Furthermore, there are significant problems with elections to the EU that challenge the view that they are truly democratic (in the sense of a liberal democracy). Firstly, the turnout to European Parliament elections is particularly low. This means that the mandate of the Parliament could be called into question, seeing as in the elections of 2004 the majority of people in the EU didn’t vote, the turnout hit an all time low of 45.5%. The situation is worse in the UK, in 1999 only 25% of the electorate voted in the European Parliament elections. The situation improved marginally in 2004, with a UK turnout of 38%. Throughout Europe a steady downward trend in turn out to European elections can be seen since 1979. One way of tackling this problem is to make voting compulsory; this method has been adopted in Belgium and Luxembourg. However, compulsory voting brings its own problems, by forcing people to vote it is arguably violating personal liberties, as well as persuading politicians to target swing voters (who in non-compulsory elections would be unlikely to vote) instead of their loyal core.
The next problem that the European Parliament has in fulfilling the criteria for a democratic institution (in the liberal democratic sense) is the lack of accountability that MEPs have to their constituents. Firstly, the PR (Proportional Representation) electoral system used in the UK and other countries is the party list system, which creates multimember constituencies. This means that a close identification is not created between MEPs and their constituent members as in single member constituencies. Furthermore, the electorate only vote for a party, they have no control over the candidates that get in for that party in their constituency. Finally, constituencies may have many MEPs representing them (e.g. in the South East constituency there are 10 MEPs) but the constituency size is huge (the South East region covers 6 million eligible voters) meaning that each MEP represents over half a million voters (in contrast with MPs who typically represent just 70,000 voters).
The use of PR systems raises the further problem of manifestos and mandates. Because one party on its own does not have a majority, it is difficult to decide which policies from which elected parties should be carried through by the European Parliament. This means that no one party has a clear mandate to implement the policies they were voted in on. This problem arises in all PR systems, but the European Parliament (EP) is even more confusing on this issue due to its party system. In elections, candidates stand for national parties, e.g., in the UK we have the Labour and Conservative parties putting forward candidates for the EP elections, but join European wide parties (or multinational political groups) in the EP itself. For example, the Conservatives sit with the European People’s Party (EPP) and European Democrats (the largest party in the EP) because they feel this party is most closely tied to their own ideological beliefs. This confuses accountability though, because the electorate has voted for the policies of the national party, and not the EU party. Broadly speaking, MEPs will vote along the European Party line, although in some cases they will place national party preference over EU party preference. For example the EPP-ED voted in favour of the new constitution, apart from the Conservative contingent of it, who voted against the new Constitution (in line with national policy).
The final problem with accountability in the European Parliament is one of publicity. National press headlines tend to centre on political activity at a national level, and very rarely mention the activities of the European Parliament and the UK’s MEPs. For example, a quick “Google” news search for Chris Huhne, a Liberal Democrat MEP for the South East region, yielded just one result, and in fact was from an article about Charles Kennedy and his aim to keep a hold of the party leadership. This vacuum of press coverage of the European Parliament is a serious blow to its accountability, because scrutiny of the press and therefore the public is a key part of accountability in a liberal democracy.
The Council of Ministers, the second part of the legislature also has a problem with accountability because the parliaments of member states have no control over the actions of government ministers within the EU.
In many liberal democracies, a system of checks and balances is used to keep control of the 3 main branches of government, and ensure that one doesn’t become too powerful. The Commission, which makes up part of the executive of the EU, is held to account by the European Parliament because the EP can dismiss the entire Commission. For example in 1999 this almost happened to the Commission headed by Santer, due to corruption charges. In the end however, the Commission all resigned before they could be called to account by the European Parliament. However, there is a weakness to this power because the EP can only dismiss the entire Commission, and not individual Commissioners.
The lack of transparency in the EU institutions is a key problem for those who wish to call the EU a truly democratic institution, because accountability cannot exist without the transparency needed to scrutinise the actions of the EU. For example, meetings of the Council of Ministers, the more powerful arm of the legislature are not open to the public, although minutes are published. Furthermore, there have been many corruption charges, both financial and political. For example, during the Santer Commission, one charge of corruption was brought against a Commissioner who was supplying her partner with a “job” and pay within the EU.
The final point that Liberal democracies are expected to conform to is protection of democratic rights of individuals for all citizens. The European Court of Human Rights through the Human Rights Act protects the rights of UK citizens and many other EU citizens. However this comes from the Council of Europe and is nothing to do with the EU. Indeed, at present, the EU does not have any human rights legislation in place, although this is a situation it hopes to rectify soon with the introduction of the Constitution, which will contain a “Charter of Fundamental Rights”. However, this charter will only apply to EU law, and not to any laws implemented on a national level.
All of these points would seem to suggest that there is a severe democratic deficit in the EU. However, there is evidence of the EU functioning as a democratic institution in the liberal democratic sense as well.
As has previously been discussed, the European Parliament is the only directly elected body of the EU, and while it has its flaws, it is the EU’s most advanced step towards a truly democratic system. Recent developments in the powers of the EP have given many hope that it will continue to develop and fly the flag for a more democratic EU. Firstly, the EP has co-decision with the Council of Ministers on an increasing amount of issues, especially since the Maastricht Treaty, making its decisions count equal to those of the Council of Ministers on many areas of policy such as trade and agriculture (usually the issues that are decided on using Qualitative Majority Voting in the Council of Ministers also apply to co-decision). It is expected in the future that co-decision will come to apply to even more policy areas, thus further destroying the democratic deficit in this area.
The EP now has increased powers over a very important of EU policy: The EU budget. This budget has to be agreed by both the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament in order for it to come into effect. Furthermore, the EP now has some powers concerning other institutions within the EU, thus forming the basis of a system of checks and balances between. The Commission is appointed every 5 years, just after the election of the new European Parliament. The new EP has to approve the new Commission President and the entire Commission (although it cannot accept or dismiss individual Commissioners). Furthermore, the EP can dismiss the entire EP at any time if it has reason to. For example in 1999 this almost happened when severe corruption charges were levelled at the Commission. However, the Commission resigned en masse before the intervention of the EP was needed. These powers have added a degree of accountability to the EU.
The EU also conforms to the liberal democratic ideal of a separation of powers; Members of the Commission (part of the executive) aren’t involved in the Council of Ministers or European Parliament (the legislature) for example. In this way it could be argued that the EU is in fact more democratic than the UK because in our Parliament the executive (the government) is made up from the legislature (Parliament); they are fused. There is even one person (the Lord Chancellor) who is in the Executive, the Legislature AND the Judiciary!
Further points could be put forward to demonstrate the EU’s democratic credentials. Firstly, the European Commission is open to being lobbied by pressure groups, and many of these have moved their centre of activities to EU institutions. For example, many issues affecting the environment are now decided by EU legislation, and so pressure groups such as Greenpeace have concentrated their action on policy makers at the EU level rather than at national level.
Another important point to note is that accountability of the EU does not have to be just to other EU institutions; scrutiny of EU policies and actions can be carried out at a national level by member states’ legislatures. In the UK, in the House of Commons, there is a European Scrutiny Committee which considers all EU legislation and its likely impact, and brings legislation it feels is important to the attention of the House as a debate item. More importantly, it monitors the actions of UK ministers in the Council, making these representatives accountable for the actions that they take within the EU, as well as on a national level. This select group regularly produces reports on issues it feels to be of importance, for example, it has recently completed reports on the financial situation of the EU (as a new EU budget is due) and on the EU’s Justice and Home Affairs policy for the next five years (as under the new constitution, this policy area will be subject to QMV rather than unanimity in the Council of Ministers). The House of Lords has a similar select Committee too, with no less than 6 subcommittees. It can be seen, therefore, that while there would appear to be a lack of scrutiny and accountability within the EU itself, it is clear that member states take on some of the responsibility for making the EU accountable.
Finally, the EU will fulfil the liberal democratic criteria of having a constitution if it is ratified by all 25 member states - a process that is due to start very soon. The constitution seeks to codify existing Treaties, as well as set out clearer guidelines for members to join and leave. Another of its aims is to make the EU more transparent and open to scrutiny, and therefore closer to fulfilling the ideal of accountability.
From the outset it would seem that the EU has a severe democratic deficit; there would appear to be a severe lack of transparency and accountability within the Commission and European Central Bank, unclear lines of political authority and a weak parliament with no clear mandate to rule. However, on closer inspection, it can be seen that the situation isn’t as bad as it would appear, with various checks already in place to ensure some degree of liberal democratic ideals are upheld. The future looks bright for the EU as well, with a new Constitution bringing in a more defined structure and even a Charter of Fundamental Rights, two huge steps towards a more democratic structure.
Further steps have been suggested to reduce the democratic deficit within the EU. For example, some people feel that giving the European Parliament more powers through making all issues co-decision with the Council of Ministers will reduce the deficit. Indeed, an increasing number of issues are now decided using co-decision, showing a movement towards this. Other suggestions include changing the party list voting system to a less party dominated system such as Single Transferable Vote as used in Northern Ireland. In the distant future some people would like to see more of the EU institutions being directly elected, although many of the national governments are opposed to this suggestion, so it seems unlikely for the foreseeable future.
