In contrast to his emphatic Catholic Emancipation campaign, O’Connell’s effectiveness at advancing the Irish Catholic cause from 1829 onwards was greatly reduced. Emancipation had seen the O’Connellites in a position to push for Irish reform in the House of Commons but they failed in their quest to secure radical change. In particular, O’Connell seemingly demonstrated a lack of effectiveness by failing to maximise his standing in the Whig and O’Connellite alliance during 1835-40. Though only an informal alliance, the Whigs seem to have come off better by maintaining government status. Certain reforms during the alliance helped to advance O’Connell’s Irish Catholic cause such as the appointment of Catholics to high offices in the Irish judiciary and the curbing of the Orange Order’s political powers. Overall, the alliance failed to fulfil O’Connell’s desires for reform generally and this is epitomised by the 1840 Corporations Act. Its terms were harsher than the British corporation Act and so O’Connell could not take political control of them as he wished. However, in defence of O’Connell’s effectiveness, the House of Lords’ supreme authority proved a major hindrance to legislation desired by the alliance. J.C Beckett produces an identical argument,
‘the House of Lords proved an insuperable barrier to any but the most moderate proposals for reform’.
There is strong evidence to support Beckett’s view. The 1840 Corporations Act exemplifies Beckett’s claim as the Lords managed to greatly delay and compromise leaving the alliance with no option but to reluctantly agree. The reactionary mentality of the Lords had not changed since the Emancipation campaign and O’Connell could do nothing to counter this within parliamentary politics. In fact, the alliance itself hampered O’Connell’s potential effectiveness as his commitment to parliamentary politics prevented him from mounting a campaign for mass support which could have pressurised the Lords into reform, similar to the Emancipation campaign. O’Connell showed a certain level of effectiveness in recognising that a change in aims and methods were needed as the formation of the 1841 Conservative government would be far less amenable to Irish reform.
Superficially, O’Connell’s efforts in the campaign for the Repeal of the Act of Union appear hopelessly ineffective. This is simply because O’Connell failed to secure Repeal at the pinnacle of the campaign between 1841 and his death in 1847. Yet, Repeal was an enormous demand and O’Connell had to face political difficulties which eclipsed even the Emancipation era. Whereas O’Connell enjoyed support from the majority of the Whigs and some of the Tories for Emancipation, even the Whigs joined the Conservatives and British public opinion in staunch opposition to Repeal. Therefore, O’Connell could be accused of being ineffective through his peaceful, delusional attitude. Robert Kee argues likewise,
‘In the prevailing parliamentary situation, with one English party holding a large majority over the other, the Repeal movement had no means of putting pressure on the government, expect by the threat of armed rebellion which O’Connell made clear he would not countenance’.
Kee’s point is valid to a certain extent as O’Connell resorted to erroneous claims about the success of the Repeal campaign. Notably, his announcement that 1843 would be ‘Repeal year’ along with his ‘No Compromise’ slogans of 1845. O’Connell’s belief in success was irreparably undermined by his placid submission to the banned Clontarf meeting in 1843. However, Kee underestimates the notion of O’Connell demonstrating limited effectiveness in obtaining mass support given Prime Minister’s Sir Robert Peel’s actions in 1844-45. The decision to increase state funding to the Catholic Priests training college at Maynooth and the Colleges Bill intimate Peel was intimidated by the religious aspect of the campaign and so sought to crush it. It was unfortunate for O’Connell that he faced the formidable Peel as he might he achieved more under a different leader.
Parnell advanced his Home Rule cause, self-government for Ireland, effectively from 1882 until the rejection of the First Home Rule Bill of 1886. This is because he succeeded in forcing Irish Home Rule to the core of British politics due to his highly effective work in ensuring his IPP held the balance of power for the British government. In essence, Parnell’s efforts greatly boosted the prospect of Home Rule as Gladstone introduced a Home Rule Bill largely acceptable to Parnell, to gain his support needed to form a government. Although it could be argued Gladstone had already converted to Home Rule, the fact Parnell manoeuvred the IPP to hold the balance of power would have pressurised him further to go through with a Bill. Parnell’s effectiveness gains greater substance due to the emphatic way he promoted Home Rule. This is because of the decisive way in which he directed the course of Irish politics towards Home Rule, through establishing the IPP as the dominant Irish nationalist organisation, subject to his unquestionable authority. Donald MacRaild claims,
‘Ultimately, Parnell had always sought to supersede physical force nationalism by his constitutional methods’.
MacRaild’s view is evidently precise, exemplified by the demise of the agrarian agitation Land League and Parnell’s creation of the National League in 1882, based on achieving Home Rule constitutionally. MacRaild’s comment is pertinent in proving Parnell’s effectiveness as it is clear that he was proficient in turning his aims into realities. The fact the IPP held the balance of power in 1885 was down to Parnell’s National League as it was indispensable in winning over the Irish classes nationwide to the extent that the Party secured 85 Irish seats out of 103. Parnell ensured the IPP’s influence was put to its best as he established a strong unity within the party, through the introduction of ‘pledge’ in which MPs vowed to abide by the IPP’s mainstream aims and Parnell’s authority.
The rejection of the 1886 Bill should not tarnish Parnell’s effectiveness for the fact he managed to impose Home Rule so influentially upon Gladstone by efficiently acquiring mass Irish support constitutes a great achievement. In Parnell’s defence there was little more he could have done constitutionally to persuade the Bill’s opponents in the Commons otherwise given their substantiated criticisms of an Irish self-government. Also the Bill would almost have been certainly rejected by the House of Lords anyway demonstrated by their rejections of the subsequent 1893 and 1912 Bills. Although the rejection of the Bill saw the Conservatives reclaim power and Liberal defections to the Conservatives, Parnell demonstrated his effectiveness by maintaining the momentum towards Home Rule in the form of Gladstone’s commitment to a future Bill when the Liberals next formed a ministry.
However, Parnell’s personality proved highly detrimental in his final year in the advancement of Home Rule. Adelman and Pearce believe that despite the 1886 General Election,
‘Parnell remained determined to stick to the constitutional path in securing Home Rule. This meant, he believed, maintaining the alliance with the Liberal Party.’
This view is valid up until 1890, for example, Parnell refused to support further agrarian agitation that would threaten the alliance. Yet, this view has limitations by the time of 1890. Parnell later sacrificed this aim to maintain his status which proves his obstinacy hindered his effectiveness in acquiring Home Rule. This is because his handling of the controversy surrounding his mistress’ divorce in 1890 destroyed the advancement of the IPP’s alliance with the Liberals for 10 years. Parnell’s resignation as IPP leader would have maintained the vital unity of the party required to further the Home Rule cause but his defiance in remaining as leader ensured the split of the IPP and thus its dramatic demise in influence. Furthermore, Parnell’s long term effectiveness is weakened as the Home Rule campaign precipitated a pro-Unionist backlash in Ulster which was to be a problem in the future Irish independence.
The leadership of Sinn Fein was effective to a certain extent in their aim to make Ireland an independent republic from Britain between the Easter Rising of 1916 and the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty. Sinn Fein were effective in the sense that they efficiently exploited the fortuitous myth that dictated they had been responsible for the Easter Rising which in time boosted their popularity. Sinn Fein manipulated this myth to become the most powerful party in Ireland, decimating the IPP’s control of the Irish electorate. Consequently, they succeeded in directing mass Irish opinion towards something more radical than the IPP’s aim of self-government, a separate Irish republic. This mandate proved invaluable as it enabled Sinn Fein to negotiate Irish independence. However, in weakening its effectiveness, Sinn Fein was dramatically aided by foreign opinion and British misjudgements. For example, Prime Minister David Lloyd George was coerced into releasing the Easter 1916 prisoners by the US President Woodrow Wilson. Wilson himself advocated self-determination of small countries and wanted an Irish settlement adding to Britain’s pressure. Also, British misjudgements ensured Sinn Fein were gifted with greater Irish support, best demonstrated by the May 1918 ‘German Plot’ which saw the arrest of Sinn Fein leaders including de Valera and Arthur Griffith.
The 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty is a milestone in Sinn Fein’s bid for Irish independence and yet it could be argued that the Irish Republican Army’s (IRA) instigation of the 1919-21 Anglo-Irish war was the key factor in paving the way for negotiations. Although the IRA shared the political objectives of Sinn Fein and were effectively its military wing, this damages Sinn Fein’s effectiveness in advancing Irish independence. Phil Chapple argues accordingly,
‘The upsurge in violence between January 1919 and June 1921 saw the gunmen determine the political agenda’.
Chapple states a valid argument as by the time political negotiations occurred in 1921 Lloyd George was desperate to end the war against the IRA. The IRA under the proficient leadership of Michael Collins was certainly effective in their violent campaign against the British security forces given the extent of the dilemma Britain faced. The effectiveness of this campaign is evident as the British forces would have had to have resorted to all-out war to crush the IRA. However, Lloyd George had no option but to negotiate as negative British public opinion dictated that an upgrade in the violence would have been severely detrimental to his position. Therefore, Chapple’s view is heavily substantiated as the military aspect clearly holds more significance than the political aspect with respect to the Irish and British relationship. This greatly restricts Sinn Fein’s effectiveness as It is difficult to see how Sinn Fein could have otherwise negotiated Irish independence in 1921 if the war hadn’t turned Lloyd George’s hand to bargain.
The 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty itself constitutes an effective advancement of the Sinn Fein cause towards Irish independence. This judgement may seem peculiar in that the Treaty failed to totally fulfil Sinn Fein’s demands for Ireland. Nevertheless, the facts that Ireland’s status, outside of Ulster, was radically altered combined with Britain’s commitment to maintain its empire ensure Sinn Fein’s great achievement. With this considered, the fact that Ireland was granted ‘Dominion Status’ like an ex-British Colony was groundbreaking considering Ireland gained thorough control of its internal affairs. The connection with Britain therefore was made minimal, as it appeared comparatively trivial with Ireland’s official membership of the Empire and a watered down oath of allegiance for parliamentarians remaining. The issue of the six Ulster counties being excluded from the Treaty could be seen as a shortcoming for Sinn Fein who were theoretically committed to a united Irish Republic. Yet, this shouldn’t profoundly affect Sinn Fein’s effectiveness in negotiating the Treaty because the inclusion of Ulster would have caused grave difficulties owing to the certain rebellion of the staunchly Unionist counties. Peter Neville writes the following regarding Michael Collins, a delegate for negotiations,
‘He did not though, indeed could not, achieve the ultimate aspiration of a 32-county united Ireland’.
Neville’s claim is largely accurate as it is highly unlikely Lloyd George would have risked the inclusion of the six counties considering the influence of powerful Unionists in government including Ulster Unionist leader, James Craig. However, aside from the immediate inevitability of exclusion, Lloyd George evidently gained the upper hand on the Ulster issue through deceiving Sinn Fein into believing a Boundary Commission and his influence would ensure the six counties would fall into the Treaty. This was proven to be a bluff from Lloyd George in the long term and this indicates a slight element of ineffectiveness on the behalf of Sinn Fein simply because they believed this falsity and were outwitted in this part of the Treaty.
In conclusion, it is clear that some Irish leaders were more effective than others in advancing their causes. In relation to the conceptual criteria it would appear O’Connell undertook the most effective advancement of Irish Catholic through Catholic Emancipation. O’Connell had no significant factors outside of his control working in his favour and had to tackle a hostile political situation to force Britain to yield to his demands. The fact that the Emancipation Act held great importance for the future of Catholics only further demonstrates his emphatic effectiveness. However, O’Connell’s overall effectiveness is let by the disappointing Whig alliance and Repeal campaign. Parnell was effective in the manner he promoted Home Rule to the British government but his effectiveness clearly suffered as the Home Rule Cause was weakened as a result of his role in destroying the IPP’s powerful unity coupled with the detrimental response of pro-Unionist Ulster. Sinn Fein’s rise to prominence was undoubtedly aided by external factors such as the Easter Rising myth and British mistakes and so its effectiveness is automatically downgraded. Furthermore, the 1921 Treaty appears to have stemmed from the IRA’s instigation of war as opposed to Sinn Fein’s political efforts. Nevertheless Sinn Fein were effective in negotiating the Treaty that remarkably changed Ireland’s constitutional status.
Bibliography
- J.C Beckett, The Making of Modern Ireland 1603-1923 (Faber and Faber Limited 1966)
- Robert Kee, The Green Flag (Penguin Group)
- Donald MacRaild, Parnell and Home Rule (Modern History Review February 1993)
- Paul Adelman and Robert Pearce, Great Britain and the Irish Question 1798-1922 (Hodder Murray 2005)
- Phil Chapple, ‘Dev’: the career of Eamon de Valera (History Review, December 2005)
- Peter Neville, The origins and Development of Irish Republicanism (History Review September 2001)
- Michael Morrogh, The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 (History Review December 2000)
- Sarah Newman, Towards The Easter Rising Irish Nationalism 1884-1916 (Modern History Review February 1995)
- K.T Hoppen, Ireland Since 1800 (1999)
J.C Beckett, The Making of Modern Ireland 1603-1923 (Faber and Faber Limited 1966), p300
J.C Beckett, The Making of Modern Ireland 1603-1923 (Faber and Faber Limited 1966), p318
Robert Kee, The Green Flag (Penguin Group), p194
Donald MacRaild, Parnell and Home Rule (Modern History Review February 1993), p32
Paul Adelman and Robert Pearce, Great Britain and the Irish Question 1798-1922 (Hodder Murray 2005), p106
Phil Chapple, ‘Dev’: the career of Eamon de Valera (History Review, December 2005), p30
Peter Neville, The origins and Development of Irish Republicanism (History Review September 2001), p3