkey because they succeeded in out-maneuvering President Denktas who had also recommended a NO vote. In so doing, most European leaders will also help to start a process of political re-assessment by Greek-Cypriots over what they have just done by rejecting the Annan plan.

The change of perceptions of the Europeans over what is currently the obstacle for the reunification of the island and the remit of Turkey out of this role will have a significant influence on the future of Euro-Turkish relations. EU is highly interested in keeping Turkey positive over its effort to solve the Cyprus problem that since the 1st of May has become its own problem too. While considering the efforts of Turkey for resolution, the EU will most probably make clear to Turkey that it cannot be expected to become an EU member as long as it does not keep on promoting a solution.

Nonetheless, the developments in the Cyprus issue and its implications for the future EU stance should not be examined in the short-term perspective, in light of the rejection of the Annan plan and the prospect of a Turkish accession date only. What is crucial in the broader view is the need for a solution, which will prove effective in its implementation and the aftermath of its acceptance. The fact that the Cyprus problem remains unsolved is an important threat for European regional stability and the project of a stable Europe with a new international role under the framework of the European Union. The positive responses of the Turkish leadership in the recent attempt for the resolution of the problem, is indicative of a progressive Euro-Turkish relationship. Nevertheless, the division of Cyprus remains a reality. The effectiveness of future EU plan is heavily dependent on the future stance of Turkish foreign policy, which under no circumstances can be regarded as stable and predictable. The significant power of the Army-which currently resisted the “Annan plan”- and the unknown foreign policy position of a future Turkish government, doesn’t leave space for reassurance. Thus, one can be optimistic but under no circumstances convinced about the future of the “Cypriot Issue”, the effectiveness and the reactions of key actors- Greece and most importantly Turkey-of the European stance on the issue.

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