Why did Britain join the EEC in 1973 and not in 1957?

The EEC’s description is as an economic customs union, in a supranational political structure. In 1951 the ‘Six’ first established their European unity by signing the Treaty of Paris, which was the beginning of the European Coal and Steel Community. The ECSC followed a Plan by French Foreign Minister Robert Schumen, which arranged the ECSC as the institution for the European coal and steel industries. The EEC was the result of talks started at Messina, then finalised when the Treaty of Rome was signed by the ‘Six’ in 1957. Britain was not present at the talks at Messina, or for the signing of the Treaty of Paris or the Treaty of Rome. This meant that Britain had not got involved in the EEC when it was established, meaning it would be harder to get involved later. A phrase applied to this lack of involvement from the start, is “missed the bus” into Europe. A conservative MP, Anthony Nutting, wrote in his book Europe Will Not Wait (1964) that he believed that by “missing the bus” Britain had been left far behind, loosing the chance to take a role of leadership in Europe, from there it could have moulded Europe to suit itself. Also he explained that if Britain had realised it would have had to join in the future anyway, there could have been more involvement in the talks in Messina, and the Rome Treaty, which would have meant an early membership to the EEC and not a late one in 1957.

There are reasons why Britain ‘missed the bus’, and there are also reasons that prove that Britain did not ‘miss the bus’ but didn’t want to or need to get the ‘bus’. These reasons affect the absence of involvement in the Schuman Plan talks, or the Messina talks.

The reasons behind Britain’s absence at the Schuman Plan talks have been summarised by Edmund Dell, a Labour MP. He described how the ministers and officials did not recognise the prospects of joining the EEC at the beginning. They should have supported the drive towards integration, although they did not agree with the idea of a supra-nationality they could have gone along with it as a rapprochement with France and West Germany. Also Dell explained that the officials should have sold the idea of ‘Europe’ to the public to gain their support for joining the EEC. Dell also puts forward the idea that France at this time, did want Britain to become involved, Jean Monet frequently phoned to ask Britain to join the talks, also the French ambassador Rene Massigli was also pro-British. By not getting involved in these initial talks Britain failed to join the ECSC, which meant they would have no involvement in the talks at Messina. By not joining the ‘Six’ they could not share their quick development and could not shape it to suit Britain, Europe began to develop in what Britain saw as a negative way. This supports the view that Britain did ‘miss the bus’ into Europe.

But Dell and Nutting can be criticised because of their view that Britain would have no influence over Europe without being part of the ECSC or EEC. Britain did take initiatives in Europe with the Council of Europe (1949) and the Eden Plan (1952), gaining a leadership position as part of the OEEC (Organisation for European Economic Co-operation) and NATO. Although because of the ‘Six’s following for supra-nationalism the Eden Plan was ignored. This supports the view that Britain did not need to get on the ‘bus’ and got involved in Europe by itself.

John Young made proved Whitehall did consider attending the talks but decided that it would not be in Britain’s best interest to join as it meant going against Britain’s idea of developing political structures slowly and loosing sovereignty. He also made the prediction that without Britain being involved the Plan would fail. This supports the view that Britain did not want or need to get on the ‘bus’.

Domestic reasons for Britain not getting involved in the talks at this stage are the implication of agreeing to share the coal and steel industries. Britain had the strongest coal and steel industries in Europe, the industries being the basis of the Labour party’s political power, it was a great British strength. By joining the ECSC Britain was being asked to share it. Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison comment to Cabinet about how the miners would feel about producing coal for Europe, not just Britain was, “the Durham miners wont wear it”. This supports the view that Britain did not want to get on the ‘bus’ because it would have to pay too much with its coal and steel industries.

Roger Bullen had the view that France made it hard for Britain to get involved, by not informing Britain of the development of the Schuman Plan, and in May 1950 when Bevin asked for more time to consider Britain’s involvement in the ECSC, Schuman gave him twenty-four hours to decide if he would attend the talks. Britain saw this a negative attitude and did not attend the talks. France had ‘snubbed’ Bevin, and it had been made clear the Schuman did not need Britain’s participation. Bevin commented to the junior MP Callaghan, Britain couldn’t join the Schuman Plan talks because ...

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The reasons behind Britain not attending the talks at Messina are also numerous, but still following the idea of whether Britain had ‘miss the bus’ into Europe by not getting involved in the talks at Messina, or if Britain chose not to get the ‘bus’.

Lord Bullock, Bevin’s biographer believed Britain had ‘miss the bus’ when they missed out on the talks at Messina.

John Young agreed with this view, because he believed that when the ‘Six’ discussed the EEC, Britain should have appreciated the dangers of being excluded from a customs union in Europe. Again he blames the Ministers for not understanding the importance of being involved in Europe and missing out on being able to get involved from the start, knowing that federalism would not harm British interest. With the lowering interest in the Commonwealth around 1955 and without the Soviet threat Britain should have re-evaluated its world position and found that it needed to take its place as part of Europe. He supports the view that Britain did ‘miss the bus’ into Europe because Britain did not realise that it should have taken a place in Europe.

Nutting and Dell shared the view that Britain had missed out by not getting involved, agreeing that the supranational political integration was the right thing for Europe. After the war in which the European countries had resisted the Nazis nationalism, they believed that a federalism of Europe would be beneficial, threats to take over nations would be useless because you can’t take over nations that have all united. They support the view the ‘bus’ into Europe was missed.

Alan Milward, author of The Reconstruction of Western Europe1945-51, believed Britain did not need to join the EEC the same way the other countries did. France benefited from joining because it would be able to share the strong German industries and control the development of the state so it could not invade again. West Germany joined and accepted limits on its national sovereignty to prove its now peaceful position in Europe. It would also be able to rebuild a strong state and a strong economy. The smaller countries gained a share of the German economy and increased their political voice. Britain had a strong industry, economy and a strong political voice, it did not have any obvious reasons to join the EEC. This supports the view that Britain didn’t need to get on the ‘bus’.

Miriam Camps (Britain and the European Community 1955-1963) felt that the EEC was against British national interest. She explains that the Foreign Office did not want to surrender the national sovereignty for a supranational community. The Treasury and Board of Trade didn’t want to cut or minimise its trade links to the rest of the world, also believing the European countries were weak and would affect the economy in a negative way. The public did not have support for joining the EEC either, they liked the idea of the Empire and Britain’s Great Power status. Lord Douglas-Home commented “the British public was still too near the glory of the Empire to accept the role for Britain as just another country in Europe”. This supports the view that Britain did not need or want to catch the ‘bus’ into Europe.

Wolfram Kaiser argues that politicians stuck to the myth of a strong Empire and Britain being a Great Power to prove that Britain was different from the rest of Europe, using patriotic themes to keep the public support. This supports the view that Britain did ‘miss the bus’ because the country was stuck on the belief of it having a lot of power, more than it did actually have.

James Ellison described how Britain had tried to influence the European integration, encouraging a more intergovernmental community instead of the full integration the supranational community would have. In 1955 the ‘Six’ were encouraged to follow the OEEC system instead of the EEC, but the ‘Six’ stayed with the EEC. The British Treasury and Board of Trade began to see the threat of being stuck outside the customs union. In 1956 the Plan G was developed proposing a free trade area (beneficial to Britain because it could include trade with the Commonwealth), which was based on an intergovernmental system. But thought the negotiations over Plan G continued from 1957 until 1958 with the ‘Six’ the free trade area did not fully work, if it had Britain would have not been so isolated from Europe. This supports the view that Britain had ‘miss the bus’ but it also describes how Britain had tried to get into Europe a different way, which failed. The failure could have been because the EEC ‘bus’ was not heading in the same direction, as Britain wanted to go.

The Free Trade area talks failed as the European countries such as West Germany didn’t want to increase its markets in exports. Plan G also failed, Europe wanted a full supranational integration, not the more limited integration Plan G suggested.

The reasons why Britain’s applications between 1957 up to 1973 can all be based on the factor of General de Gaulle being President of France and his dislike for British involvement in the Europe.

General De Gaulle became President in 1958; he used few political ‘niceties’ and immediately vetoed the Free Trade area talks. He found that without Britain’s presence in the EEC France could take the leadership role without competition. Also after the Suez Crisis there was a loss of good feeling between France and Britain, both realised that they could not act on their own, Britain found its strength through the Special Relationship it had with America. France would have to build its base of strength and found it could use the EEC.

Macmillan applied for membership to the EEC for economic and political reasons. The Free Trade area talks failed, which left Britain isolated from the European economic and political group, with other non-EEC countries such as, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland and Portugal. These excluded countries formed the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) but it could never be as strong as the EEC in Europe. Other economic reasons include Britain’s interest in joining the economic growth the Six had created by removing tariff barriers within Europe, because Britain’s economic growth had considerably slowed. Macmillan also had to begin to withdraw from the Commonwealth countries, granting them independence; he did this because the Commonwealth countries were beginning to drain money from Britain, they couldn’t create enough trade. Trade with Western Europe increased between 1953-1960, exports to the Common Market rose by 29%, while only at 1% to Sterling countries. The ETFA couldn’t help Britain’s finances either; Britain had the strongest economy out the other member countries. The political reasons for wanting to join the EEC include the Suez Crisis, the Commonwealth and America. The Suez Crisis (1956) had proved that Britain was no longer a Great Power, needing America’s support to influence the world. The Commonwealth was also in trouble and was beginning to look to new markets to trade in, some even looked to the EEC for support, Nigeria joining in 1962. Macmillan saw that the EEC could be used to boost British power and influence, but America was also pushing Britain towards joining as a way of increasing its own influence in Europe. Britain would keep the EEC friendly towards America, meaning it was not as likely the EEC would become a ‘Third Force’ in the World and turn away from NATO. All these reasons can be classed as short term reasons; a quick fix for the economy, and Commonwealth, and an increase in trade and influence in Europe. Also the conflicts within the Conservative Party over Europe would be settled and Macmillan would prove he was pro-European. But it was already clear to Macmillan that this application would be very likely to fail.

Macmillan had even tried to tempt France with nuclear power as an incentive to allowing Britain to join. He met with American President Kennedy at Nassau and agreed to buy Polaris missiles, to be put in place for Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent. Macmillan went on to meet with De Gaulle at Rambouillet (October 1962) and offered the Polaris missiles as a way of increasing French power. De Gaulle declined the offer because the missiles were from America, showing that America had control over Britain, he had another reason to veto Macmillan’s application.

The failure to join at this point was because Britain was accused of not being European enough. By insisting on conditions on Britain’s membership proved that Britain did not have the compatibility needed to join without changing the Community already formed. Britain needed the conditions so the Commonwealth commitments and the Community’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) were considered. There was also a lot of opposition within the Conservative government and Labour Party towards applying to the EEC. With the combination of only joining “if the conditions were right” and the oppositions within government, De Gaulle accused Britain of not acting in a European way and the application was rejected.

Wilson tried to apply in 1967, but after six months it was rejected by De Gaulle. He wanted to join the EEC because Britain was facing an increasingly worse economic situation, also the strength of sterling was still lowering. He had learned that negotiation issues much be kept to the minimum but CAP still had very issues that needed to be resolved before Britain could successfully join the European community. Wilson went as far as accepting the terms of the Treaty of Rome, accepting the supranational principle for the EEC. He tried to persuade the Five, without France, trying to convince them Britain was needed for Europe to become a great force. But the Five didn’t want to loose France by letting Britain join, France went on to veto the application with the reason of Britain’s entry was only to aid its weak economy, though the application was rejected again he left the application open to be put forward again.

Heath was the next Prime Minister to apply to the EEC. He used the tactics of ‘downplaying’ the CAP negotiations and the Special Relationship with America. It was difficult to ‘downplay’ the CAP negotiations because Wilson had said on TV that Britain’s entry would have to be on the right terms, especially concerning the agriculture. He had been so determined because if Britain joined with the agricultural terms the EEC applied then Britain would have to pay more in and would in turn get less back than the other EEC countries. By not accepting these terms and negotiating the Six saw it as him trying to change the Community to suit Britain. Heath had to go against what Wilson had said and ‘down play’ the need for negotiations over agriculture. He promoted his Party and himself as committed pro-Europeans, ‘downplayed’ the negotiations over agriculture, and France discussing the world role of the pound sterling, also the Special Relationship with America. This application was yet again rejected by De Gaulle after six months of discussions. But after De Gaulle had retired and French President Georges Pompidou had talked with Heath and was convinced of his honest pro-European attitude membership the EEC was finally accepted.

The factor of General De Gaulle in answering the question of why Britain joined the EEC in 1973 and not in 1957 is one of the strongest factors. De Gaulle seemed to dislike Britain and at every chance reject their attempts to join the EEC. It was believed that De Gaulle wanted France to be the leading influence in Europe and didn’t want Britain to become a member to rival France’s leadership. He also wanted Europe to be free from America, becoming the ‘Third Force’ in the world. Because Britain had a Special Relationship with America if Britain gained membership the America could work through Britain to influence all the European members. As an independent ‘Third Force’ the EEC would be able to leave NATO, make friends with Russia, and become a stronger Europe. De Gaulle believed this could be done as long as Britain was not a member. Within the supranational community there was dispute, the Five wanted complete integration while France wanted a Europe of independent states, Britain problems with the supranational commitment would have been settled and Britain offered to help France by creating a balance of complete integration and individual states. Though this would have supported France’s wish for ‘Europe des Patries’, De Gaulle still did not allow Britain membership, using the reason that Britain was not European enough, seeing as Britain would be going against the other Five countries did not accept the ‘Europe des Patries’. De Gaulle rejected all of Britain’s applications to join the EEC for the reasons of not being European enough, needing too many negotiations which could change the community, and because Britain was too close to America. He personally wanted to Britain to be excluded so it could not rival France’s power in Europe. Once De Gaulle had retired and the new French President Pompidou too over, Britain was given membership to the EEC, having talked to British Prime Minister Heath Pompidou was convinced of his honesty and pro-European attitude.

In 1957 Britain was held back from becoming a member of the EEC because of economic reasons and political reasons. Having ‘miss the bus’ into Europe Britain was not able to join the EEC until much later in 1973, the reasons for this time between were political and economic, but more importantly the factor of the French leader De Gaulle. Economically through the years between when Britain ‘miss the bus’ and the final application in 1973 Britain economy had been weakening, the strength of the sterling had been lowering and Britain had to negotiate to become a member of the EEC, over agriculture and coal and steel industries. Politically Britain was accused of not being pro-European enough, by having to divide its attention between the Commonwealth countries and its Special Relationship with America Britain could give little attention to the EEC or Europe. The last factor of De Gaulle meant that Britain did not gain membership until De Gaulle had retired. De Gaulle vetoed Britain’s applications, accusing of not being pro-European enough, this may have been because he wished France to remain the leader of Europe with no competition from Britain. Also he had plans of Europe becoming a ‘Third Force’ independent from American influences, Britain would have joined the EEC meaning America could influence Britain who would in turn influence the other European countries.

Britain finally obtained membership to the EEC in 1973, with the French President’s support.