Levinger and Clark (1961) conducted an experimental test of Freud’s repression hypothesis. They looked at the retention of associations to negatively-charged words, such as quarrel, war, angry, fear; compared with those for neutral words such as window, cow, and tree. Participants were then asked to give immediate free association to the words (to say exactly what comes into their minds). It took participants longer to respond to the emotional words. These words also produced higher galvanic skin responses (GSR – a measure of emotional arousal).
Immediately after the word association tests had been completed, participants were then given the cue words again and asked to try and recall their associations. They had particular trouble remembering the associations to the emotionally charged words. This supported exactly Freud’s repression hypothesis.
However there are other studies which show that whilst highly arousing words tend to be poorly recalled when tests immediately, the effect reverses after a delay (Eysenck & Wilson, 1973). If words are being repressed, this should not happen, as the words should stay repressed. Therefore suggesting that arousal was the cause of reversal.
Parkin et al. (1982) replicated the original study by Levinger & Clark, but they added a delayed recall condition. Participants were asked to recall their associations seven days after the original test. The results supported Eysenck & Wilson’s interpretation – higher arousal levels inhibit immediate recall but increase longer – term recall. However, later research has not always supported the arousal interpretation and the question of emotional inhabitation remains open (Parkin, 1993).
To evaluate Freud’s repression hypothesis, theoretically speaking, forgetting more unpleasant than pleasant memories could mean that people rehearse upsetting material far less because they do not want to think/ talk about it. It is also difficult to tell to what extent the repressor chooses not to search their memory or is unable to.
Experimental evidence is difficult to gather due to the ethical problems of probing for traumatic memories or creating them by exposing subjects to unpleasant, anxiety stimulating experiences.
The studies that have been conducted, show mixed results and, where negative emotions have been found to increase forgetting, there has been debate over the cause i.e. emotion can affect memory without the need for an ego.
Mild anxiety has been produced in the laboratory by giving false ‘failure feedback’ which does impair memory. However rather than causing repression, Holmes (1990) argues that it causes people to think about the failure which distracts attention away from the memory test (interference theory), since giving ‘success feedback’ also impairs recall.
Higher anxiety was produced by Loftus & Burns (1982) who showed two groups a film of a bank robbery, but exposed one of the groups to a far more violent version where a young boy was shot in the face. The group that saw this version later showed far poorer recall of detail than the control group. Freud might have suggested repression, but Loftus (1987) could explain the forgetting with the weapons focus effect. This is where a fearful or stressful aspect(s) of a scene (e.g. the gun) channel attention towards the source of distress and away from other details. Alternatively, people may need to be in the same state i.e. anxious, to recall properly (cue-dependent explanation).
Whilst cases of psychogenic amnesia are consistent with Freud’s theory, a strictly Freudian interpretation may not be necessary, and experimental support for the repression hypothesis is inconclusive.
Brown & Kulik (1977) coined the term flashbulb memory (FM)to refer to a special kind of episodic memory, in which we can supply a vivid and detailed recollection of where we were and what we were doing when we heard about or saw some major public event.
The experiment they conducted, asked participants about their memories of various actual or attempted assassinations which had occurred in the previous 15 years, including those of John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy. They were also asked if they had FM’s for more personal shocking events.
Of 80 participants, 73 reported FM’s associated with personal shocks, commonly the sudden death of a relative. John F. Kennedy’s assassination was recalled most vividly, although other successful or unsuccessful assassinations also produced detailed memories.
Brown & Kulik also found that an FM was more likely if an event was unexpected and of personal relevance. For example, whilst 75% of black participant reported a FM for Martin Luther King’s assassination, only 33% of white participants did so.
Brown & Kulik argued that flashbulb memory was a special and distinct form of memory since the emotionally important event triggers a neural mechanism in the brain, which causes it to be especially well imprinted into memory. The memories are therefore more detailed and accurate than most. Also the structural form of the memory was very similar. Participants nearly always tended to recall where they were, what they were doing, who gave them the information, what they and others felt about it and what the immediate aftermath was, when they first knew of the event.
To see if FM’s are accurate and reliable, a further study was conducted by Conway et al. (1994), who argued that the resignation of Mrs Thatcher as Prime Minister in 1990 should have produced FM’s. According to them, this was an event that was surprising and consequential to most people in the UK.
The results showed that 86% of a British sample had a FM of this event after 11 months, compared with only 26% of samples from other countries.
Different findings were reported by Talarico & Rubin (2003). On 12 September 2001, they assessed students’ memories for the events of the previous day and for a very recent everyday event. The students were then tested again between 1 and 32 weeks later. The participants claimed that their FM’s remained vivid over the 32 week period. However, their FM’s were not very accurate or consistent over time; they were no more consistent than their everyday memories.
However, Cahill & McGaugh (1998) suggested that FM’s may have an adaptive function. At times of high emotional arousal, hormones are released which enable individuals to cope with a highly emotional situation and to help individuals to cope with a similar situation in the future as it is well remembered.
To evaluate, the study conducted by Conway et al. provided evidence for flashbulb memories, thus leading to renewed interest in flashbulb memories.
Talarico & Rubin researched and found that Flashbulb memories are not always accurate.
Brown & Kulik suggested that a special neural mechanism in the brain, results in the whole scene becoming ‘printed’ on the memory. However, they do not go in to much detail about this, therefore leading to ambiguity surrounding this theory.
Cahill & McGaugh (1998) think that because it is adaptive to remember emotionally important events animals have evolved arousing hormones that help respond in the short term and aid storage of the event in the long term.
Some researchers have also suggested that it is repeated rehearsal of these memories that makes them enduring (Neisser, 1982). Also, because an event is given prominence in the media and is widely discussed in society, this may also contribute to the endurance of FM’s.
Lastly, the similar form of ‘flashbulb memories’ may just reflect the normal way people relate information about events to others (Neisser, 1982).
In conclusion, there are two concepts which try to explain how emotional factors influence memory, for example, according to Freud’s motivated – forgetting theory, unacceptable memories are made inaccessible through the defence mechanism of repression. The research surrounding Flashbulb Memories shows the vividness of FM is no guarantee of their accuracy, and we only have FM’s of events which have personal relevance and consequences. Whilst there are strengths to both concepts there are also limitations to each.