This essay would be examining the methods through which the British won the Battle of Britain, through the use of radar and the careful use their fighter planes. It

The British were fully aware of the German goals, strategy, and often even tactics due to their ability to read the German Enigma cypher, which was used for most high-security German military radio communications. This fact, not revealed until the 1970s, was crucial in forming British tactics. They had also killed or turned all German agents in Britain.

The Germans didn't keep using any single strategy, even when it was on the verge of defeating the RAF largely because they didn't have any real idea of its success, but also because Hitler's style encouraged competing interests in the High Command to try their pet theories in tactics.

The Battle can be crudely divided into four sections:

July - August 11: Kanalkampf

August 12 - August 24: Adlerangriff

August 25 - September 6: German's attack RAF planes and airfields almost exclusively. The critical period of the battle

September 7 onwards: London and other major cities are bombed.

The Germans had however grossly underestimated the use of the radar systems that the Bristish so dearly used.  The technology used allowed the radar to return to operation 6 hours after being attacked.  They were taken off air and returned to operation after the German squads had passed.  General Göring later did not see the importance of the attacks on the radar systems and this tactical error became the RAF’s advantage in upsetting the Luftwaffe.

In the early phases of the battle the RAF was hamstrung by its reliance on obsolete fighting drills. These restricted their squadrons to tight 12 aircraft formations composed of three-aircraft "sections" in tight "V's" nicknamed 'vics'. With four sections flying together in tight formation only the squadron leader at the front was free to actually watch for the enemy, the other pilots had to concentrate on him and each other. RAF fighter training also emphasised by-the-book attacks by sections breaking away in sequence. The German pilots dubbed the RAF formations "Idiotenreihen" ("rows of idiots") because they left squadrons vulnerable to attack. They employed the looser and more flexible four-ship 'Schwarme' developed in the Spanish Civil War, using two pairs each consisting of leader and wingman. The frontline RAF pilots were acutely aware of the inherent deficiencies of their own tactics. However, they could not radically change them as arriving replacement pilots, often with only minimal actual flying time, could not be readily retrained in the midst of battle. A compromise was adopted whereby squadron formations used much looser formations with one or two aircraft flying independently above and behind (dubbed 'weavers') to provide increased observation and rear protection. After the battle RAF pilots adopted a variant on the German formations with some success.

The fact that 'sweeps' by German fighters not escorting bombers were often ignored by fighter command seems to reinforce the idea that Dowding sought always to preserve his fighter force to fight another day.

During the battle, some commanders, notably Trafford Leigh-Mallory of 12 Group, proposed that squadrons should be formed into , consisting of at least three squadrons, to attack the enemy en masse, a method pioneered by the legless pilot . Proponents of this tactic claimed that interceptions in large numbers caused greater enemy losses while reducing their own casualties. Opponents pointed out that the big wings would take too long to form up, and that the strategy ran a greater risk of fighters being caught on the ground refuelling. The big wing idea also caused pilots to over claim their kills, due to the confusion of a more intense battle-zone.

The technology in the British fighters was also an important factor that produced success in the Allied Forces upsetting the Germans.  British fighters were equipped with a simple form of transponder, which automatically replied to interrogation from the ground systems with an identification signal. Known as IFF, or Identification Friend or Foe, it identified friendly aircraft on the screens. A secret device, it was code-named 'Parrot'. The instruction to switch it on was therefore "Squawk your Parrot". That term is still in use today as modern transponder codes are known as 'Squawks'. Steer is also still in use, and these remnants are a testimony to the basic soundness of the system of 1940.

The Battle of Britain marked the first time that the Nazis were stopped and that air superiority became clearly seen as the key to the war. Though the battle was small in the number of combatants and casualties, had the Germans triumphed the war would have taken a very different path. The British victory marked the first failure of Hitler's war machine.  Modern military historians have suggested the Luftwaffe could not win the battle.  Their numerical majority was not sufficient to achieve superiority over the technically advanced RAF.  Dowding's and Park's strategy of choosing when to engage the enemy whilst maintaining a coherent force was totally vindicated.  Overall the Battle of Britain was a British victory, although on a small scale compared to later battles it was significant, especially in increasing American anti-Nazi opinion.

Although the Germans came very close to beating the RAF and thus setting the prerequisites for Seelöwe, the switch to terror strategy allowed the RAF to recuperate and to defend against the attacks. The terror strategy in itself could not force the British to surrender.