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would decide all matters of policy for the duration of the strike. The formation of this committee, while seemingly a prudent measure, did, in actuality, contribute significantly to tensions within the city and would be a primary factor in the failure of the strike as public opinion began to turn against the strikers when many came to view this committee as the de facto government of Winnipeg.
When resorting to strike action in order to achieve their goals unions, typically, attempt, as much as is possible, to avoid direct confrontation with the public as they see this as detrimental to their cause. During a general strike, however, the goal is not only to inconvenience employers but, also, the general public in the hope that this will lead to calls for a resolution on the striker’s terms. While this sort of public outcry was, undoubtedly, the goal of the Winnipeg strike leaders they were, nevertheless, unwilling to permit a complete breakdown of society and this, perhaps more than anything else, led to the failure of the general strike. While it is certain that the strike committee wished to prevent a complete breakdown of society so that public opinion would not turn against their cause this approach seriously undermined the effectiveness of the strike. Had the strike committee taken a more radical approach, as some within their ranks advocated, it is conceivable that they would have been successful in achieving their goals provided, of course, that they managed to win the public relations battle by convincing the general public that their fight would result in advancements for all members of society. In the end the strike committee chose a more conservative approach and this, combined with their loss in the public relations battle, made their defeat inevitable.
6
As the strike became a foregone conclusion employers and government wasted little time responding to labour’s challenge and proceeded to establish the Citizens’ Committee of 1000. This organization was comprised of the city’s most influential manufacturers, bankers and politicians and, rather than giving the strikers demands any serious consideration, the Citizens’ Committee, with the support of Winnipeg’s leading newspapers, declared the strike to be a revolutionary conspiracy organized and led by a small group of foreigners directed from Moscow. The Citizens' Committee ignored the strikers' basic demands for improved wages and union recognition, concentrating instead on a campaign to discredit the labour movement. John Dafoe, the influential editor of the Manitoba Free Press, advised that the best way of undermining the movement was to ". . . clean the aliens out of this community and ship them back to their happy homes in Europe which vomited them forth a decade ago.". The Citizens' Committee regarded themselves as neutral in the initial disputes between the building and metal trades unions and their employers but felt that a general strike could paralyze the city and they, therefore, demanded that all three levels of government act decisively against the strikers and, in particular, against those public employees who had gone out in sympathy with the metal and trade workers. The first priority of the Citizen’s Committee was the replacement of those members of the Winnipeg police force who were refusing to pledge themselves not to strike. When the majority of the city's 200 police were dismissed on
June 9, the Committee financed the enlistment of 1800 special constables. Most of these
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men were drawn from the Anglo-Saxon middle-class regions of the city.
When the strike began at 11:00A.M. on 15 May approximately 30,000 union and non-union workers walked off the job in an astounding show of support for the building and metal trades unions. This demonstration of solidarity was so unexpected that a group of strike leaders, who had gone to a favourite restaurant for lunch, were surprised (although it must be assumed that their surprise was a pleasant one) to find the establishment closed. Despite the widespread nature of the strike the city, at first, seemed to take events so much in stride that the Free Press, in its last issue before the onset of the strike, declared “Winnipeg passed through the first day of the general strike without disorder, and without that tie-up of everything that some feared . . .”
When milk was not delivered the next morning, however, the attitude displayed by the press towards the strike changed dramatically not only in Winnipeg but across Canada. The failure of the strike committee to provide for the delivery of this necessity not only prevented the general public, as well as strikers and their families from receiving milk deliveries, but, also, resulted in charges that the strike committee was attempting to further its cause by starving infants and invalids. While these charges were certainly untrue they still represented a public relations defeat for the strikers and, undoubtedly, led to the decision by the strike committee, reached during a meeting held at City Hall on 16
May, to avoid a complete breakdown of society by restoring some essential services.
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This decision, taken as much for positive publicity as for humanitarian reasons, sounded the death knell for the striker’s cause as the restoration of these services could serve only to reduce the severity and, thus, the effectiveness of the strike. Milk was delivered to hospitals immediately and normal milk delivery was resumed on 18 May.
It was also decided, at the meeting of 16 May, that bread delivery, which had been
suspended in the same manner as milk delivery when the strike began, would also be
resumed on 18 May. This decision undermined, in exactly the same manner as the decision to restore milk delivery, the position of the strikers and, thus, further weakened the effectiveness of their job action. When these two decisions are taken together, however, it becomes apparent that, regardless of the strike committee’s motives or the events which would transpire over the coming weeks, the strike was doomed at this early stage due to the minimization of its impact on the general public. Had the strike committee held fast it is possible that the strike might have been successful. In addition, if they had been able to adequately explain to the general public that, although these services would be provided in emergencies, they could not be fully restored until their demands for better wages and the right of collective bargaining had been met, it is conceivable, in light of the class divisions which existed in the city, that the strikers might have persuaded the public to endure the hardship for the common good.
Milk and bread deliveries were not the only essential services which were withheld at the onset of the strike as restaurants were closed, oil and gasoline were not
delivered, the postal service was disrupted, communications broke down, police and fire
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services were unreliable, garbage was not removed, and the availability of water was reduced. Just as with milk and bread deliveries the strike committee decided that, to a certain degree, each of these services must be restored in order to avoid complete societal breakdown. When combined with the decision to deliver milk and bread the restoration of these services severely weakened the striker’s position. It is difficult to understand how the strike committee could not foresee that they were undermining their own cause each time they capitulated and restored a service which both they, and the government, deemed essential when, by doing so, they were, essentially, depriving themselves of their most effective weapons.
In the food service industry, which had voted unanimously in favour of the strike, some restaurants were forced to close but the strike committee determined that it would in their best interest to keep as many as possible open. An agreement was reached with proprietors which would guarantee delivery of supplies on the condition that establishments were kept open. Keeping restaurants open could serve no useful purpose and was, in fact, detrimental to the strikers cause. That the strike committee still chose to keep these businesses open is another example of how their determination to avoid a complete societal breakdown undermined their efforts during the strike. Many restaurants did continue functioning for a time but, eventually, even those which had initially remained open were closed. When these closings occurred many strikers claimed that it
was an effort to starve workers into submission. This claim was untrue, however, and it
is difficult to understand how the strikers could have made such allegations against
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establishments which had done their best, under difficult circumstances, to continue operating. Their belief that the closure of restaurants was designed to starve them into submission clearly demonstrates the divisions which existed within the city but the strikers who made these claims obviously failed to comprehend that these businesses closed due to difficulties in obtaining adequate supplies.
Another attempt to avoid societal breakdown which actually harmed the striker’s cause resulted from the decision to permit the oil and gas companies to supply all farmers, police, Doctors, officers of health, ambulances, and fire trucks with adequate fuel to meet their needs. Although this decision was, obviously, taken for humanitarian reasons it could not fail to further undermine the striker’s efforts. When this decision was compounded with earlier decisions to permit such activities as milk and bread delivery it becomes clear that the efforts of the strikers would no longer be sufficient to shut down the city but would, rather, become simply an inconvenience in people’s lives.
The postal service was effectively shut down as mail could neither be sorted nor delivered and, as a result, many of the city’s postal stations were forced to close. The situation became so bad that the postmaster was forced to ask Ottawa to refrain from sending anything but first-class mail to the city. Telephone and telegraph service suffered the same fate as the postal service and, as a result, communications came to a virtual standstill. While the closing of these services clearly demonstrates the
effectiveness of the strike their disruption was not enough to seriously inconvenience the city as the strike committee agreed to allow these services to function for emergency
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purposes. By doing so they, once again, failed to capitalize on the most effective tool available to them and, as, in effect, caused an inconvenience rather than the complete shutdown which was necessary to achieve their aims.
Essential services, such as the police and fire departments, were kept running in order to ensure public safety. The police force, obviously forgetting their sworn duty, had voted to strike but had remained on the job at the request of the strike committee. Even when performing their duties, however, they were not effective as they tended to shirk their duty as they saw fit. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that Mayor Gray “. . . was the victim of a minor assault . . . while . . . policemen in the vicinity refused to obey the Mayor’s order to arrest certain me creating the disturbance.” Police officers not only refused to perform their duties but, also, in certain circumstances, took part in overt acts of violence such as the assault of one of a city official. In this instance an individual was accosted while cranking a car outside the Mayor’s office and, when another city official went to explain to the hooligans that the first gentleman was simply going about his business as a member of the Mayor’s staff, “. . . the strikers instantly set upon the second man, kicking him while the constables held him . . .” With the members of the city’s police force, who were, ostensibly, employed to maintain law and order, taking part in activities such as these, which were in direct contravention of the strike committee’s pleas for the strike to remain non-violent, it is little wonder that the Citizen’s Committee
sought to replace them with volunteers for the duration of the hostilities. Even Prime Minister Borden felt that the situation involving the police force was important enough to
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address in the House of Commons when he stated that “. . .we are absolutely determined that law and order should be maintained, and . . . that members of the Civil Service cannot be permitted to disregard their public duties . . .” The police were provided the opportunity to remain at their jobs on the condition that they signed a document stating that they would perform their duties and uphold the law as well promising that they would not participate in any sympathetic strikes. This they refused to do and, as a result, they were replaced by the ‘Specials’ who had been recruited by the Citizen’s Committee.
Despite the fact that the city’s firemen had left the job on 15 May fire services
remained in operation through the efforts of the Citizen’s Committee and hundreds of volunteers. They were only able to do so, however, with the tacit approval of the strike committee for, had the committee decided that fire services should be completely suspended, it is likely that they would have been successful, with the manpower available to them, in shutting down the city’s fire stations or, at least, in preventing the volunteer fire service from reaching the sites of fires. Although it is completely understandable that the strike committee would seek to ensure the safety of the citizens of Winnipeg by permitting these essential service to function it must be conceded that, in doing so, they once again undermined their ability to force a resolution on their terms. There remains the possibility that, had essential services such as the police and fire departments been
completely shut down, the various levels of government would have exerted pressure on
employers in the building and metal industries to resolve the dispute, regardless of cost,
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in order to ensure the safety of the city.
Two other services which must be deemed essential to public safety, in this case health, are garbage collection and water service and these, too were disrupted by the strike. The disruptions were not complete, however, as the strike committee decided that it would be in the city’s best interests for these services to remain operational, albeit in a diminished capacity, while the strike continued. This decision, as with all others concerning essential services, was taken for humanitarian reasons but, just as the other decisions did, could not help but undercut the effectiveness of the strike and thus diminish the possibility that the strikers might force a resolution on their terms.
In addition to allowing services deemed essential to remain operating the strike committee, in its continuing determination to avoid any acts of violence on the part of strikers which might harm their cause, decided that the city’s theatres should remain open so as to provide entertainment to those who were idle due to the closure of businesses. This decision, although equally as understandable as the others taken by the strike committee, meant that, although many businesses were shut down, the city was not paralyzed and, except for the lack of work and diminished services, life continued very much as before. Allowing such businesses as theatres to remain open must surely have made the strike seem less ominous and might also have caused it to appear, despite the
publicity in the national newspapers, as if it were more an extended long-weekend than a complete work stoppage. This, again, could only serve to weaken the striker’s cause.
The strike committee also weakened its position by failing to reach out to citizens in rural areas who might have been persuaded to lend their support to labour’s cause.
14
There is little indication that farmers felt much sympathy for the urban labour movement and, as attitudes towards the strike hardened amongst opponents within Winnipeg, the farmers also became increasingly anti-labour. Had the strike committee realized the potential benefits of cultivating support from the rural areas of the province they might have been able to exert more pressure upon the government to intervene while the strikers enjoyed their greatest strength and influence. Failure to do so was yet another nail in the strikers coffin driven by their very leaders.
As May drew to a close the battle lines were clearly drawn but the strike itself, due to the decisions of the strike committee to permit essential services to remain in operation, was doomed to failure. It must be conceded that the strike committee had organized the forces of labour with remarkable efficiency and had put in place the machinery necessary to prevail. Had they not made the aforementioned decisions regarding essential services it is entirely likely that they could have brought the city to its knees and, thus, forced a resolution which would see them emerge victorious. Another aspect of the strike committee’s preparations which cannot be lauded enough was their determination that the strike should remain non-violent. Their ability to ensure that this remained the case was remarkable indeed.
While the strike committee had organized labour with a great deal of skill the
same can be said for their opponents in the Citizen’s Committee. This committee had organized a force of volunteers which enabled the city to remain functioning in a lawful manner even while essential services had been disrupted and the police force had ignored their sworn duty to uphold law and order. Had the Citizen’s Committee not organized as
15
effectively as it had it is likely that, despite the strike committee’s determination to avoid violence, anarchy might have descended upon the city at any point during the strike.
The strike committee had committed serious errors, albeit for the right reasons, by allowing essential services to remain in operation but, in the early days of the strike, they reached a decision which would cause them to lose public support almost as dramatically as their failure to ensure the delivery of milk and bread during the first days of the strike. When the committee determined that some workers should resume their duties in order to ensure that essential services were provided many of these men expressed concern that they might be subjected to threats, if not outright harm, if they went back to work without it being obvious that they had done so with the explicit approval of the strike leaders. As a result the strike committee decided to provide these men with placards which read ‘Permitted By Authority of Strike Committee’ but, rather than simply ensure the safety of those workers, such as milkmen, who returned to work these placards actually caused the strikers to lose support from the general public. The reason for this is that these placards were seen as de facto evidence that the strike committee was functioning as a provisional government within the city. This fed fears that the strike was an attempt to instigate revolution and, considering the events which had recently occurred in Russia, it is not
surprising that citizens who were not involved in the strike became, despite the strike leaders continuing assertions that they were not seeking revolution, afraid that a revolution had, in fact, begun.
During the month of June the strike, which had, for all intents and purposes failed by the end of May continued towards a tragic conclusion which, in hindsight, could have
16
been avoided. On the night of 16-17 June the government, in an obvious effort to break the strike, proceeded to arrest eight strike leaders and imprison them in Stony Mountain Penitentiary. On government orders the arrested men were charged with
. . . conspiracy “to excite divers liege subjects
of the King, to resist laws and resist persons,
some being part of the police force in the city
of Winnipeg . . . and to procure unlawful
meetings, and to cause divers liege of the King
to believe that the laws of the Dominion were
unduly administered.
One of the groups which became most involved on both sides of the strike was the returned soldiers. Many of these men, who had been leading active and adventurous lives for most of the previous four years, had a difficult time readjusting to civilian life and, as a result, the strike afforded them an opportunity to express their built up energies. Neither side could claim a monopoly on the soldier’s loyalties and, as a result, they became an important group on both sides of the strike but, rather than helping the striker’s cause, their participation was detrimental to the strike committee’s overall goals. As the returned soldiers became more active they made the policy of passive resistance impossible to
maintain and, as a result, the anti-strike forces were handed yet another public relations
triumph.
The returned soldiers participated in a series of marches, which began on 31 May, in support of the strike. Similar parades were staged by those returned soldiers who opposed the strike. These mass rallies created a situation in which, under the right circumstances and despite to exhortations by the strike committee that violence be
17
avoided, disorder might break out at any time. Mayor Gray decided that, in the interests of public safety, these parades should be outlawed and, on 5 June, issued a proclamation that they be stopped immediately. The soldiers ignored this proclamation and the Mayor was forced to issue a second decree on 11 June. The Mayor, at this time, was becoming increasingly frustrated by the obstinance of the strikers and the parades, due to the potential threat they posed to public safety, were the last straw. During a meeting on 21 June the Mayor was informed that a crowd was gathering in front of City Hall and he chose to address this crowd so as to convince them to disperse. He appeared before the throng and read the Riot Act but, as he was doing so, the Royal North West Mounted Police, who he had requested to maintain order by patrolling the streets, forced their way, on horseback, into the crowd. Some minor scuffles ensued between the R.N.W.M.P. and the members of the crowd which resulted in a second charge. When this charge also proved to be unsuccessful in dispersing the crowd a third charge was mounted during
which members of the R.N.W.M.P. drew their revolvers and fired into the crowd which
resulted in several injuries and, tragically, one death.
The actions of the R.N.W.M.P. have been hotly debated since the tragedy occurred but it is clear that they acted inappropriately as the crowd was a peaceful one and there was no reason for them to charge in on horseback. There was even less reason to start shooting at unarmed citizens. Although the authorities tried to claim that shots had been fired and that the police were simply returning fire there is insufficient evidence
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to support this charge. As a result it must be conceded that, although the events of 21 June broke the back of the strike and led directly to its conclusion, these actions on the part of the R.N.W.M.P. were unprovoked and should, therefore, be considered illegal.
Having examined the events of the Winnipeg General Strike it is obvious that the strike committee, although they were in the unenviable position of having to balance their goals with the needs of the citizens of Winnipeg, made several crucial mistakes which, ultimately, caused the strike to fail. Had they not endeavoured to restore essential services they ran the risk of alienating those citizens who supported them in their quest for better wages and union recognition but, nevertheless, this was a risk which should have been taken for it is entirely likely that, at least during the early days of the strike, public opinion would have remained on the striker’s side thus enabling them to force a resolution on their own terms. As it turned out the restoration of essential services caused the strike to drag out as the authorities felt no desperate need to settle with the strikers. As the strike wore on it became less and less likely that the strikers would be successful in their endeavours and this can be directly attributed to the strike committee’s decisions to permit essential services to function, albeit in a reduced capacity. In the end, then, it must
be acknowledged that, although their cause was just, the strikers, or at least their leaders, must shoulder the blame for their lack of success.
Bibliography
Bercuson, David Jay. Confrontation at Winnipeg. © Montreal, 1974.
Bumsted, J.M. The Winnipeg General Strike of 1919. © Toronto, 1994.
Finkel, Alvin; Conrad, Margaret; and Veronica Strong-Boag. History of the Canadian People Volume II: 1867 to the Present. © Toronto, 1993.
House of Commons Debates, 1919.
Manitoba Free Press, © Winnipeg, 1919.
Masters, D.C. The Winnipeg General Strike. © Toronto, 1950.
McNaught, Kenneth and Bercuson, David. The Winnipeg Strike: 1919. © Don Mills, 1974.
Penner, Norman, Ed. Winnipeg 1919: The Striker’s Own History of the Winnipeg General Strike. © Toronto, 1973.
Rea, J.E. The Winnipeg General Strike. © Toronto, 1973.
David Jay Bercuson, Confrontation at Winnipeg, (Montreal, 1974), p. 176.
Kenneth McNaught and David Bercuson, The Winnipeg Strike: 1919, (Don Mills, 1974), p. 45.
D.C. Masters, The Winnipeg General Strike, (Toronto, 1950), pp. 40-41.
J.M. Bumsted, The Winnipeg General Strike of 1919, (Toronto, 1994) p. 117.
Although the police force had remained on duty it had only done so at the request of the strike committee.
Manitoba Free Press, 16 May 1919.
Manitoba Free Press, 6 June 1919.
House of Commons Debates, 1919, p. 2853.
Hereafter referred to as the R.N.W.M.P.