During the course of this essay I will attempt to argue that Dawkin’s view is in fact more coherent than Hick’s. I find Hick’s views problematic as it is unclear whether or not the replica, is in fact the deceased person. It would appear that an exact replica is not the same as the original person for there has to be some sort of continuity between the original person and the person of the afterlife.
Hicks argues that the replica would indeed have the same psychological make up of the original, but does this then make the person the same individual? According to Mel Thompson if the answer to this question is yes, then life after death is theoretically possible. However this then raises the question whether death has actually taken place. For death as we know it involves the cessation of the person. If Hick’s view were possible surely this would be more of a relocation of an individual rather than the death and resurrection of that person.
When asked whether the replica and the deceased were in fact the same person, Hick argues that he would be if he thought of himself and others thought of himself as the same person. We can see from Hick’s answer that the boundaries are unclear. It could be argued however that Hick’s view of the ‘replica’ is not meant to be taken literally. Perhaps Hick is merely trying to demonstrate the possibility of life after death, in the form of a new physical body as a means of expressing personal identity. Of course for those who believe in an omnipotent God, the belief that God could create copies of individuals including that persons psychological make up and memories is not beyond possibility. Hick’s argument is that his theory is logically coherent however just because something could happen provides no prove that it does happen.
Both Dawkins and Hicks are clear that our earthly life in our current physical form will end. However their ideas about our survival after death could not be more different. For Dawkin the continuation of our genes in our children and their descendants is the only conceivable way that we can ‘live on’. Dawkin’s argues that because natural selection preserves advantageous gene mutations and discards disadavantageous ones. It is quite inevitable that complex forms will arise that are particularly well adapted to their environments. Such complex adaptations could appear to be the result of a divine designer, using computer simulations, Dawkins shows that it is possible to produce a wide range of complex shapes, using only a few variables. Therefore according to Dawkin any evidence of ‘divine activity’ is an illusion. A theists argument in response to this would be that their had to be a prime mover providing the small number of variables in the first place, Aquinas would argue that the prime mover is God.
Dawkins compares the replication of human genes to a computer replicating data: ‘The machine code of the genes is uncannily computer like.’ ( Dawkins, R. River out of Eden p 17). A dualist could turn this around to suggest that this replaces the spiritual concept of the soul with a more modern metaphor/ myth, the data representing the soul with the hard drive representing the body.
In terms of the ‘body/ soul distinction’, Hick’s views are confusing as he does not successfully underpin the continuity problem. However Dawkin’s views appear less complex as they deal with only one earthly realm and they reduce all human activity to chemical responses in the brain. This is not to say that Hick’s view are less convincing over those of Dawkin’s, the simplistic ( and in my own opinion, limited) views of Dawkin appear to present a more coherent distinction but perhaps a less convincing argument.
