Ann Oakley (1972) is a key feminist sociologist who supports the notion of a ‘sex-gender division’. Oakley argues that gender is separate from biological sex and argues that gender roles are learnt rather than innate. Oakley focuses on gender role socialization, particularly concentrating on the agents of family and its role in the construction of gender identity.
One kind of gender socialization identified by Oakley was canalization, whereby on the foundations of sex, children are given different toys by their parents which focus the child’s interests in certain ‘appropriate’ objects and activities. For instance, boys are given toy cars, trains and planes which are linked to active and technical connotations. Whereas, girls are more likely to be given dolls, teddy bears, prams and miniature, toy ovens which stimulate a rehearsal of female traditional roles such as cooking.
A further type of gender socialisation Oakley has identified is verbal appellation. This refers to the content and style of language used by parents, which provides a further process of differentiation. For example boys are often described as ‘big strong lads’ whilst girls are frequently referred to as ‘sweet little angels’. The words and phrases parents use to praise or criticise their children help build up the child’s self-concept of what a boy and girl should be, thus contributing to the reinforcement of gender identity within the family.
However, it has been noted that a vital criticism of Anne Oakley’s gender role socialization theory is that it fails to recognize that we have a choice in constructing our own identity as males or females. For instance, the majority of parents do not try and determine their children and their roles. This has been illustrated in a study conducted by Susan Goldberg and Michael Lewis (1969). They drew the conclusion that mothers subconsciously reward daughters for being more dependant and passive in comparison to sons, who are more likely to be rewarded on the basis of being more active and independent. This is further challenged by the existence of homosexuals in our society which surely indicate that gender role socialization is not always successful.
On the other hand, a cross-cultural study carried out by Margaret Mead has illustrated that gender is in fact separate from our biological sex. Margaret Mead studied three tribes of New Guinea; the Arapesh, Mundugumor and Tchambuli. Mead’s findings showed that each tribe varied extensively in terms of their attitudes and behaviour. For instance, both Mundugumor males and females were found to be typically selfish and aggressive (what our culture would refer to as ‘masculine’) whereas in the Arapesh males and females were both reported as cooperative and sensitive to others around them (what our culture would label ‘feminine’). These results would therefore imply that there is no universal masculine or feminine personality, thus supporting Oakley’s claim that gender is a social fact constructed by the culture around us and, as a consequence, unrelated to our biological sex.
A further reason for the distinction between sex and gender has been argued by feminist sociologists, who have claimed that when sex and gender are interchangeable it is easily argued that certain experiences are an inevitable consequence of being male or female. This eventually leads to sexism (normally in relation to women rather than men). For example, traditionally it was often seen that women were naturally to do the housework and raise and care for the children rather than participate in paid work. However, nowadays in our modern industrialised culture, research has shown that this traditional view has now changed as statistics have revealed that today 60% of married couples depend on two incomes. This supports the idea that gender is susceptible to change over time.
The ‘sex-gender distinction’ is therefore vital for feminists and other researchers as it enables them to investigate a males and females gendered experiences without having to revert back to biological determinism. This allows feminist sociologists to argue that there is nothing about a women’s biology that causes a women’s subordination. But instead, that the inequalities between the two sexes are socially determined phenomena that have the capacity for change. As a result, this allows women to drive a divide between what women are told they ‘should be’ and what they ‘actually are’.
However, latest writings on sex and gender have implied that feministic sociologists have relied upon too great a polarisation of the ‘sex-gender distinction’. This is backed up by modern gene research which argues that biological facts do contribute to some behavioural attributes. Such examples can be seen in research on transgendered individuals. For instance, transsexuals, are individuals who psychologically feel that they a ‘trapped in the wrong body’ i.e. their biological identity is not correlated to their gender. Bornstein (1998) supports this view, in arguing that the discrepancy between sex and gender has been too narrowly defined as male or female, and that reconsideration is required, in relation to gender, in order for it to be more broadly considered and approached. This can be seen by Anne Fausto-Sterling (1993) who has suggested that biologically speaking there are many variations running from male to female, which includes ‘male pseudo hermaphrodites, female pseudo hermaphrodites’ and ‘true hermaphrodites’. This was referred to as the five sexes. On the other hand, a limitation with this specific notion has been proposed by Kessler and Mckenna (1978). They argued that Anne Fausto-Sterling’s proposal gives genitals primary signifying status and excludes the fact that majority of the time in our daily life’s we make sex assignments and ascriptions with a complete lack of knowledge about others genitals. Instead, our acknowledgment of one’s sex is dependent on other evident characteristics. Such examples are visible body hair, physical appearance, clothing and behaviour, to name a few.
In contrast, the ‘sex-gender distinction’ is moreover backed up by Garfinkel (1967) who examined that western societies rely on a dimorphic model of sex. This model suggests that as soon as a newborn child is born, they are immediately classified into either one of the two distinct sexes; female or male. This determination of sex presumes a consequent set of behaviours and attitudes which are suggestive of that gender (masculine or feminine), thus resulting in the probable direction of the child’s life. However, historical studies have shown that this model was preceded by a different one-sex model, as shown by Thomas Laqueur (1990). This model dominated the 17th and 18th centuries, in which the central thought was that male and female bodies were primarily similar, even in terms of genitalia. In contrast to the latest 19th century two-sex model, males and females were not seen as difference in kind, but rather in degree. It can therefore be proposed that sex may not be as fixed as feminist sociologists have argued.
In conclusion, the ‘sex-gender distinction’ can be seen as important for sociologists for a number of reasons, as outlined above. However, the fact that the ‘sex-gender distinction’ is perceived as fixed and unchangeable leads too one if it’s major flaws; it’s too narrow. This means that many nuances of intricate social organisations are excluded. This acts a vital drawback and leads to the view that it may be more efficient for sociologists to consider the view that each of the two key concepts is dependent on the other; gender is influenced by sex and sex is influenced by gender.
