A possible decline in Belief and Practice also hints at the possibility of Secularization within Malaysia. This is reflected in the rise of the partially observant Malaysian Muslim- who, despite religious requirements to the contrary, only attends Mosque every Friday, instead of five times a day- illustrating weaknesses in religious practice. Other Muslims in Malaysia also do not abide strictly by religious rules, such as hijab (modesty) for women, and specific rules on fasting and the consumption of alcohol. Both of these can only be proven through general observations- as statistics on such issues do not exist. One figure that can be statistically proven and also is clear evidence at a lapse in practice is the gradual year-on-year increase in the number of adult Muslims caught by religious police in the act of “khalwat” or “close proximity”. The increasing number of apostates (Muslims who renounce Islam), from 550,000 in 2000 to 650,000 in 2005 shows a clear number exiting the religion. However, this figure includes conversions to other religions- and is therefore not exactly the best yardstick to measure secularization with. This combined gives signals to the possibility of a decline in both beliefs and practice- which also hints at the possibility of secularization.
Proving the occurrence of secularization amongst Muslims in Malaysia is however extremely difficult, given the fact that the vast majority of actions that give proof of secularization are considered either illegal or socially unacceptable in the extreme- henceforth explaining the complete lack of statistics to prove increased alcohol consumption, or lower mosque attendance. Given the highly entrenched status of the Islamic faith within the Malaysian state and its political importance, statistics proving secularization would inevitably be seen as both embarrassing and undermining to the state. If such statistics exist, they are unavailable on the public domain- meaning that although one can see the possibility of secularization occurring, it is almost impossible to prove it to the letter of Wilson’s concept of “decline over time” due to the lack of both current and past figures.
On the other hand, it is very easy to argue that secularization in Malaysia is not occurring. This is due to a number of factors. A very clear indicator against Secularization is the statistical fact that 100% of all Malays are declared Muslims- but this may not necessarily be a true reflection. However, the most predominant factor by far is the institutional strength of Islam in Malaysia. Islam is Malaysia’s state religion, and as such also enjoys state support, funding and patronage. Islam has significant built-in advantages within the framework of Malaysia’s constitution besides from its status as State Religion. All ethnic Malays (who make up the majority of the population) become Muslim from birth. The very fact that Islam is dominant within the life of the Malay child from birth until death provides a compelling counter against the argument that secularization has occurred in Malaysia.
Islam’s institutional strength is also clearly manifested in the overt Islamic nature of governance. Government policy in general has a very strong Islamic ethos- reflected in the promotion of “Islam Hadhari” or “Civilization Islam”, which, amongst other things, advocates moral integrity and faith in Allah as the principals of Malaysian governance. Both major Malay political parties strongly tie themselves in with the idea of Islam, and use Islamic language at every possible opportunity. The United Malay National Organization (UMNO), the main governing party, is Islamic by both definition and nature, controls 2/3rd’s of the seats in the Dewan Rakyat (House of Representatives), and leads nearly every state government. The Opposition (and Fundamentalist) Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) controls 6 seats in the Dewan Rakyat, together with the state government of Kelantan.
The ideals of Islam and Islamic Principals also manifest themselves in Malaysian foreign policy- through Malaysia’s advocacy of an “International Islamic Economic Partnership” and its keen participation in the Organization of Islamic States. Malaysia’s constant offer to send peacekeepers to Muslim areas in trouble (one example of which is the Malaysian Army’s role under the UN in protecting Bosnian Muslims) shows a clear influence of the idea of Islamic identity on external relations. The extent to which Islam plays a guiding if not main role within Malaysian politics clearly shows the strength of the institutional link between religion and government.
The Islamic faith also still clings on closely to its latent functions (Parsons). Faith schools (or Agama schools) are widespread around the country, and offer state-funded education based mainly on the Islamic faith. Private “integrated” schools (a softer word for a Madrassah), which feature a curriculum based around prayer, Islam and Arabic, are also beginning to gain popularity. Malaysia also boasts a government-founded International Islamic University. Mosques also play a crucial role in the provision of social services, charity and aid to the poor- and in many cases, act as distribution points for government welfare agencies. The judicial and social control roles of Islam are also still clearly manifested, through the Syariah Courts system for Muslim Malaysians, as well as the existence of religious police, or enforcement officers, to ensure adherence to religious codes. A vast plethora of government quangos, from the Halal Food Licensing Boards, Islamic Business Development Agencies to the various Islamic Development Departments throughout the country clearly show the strength of Islam beyond religious roles and again clearly show that secularization has not occurred.
It could perhaps be argued that instead of undergoing secularization, Malaysia is undergoing resacrilization. This can be proved by the increased emphasis on Islam under the current prime minister, in comparison with previous administrations. Dr. Mahathir’s declaration of Malaysia as an “Islamic state” in 2001, and the following re-emphasis on increasing the idea of Islam as a pillar of the state help to support this arguments. Evidence for resacrilization can also be seen in the public sphere, with the rise of the fundamentalist Islamic Party of Malaysia to power in the state of Kelantan, where the rules of hijab (modesty) are strictly enforced, women segregated from men in public places and bans on alcohol, pork and the lottery put into place. This goes hand in hand with resurgence in Islamic Culture- most vividly illustrated by Malaysia’s new administrative capital, Putrajaya, which surprisingly enough features only 3 buildings of a traditional Malay design- with the majority of the rest built in a distinctively Arabic/Islamic style, as well as a rise in the use and popularity of Islamic banking in Malaysia. Another argument to prove resacrilization and hence disprove secularization is the growth in Muslin cults and deviant sects, which now number 22. A famous example of this growth in cults and sects is the Sky Kingdom cult- based around reinterpretations of Islamic texts fused with other religious elements. Despite the fact that most of these cults and sects are rapidly stamped out by religious authorities, it can be said that they show clear evidence against the possibility of Secularization in Malaysia.
Although arguments for secularization can be found if not wrung out for use, Secularization in Malaysia just may not be possible because of the fact that it is almost impossible to convert away from the Islamic faith. Conversion away from the Islamic faith in Malaysia usually involves making an application to a Syariah Court for an apostate certificate- which is usually denied. In many cases, the very act of applying for apostasy is punishable by up to 3 years in a “re-education” camp. The fundamentalist Islamic Party of Malaysia administration in Kelantan has also made it clear in recent years that they would like to introduce the death penalty for apostates as soon as possible. This, however, cannot be done due to the fact that criminal justice and capital punishment is not on the State List. The degree of social control and surveillance in Malaysia over Muslims, combined with overbearing social expectations due to the central role of religion, makes it very difficult for people to show any loss of faith or lapse of practice. It could even be argued (but due to a lack of statistics, not proven) that Malaysia may suffer from “belonging without believing” as Muslims must still belong due to both legal and social pressures, but may not necessarily believe. It can also be argued that the Islamic faith in Malaysia no longer constitutes a religion by right, given its wide ranging institutional presence- instead, it has been swallowed whole by both state institutions and political parties- leading to an unusual situation in which religion becomes a vehicle for other interests, instead of politics and government being the vehicle of religion.
In conclusion, it must be said that despite the uncertainty surrounding the Islamic faith in Malaysia, as well as a glaring and unsatisfying lack of statistics that make it all but impossible to prove either argument, evidence clearly shows that secularization is not happening in Malaysia, and certainly will not happen in the near future, given the wide-ranging presence of the Islamic faith both in government, society, politics and culture.
