On the contrary, Trotsky had little influence as Commissar for War, which only brought him support from the Red Army, and as an intellectual he had support from the universities as well. However, Trotsky’s intellectual capabilities and his status as a Marxist theorist often made him appear arrogant and led to a poor sense of judgement when dealing with other people. An example of this was seen when he published his ‘Lessons of October’, which criticised Lenin’s NEP. He had completely misjudged the mood, while Stalin made the most of it by giving numerous lectures on ‘Leninism’ in several universities. Trotsky made little effort to cultivate support and thought that inter-party squabbling was beneath him. He was purely an individualist and this fact did not suit the coalition situation that followed Lenin’s death, hence making Stalin appear to be a more suitable option. Furthermore, Trotsky was feared to become a Bonaparte figure who would lead a military dictatorship and so again, Stalin was seen as a safer option as opposed to the more ‘dangerous’ figure that Trotsky represented.
As the Triumvirate formed between Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev, Trotsky was the most significant character to remain an outsider to it. While Zinoviev, Kamenev and Trotsky attacked each other, Stalin stayed out of the dispute, building his own power base, while being portrayed as the moderate peace maker, trying to uphold party unity, at the same time. Stalin continued to fill Congress with his supporters, something Zinoviev and Kamenev allowed him to do due to their fear of Trotsky. Thus, the result was that as his rivals grew weaker by fighting amongst themselves, Stalin gradually increased in power and popularity.
There were two main issues that divided the Bolshevik party’s left and right wing, those being the NEP and the issue of ‘Permanent Revolution’. Stalin proposed the idea of ‘Socialism in One Country’ in 1925, which not only opposed Trotsky’s view on Permanent Revolution, but also his old allies’ view on the discontinuance of NEP. Stalin argued that the revolutionary wave that had been hoped for had evidently not happened and so world revolution, as proposed by Trotsky, was unlikely. Stalin contended that that the Soviet Union should be made strong and industrialized before attempting revolution on a world scale. He wanted to make the revolution at home successful so that the capitalistic powers in the West would appeal to it. Clearly this had undertones of patriotism and nationalism, and so Trotsky’s attacks on the idea simply portrayed Stalin as the true patriot, defending his idea for the sake of the Soviet Union. Moreover, it enabled Stalin to depict Trotsky as irresponsible and disloyal to the revolution in Russia. This was worsened by the fact that Trotsky had had previous Menshevik connections before the October Revolution, and as the call for Permanent Revolution was similar to that of the Mensheviks, Stalin was effectively able to arouse suspicion over whether Trotsky was a true Bolshevik. Hence, it was Stalin’s idea that gained most support.
The idea of Socialism in One Country fit in well with Bukharin’s right wing views on NEP and thus an alliance formed between them, marking the end of the Triumvirate. Zinoviev and Kamenev, angered by Stalin’s change in policy, called for a vote of no confidence in him in the XIV Party Conference, but as Stalin had packed Congress with his own supporters, the two were easily outvoted. They had not anticipated that the power they had allowed Stalin to accumulate would be used against themselves, but Zinoviev and Kamenev were not alone in their underestimation of him; it was this underestimation that allowed Stalin to gain so much power and influence in the party structure.
Zinoviev and Kamenev resorted to forming an alliance with their old enemy, Trotsky, and so in 1926 the United Opposition was established, calling for Permanent Revolution and an end to the NEP. It did not take long for Stalin to defeat them with his powers as General Secretary. After being refused the right to speak at the XV Party Congress in 1926, the Opposition began to work in secret. An organised mass demonstration in Moscow held in the same year enabled Stalin to accuse them of forming factions, and so as General Secretary, he expelled them from the party. The expulsion split the Opposition in two; while Zinoviev and Kamenev were allowed to come back to the party, though not to their previous positions, after renouncing their views, Trotsky, being a man of principle, refused to do so. His refusal resulted in him being exiled to Alma-Ata in Central Asia. This signified Stalin’s triumph over the left.
Not only did Stalin manage to outmanoeuvre his rivals on the left, but he was also able to defeat his opponents on the right. The next issue that was to divide the party was that of industrialisation. This was not a division caused by stark differences in ideology, but there was merely a disagreement over how and when it should take place and also the role of the peasants. Again, the left viewed force as the only possible route in achieving the resources needed to support an industrialization programme. On the other hand, the right believed that the use of force would result in a decline in production, and that a policy of persuasion should be adopted to avoid peasant opposition. In 1928, Stalin put forward his Five Year Plan, which advocated a policy of rapid industrialisation, an idea which was contrary to the right wing views of Bukharin, a recent ally. Thus, this led to the Right Opposition group emerging, led by Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky, who argued for the continuance of NEP and were against Stalin’s forced militarization of labour. This was a left wing idea, and this plan came within months of having defeated his rivals on the left. Stalin was able to defeat the threat on the right by simply outvoting them in 1929 with his ever growing number of supporters in Congress. This time, Stalin’s supporters were also joined with the left wing, anti-NEP party members, hence easily securing the vote against the right. Bukharin and Tomsky were removed from their positions of power by 1929 and Rykov was removed in 1930.
In conclusion, it can be said that Stalin defeated the left, like the right, by manipulating the party structure and organisation and the key tool that enabled him to do this was his immense power as General Secretary. It is doubtful that without this post Stalin would have been able to outmanoeuvre his rivals in such a way, as controlling the votes and securing his support allowed him to assure the majority beforehand to ensure success. Stalin’s personality was most suited to organising the down fall of his opponents and though the issues that divided the Bolshevik party were not deeply ideological and irreconcilable, Stalin magnified them so that he was able to remove his rivals in the struggle for power. The personality of his opponents, such as Trotsky, did not suit to winning the struggle, and a mixture of Stalin’s strengths and his opponents’ weaknesses allowed him to succeed. The result of his efforts was that the coalition formed in 1924 ceased to exist and Stalin stood as a single dictator, free to implement his policies unchallenged.
