Other discussions have treated the controversy as being over the proper research policy (the "how" question), that is, about "the most valuable ways of gaining knowledge and understanding about memory" (Loftus, 1991, p. 16; see Banaji & Crowder, 1989; Tulving, 1991). Proponents of the naturalistic study of memory have questioned the ecological validity of much laboratory experimentation (e.g., Aanstoos, 1991), whereas laboratory proponents have stressed the importance of experimental control and generalizability of results. Banaji and Crowder (1989), for instance, argue that because naturalistic research methods often lack experimental control, the "ecological validity of the methods as such is unimportant and can even work against generalizability" (p. 1187; see also Morton, 1991; Roediger, 1991). In general, naturalistic memory researchers acknowledge the desirability of controlled experimentation, but claim that a strict adherence to this methodology would leave out many interesting memory phenomena (Conway, 1991, 1993; Gruneberg & Morris, 1992).
Finally, still other researchers have underscored the "where" as being a fundamental, inseparable aspect of memory phenomena. For example, Neisser (1988a) has stressed the affinity between the ecological approach to the study of everyday memory, and the ethological approach to studying animal behavior, both of which focus on organism-environment interactions (see also, Ceci & Brofenbrenner, 1991). He therefore emphasizes the social-functional context of remembering, stating that "the theory we require will have to deal with persons, motives, and social situations . . . Most of all, it will have to deal with functional issues" . The implication is that studying the same phenomena in the laboratory and in natural settings may lead to very different conclusions. Indeed, Gruneberg, Morris and Sykes (1991), point to findings (Morris, Tweedy, & Gruneberg, 1985) in which "the real-life nature of the experience made a considerable difference to memory processing"
Importantly, however, although the three dimensions--the what, how, and where dimensions--are correlated in the reality of memory research, they are not logically interdependent. For instance, many everyday memory topics can be studied in the laboratory (Neisser, 1991; Roediger, 1991), and memory research in naturalistic settings may be amenable to strict experimental control (Conway, 1991; e.g. Loftus, 1979a).
I propose that the everyday-laboratory controversy harbors what appears to be a more fundamental breach--a difference in the very metaphor of memory implicitly espoused by each camp. These metaphors, the storehouse and correspondence metaphors, embody two essentially different ways of thinking about memory and about how memory should be evaluated: The storehouse metaphor, which likens memory to a depository of input elements, implies an evaluation in terms of the quantity of items remaining in store. In contrast, the correspondence metaphor, which treats memory as a perception or description of the past, implies an evaluation in terms of the accuracy or faithfulness of that description.
Research examples
Jacoby and his associates (e.g., Jacoby, 1988; Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989; Jacoby, Lindsay, & Toth, 1992; Kelley & Jacoby, 1990) have promoted a constructive-attributional approach which places a special emphasis on the subjective experience of remembering. This experience is seen to result from attributions to the past that are evoked by a feeling of familiarity for a present stimulus. When the fluent processing of a present stimulus, and hence its subjective familiarity, actually does derive from previous exposure, then the attribution to the past should result in correct or veridical remembering. However, a feeling of familiarity may also derive from other sources, and when improperly attributed to the past, may give rise to confabulations and memory illusions. Thus, in investigating the genesis of memorial experiences, Jacoby and coworkers have demonstrated how false memories may be created by altering perceptual processes independently of past experience. In their view, "the conscious experience of remembering is not to be found in a memory trace. Rather, remembering is an inference based on internal and situational cues" (Kelley & Jacoby, 1990, p. 49). This work, then, displays a concern with both veridical and nonveridical remembering, and suggests possible reasons why people's current "perceptions" of the past might deviate from reality. These finding will have significant impact on eye witness research.
A study by Neisser (1988b) can help illustrate some of the issues that stem from these confoundings. Neisser examined memory for real-life events that took place during the course of a seminar that he taught. Memory was assessed using either a cued recall or a multiple-choice recognition procedure. Neisser found recall memory to be much more accurate than recognition memory, and pointed out that such a finding might come as a surprise to traditional memory researchers, who are accustomed to the general superiority of recognition memory found in laboratory studies.
In my opinion, then, too much has been made of the desire to maintain continuity between the study of everyday memory and the traditional laboratory approach (Klatzky, 1991; Winograd, 1988). As "metaphorical pluralists," we would advocate otherwise: Rather than attempt to bridge between the two fundamentally different treatments of memory represented in the traditional and everyday memory camps, or perhaps to merge them, we would prefer to see their differences sharpened and cultivated. In that way, each horse will be able to draw the chariot of science, as far and as fast as it can.
Consider a simple situation in which memory is tested for only one single item of information using a forced-choice procedure. For example, in the well-known study by Loftus, Miller, and Burns (1978), subjects were required to decide whether the traffic sign in the witnessed event was a stop or a yield sign. In that study and others like it (e.g., Boon & Davies, 1988; Wagenaar & Boer, 1987), memory accuracy is assessed simply by noting whether the provided answer is correct or incorrect. This might be compared to the hypothetical case in which a studied list of paired associates is followed by a single probe and two alternative responses, e.g., "SIGN - STOP/YIELD," and the intention is to assess memory quantity. Operationally, the two measures, accuracy and quantity, are equivalent; the difference between them is solely a matter of the experimenter's intent. Whereas in the former case the test is designed to examine whether the person's memory is a faithful reproduction of the witnessed event, in the latter case the intent has traditionally been to determine whether the designated item is still in store and accessible.
