The employer works in a factory as leader of the plant, together with employees and workers who constitute his retinue, to further the aims of the plant and for the common benefit of the nation and state. (Welch, The Third Reich – Politics and Propaganda, 1995, pp.54-55)
Here, propaganda was clearly used in an attempt to gain support, or at worst acquiescence, to the abolition of the Trade Unions, claiming that the DAF was a ‘symbol of the nation’ (Welch, The Third Reich – Politics and Propaganda, 1995, p.55). The Nazis also used propaganda in an attempt to appeal to the emotions of the German people when introducing labour camps, forcing people to work. Slogans such as ‘work enobles,’ and ‘labour liberates,’ were used in an attempt to explain why these changes were happening and therefore, perhaps, reduce opposition therefore maintaining Hitler in power (Welch, The Third Reich – Politics and Propaganda, 1995, p.56). Some historians, such as Ian Kershaw, argue that propaganda relating to the idea of ‘Volksgemeinschaft’ actually had little influence in maintaining support for Hitler, (Welch, The Third Reich – Politics and Propaganda, 1995, p.58)and some such as Tim Mason, would even go as far as saying that it was in fact an “unmitigated failure.” (Welch, The Third Reich – Politics and Propaganda, 1995, p.57) However, Welch believes that, whilst not fully indoctrinating people into the idea of ‘Volksgemeinschaft’, the propaganda did create a heightened national awareness, sufficient to secure a degree of stability (Welch, The Third Reich – Politics and Propaganda, 1995, p.58) Nevertheless, it must be said that propaganda was generally less effective when it was attempting to manufacture totally new values, than when it played and built on existing social and political values; especially when it could exploit the expectations and disappointments of the Weimar Republic and the traumas of war as it did when attempting to create the ‘Hitler Myth.’ (Kershaw, 1991, p.89)
Stephen Lee tells us that the main reason for positive support during the Third Reich was due to the popularity of Hitler, who had no equivalent during the Weimar years (Lee, 1998, p.49). Arguably, the creation of the ‘Hitler myth’ was, perhaps, one of the most successful achievements of the ‘propaganda machine.’ Indeed, Goebbels’ own view was that the “creation and consolidation of extraordinary bonds of loyalty to Hitler, surpassing any ‘normal’ level of trust in political leadership” was his most notable political success (Welch, Nazi Propaganda, 1983, p.185). However, one must consider to what extent propaganda was responsible for the creation of the ‘Hitler myth.’ Ian Kershaw believes that the ‘Hitler myth’ was in fact “as much a creation of the masses as it was imposed on them” (Welch, Nazi Propaganda, 1983, p.185). However, there is much to suggest that propaganda did have a significant part to play in creating the ‘Hitler myth’ which, perhaps, “bridged the gap between…the need for uplift, security and a positive outlook for the future and…the disillusionments of everyday life in the Third Reich.” (Peukert, 1987, p.73)
As mentioned, propaganda had its most notable success when building on existing social and political values and when it was able to exploit the expectations and disappointments of the Weimar Republic. This is precisely what the Nazi propaganda did in its attempts to create the ‘Hitler myth.’ Much of the propaganda was designed to strike a chord with the widespread disillusionment with institutions, political parties and leaders of the Weimar Republic (Lee, 1998, p.49).The ‘Führerprinzip’ was based on the idea that in order to destroy the old privileged and class ridden society of the Weimar Republic, and replace it with an ethically pure and socially harmonious ‘national community’, that a special personality was needed (The Third Reich – Politics and Propaganda, 1995, p.83); this person must have the power and will to actualise ‘Volksgemeinschaft.’ It is, perhaps, in successfully achieving the goal of creating a ‘Führerprinzip’, that some historians such as Kershaw, have acknowledged that Nazi propaganda was highly effective. According to Kershaw, it not only portrayed Hitler as another party leader, but as the party leader for whom Germany had been waiting. (Welch, Nazi Propaganda, 1983, p.185) Nevertheless, although many believe that it is the creation of the ‘Hitler myth’ which is the “most important theme in cementing Nazi propaganda together,” (The Third Reich – Politics and Propaganda, 1995, p.83)the intensity of the ‘Hitler myth’ cannot simply be seen as entirely the result of Nazi propaganda. Had such hysteria have been created by such an artificial construct it would, according to Peukert, “have shattered on making impact with real experiences or real disappointments.” (Peukert, 1987, p.75) Kershaw goes on to say that even Goebbels’ “full bag of tricks could not turn black into white,” (Kershaw, 1991, p.89) and that much of Hitler’s popularity derived from the scale of his achievements after 1933 in both the domestic and foreign sphere. (Welch, Nazi Propaganda, 1983, p.186) It is these ‘successes’ to which we will now turn our attentions.
C.W. Guillebaud, a Cambridge Economist, emphasised the economic successes achieved during the Third Reich, such as solving the economic stagnation and problems of mass unemployment, as a cause for Hitler’s maintenance of power. (The Third Reich – Politics and Propaganda, 1995, p.59). Figures show that compared to 1933 when over one third of the population were unemployed, by 1939 only 74 thousand people were unemployed and that there were over 1 million job vacancies. This is a massive achievement on the part of the regime and although Guillebaud goes on to say that there was a ‘cynical book-keeping manoeuvre’ in spring 1933 which wiped 1 million off the unemployment register, by autumn 1933 there was real work creation. (The Third Reich – Politics and Propaganda, 1995, p.59). It must be said that many of these jobs were created in ‘labour camps’, but nevertheless a considerable number of people were ‘offered’ tasks and jobs which, perhaps, boosted their self esteem and offered opportunities for promotion (Peukert, 1987, p.72). The economy also experienced an economic ‘boom’. This was partly due to Hitler’s re-armament programme, and partly due to an increase in industrialisation through programmes such as building the Autobahns, but nevertheless GNP rose from 58 thousand million in 1932, to 93 thousand million by 1937. (Peukert, 1987, p.69). However, although it could be argued, perhaps, that the ‘successes’ were enough on their own to guarantee Hitler in power, one cannot ignore the way in which propaganda exploited these successes. Even where there was some opposition, from industrial workers for example, who saw the economic ‘miracle’ in terms of increased working hours and reduced wages; they still welcomed the restoration of full employment and the economic upturn as portrayed in the propaganda. (The Third Reich – Politics and Propaganda, 1995, p.88) Propaganda also played an important role in convincing many workers that the economic ‘miracle’ was a direct result of Hitler’s leadership.
Propaganda was used to promote a wide range of workers’ ‘schemes’ that were created by Hitler to highlight the successes of the new economy and, perhaps, enhance the idea of ‘Volksgemeinschaft’ and the necessity of Hitler in order to achieve this. Schemes such as ‘Beauty of Labour’ were designed to promote the idea of better working practices for Germans, and the idea that conditions were going to improve in the workplace. Other schemes such as the ‘Strength Through Joy’, scheme organised leisure activities for the German labour force. Not only did this promise to give many workers new opportunities previously unavailable to them, such as weekend trips, Mediterranean cruises or the possibility of buying a ‘people’s car’ (Volkswagen) through new saving schemes; it also cleverly distracted workers from their loss of rights such as Trade Union membership and lower wages (The Third Reich – Politics and Propaganda, 1995, p.57). Some historians, however, believe that these schemes were unsuccessful. Tim Mason, for example, argues that the ‘Strength Through Joy’ campaign was only a “qualified success amongst workers, because only the better off could avoid excursions.”(Welch, Nazi Propaganda, 1983, p.189). Furthermore, he writes that propaganda aimed at highlighting reduced employment, perhaps, had more impact “amongst those not directly affected, than amongst workers forced into back breaking work.” (Welch, Nazi Propaganda, 1983, pp.188-9) Nevertheless, although there were, perhaps, wide discrepancies between the Third Reich images of the economy as portrayed in the propaganda, and the actual achievements of the regime through campaigns such as ‘Strength through Joy’, what the propaganda was able to do was convince many that the economic ‘miracle’ was a sign that things were getting better. (The Third Reich – Politics and Propaganda, 1995, p.52). Therefore, although it could be argued, perhaps, that there were many problems and inconveniences which could have provoked a reaction from the masses, due to clever propaganda the overall balance was positive (Peukert, 1987, p.69). Moreover, the propaganda was also successful in convincing the ‘man in the street’ that the ‘economic miracle’ was a positive achievement of Hitler’s. (Peukert, 1987, p.70)
Many historians have accounted for much of Hitler’s popularity from his achievements in foreign policy. Indeed, there is much to be said about Hitler’s foreign policy successes, certainly prior to 1938. According to Welch, from 1936 when Hitler’s troops re-occupied the de-militarised Rhineland, until 1938 when they annexed the Sudetenland, Hitler won support from all sections of the community. (The Third Reich – Politics and Propaganda, 1995, pp.88-9). Moreover, he was able to carry out these foreign policy coups peacefully, and without recourse to war. (The Third Reich – Politics and Propaganda, 1995, p.88) This was a recurring theme in Nazi propaganda. (Lee, 1998, p.50). Arguably, Nazi propaganda had a relatively easy task in the foreign policy arena, certainly until 1938, as it was able to play on the pre-existing consensus that Germany had been maltreated following the end of World War 1. (Welch, Nazi Propaganda, 1983, p.186). This, together with the idea of ‘Volksgemeinschaft’ enabled propaganda to centre around two facts; firstly that Hitler was righting the wrongs of the Treaty of Versailles, and secondly that he was attempting to unite all German speaking people within a ‘greater Germany’ (Peukert, 1987, p.68). However, it was not only the physical gains made in foreign policy that were important, so were Hitler’s methods. (Peukert, 1987, p.68)
Foreign policy propaganda portrayed Hitler as a man of peace; able to recover Germany’s ‘lost’ territories, thereby restoring greatness to Germany but at the same time, able to do so without bloodshed. (Welch, The Third Reich – Politics and Propaganda, 1995, p.88). This strengthened the idea of the ‘Hitler myth’. The Führer appeared to offer strength of leadership and a desire for success, which in the previous ten years of uncertainty and disillusionment during the Weimar Republic, had not been met. This led to Hitler receiving “unparalleled popularity and prestige.”(Welch, Nazi Propaganda, 1983, p.189). The effectiveness of propaganda in maintaining Hitler in power can, perhaps, be seen in the summer of 1938 when the feelings of the German public border-lined panic, and some would even argue, an unwillingness to fight in the expected forthcoming war (Welch, Nazi Propaganda, 1983, p.186). Even under these circumstances propaganda was able to persuade the majority of the public that war was unavoidable and that it had been forced on the Government (Welch, Nazi Propaganda, 1983, p.186). When considering propaganda in terms of exploiting foreign policy successes one cannot ignore the fact that whilst propaganda was a useful tool, particularly in promoting the ‘Führer myth’ through foreign policy propaganda, Hitler did achieve many real successes particularly until 1938. One area where it appears that propaganda was successful was in promoting the idea of Hitler of a man of peace. This is particularly interesting when considering another reason why, perhaps, Hitler was able to maintain power, the use of terror and repression.
Although much of Hitler’s popularity and lack of opposition, perhaps derived from his domestic and foreign policy ‘successes’ and the creation of the ‘Hitler Myth,’ it is not enough to fully explain why Hitler was able to maintain his power. In order to understand this, one must examine the impact of Nazi repression and the use of terror within the regime. Regardless of the many reasons outlined previously, one cannot ignore the fact that, quite simply, there were no opposing political parties in Germany. Within the first six months of Hitler’s ‘seizure of power’, constitutional changes not only removed any possibility of voting for established opposition, but also removed that opposition and also the possibility of setting up new forms of opposition; to do so would have been regarded as not only disloyal but also as treason.(Lee, 1998, p.50). The removal of opposition was often done through violence as was the case in the ‘Night of the Long Knives’ when the leaders of the SA were brutally murdered. Jeremy Noakes wrote that “the ‘seizure of power’ was anything but peaceful.” (Geary, 1993, p.38). During the initial terror campaign following the seizure of power Geary tells us that
KPD and SPD buildings were raided…party members were beaten up…‘wild’ concentration camps were set up…where Communists and Social Democrats were sometimes tortured and murdered. (Geary, 1993, p.38)
Furthermore, political opponents and Jews were ‘removed’ from the civil service and independent political parties and pressure groups were dissolved and declared illegal. (Geary, 1993, p.39). However, this repression and terror was constitutionally legal. Following the Reichstag fire, which the Nazis cleverly exploited to signal a possible communist threat, emergency ‘Reichstag Fire’ decrees were passed which allowed Hitler to legally suspend freedom of press and speech. This, together with the Enabling Act of March 1933, which allowed Hitler to rule without the need for authorisation from the Reichstag, gave Hitler the power to rule as a dictator. Moreover, following the ‘Reichstag Fire decrees,’ the media had been taken over by the Nazis, which gave them the power to “apply negative censorship in whatever form it considered necessary and, more constructively, to shape the development of culture at all levels” (Lee, 1998, p.33). Some historians would argue, therefore, that to say Hitler’s power rested purely on ‘totalitarian terror’ is, perhaps, only a partial truth. (Kershaw, 1991, p.62). Moreover, some would argue that terror, in some instances, was actually approved to a degree as it was seen as necessary for the restoration of order. (Peukert, 1987, p.76). This can be seen particularly clearly following the ‘Night of the Long Knives,’ when although many people were brutally murdered, Hitler emerged as ‘practically a hero.’ (Lee, 1998, p.50) He was cleverly portrayed, by the use of propaganda, to be acting with a ‘firm hand’ considered necessary to ensure that order would be enforced so as to achieve a better Germany. (Peukert, 1987, p.71) Furthermore, whilst Hitler clearly used violence as a means of repression following the ‘seizure of power,’ Kershaw tells us that his was not a constant over time. (Kershaw, 1991, p.63). He goes on to say that the numbers in concentration camps after the initial terror surge, fell for some years with numbers not rising again until 1938/9. Kershaw then goes on to say that the terror and repression was also highly selective, aimed only at people associated with Left Wing parties, or at an ‘unloved’ tiny majority such as Jews, gypsies, homosexuals, beggars and other ‘anti social elements.’ (Kershaw, 1991, pp.62-4).
In conclusion, whilst the significance of propaganda cannot be ignored when considering how Hitler was able to maintain power from 1933-39, it would be an “over simplification to think of the German public as a ‘tabula rasa’ upon which the regime drew whatever picture it wished” (Welch, The Third Reich – Politics and Propaganda, 1995, p.51) Without concrete achievements, propaganda alone would not have been able to sustain the positive image of Hitler. Arguably, much of Hitler’s popularity, perhaps, came from the scale of his both his domestic achievements and his many foreign policy successes after 1933. There are those however who would argue that Hitler’s maintenance of power was possible because the “opposition was crushed, broken, cowed and neutralised through unprecedented and unmitigated levels of repression by the Nazi state” (Kershaw, 1991, p.75) and therefore that the “weakness of the opposition [was] the strength of the regime.”(Kershaw, 1991, p.65). Nevertheless, the basic consent for Hitler lay, perhaps, due to one of Goebbels’ most significant successes. Through the use of propaganda and the creation of the ‘Hitler myth,’ it was possible to separate Hitler from the increasingly negative image of the Nazi party (Welch, Nazi Propaganda, 1983, p.185) and the positive image of Hitler was then used to counterbalance the use of terror. Indeed Emil Lederer, a contemporary observer argued that winning over the masses was not merely more important than brutality as a means of control, but was the “necessary pre-requisite for the use of terror.”(Hiden et al, 1983, p.53)
Bibliography
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