Another aspect of Gorbachev is his aversion to the use of force. This is a significant example of his actions coupled with his personality. The aversion to the use of force destabilizes the USSR because it makes it look weak, its prestige and authority suffer, and this would spur on those who would go against it. For examples, rebels in Chechnya would more likely to be deterred if they new that the USSR was strong and powerful. Gorbachev had a deep inner “aversion to the use of force” (ZA P79). This could be connected with the fact he had “no particular links with the military” (MG+tEoSP P43). This can also be linked with the insecurity of Gorbachev’s power base. If he had no connection with the armed forces, it undermines his personal strength and position, and the strength of the USSR. Some liberals and dissidents “believe that Gorbachev’s absolute rejection of force was erroneous” (ZA P92) as sometimes a strong hand is required. However this point can be debated to a certain extent by the action of troops in Tbilisi, Georgia in April 1989 where forced was used. This cannot be weighted much because after this incident “Gorbachev declared a taboo on the use of the force” (ZA P83). His aversion to the use of force weakened the country slightly, but again not to the point where the USSR would disintegrate.
Perestroika contributed to the weakening of the USSR and this policy was bought about mainly by Gorbachev. This is another policy in which his belief plays a role, the desire for reform is within his personality. In January 1987, at the annual Central Committee Plenum “Gorbachev raised for the first time…that reform entailed…competitive elections” (MG+tEoSP P46) and that Gorbachev persuaded the party to undertake larger changes during September 1988 (MG+tEoSP P49). This is corroborated when in December 1988, where he hinted at the underlying principles of perestroika at the UN, where he talked of “freedom of choice” (CW P375). A further example of Gorbachev fully responsible for perestroika is when he opened a freely elected parliament (MG+tEoSP P1). However the idea of perestroika was not wholly Gorbachev’s idea. Under Andropov there was a “perestroika team” with Gorbachev a “principle figure” (MG+tEoSP P39). This suggests that perestroika was initiated under Andropov’s premiership, not Gorbachev’s. There is also the issue of Gorbachev’s colleagues ready to “send to hell at any moment the whole of Marxism-Leninism…[to] preserve their own hierarchal positions” (ZA P66) which implies those around Gorbachev would willingly enhance perestroika if it was in their own interests. It should also be noted that Gorbachev’s word had “ceased to be the word of a dictator” (AtG P14), he could not act unilaterally, so the “blame” for perestroika must be shared among the politicians of the USSR. Perestroika was created by Gorbachev but its application onto the USSR was done many others in addition to Gorbachev. This policy was damaging to the Soviet Union because it was “not being practised consistently and firmly enough” (AtG P254), a view echoed by Zubok: “perestroika was vague and could not be a practical guide for reforms” (ZA P75). Incomplete implementation was damaging because governments cannot run on half measures as it leads to anarchy. To use an analogy “”[the] difficulty of gradual reform: if he removed any brick from this structure the whole temple might come crashing down” (MG+tEoSP P14). Perestroika brought about an inefficient parliament in the opinion of Yeltsin: “urgently needed measures have not been passed into law” (AtG P261). This leads to destabilization because lower levels are not receiving orders and this leads to inefficiency and chaos. Perestroika lead to the rise in the number of so-called “informal organisations” (MG+tEoSP P45). By the first half of 1988, Popular Fronts “challenged the local party agents” (MG+tEoSP P48), “opposition parties [were poised] to take government which they generally did during the 19990s” (MG+tEoSP P49). This weakens the USSR because government would no longer be monolithic, it would be a mosaic of other smaller parties, which exacerbate inefficiencies. Perestroika entailed the removal of Clause 6, which guaranteed the role of the party (MG+tEoSP P50). As a result planning faltered, party directives ceased and “society was dissolving” (MG+tEoSP P51). These examples demonstrate how perestroika weakened the USSR. However there is a significant piece of evidence to show that perestroika was not the death knell of the Soviet Union, the very fact that the USSR continued to survive and function, Yeltsin was criticising the parliament in his book a year before the USSR broke up. The idea of reform implemented partly by Gorbachev, partly by others, weakened the USSR but did not cause its destruction
Linked in with perestroika is the idea of glasnost, because without glasnost, perestroika is ineffective. Also it links in with Gorbachev’s personality, as openness was a belief of his. There are examples of Gorbachev personally bringing glasnost and its principal ideas to the public domain at the 27th Party Congress of the CPSU, where Gorbachev is said to have introduced the idea, (R+FotSE P112), hinting at “liberalisation of culture” (MG+tEoSP P44). Another more prominent example of Gorbachev introducing glasnost himself is when he met privately with writers for help against “an administrative layer…that does not want changes” (MG+tEoSP P45) and as a result by the end of 1987 a “variety of material and opinion [was being published] unknown since before Stalin” (MG+tEoSP P45). These points must not be overstated because as with perestroika Gorbachev could not have implemented glasnost on his own. This point is best illustrated when the new parliament struck off “anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda” off the list of “crimes against the state” (MG+tEoSP P2). This shows that glasnost is being implemented by someone other than Gorbachev. In addition the policy of glasnost was linked in with Yakovlev and it is the opinion of Miller that he was “the driving force behind glasnost” (MG+tEoSP P42). These examples show that glasnost was only partly caused by Gorbachev. It is undeniable that glasnost effected the USSR. Because of glasnost protests could now occur that “threatened to…destabilize the inner empire” (R+FotSE P122). This is particularly shown in the case of the Alma-Ata riots where the people “felt freer to express anti-Russian sentiments” (MG+tEoSP P45), enabled by glasnost. In Nagorno Karabackh in February 1988, riots erupted that were the “invested energies of many people after many years” (MG+tEoSP P45). Glasnost had a detrimental effect on the USSR because it left it open to attack over past grievances. This would stress an already weakened system due to perestroika to the point of breaking. Following the fall of the Berlin wall, the “self confidence of people power [was] immeasurably enhanced” (R+FotSE P131) and this would encourage more demonstrations, as people knew they had a chance to succeed. Because of glasnost, the Afghan war became televised and this galvanized the government’s unpopularity, just as the televised Vietnam War had a detrimental effect on the US administration. Historical research permitted by glasnost had a negative impact on the Soviet Union, strengthening hostility to the regime. The massacres of poles at Katyn, and the discovery of mass graves in the Ukraine and Belorussia all alienated people from the regime, which weakened the USSR because the government no longer had a strong power base. The Nazi-Soviet Pact “galvanized Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into nationalist protest” (R+FotSE P119). Other examples of the “excesses of the Stalin era” had the effect of reviving the “nationalist campaigns of the non-Russian bloc” (R+FotSE P119). The rise of nationalist movements in a country is not a sign of strength but of weakness. Following the broadcasting of the Supreme Soviet on television, an “entire population awakened” (AtG P246) politically. This population had access to western thought because of openness, such as human rights and democracy. The principle of democracy undermined the Soviet position because it advocates the creation of more than one party, which goes against the basis of Soviet power. These examples show glasnost having a negative impact on the USSR. It can be debated that glasnost had decisive advantages, such as politicians actions would now be open to the public to view, making leaders accountable to the people. This is a vital element to democracy and in this respect glasnost would strengthen the new democracy in the USSR, making the country more stable. Also openness is beneficial in exposing corruption, as in the Tehelka case in India. Rooting out corruption would make the Soviet Union more stable. Glasnost was created for the most part by Gorbachev, however it did not deal the decisive blow that finished the USSR, like perestroika it only weakened it and left it open to attack.
A regimes popularity determines how successful it is. The greater the popularity, the more stable the power base. By the 1990s the popularity of the CPSU was at a low. Gorbachev is to blame to a certain extent, however the underlying reason go beyond just him. Unpopularity is due to some extent to the policy of glasnost, because people can now know the truth due to free speech, they can know the horrors of the Stalin era for example. Vladimir Medvedev and Boris Yeltsin “almost in unison” say Gorbachev enjoyed the “luxurious, comfortable life of the party nomenklatura” (ZA P74). This is evident in the August coup where he was at a retreat, something that many of his countrymen could not afford. These excesses of the Soviet premier are nothing compared to other scandals. In Uzbekistan a scandal erupted involving high-ranking members of the CPSU. Soviet media called it “organised crime” (MG+tEoSP P33). There was also the issue of the nomenklatura (the system of appointing an office or position) who “strengthened public alienation from the ruling class” (MG+tEoSP P18). Gorbachev himself saw the “rise of corruption” (MGM P216), which is also confirmed by Zubok “how awful and corrupt was the ‘system’” (ZA P72). There are also other reasons for the government’s unpopularity “grievances which go back to the early 1920s”. This is corroborated to a certain extent by Shevardnandze who “described how the injustices of the Stalin era had generated hostility to Moscow” (CW P384). Perhaps the single largest event that contributed to the unpopularity of the regime was Chernobyl’: “public anger was reinforced by the realisation that the disaster had been caused by a stupidity an irresponsibility promoted by the regime itself” (MG+tEoSP P44). Such examples are of others causing unpopularity and not Gorbachev. Unpopularity had dire consequences for the USSR. If the state was unpopular it no longer had a true power base and that left it open to attack from revolution. However this case is too extreme to consider. The earthquake at Spituk and Leninakan caused massive destruction and this was blamed on poor construction and maintenance. Such an example highlights how the government would have been attacked (R+FotSE P115) and its reputation weakened. The pollution from the “dinosaur factories” (R+FotSE P121) that was given out from Baikal to Bitterfield gave impetus to create movements with and environmental and soon nationalist focus. This is an example of unpopularity leading to Soviet destabilization. Yeltsin is another example, he was elected partly because he was know for his anti-corruption and nationalist stance and this would damage the USSR because Yeltsin would advocate the withdrawal of the largest republic from the USSR. Miller describes grass roots support as a “more effective means of social control” (MG+tEoSP P11). With this support gone, the Soviet Union’s freedom of action would be greatly reduced. Gorbachev had little to do with the regimes popularity, as it was more a legacy of the past. However the increasing unpopularity had a detrimental impact on the USSR, but it should be remembered that this did not cause the end of the USSR in the form of a popular revolution.
Gorbachev indirectly created nationalism through his actions. Unpopularity gives impetus to nationalism, as people look away from the current government to one more representative of their own nationality, especially in a country as ethnically diverse as the USSR. By allowing the Soviet satellites to break away, he spurred on separatists within the USSR, as they believed they would be a greater chance of breaking away. It is the view that “Gorbachev’s decision to switch from the Brezhnev Doctrine to the Sinatra Doctrine…part promoted the comprehensive decolonisation of the outer empire” (R+FotSE P133). This quote demonstrates that Gorbachev allowed the break away of the satellites. Appeasement to the Baltic republics “only whetted their appetite for more” (R+FotSE P137). It is often the case of appeasement that spurs on nationalists rather than subduing them, as they think they are winning their fight. Another example of Gorbachev fuelling nationalist ideas is in Tbilisi, Georgia who were “inflamed by [the] massacre of protesters” (R+FotSE P139). These examples show Gorbachev inadvertently boosting nationalism. However it would be too simplistic to say that nationalism was entirely Gorbachev’s fault. Historians suggest that nationalism was only “muzzled and kennelled” (R+FotSE P121) and not subdued permanently. The Baltic republics were “long dismayed” (R+FotSE P122) over Russian immigration. A direct counter to the idea that Gorbachev was responsible is shown when the Baltic republics were “champions of an environmental-cum-nationalist campaign” (R+FotSE P122). This demonstrates that nationalism was caused by someone other than Gorbachev. The role played by Gorbachev was not significant in the rise of nationalism. Nationalism destabilizes a country because it takes resources to suppress it and restricts a country’s freedom of action. In the Soviet Union it “threatened to pervade and eventually destabilize the entire inner empire” (R+FotSE P122). When the Lithuanian declaration of independence was issued, it pushed morale even lower and spurred on separatists. This shows that nationalism could weaken the USSR. The Lithuanian call for independence also lead to Russia declaring its sovereignty in June 1990, a “unilateral declaration” (R+FotSE P149). This is a potentially devastating event, as it shows that the Union’s largest republic no longer has faith in it. It also demonstrates how dangerous nationalism and how far it could spread. However for the most part it remained a threat, it should be remembered that the declarations of sovereignty were not calls for independence. Gorbachev played a role in fuelling nationalism, but it was relatively a minor role. Nationalism did play a role in weakening the USSR but it did not cause the end of the USSR directly.
The economic weaknesses of the USSR cannot be solely attributed to Gorbachev, as there were many policies from previous administrations that caused the Union’s economic precariousness. This factor can be linked in with Gorbachev’s personality, especially his procrastination. It is the opinion of Zubok that the “financial and state crisis…[the] immediate cause was Gorbachev’s choices or non-choices” (ZA P65) and that his “approach to economic reforms was deeply flawed” (ZA P65). This is evident in some policies brought about by Gorbachev, such as the anti-alcohol campaign that wasted needed money and the continuing arms supplies to his “clients” (ZA P66). Perhaps the most prominent example of Gorbachev causing economic weakness was the law “On the State Enterprise” which lead to rampant inflation (MG+tEoSP P51). These examples show Gorbachev weakening the USSR monetarily. However the economic situation of the USSR was also due to some past policies. For example, military expenditure was forty per cent of the state budget (MGM P215). This expenditure was compounded by the farming subsidies that even in 1975 “exceeded the defence budget” (MG+tEoSP P25). It is the opinion of Miller that the planned economy “had lost its dynamism” (MG+tEoSP P36) and this is confirmed to some extent by Gorbachev in his memoirs “economic growth had virtually stopped” (MGM P246). These examples show that Gorbachev was not the cause of the economic troubles. The financial crisis can also be attributed to monopolists, as it was easy to “lose touch with the real economic world” (MG+tEoSP P17). This infers that production was not tied to demands, leading to economic weakness and inefficiency. Gorbachev was partly responsible for the economic crisis for the Soviet Union, mainly because of the law “On the State Enterprise” which lead to inflation. However other causes can be placed at the feet of his predecessors. Economic weakness is detrimental to the strength of the USSR because it removes the capacity to run an effective unified country. Scholars argue: “economically the Soviet Empire was on the brink of bankruptcy” (R+FotSE P110). It must be remembered that the Soviet Union was not entirely weak, it still had the capacity to be a superpower. In addition, the USSR had suffered economic weakness for many years and this had not lead to collapse. Gorbachev may have played a part in the USSR’s economic troubles but these troubles were not sufficient to cause the Union’s break-up.
There is also the case of other people causing the disintegration of the USSR, in this instance Gorbachev could not have played a direct role, countering the idea that he was responsible. Perhaps the most poignant example of the break-up of the USSR is that the deputies themselves voted “the Supreme Soviet…out of existence” (MG+tEoSP P62) effectively ending the Union. This is a direct example of the Soviet Union being broken up. Also, Lithuanian calls for independence were “setting an example for all other union republics to emulate” (R+FotSE P144), this was damaging to the USSR because it lead to all the Union Republics to declare sovereignty, which was “politically devastating” (R+FotSE P147). When Yeltsin signed his decree banning the CPSU, this showed an example of a key foundation of the USSR being dismantled, leading to the end of the USSR. It’s the belief of Gorbachev that the “coup had given a strong impulse to disintegration” (MGM P646). These examples show other people breaking up the USSR. However some of these points can be debated. The declarations of sovereignty were not calls for independence and that those which were received were mainly isolated, such as the Baltic Republics. There is also the issue of the Union Treaty that was to come into effect a few days after the August coup. This demonstrated the desire of the republics to stay together. In Mikhail Gorbachev’s memoirs, it says he conducted polls after the August coup that stated seventy-three per cent desired a federalised union in some form. The role played by other people in the end of the USSR was certainly significant, as some of the key measures for the break-up of the USSR were carried out not by Gorbachev but people like Yeltsin and the deputies of the parliament. In this respect Gorbachev was not responsible for the end of the Soviet Union.
Though the coup was practised against Gorbachev, there is some evidence to suggest he brought it upon himself. However it should always be remembered that Gorbachev was a “spectator” of sorts, he was under virtual house arrest while the entire coup took place and failed. This is perhaps the strongest example of others people breaking the USSR up. Policies of social pluralism “alarmed traditionally minded communists” (MG+tEoSP P47). There were other reasons such as Gorbachev’s “natural westernism” (ZA P80). This leaning to the west left Gorbachev “hovering without political support” (ZA P67) which left the leader of the state open to attack. As a result Gorbachev allied himself with the “aligned urban democrats of Yeltsin’s Russian regime” (MG+tEoSP P52) further polarising the rifts in the CPSU. All these reasons show why Gorbachev might have contributed indirectly to the coup. However the perpetrators of the coup were the main driving force behind it, not Gorbachev. They were “all groups whose power and livelihood were linked to the older” (MG+tEoSP P52) and “top level communist hardliners” (R+FotSE P152) who were “imitating the party’s style but not under its control” (MG+tEoSP P51). These examples show that it was mainly hardliners who were the main instigators of the coup and not Gorbachev. As a result of the coup Gorbachev became the “principal victim” losing dignity and respect of the Soviet public and more importantly his power. Yeltsin was the “principal beneficiary” of the coup, his popularity skyrocketing. The coup lead to the banning of the CPSU. This would have a destabilizing of the USSR because the controlling party would no longer exist, there would be no form of centralised government. The coup lead to the destruction of the last elements that wanted to keep the USSR intact, the CPSU and Gorbachev. The coup was not directly caused by Gorbachev but did cause the end of the USSR.
It is all too easy to assume that Gorbachev’s policies caused the break-up of the Soviet Union. There are examples of Gorbachev trying to keep the USSR intact, which further counter the idea that it was his fault that the USSR broke up. In his memoirs he states: “I did not at all intend as some claim today ‘to throw the party to the winds of fate’” (MGM P351). However this piece of evidence cannot be emphasized too much because Gorbachev is trying to put himself in a good light. Some do say that he was “deaf to nationalist voices within the Soviet Union” (CW P375). This is confirmed when Gorbachev declared the borders of the USSR were “non-negotiable” (R+FotSE P136). He honestly believed the “integrity of the Soviet Union took automatic precedence” (R+FotSE P137). These demonstrate that Gorbachev was deeply concerned with keeping the USSR intact. This can be further demonstrated by the Union Treaty in which he tries to preserve the USSR. Another example would be the economic blockade of Lithuania following its calls for independence, a measure designed to force it to stay in the Union. These measures do demonstrate that Gorbachev tried to keep the USSR intact, but for all this, it still broke up. His policies weakened the Union but did not cause the USSR to break-up directly.
Gorbachev certainly caused the weakening of the USSR, in the form of his actions, perestroika and glasnost. Other factors such as nationalism, economic factors and unpopularity also contributed to the weakening of the Soviet state. However these factors did not cause the immediate end of the USSR. Rather the end of the Soviet Union can be attributed to the failure of the August coup and the subsequent of Yeltsin. Gorbachev did not cause the coup directly, so the end of the USSR cannot be attributed to him. In this respect, the opinion of Zubok: “without Gorbachev, the dismantling of the cold war could not have happened as quickly as it did” (ZA P93) is not valid. The quote can be inferred to say that Gorbachev created the conditions for the coup, but the actual act in itself Gorbachev was not associated with. It is interesting to note that had the August coup not occurred, the Union Treaty would have come into effect and the USSR would have strengthened, perhaps enough to silence separatist voices in the Baltic states, though this would be an extreme case. The failed coup itself lead to the break-up of the Soviet Union as it secured the rise of anti-Soviet forces such as Yeltsin, who subsequently went on to abolish key aspects of the USSR such as the CPSU. Gorbachev was not responsible for the end of the USSR, only responsible for the weakening of the Soviet Union, it was the coup that gave the “final blow” to break-up the USSR.