By this time, the Americans were reflecting on the French rule and the possible effects of that in the area, on Communism - which was by now a major feature of the U.S. foreign policy. In context, several countries were assuming Communism as their de facto political leaning, including: Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Albania. The successes here did not reflect popular opinion and in some cases were aided only by the force of the USSR army; this being against the agreed ‘free election’ strategy that had been agreed at Yalta and demonstrating to the Americans’ that Joseph Stalin’s plan was to dominate Europe (and perhaps even the world) through the spread of his ideology.
In 1949, Chinese Communists were now widespread throughout the country and Indochina, a consequence of the October Revolution under Mao Zedong; giving a much needed boost to the Vietminh campaign – China and the USSR now supplied most of the equipment needed to transform the Vietcong from a small-scale insurgency into a conventional regional army. Also in 1949, the Elysee Agreement was signed by Bao Dai (the Emperor of Vietnam) and President Vincent Auriol of France where the French pledged to assist in the building of a national anti-Communist army, as opposed to one that was backed by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) training. By 1950, the Americans’ position was one that backed the French rule if it meant the clear and possible eradication of Communism in that theatre. To back this move, Truman authorised the sending of $15m in military aid to France for the war in Indochina; this also included military advisors and a military mission. The U.S. government dismissed any thoughts that the ‘advisors’ would be of any military significance, rather, they were to oversee the $10m worth of U.S. supplies which had been sent there. This was now the first step in the American involvement in Vietnam, and one that had escalated from them supporting the (now called) Vietcong forces against Japanese forces in World War Two to providing aid for those who wished to work against the Vietcong. A remarkable and noteworthy change in political stance - emphasising the increasing American determination to put a halt to the spread of Communism, which was now affecting Asia, especially the South East, as well as Europe. Mao’s premiership highlighted the rapid succession of events that seemed to epitomise the Communist sweep across key areas of the world, this being a fundamental reason for invoking the American response of sending military aid to a conflict it had no other political or military interests in.
The 1950s was a pivotal period in terms of political changes, marked by the spectacular French departure in 1956. Leading up to that French exit, was the build-up of Vietcong forces, where Giap was now the general of a guerrilla army which numbered 100,000; despite the colonial power having the same number of troops, and the sympathies of 300,000 Vietnamese (mainly those who held religious beliefs or large amounts of land, which would be threatened by the existence of Communism) this was not enough. The French were attempting to control an area the size of Greece and the dense forest made for a task that was not appropriate to either the terrain the troops had been trained nor to the type of fighting their troops had been involved in prior to Vietnam. Giap ordered his troops not to launch a single attack on this particular occasion, instead his strategically placed artillery (which destroyed the landing strip, and therefore made it impossible for the French supplies to arrive) and the tunnels which had been built around the area the French were in, won the battle – despite it lasting 57 days. Ironically, the landing strip was there from the First Indochina War (1946-54) for Operation Castor to block Vietminh forces and their transport objectives – now that that had been destroyed by the Vietminh, the battle and its outcomes marked the end of France’s colonial status; its reputation significantly dented by losing to a non-national force in a war where it was supposed to be the superpower. The new U.S. President, Eisenhower, explored the hypothesis behind the supposed ‘Domino Theory’ (the term has been coined by the U.S Secretary of State, John Dulles) in which he felt reflected the increasing Communist influence in the area – this being a phrase which would become widely used and a predominant reason for the U.S. proper involvement in the 1960s. In combination with the ‘Iron Curtain’ and many other events which had been linked to the USSR in some form, the opinions of many Americans regarding their own security were now influenced and dominated by the ‘Red Scare’ which encompassed anyone who supported socialism or workers’ rights. This domestic atmosphere was capitalised on by the various U.S. administrations, who now felt that if Americans’ were to be ‘on the ground’ in Vietnam there would not be any civil unrest back home unless there were to be events that would change that (as what would happen in the late 1960s and 1970s). This meaning that increasing involvement in an area where there weren’t any objections to it would perhaps even show that the President had, in some way, power that represented grassroots America – leading to a re-election of that individual. The government had to be seen to be doing something to combat this threat, otherwise the domestic voters, who were being influenced by media reports, would think of them as incompetent - the once vote-enticing policy of ‘fighting Communism’ was now a real threat of election-based removal from power for the Republicans under Eisenhower.
The Geneva Convention was called to determine the post-French future of Indochina, proposing a temporary division of Vietnam along the 17th parallel, to be followed by nationwide elections to unify the country in July 1956. The new President of South Vietnam Ngô Ðình Diệm dismissed the proposals and called into question their potential effectiveness – the U.S., although sceptical of his refusal, backed him due to his strong anti-communist stance (this reflecting the increasing pressure on them for them to do something against the ‘threat’). Diem was a strong character, but did not follow protocol on most incidents, the most famous of which was his earlier and clearly rigged 98.2% victory in the general election of 1955. Eisenhower had hoped that Diem would show the ‘good’ side to the mounting American influence in politics, in the shape of land reforms etc., which were desperately needed to lift the population out of poverty. The Communists offered this policy, as part of the ideology, and if Diem were not to offer it as well, then the population would turn against any possible American ‘help’. Although there was the presence of the MAAG from 1950, Eisenhower deployed the whole company in 1955 to train the ARVN (South Vietnamese Army), Kennedy would later send more. In the intermittence between 1956 and 1960, nothing much occurred aside from Diem’s continual purging of Communists in the south and a terrorist bombing in Saigon, 1957; part of a wider campaign by the Vietcong (whose name now averted any patriotic meaning) to de-stabilise the south in order to ‘fight back’ against Diem’s suppression. In early 1960, South Vietnamese officials were being targeted – later in that year, the National Liberation Front (NLF) was created and this had broad appeal to middle-class peoples as well as the poorer peasants. Shortly after the NLF creation, Kennedy became President and he wanted the American people to think he was as tough on the causes and effects of Communism as both Truman and Eisenhower. He was keen to increase American involvement in South Vietnam but did not want to send troops there, for this would represent deeper interests, which he would not want to be visible at this point. Any threat to South Vietnam would draw China into the conflict as well, which was what had happened in the Korean War, where a stalemate had occurred and the country split into two, permanently. He increased the number of U.S. ‘advisors’ working in the area, who were responsible for the training of ARVN troops, they rose in number from 3000 to, in 1963, 16,000.
The ‘Strategic Hamlet Programme’ of 1962 was ultimately a failure as well, and was poorly planned from the beginning; removing villagers from their settlements because they were passing information and allowing Vietcong (VC) fighters to stay there was absurd - this policy would never encourage the peasants to stop communing with the VC. This in turn, meant that the villagers (who were now spreading communism because of their relocation) were not likely to turn against the NLF, who offered them land and communal living without the harsh realities of tax and so on, under Diem in the south – making possible the increase of communist sympathisers in Vietnam. Later in 1962, Senate Majority Leader, Mike Mansfield, reported to JFK that the $2b America had spent there, propping up Diem’s disorganised government had been wasted - he was right to say so, Diem had effectively taken the money for himself and his top, Roman-Catholic, officials. His inconsiderate policies favoured Roman Catholics over Buddhists (who made up the majority religion in Vietnam) and this was the main reason for the escalation of the Buddhist Crisis, with the reporting of which, affecting those in America who were shocked at the images they were seeing. A deepening outcry from the public gave way for America to do something about Diem, and in November 1963 (only a few weeks before Kennedy would be assassinated) the CIA-backed coup d’état murdered him and his brother, who also occupied a high-ranking position. The significance of this was big, now Communists were a real threat to those in South Vietnam, with the man who replaced Diem’s seat lasting only three weeks – this representing the instability of the South, and possibly showing the peasants, again, who they should sympathise with.
The loss of Diem, the “puppet who pulled his own strings”, meant there was now no choice but for America to intervene in a much more predominant fashion, as opposed to cover-ups and secrecy which had riddled the Kennedy administration, who denied operating any USAF or US Military operations in Vietnam. This reason alone would have given enough justification, at least in their view, for the now-in-power Lyndon B Johnson to become more involved, both politically and militarily, in Indochina. The Gulf of Tonkin incident in July/August 1964, typified American purpose in trying to secure Congressional backing of any resolution which would involve increasing the number of soldiers in Vietnam. It was done so Johnson could bolster reduced morale in South Vietnam, through demonstrating the ‘retaliatory’ attacks the U.S. could launch at the North. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident was two separate incidents which involved naval forces of North Vietnam and the United States in the waters of the Gulf of Tonkin. On 2 August, 1964, the destroyer USS Maddox fired at three North Vietnamese torpedo boats, resulting in damage to the three boats. Two days later the Maddox (having been joined by the destroyer Joy) reported a second engagement with North Vietnamese vessels. The ‘aggression’ in the latter never occurred and even before confirmation of the attack(s) could be received, Johnson had decided to return fire; knowing that there was nothing happening and in fact was conspiring to convince Americans’ that their soldiers were under fire - giving them a reason to support a war which was now imminent. Congress was kept in the dark over what the happenings actually were, possibly because they did not have readily-available access to military intelligence. In a speech on Capitol Hill, Johnson addressed Congress and it was clear, through the slow release of discrete propaganda by the Administration over the years, that they would support the Gulf of Tonkin resolution – they did, it was passed unanimously in the House of Representatives and by a large margin in the Senate. Congress was prepared to secure any motion which defended and/or increased American personnel; this meant they passed the motion which in turn meant that the US Army could “take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom”. Johnson now had the legal backing he needed to pursue his objectives in the theatre and so with the instigation of ‘Operation Rolling Thunder’, the war had now begun.
