After officers over threw a more liberal government in El Salvador, President Kennedy approved that governments of the civil-military type of El Salvador are the most effective in containing the communist penetration in Latin America. El Salvador was the country that was the pride of the alliance. This was shown by its grants of a greater amount of funds then any other Central American country. Above all else, the most challenging dilemma was the question that even if the real growth occurred, would the poor or the rich parts of the population receive the benefits from everything? The alliance was going to be a revolutionary task, but not a stranger to the revolution. No Latin American country had ever had a peaceful revolution, however, Kennedy was assassinated before the alliance ever began. When Johnson stepped into office, he downgraded the alliance and half of Kennedy’s program was consequently dropped.
In the 1980’s, the country was devastated by a revolution that claimed thousands of civilian victims and drew an even deeper United States involvement. The plan for El Salvador was carried out by a regime close to the oligarchs. “The decade of the Alliance ended in El Salvador as the decade of the revolution began”. There was a fear of the FMLN losing ground in the negotiations. (A further explanation of the FMLN needs to preceed this mention of them.) They did not know what the Americans were thinking and without them, El Salvador would never be able to survive on their own.
After years of brutal fighting, in April of 1980, it was clear that although the (maybe you mean the individual guerilla groups that would soon make up the FMLN…otherwise the next paragraph doesn’t really make sense.) FMLN was not able to defeat the Salvadoran military, it had developed a sufficient military capacity that was very likely itself to be militarily defeated. The revolutionary groups agreed to combine their actions and put together guerrilla groups.
They put together five guerrilla groups that formed the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). (The FMLN developed the FMLN? I would change this but I’m confused. It seems this paragraph be before the paragraph right above it because it explains the FMLN and how they formed whereas the prior paragraph makes mention of what the FMLN is doing.) The FMLN developed out of Marxist groups and guerrilla fighting. The overall strategy of the FMLN was “Prolonged Popular War”, which meant to borrow directly from the Asia revolutionary thought. Although the FMLN and the FDR had conflicting views, the two groups united in their determination to remove the oligarchical and military rule. (What is the FDR?) Their goal was to replace the old system with massive land reforms and nationalization programs. When the FMLN announced the launching of a final offensive, the United States would find an irreversible situation in El Salvador.
The FMLN’s rural political powers were stronger then that of their government. They were more massive in numbers, training and technology that suggested the political capacity with the military. Women became part of the FMLN as full time cooks, radio operators and other roles as well. Liberation theology generally understood women as mothers whose suffering should be less, but not as fully active political subjects. Many females suffered the death of their partners during the years of the combat with the FMLN. Wartime was affecting relationships in general. They were becoming unstable which led to a greater number of causal sex relations. Pregnancies were occurring and women were leaving to give birth to the babies during this time. In post war interviews, several contained mentions of sexual harassment on the part of commanding officers. There were also reports of pressure to engage in sexual activity and sexual abuse as well.
By the end of 1983, the FMLN’s military in El Salvador was controlling about a fifth of the nation’s territory. Their military strategies were changing, the FMLN moved during the day as well as the night and were eliminating the fixed government positions. The purpose of this was so that there would be little military presence except during the campaigns. The United States provided aid to the FMLN and the army doubled within a year. Later, President Bush visited El Salvador to convey to the military that U.S. aid would decrease if the state did not improve its treatment of the people. President Bush was a man of his word and U.S. aid to El Salvador did in fact dramatically decrease.
Another factor that contributed to the decrease in aid was the Salvadoran military’s gradual implementing of the strategy promoted by the United States. (Is this right? If the US promoted it why would it be a factor for them decreasing their aid?) The FMLN’s strategy was reliant upon two factors. The first factor was an intensifying of military operations in rebel-held areas. This would include serial bombing and the deployment of specialized forces on long-range patrols. Second, counterrevolutionary institutions would be founded. This would incorporate the writing of a new and more liberal constitution along with implementing contested elections.
The FMLN had many strategies planned throughout their campaign. One such plan was to take advantage of the government exhaustion. The modified strategy called for a military offensive in the eastern part of the country rather than on a countrywide level. The objective was to drive away the government and army and declare liberated territory. Their first initial step was to build up the guerrilla military apparatus. With this strategy in process, focus shifted to strategies centered around concentration and attack of well-defined directions, namely concentration of these units on military targets. The new strategic phase had a kick off in 1982 and concluded by 1984. During this time, the Guerrilla groups were able to enjoy several successes.
Walter Lafeber, Inevitable Revolutions (New York: Norton & Company, 1993) p. 150
Walter Lafeber, Inevitable Revolutions (New York: Norton & Company, 1993) p. 154
Elizabeth Wood. Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2003) p. 122
Jose Angel Moroni Bracamonte and David E. Spencer, Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerrillas (London: Praeger Publishers, 1995) p.13
Elizabeth Wood. Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2003) p. 131
Jose Angel Moroni Bracamonte and David E. Spencer, Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerrillas (London: Praeger Publishers, 1995) p. 21