Middlebrook thoroughly describes the plan of attack, but is careful not to say which elements of the attack would fail until later in the book. This helps give the book a stronger narrative style that is captivating and compelling. The plan called for heavy shelling of the German trenches for over a week, followed by infantry attack in waves, without small attacking parties moving into No Man's Land to secure trenches quickly after the artillery lifted. Middlebrook sees in this two of the greatest follies in the battle, both of which fall on the shoulders of General Henry Rawlinson. The first mistake was overconfidence in the destruction of the German trenches by shelling. The German trench system was stronger and more elaborate than most had figured. It had deep, fortified dugouts that could sustain the heavy artillery fire. Also, the artillery barrage was supposed to destroy the German lines of barbed wire, but again, it failed. Men were told that they would have little resistance crossing No Man's Land and that they would find empty trenches on the other side. They were sorely mistaken. The destruction of the barbed wire required a very accurate and precise artillery attack, especially when using shrapnel shells, and this was not achieved. On top of that, a large number of shells did not explode. Men reported seeing hundreds of unexploded shells strewn across the battlefield.
The second great mistake, from Middlebrook's point of view, was the exclusion of troops to secure German trenches immediately after the shelling stopped. This could stem from Rawlinson's overconfidence in the artillery. If key positions were attacked before the Germans had time to prepare their defenses, British troops could have quickly gained an advantage over the Germans. Middlebrook argues that Rawlinson had little faith in new army soldiers, and that he thought a rushing attack would be to complicated and confusing for them to execute. Instead, it was ordered that the men should adhere to the rigid wave system. Men, loaded with a large amount of equipment, walked in lines across open ground with German machine gunners directly in front of them. Middlebrook says "It was the senselessness of sending up to eight waves of heavily laden men across open ground, without any sort of advance guard, that caused a high portion of the casualties" (280)
Another issue that Middlebrook addresses is the handling of the success of the right side of the line. Here was one of the only divisions that achieved all its objectives. The 30Th. division, which bordered the French army, had initial success and quickly progressed through No Man's Land to the German trenches. With slight resistance they took the town of Montauban and the German trench behind it. The British army now had a position from which they could lead a decisive attack. Again, Rawlinsion had the choice of action. He could use varying degrees of a cavalry attack or could continue further with an infantry attack. What he chose to do however, was to keep his men in Montauban, and have them defend the town. Middlebrook analyzes the situation:
"The cavalry might have been caught by long-range German machine gun fire or British artillery fire; their return route might have been closed behind them. But, considering the slaughter of the British infantry farther North, these would have been risks that cavalry would certainly have accepted. Two or three cavalry regiments, boldly handled, could have achieved results out of all proportion to their numbers." (288)
Middlebrook proposes the consequences of the hesitation. After two days at Montauban, Rawlinson decides to progress the soldiers, but by that time cooperation with the French army in the area had broken down and the Germans were regrouping and prepared for such an attack. A crucial opportunity had been missed.
The book also contains in depth analysis of international relations and peace discussions around the time of the battle. Middlebrook argues that Britain's strong alliances, most notably with France, gave it little choice but to fully commit to conflict against Germany. By the time of the Somme, France was in dire straits and were barely holding on at Verdun. A large attack was needed to sufficiently draw German troops away and give France a fighting chance. Middlebrook also assesses alternate fronts of attack, but comes to the conclusion that the Somme is one of their best chances. Naval routes of attack were severely blocked off and coming through Holland would have violated neutral territory.
A feature of the book that I found especially insightful and compelling was the inclusion of the perspective of German military personnel. Throughout the narrative of the text, Middlebrook quotes German soldiers with the same manner he quotes British soldiers. Understandably, the British offering far outweighs the German, but the inclusion at all is refreshing. The reader is shown the fundamental similarities between sides and is given a broader understanding of humanity in war.
In the end, the goal of this book is to explore if the first day was a success and if the battle as a whole was worthwhile. Middlebrook looks at Haim's original objectives to determine what might mean. "The French were relieved from defeat at Verdun; the positions held by the Allies at the end of battle were better than on 30 June; Losses were inflicted on the Germans." (289) But, as Middlebrook states "the British assault had been on such a scale that success, in this limited sense, had been inevitable. The terrible losses made it a success hardly worth having" (290) This book provides the reader with a clear view not only of a single battle, but of the elements of the British army in 1916. Most importantly, it gives the reader a glimpse into the mind of the soldiers who fought in that battle and that army. It is a powerful piece of literature that is both enlightening and engaging.
