Account for the failure of democracy in Germany in the period 1928 to 1934.

MODERN HISTORY

Richard Sawyer

Those in power in Weimar Germany so consistently mishandled the political and economic situation leading up to the period 1928-1934, that a well-structured challenge from the Nazi Party brought about the fall of democracy. This Nazi Party was stronger ideologically, structurally within the party and politically, with Hitler as Fuhrer a major factor himself. In addition, factions within Germany for whom a right-wing political system was more beneficial, such as the army and big business, aided the eventual change in governance. Thus a series of events occurred which can be summarised by these three main factors: failure of the Weimar Government, strength of the Nazi Party and finally the political finesse of Hitler himself in the total abolition of democracy in Germany in 1934.

The Weimar democracy was weak in three key areas, which led to the failure of this democracy. These areas can be roughly classified as political, structural and economic weaknesses. The declaration of a German democratic republic on November 9th 1918 by Philipp Scheidemann was not a result of a revolution or popular movement within Germany, and thus it was not necessarily a solution with great support from the populace. Furthermore, historian Shirer argues there was a history within Germany of authoritarian rule under a Monarchy with close ties to a strong military, and hence there was no precedent of voting or democratic freedoms in German culture. Therefore, from its establishment, democracy was weak politically in Germany. This was not assisted by the structural problems of the constitution; proportional representation meant that no clear majority was found in the Reichstag necessitating weak multi-coalition Governments and frequent elections as a majority dissolved when any disagreement between parties arose. Third, the false Golden Age of economic prosperity created by the Dawes (1924) and Young (1929) Plans and resulting loans from the US Government the during the 1920s had come to a close as the Great Depression hit, and unemployment rose to over 6 million in Germany. Yet, the Weimar Government has survived the hyperinflation of the early 1920s, and therefore it is easy to over-estimate to impact of the Great Depression on the failure of democracy. The economic situation did help to draw more voters towards the fringe parties, and create an atmosphere more willing to foster extremist views as the Weimar Government was seen as weak and unable to cope with Germany’s problems. Thus, the first major factor attributing to the downfall of democracy in Germany was the preceding failure of the Weimar Government politically, structurally, and economically to take a firm hold over Germany.

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The Nazi Party’s strength in three main areas allowed it to precipitate the failure of democracy in Germany. Ideologically, structurally and politically the Nazi party was superior to the Weimar Democracy especially in the period 1928-1934. Ideologically, historian Hans Mommson claims the Nazi Party was a “catch all party” in that the party’s nationalistic, socialist and racist policies were attractive to large sections of German society. While the strong nationalistic claims for a superior German race were popular among conservative elements in society, the socialist elements were popular to workers and those in rural communities. Nazi claims to stop reparations to the Allies, expand through Eastern Europe (Lebensraum) and the use of scapegoats such as communist and Jews were all popular in a country used to the vague position of a conglomerate democracy from the Weimar Government. Therefore the ideology of the Nazis was one factor leading to the failure of democracy in Germany.

The Nazi party were also increasingly well structured throughout the 1920s. This structure had three main affects. First, propaganda and bullying was institutionalised in the Nazi party in the SA and SA. The SA was created in 1920 to protect party meetings, but also disrupted communist party meetings and pamphleteer for the Nazis. The SA’s marches demonstrated the might of the Nazi Party, and their consistent undermining of communist marches and party meetings weakened the left wing of German politics. The SA was massively popular in Germany in recruiting members, and had grown to 3 million by 1930, demonstrating the success of the Nazi party’s diverse structure. Second, the Nazi party followed a policy of gleischaltung once Hitler had become Chancellor in 1933, under which large sections of the German community became extensions of the Nazi Party. This included youth groups and women’s organizations, and importantly many branches of law enforcement, creating a state under increasing Nazi control.

Third, the Fuhrer Principle was extremely important in allowing members of the Party to partake in activities that would otherwise be considered illegal or immoral, without tarnishing Hitler, or therefore the official Nazi party itself. Kershaw argues this principle was a “rejection of the institutional and bureaucratic norms… in favour of dependence on personal loyalty as the base of authority.” Thus, this principle led to the Night of the Long Knives in June 1934, as the leader of the SA Ernst Rohm and many other political adversaries were removed by force by the elite force branch of the Nazi Party, the SS under the leadership of Himmler. Hitler was praised for controlling the revolutionary wing of his party, and those below Hitler carried out his orders carefully, employing force officially for the first time. Thus, the Nazi party’s structure allowed for legalized brutality, due to, as Kershaw explains, “unconditional or unquestioning obedience” leading to “cumulative and progressive radicalization in the Third Reich.” Therefore the structure of the Nazi party furthered the dominance of the right wing over democracy by: formally institutionalising propaganda and bullying tactics; creating diverse influences in German society; and also creating a hierarchy of party members all responsible only to Hitler.

Hitler was never voted President, and when on August 1st 1934 Hitler declared himself Fuhrer of Germany complete, there had been a play between Hitler himself and other conservative factors in Germany allowing this action to take place. Hitler was a political force for the Nazi party with famous oratory skills and skill in manipulating the Reichstag, shown in his eventual position as Chancellor in 1933; and the passing of bills that progressively moved Germany towards dictatorship such as the Reichstag Fire Decree (February 27, 1933) and the Enabling Act (March 23rd 1933). Historian Ian Kershaw argues Hitler was mainly important as a figurehead in this move, and a real symbiotic relationship between the Nazis and major factions in German society was the major determining factor. By this, Kershaw mainly means the capitalist ‘big business’ that sponsored the Nazis as they became more popular and were set to benefit from totalitarian rule free from unions, and the traditionalist Army who had lost large amounts of power in the Weimar Democracy under the Treaty of Versailles. Finally, the moves by Hitler were made possible by the determined effort the Weimar Democracy had made throughout the 1920s to undermine the leftwing of German politics, which it saw as the main threat to democracy. Thus, the Weimar politicians had used conservative elements such as the Army to defend against communism, and by the 1930s, it was the rightwing of politics that was strong enough to defeat democracy and instill a dictatorship.

Therefore the weakness of Weimar and the various strengths of the Nazi party resulted in the failure of democracy in Germany between 1928-1934. Weimar had been historically weak politically, structurally and faced new economic problems by 1929. The Nazis utilised a popular ideology and an effective party structure, including use of brutality, to infiltrate German society. Historians have debated Hitler’s role, but his skills in speaking and manipulating assisted the party’s success. Finally, the economic capitalist base was a determining factor, as big business and the forces of the army supported the Nazi regime. Thus it was in 1934 that democracy failed in Germany, and Hitler was able to begin to move towards his ambitions for Germany as he saw fit.

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