Cuban Missile Crisis Sources Questions

George Maund

Cuban Missile Crisis - History Coursework Assignment Two

Question One

Source A shows that the President must have felt a great sense of urgency in order for him to telephone his brother, the American Attorney General, at the start of the working day. The Source also indicates that President Kennedy went straight to the point, stating that America faced great trouble, and that he was now sure of Soviet placing of missiles on Cuban land.

President Kennedy would have felt very threatened upon seeing the U2 spy plane photographs. His initial reaction would have been deep shock at the proof of ballistic missiles so close to America. Source B contains the geographical implications of the placement of missiles. These missiles were so close to American shores that they would bypass the early warning system located in the Arctic, which was designed to detect missiles approaching from Russia, east of America. If Kennedy had looked closely at the geographical implications of inter-continental ballistic missiles on Cuban soil, he would have seen the vast array of threatened American cities. Miami, New Orleans and Dallas fell inside the 1000-mile radius of short-range ICBMs, and New York, Chicago and the capital were within the 2000-mile radius of long-range ICBMs.

In addition to the implications of missiles being present on Cuba, the very idea that the enemy and fellow superpower Russia had made a strategically provocative move by placing these missiles would have made the President thoroughly insecure when conversing with Khrushchev.

Question Two

President Kennedy had six different optional responses towards the Soviet placement of missiles on Cuba, as it was felt throughout America that some form of action had to be taken against such a provocative Soviet move.

Firstly, as shown be Source C, America could conduct a series of surgical air strikes on Cuba to eliminate the missile bases. The problem with this option was that it could have led to the escalation of the Crisis to new heights, such as an all-out nuclear response from Russian missile bases, or the invasion of Berlin by East German forces.

Secondly, Kennedy had the option of invading Cuba. This would have resulted in high casualties on both sides, probably would have been in the same light as the Bay of Pigs failure, and almost definitely would have resulted in the Soviet invasion of Berlin. This option did not have a one hundred per cent chance of success.

From Source C we can see that Kennedy also had the option of a nuclear strike in mind. The air force, as well as all other forces in the military, had been put on alert for either bombing Cuba or Russia with nuclear missiles. As soon as the missiles showed up on the Russian radar, however, a Soviet nuclear response would have been inevitable.

Escalation of the Crisis to war status was not an option by any means, so the first three responses were considered improper. The EX-COMM committee came up with five of the options, which they presented to Kennedy. The last two are of a more diplomatic nature, plus one additional option.

Kennedy could use diplomacy to appeal to Khrushchev, but this would make America look weak. In Source D Kennedy makes the implication of diplomatic relations being an option by calling upon Khrushchev to “halt this reckless and provocative threat.

Finally EX-COMM gave the option of a blockade, or quarantine, on all ships approaching Cuba. Source D, a radio message from President Kennedy, tells of how he ordered a routine inspection of cargo on ships bound for Cuba, so that any ships with missiles components on board would be turned away. This put the ball in Khrushchev’s court - it meant that the next strategic move would have to be his.

In Source C it is implied that there was an option of doing nothing. This would only make Kennedy look weak and the build up of missiles would increase further.

The responses involving direct military action, and therefore a high chance of casualties were eliminated. That left Kennedy with diplomacy, a blockade or doing nothing. Choosing diplomacy would mean months of talks and would take far too long. Choosing to do nothing would give the Soviets more time to build up their bases and increase the threat of nuclear strike from Cuban soil. So it was decided that the blockade ...

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In Source C it is implied that there was an option of doing nothing. This would only make Kennedy look weak and the build up of missiles would increase further.

Question Three

Part (i)

Source E treats the conflict as a political dispute, for example Kennedy refers to the “regime” in Cuba as unsuitable to the USA. It draws on both the Soviet and American perspectives, as the Soviets see the USA guilty of an “anti-Cuban propaganda campaign” i.e. the USA’s attempt at conspiring against the Cuban leader, Fidel Castro. To the Soviets, the implications of American re-involvement in Cuba were threatening to say the least, as they probably felt quite content with the trade opportunities with Cuba. Where Gromyko (Source E’s author) refers to America’s actions as being able to “lead to serious consequences for the whole of mankind”, he is talking of the threat of retaliation by the USSR on behalf of communism itself, and, emphasising the potential of having an effect on “the whole of mankind”, it is possible to infer that Gromyko meant some kind of nuclear attack on the USA.

Source F is a more amicable and diplomatic extract. It deals with the military or armament side of the conflict as a cause for concern, not a potential bullying tool. Khrushchev attempts to persuade Kennedy to cease the blockade and pledge not to invade Cuba in exchange for the Soviet removal of weapons from Cuba. The source is dealing directly with the likes and dislikes of both sides – Khrushchev actually wants to resolve the crisis. The attitude in Source E, however, is much more stubborn. The Soviets share their perspective, and both sides are subtle with what they imply. Source F has the attitude of going straight to the point.

Part (ii)

The two sources are fairly useful in understanding why the crisis occurred over Cuba, but in different consistencies and to different lengths.

Although both the sources avoid giving a full account as to why the USA became involved in Cuba. Source E gives the idea that the USA was responsible for the conflict as President Kennedy talks of how the communist regime in Cuba didn’t suit the USA. The source avoids the factor of missiles being present on Cuba. This selective viewpoint thus makes America look like the offending nation, and we see why the source is biased towards the USSR when we look at the nature, origin and purpose it serves. Source E is an extract from the memoirs of Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister at the time of the conflict. The point of memoirs is always self-benefit and self-glorification. With the added bonus of Gromyko being a Soviet citizen, his memoirs would be biased towards making the USSR appear innocent and righteous, and to make himself seem a successful Foreign Minister. In reality the USSR were taking advantage of their Cuban “position” by installing missiles on the island. By doing this, the USSR had avoided the USA’s early warning defence systems in the Arctic, giving access to instantaneous and undetectable destruction of any American city within 2000 miles of Cuba. In this sense, Source E gives insight as to why the USSR became involved in the crisis, but not so much the American reasons.

Source F shows Khrushchev’s intended stages of diplomatic relations with the USA to bring an end to the crisis. By doing this it points out the wants of both sides, thus unveiling the reasons for either nation being involved in the conflict. Firstly Khrushchev asks of America to get rid of its blockade and pledge not to invade Cuba, and in exchange he will take away missile installations on the island. Therefore, the Soviet perspective and necessity of being involved in to protect the best interests of its ally, Cuba, and in doing this wants to prevent American aggression or threat therein. The USA’s reason for being involved is simply the threatening presence of missiles on the island.

The fact that Source F is a diplomatic letter from one side to the other means that behind the scenes intentions of the USSR are not shown. This use of tact was wise, as it would bring a swifter solution to the problem. Using other public knowledge, it was apparent that the deal extended into Khrushchev asking for the USA to remove Jupiter missiles from Turkey. Although this isn’t a reason for involvement in the conflict, the USSR’s secret intentions were revealed here. It is more likely that Khrushchev was taking advantage of an already decent situation. By mentioning this in his diplomatic letter, Khrushchev would have seemed threatened by the Turkish missiles, and therefore weak in the face of the Americans. In conclusion, the sources are fairly helpful in understanding motives, although throughout it is important to understand that Khrushchev did not at any point want to appear weak.

Question Four

The Cuban Missile Crisis was settled so quickly due to four different yet corresponding reasons. To begin with, the nature of the crisis was such that both sides were on the edge of their seats awaiting an opportunity to end the conflict, yet attain their individual goals or aims from the crisis at the same time. In other words, the danger of a nuclear war was so frightening to the leaders that neither wanted to have to make a ground breaking move towards nuclear war. However, the USA was intent on getting rid of the missiles on Cuba, and the USSR was intent on America not invading the island or carrying on their naval blockade. Yet at every opportunity in the past both of the sides were mildly belligerent, often using the threat of their nuclear capability as a means of bullying the other into backing out. This is why at the stage of the crisis featured in Sources H and I, both sides were much more agreeable and were leaning towards solving the problem rather than resorting to a nuclear war. Source H goes on from this point to show Khrushchev’s desire for a diplomatic solution as he is the one to really put out the boat in terms of building up communications between the two sides. By announcing to Kennedy his proposal, Khrushchev put the ball into the American President’s court. As soon as Kennedy set eyes on the proposal, he snapped up the opportunity to bring an end to the escalation of the crisis by responding positively to Khrushchev’s offer.

Not only the context of the time and setting of the crisis contributed to a quick and easy settlement. There was also the apparent likelihood of mutually assured destruction should either side step over the indefinable boundary set by their “enemy”. This contributed to an air of needing to get through the crisis and not prolong it to the point when a nuclear attack of some kind was the only option left for either of the two nations. This was motivation enough for both leaders to put an end to the crisis diplomatically.

Thirdly, Kennedy had felt a great deal of pressure coming from the American people to resolve the Cold War conflict. Khrushchev also felt that he ought to live up to the high expectations of the Soviet people, not only as a communist figure but also as a strong world leader. Neither nation wanted the conflict to break down into a nuclear war, but at the same time Kennedy felt a deep routed bitterness towards the CIA, as they failed to remove the missiles from Turkey and Italy when Kennedy had asked them to do so, before the missile crisis had come into existence.

Which leads to the final reason for choosing to end the conflict so rapidly. It was the very nature of the crisis itself that pushed the leaders to resolution. The fact that diplomacy was now an option meant that both the leaders would make promises to get what they both wanted. There was a secret agreement between the USA and USSR, as suggested in Source I. This “secret deal” was that in exchange for the Soviet’s removal of their missiles on Cuba, America would, at some point soon after the crisis, get rid of the NATO missiles in Turkey. This was hidden from the American public to protect Kennedy’s name, and also make him appear to be an even stronger President. It has become apparent, in articles such as Len Scott’s “Was there a Turkish Deal?” that there was in fact a hidden bonus for Khrushchev, which undeniably must have tipped the balance for him during the talks. It has been found that President Kennedy had intended to have the missiles taken from Turkey a long while before the crisis began.

Thus finally Source I comes into place. Kennedy, according to a quite fair historian’s perspective, was victorious. The Soviets had “backed down” and had destroyed their missile instalments. To the average American citizen, Kennedy had saved the world from mutually assured destruction. Even though this is certainly true, his inclusion of the removal of the Jupiter missiles from Turkey was surely the offer Khrushchev couldn’t refuse, thus ending the crisis quickly and quietly without any bloodshed or time to change ones mind.

Question Five

Part (i)

The two sources differ as each one demonstrates clearly that both sides, the USA and the USSR, see themselves as the victor of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Source I begins by talking about President Kennedy as the victorious saviour who convinced the Soviets to back down and bulldoze their missile sites. However, at the end, the author mentions the fact that the USA withdrew its missiles from Turkey and Italy. At the time that Source I was conceived it was not public knowledge that the American missile instalments were removed as part of a secret deal with the Soviets after the crisis. The historian, therefore, takes a risk in giving his fairest possible perspective of the crisis. Following on from this, Source J talks of the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis as a victory of Soviet foreign policy, and that there was an agreement or settlement that there would be no invasion of Cuba by the USA – this was seen by the Soviets as a victory, as they no longer needed their missiles in Cuba to prevent America from invading the island. Source J points out that this time Kennedy was the one who “gave in”.

Overall, it was seen by either side as a victory for themselves – they each got what they wanted. The USA intended to have the missiles removed, and the Soviets intended to have USA kept out of Cuba, and to not fall into any kind of direct conflict with America, nuclear or otherwise. A sense of relief, therefore, is felt in both of the Sources.

Part (ii)

The views expressed in Sources I and J differ so greatly for a variety of reasons. They contrast each other greatly, yet at the same time have one common factor - they both imply that a single victor emerged from the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, in each source, the victorious nation and the reasons for that nation being the “winner” are particularly individual and distinctive.

Firstly, the author of “The Brink”, Detzer, is a US historian. However he does not publish a book for the purpose of glorifying his nation. Instead, his historical account exists merely to give us as accurate and fair a view and summary of the Cuban Missile Crisis as he can put together. The juxtaposition of the two parts of the Source – Kennedy’s “victory” and the removal of missiles from Turkey, is verification that this man is not bias in his portrayal of this crisis. In fact, he took a risk by publishing the footnote in 1980, as it was not public knowledge that the removal of the Jupiter missiles from Turkey took place – let alone was connected to a “secret deal” in the Cuban Missile Crisis – until 1987.

On the other hand, Khrushchev’s memoirs are obviously more biased, simply because of the fact that they are memoirs means that they are produced only to better the public opinion of the author. This personal gain, in Khrushchev’s case, would have been more extreme than usual, as it was commonplace in the USSR to litter one’s memoirs with self-glorification and self-benefit to give the Soviet people a good recollection of their leader’s accomplishments. In Source J, the Soviet leader tells how the American President “gave in”, and that this was a great victory of communism and Soviet foreign policy. In the sense that neither side fired a shot at the other, it was a success of Soviet constraint. Khrushchev’s book would have been news to some of the Soviet people, as current affairs weren’t broadcast to the public in the USSR. It is for that reason – the fact that never before have the Soviet people been able to judge the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis – that Khrushchev makes his book so self-glorifying.

If we look at the reasons why the USA agreed to the terms of Khrushchev’s diplomatic letter it is possible to see why it is that Kennedy is the more victorious of the two leaders. After the disaster of the Bay of Pigs invasion, President Kennedy would have been strongly against the idea of a second invasion, even more so than when he had felt unhappy with the idea of the Bay of Pigs taking place. In that sense, Kennedy had lost nothing at all – as Khrushchev had only asked of him to remove the blockade from around Cuba. It was also apparent that Kennedy wanted to remove missiles from Turkey before the Cuban crisis had begun, so again in that sense he had not lost anything or had anything demanded of him which he did not wish to go along with. Khrushchev on the other hand had wanted to bypass the American early warning system in the Arctic by placing missiles on Cuban shores. Thus, he had lost the ability to destroy any American city within a 2000 miles radius of Cuba.

In conclusion, the views vary so widely because the historian merely wishes to give a fair account, whereas Khrushchev wants to save face and appear to be less weak than he actually was during the crisis.