‘The more havoc the IRA wreaked, the more the loyalists lashed out at the Catholics, and the more action and reaction intertwined, the more callous everyone got.’ (Coogan) This idea supports the notion that the nature of Loyalist paramilitary groups within the Troubles was purely reactionary, and is evidence for the loyalist claims that they are the morally justified in the conflict. Keith Jefferey concurs that ‘Loyalists were secondary terrorists. Their violence was sustained not so much by internal ideological compulsion as by the external influences of PIRA activity and the policy response of the British government.’ He claims that the loyalist approach in the Troubles was four fold. The first tactic was the ridding of Catholics from Protestant areas, the second was holding Britain to its promises to Northern Ireland, and the third was preparation for the worst case scenario; if Britain was to withdrawal. The fourth and most significant factor in relation to the nature of Protestant paramilitary organsisations were the campaigns of sectarian killings. Catholic citizens were easier to identify than nationalists paramilitaries, and thus were killed in acts of ‘representative violence’ (Wright) which was intended to threaten Catholics and thus prevent them from supporting the IRA. Although such acts may appear to be more random and haphazard than the republican activity, they should be considered rational, in that it was ‘goal governed behaviour based upon attention to the consequences of action.’(Darby)
One of the major loyalist paramilitary organizations operating during this period was the UVF. Reformed in 1966 with the claim that ‘known IRA men will be executed mercilessly and without hesitation,’ it was a small and rather secretive organization in comparison to the UDA. The UDA emerged in September 1971 as an umbrella organisation encompassing a number of small protestant vigilante groups, formed to protect their own areas against IRA violence. Whilst it was responsible for numerous sectarian killings before 1979, it is a legal organization, and rather the Ulster Freedom Fighters are considered to be it’s military wing. Other Loyalist paramilitaries included the Orange Volunteers and the Red Hand Defenders. In general, these all tended to be less organised in nature than the Republican paramilitary organizations, and were more reactive than active. The fragmented, overlapping and conjoining tendencies of these groups, and the use of cover names made it extremely difficult to determine the exact composition and actions of each organisation within the Troubles.
The paramilitary groups played a most significant role in the Troubles, almost entirely responsible, with the aid of the RUC, UDR and the British Army, for the atmosphere of conflict and violence in Northern Ireland. It was the activities of these groups that marked out and defined this turbulent period. As Martin McGuinness pointed out, ‘Armies must be fought with armies’ (Rebel Hearts) and this mentality, in addition to the hurt and anger the terrorist acts caused, created a continuing cycle of violence, revenge and blame. The paramilitary groups were able to justify their own use of terror by referring to the civilian casualties the other side had caused, or the sufferings they had endured. In this way, groups began to receive the backing and support of the public, who would all have been touched by the conflict in some way. Of the 3600 people killed, and 40 000 injured, 59% were killed by Republican paramilitaries, and 28% by loyalist paramilitaries (Grant). In a population of just 1.6 million, these figures are significant. They are a clear indication of the impact of the Paramilitary organisations, and their instrumental role in breeding the environment of bitterness, hurt and fear that continued to damage the spirit of peace and any hope of negotiations.
The beginning of the troubles was marked with the opposition to non-violent civil rights movement of the Northern Irish Catholics. The riots that followed led to two immediate results, the first being the Unionist government’s appeal for support from the British army, and the second being the rejuvenation of the IRA. Although at first the Catholic community had welcomed the presence of the soldiers, they soon came to adopt the republican view that they were a symbol of oppression. A new militant republicanism emerged, and the PIRA campaign to rid Ireland of British troops was launched in 1971. In return, this prompted violence from the loyalist paramilitary groups. The significance of, and the support for the IRA were seen to increase with the strained relationship between the Catholics and the RUC’s, and this tension escalated in 1971 with Bloody Sunday, a protest over internment without trial that led to the murder of 13 nationalists. As a result of paramilitary activity, ‘civil right in Northern Ireland had been seriously eroded, and freedom in the name of safety had been sacrificed to some extent in both Great Britain and Ireland.’ (Rowthorn and Hawke) The political violence in Northern Ireland appeared to reach its peak from 1972-77. ‘Since 1970 the main form of violence had changed from sectarian rioting into a triangular guerrilla war.’ (Darby) Despite the ceasefire of 1972, the IRA had lost much support as a result of it’s countless acts of terror. The hunger strikes of 1975 however, saw a fresh wave of republican support.
The role of the paramilitary groups up until now had been creating terror to further their aims, but they were seen to adopt a more political stance towards the latter half of the Troubles. Whilst there had been slight hope of peace in the 1980’s, the next decade saw an outbreak of talks, many of which involved members of paramilitary organisations. Ultimately, ceasefires require the consent of the paramilitary, and their role in the peace process is instrumental. The ceasefire of 1994 had not been permanent, however, in 1997 the IRA declared an unequivocal ceasefire, and despite the later armed attacks, the Good Friday Agreement of March 25 1998 was reached.
The republican paramilitary groups, namely the IRA, took on the additional, self-appointed role of policing their local communities. This stemmed from a distrust of the state Police, the disaffection of certain regions, and the RUC’s inability to deal with low-level anti-social behaviour. As the Catholics became increasingly hostile towards the British Army, and grew in constant fear of Protestant attacks, the IRA became renowned for providing Catholic areas with an effective defence, and their ‘punishment beatings’ became widespread. Republican paramilitary groups were thus able to set themselves up as a form of ‘alternative state’ in their base communities, and this provided them with both legitimacy, and unwavering support from those they provided for. This role clearly distinguishes the nature of republican and loyalist paramilitary groups within the Troubles, for the Loyalist paramilitaries had to compete with the government security forces for personnel, and were, in a way, restricted by their ties to the state and Britain in terms of their terrorist activity. ‘The nature of paramilitary activity on the loyalist side is also affected by the fact that there were a number of legitimate outlets for those members of the Protestant community who wish to play their part in the fight against the IRA. Many committed loyalists, who on the Catholic side might be members of the IRA, joined the RUC or the UDR.’(Boyle, Hadden, and Hillard)
A role that all the paramilitary groups shared in common, be they republican or loyalist, was gaining political influence of some degree, as a result of their terrorist activity. As such, many served as military wings for political parties, often with overlapping personnel, aims and beliefs, and the paramilitary organisations were able to bring the political leverage that the parties desired. As Sinn Fein had announced in the latter half of the 1970’s, the cause was better served by a combination of ‘both the armalite and the ballot box.’ Thus the paramilitary groups were seen to play a highly significant role, particularly towards the end of the troubles. The UDA, and two other parties, the PUP and the UDP were linked to various paramilitary groups, including UFF, and the Red hand defenders. Similarly, the INLA was considered to be the military wing of the Irish Republican Socialist Party, and the IRA held the same relationship with Sinn Fein.
The paramilitary groups played a most significant role in the Troubles of Northern Ireland, and the nature and activities of these organisations defined the entire conflict. The groups had differing aims and beliefs, yet were often very similar in nature. They employed force and terrorist tactics for political leverage, and often had ties to a particular political party. The Loyalist organisations were of a more ‘reactionary’ nature, rather than the extremely ideologically based republican groups, and the republican ability to tap into the sentiment of the Catholic community that it defended was seen to distinguish the two. Both were, however, instrumental in creating an environment of tension, anger and conflict, and defined the political, social, economical, and physical components of Northern Irish society from 1968-1998.
