Account for the success of the Bolshevik revolution in

   The Provisional Government’s lack of ‘genuine’ authority contributed to the success of the Bolshevik revolution in October, 1917. The Dual Authority exercised between the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet, indeed crippled the government’s integrity of rule. Guchkov, the minister for war, argued on March 9th, ‘The Provisional Government had no real force as its disposal.’ The Provisional Government’s decrees were carried out only to an extent the Soviet of Worker’s and Soldiers’ Deputies approved. ‘In its hands (are) the most important elements of real power, such as the army, the railways, the post and telegraphs. It is possible to say flatly that the Provisional Government exists only as long as is allowed by the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldier’s Deputies. In particular, it is now possible to give only these orders which do not radically conflict with the orders of the above-named Soviet.’   

   The military failure of the army was significant in the victory of the Bolshevik revolution. The 15 million men added to the Russian military machine 1914-1917, fought with numerous inadequacies. From the humble beginnings of its rule, the Provisional Government committed much of Russia’s manufacturing resources to a disastrous war effort, rather than address the concerns of the peasantry. ‘Maintenance of the war effort not only frustrated the peasants’ land demands but also influenced the government’s attitude towards worker’s demands. The war required enormous supplies of such things as food, clothing, shoes and arms, which stretched Russia’s manufacturing resources to their limit.’ The defeat of the struggling Russian army allowed German and Turkish forces to establish easy blockades on Russia’s geographical boundaries; therefore ‘Russian dependence on imports of raw materials further increased the country’s vulnerability to the blockade.’ The inability of the government’s machine of repression shares a similarity to the breakdown of the military during the February revolt, demonstrating the significance of a steady army in maintaining order. However the Kornilov affair seemed to provoke the dissolution of the Provisional Government’s military leadership. ‘An unsuccessful attempt by General Kornilov, head of the army, to overthrow the Kerensky government and establish a military dictatorship further discredited the military leadership.’ Despite the ill-judgment of the Provisional Government and the unforeseen Kornilov incident, further military failure was channelled through the poor conditions experienced within the army. ‘Because of general war weariness, bad nourishment, mistrust of officers, there has developed an intense defeatist agitation accompanied by refusals to carry out orders, threats to the commanding personnel, and attempts to fraternize with the Germans.’ Indeed, the failure of the Russian military contributed to further discontent with the Provisional Government’s promise to guarantee security.

   The failure of the Petrograd Soviets and All Russian Congress of Soviets contributed to the Bolshevik revolution due to the inability of its moderate socialist leaders to exert their ‘popular’ power. Historian Richard Abraham comments on the strong support for the Soviets, ‘the Soviets…elected, as they were, by workers in factories and soldiers in the barracks…enjoyed much more prestige in the minds of the masses than the provisional government.’ Despite the control of the Soviets over troops through the issue of ‘Order No.1’, the rail lines and the telegraph service, they enjoyed limited definitive power. Historian Michael Barlow argues the problematic nature and disunity within the Soviets, ‘there was conflict among the Soviet leaders…they lacked experience in government and their leading spokesmen were in exile.’ The Socialist Revolutionary, Chernov, further argues the inexperience of the Soviet leaders, ‘the leap from the remote Siberian village or the Genevan colony of exiles straight to the seats of government was like being transferred to a different planet.’ Also, the interpretation of Marxism by Soviet leaders would procrastinate any attempt by the Soviets to seek sole power. Barlow comments, ‘Soviet leaders remained wedded to an interpretation of Marxism which required a period of bourgeois political leadership as a prelude to a socialist seizure by the proletariat.’  Furthermore sole rule for the Soviet leaders required a Soviet perspective on Russian war engagements, yet no unified decision had been formulated. Indeed, the Soviet enjoyed greater support than its ‘Duma origins’ contemporary, yet was reluctant and conservative in practising its power.

   The Bolshevik victory was achieved due to the rise of the Bolsheviks through 1917, incorporating the strong leadership of Lenin. Lenin’s ability to emphasize the weaknesses of the Provisional Government and yield appraisal for the Soviets enabled him to ‘establish a pre-eminent position among those who wanted a radically different Russia.’ Through his April Theses he constructed the ‘blueprint for revolution’ and persuaded his contemporaries his doctrine would be victorious. ‘One man had totally changed his party’s perspective: ‘victory’ now meant the victory of a specific group, the Bolsheviks, who would realize the revolution.’ Lenin’s close incorporation of Marxist manifestations into the management of the Bolsheviks was significant.

   The ability to identify and critique the bourgeoisie nature of the Provisional Government was fundamental in the success of the Bolshevik revolution. Such propaganda campaigns would cause dissatisfaction among the populace. Lenin’s April Thesis argued the Provisional Government to be a power of the bourgeoisie, needing to be overcome by the proletariat. ‘The specific feature of the present situation is Russia is that it represent a transition from the first stage of the revolution…the power in the hands of the bourgeoisie, to the second stage, which must place the powers in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest strata of the peasantry.’ The propaganda campaign echoed in Lenin’s State and Revolution, he ‘once more coupled the bureaucracy and the army as the two most characteristic institutions of the bourgeois state machine, which the revolution would have, not to take over, but to destroy.’ The Bolshevik revolution would thrive on these campaigns of ‘hate’ with the support of a revolution craving proletariat.

      

   Furthermore, the role of Trotsky in securing the services of the ‘Red Army’ proved clinical to the final success of the Bolsheviks. Trotsky’s acquired chairmanship allowed the organization of the uprising and complete command over the Petrograd garrison, both critical in the final seizure of power by the Bolsheviks. With the ‘Red Army’ as the Bolshevik machine of repression, little resistance was met. N.N. Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution 1917: A Personal Record, (1962), comments on the importance of the final downfall of the Provisional Government, ‘it (events of October 26th) was natural to try above all to paralyse the political and military centre of the Government, that is, occupy the Winter Palace and the Staff.’ Indeed, Trotsky under Lenin’s control, with his role in the Military Revolutionary Committee was pivotal to the final seizure of Winter Palace on October 26th.

   In conclusion, the victory of the Bolsheviks can be attributed to the failure of the Provisional Government in response to land policies; their failure to gain support from the populace; the lack of ‘genuine’ authority of the Provisional Government and the military failure of the army. The failure of the Petrograd Soviets and All Russian Congress of Soviets also contributed to the Bolshevik revolution due to inability of its moderate leaders to exert their ‘popular’ power. The Bolshevik victory was attained due to the rise of the Bolsheviks through 1917, with the leadership of Lenin and their ability to attack the bourgeoisie state of the Provisional Government. Furthermore the Bolshevik revolution was achieved due to the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, by gaining the critical support of the ‘Red Army’ though Trotsky’s role within the Military Revolutionaries Committee. However the Bolshevik seizure was rather a beginning than an end to the revolution, as civil war loomed rather than the democratic peace Lenin had foreseen.

     

Bibliography

Bucklow, M., Russell, G. (1976) Russia: Why Revolution?. Melbourne: Longman Chesire

Carr, E.H. (1966) The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923. Middlesex: Penguin Books

Corin, C., Fiehn, T. (2002) Communist Russia Under Lenin And Stalin. London: John Murray Publishers

Kochan, L. (1967) Russia In Revolution. Great Britain: Weidenfeld & Nicholson

Kochan, L., Abraham, R. (1962) The Making Of Modern Russia. Great Britain: Penguin Books

 

---