Scotland existed for several centuries as an independent state with its own crown, parliament and legal system, and might have fallen to English rule from the reign of Edward I had it not been for Robert the Bruce; Scottish independence was reasserted in the 1320 Declaration of Arbroath and remained for over three further centuries. The succession of James VI of Scotland to the English throne in 1603 ensured that Scottish and English interests remained closely entangled throughout the 17th century. The Union with Scotland in 1707 created a British state, though Scottish nationalists have always regarded the Act as a betrayal.
Hence the historical background of the UK is complex and explains why the 19th century form of nationalism as a political doctrine asserting the right to national self-determination had little relevance here. Britain was already a nation state that did not need to be freed from foreign rule or to be united. In the 19th century there was no significant movement for Scottish or Welsh independence, though Ireland was very different. Gladstone was converted to Irish Home Rule in 1886. Southern Ireland became a free state in 1922, leaving the six northern Ulster counties as part of the UK. For most of the period of empire (colonial acquisition and victories in wars) nationalism was a matter of confirming national superiority, not regional differences.
Significant support for nationalism in Scotland and Wales is very recent – Plaid Cymru was founded only in 1925, and the SNP in 1928. Neither achieved much electoral success before the late 1960s. The British Government made some concessions – a Secretary of State for Scotland was appointed in 1885, and a Scottish Office was established. Wales, with legal and administrative systems similar to those in England, did not acquire a Secretary of State and a Welsh Office until 1964. But from the late 19th century there were concessions to Welsh nationalism (which was linguistically and culturally based) on religion, temperance, education and the use of the Welsh language in judicial proceedings and on TV.
Both Scotland and Wales suffered disproportionately from the decline of the UK’s manufacturing industries; this nurtured nationalist currents in both countries. The SNP won 30.4% of the vote and 11 seats in October 1974, while PC won 10.3% of the vote and three seats. Since then support has fluctuated, but the nationalists are now firmly established as the principal opposition party to Labour in both countries.
Welsh nationalism has never been primarily economic. It has not flourished in the valleys of South Wales which were hardest hit by economic decline, but rather in the core Welsh-speaking areas of the north west where preservation of the Welsh language and culture has been the key concern, as well as fears over English immigration. Wales is essentially divided rather than united by the language issue, which explains the failure of nationalism to grow, at least until the 1999 Assembly elections (and seats were lost in 2003).
Support for Scottish nationalism has been stronger but more volatile. Language here is a negligible issue, allowing the SNP to make a wider appeal based on national sentiment and Scottish economic and political interests. The negative part of the appeal is the perceived neglect of Scotland by the remote and politically alien Thatcher government, seen as responsible for economic decline, privatisation and the poll tax – all unpopular in Scotland. At the same time the SNP has always argued that ‘It’s Scotland’s Oil’ and that Scotland would be economically better off if it had control of it. More recently the SNP have shifted their stance away from outright independence (never popular with more than a third of Scottish voters) and towards campaigning on the platform ‘Scotland in Europe’.
By the mid 1970s there were (perhaps the first time ever) serious doubts about the long-term survival of the British state, with Northern Ireland in turmoil and nationalism on an upward curve in Scotland and Wales. The attempt at devolution in 1978/9 was botched in Scotland (failing to secure the necessary support of 40% of the eligible voters) and rejected decisively in Wales. Labour’s landslide victory in 1997 (and fear of loss of seats in Scotland and Wales in the future) led to the establishment of a Scottish parliament and Welsh assembly, following successful referendums in both countries in 1997 (though only narrowly approved in Wales). Meanwhile a devolved assembly and executive (since suspended) were more precariously established in Northern Ireland, where the nationalist threat operates largely outside conventional politics, and erupts periodically in violence. Here it is largely the product of religious divisions, reflecting the minority status of Catholics in Ulster and the overwhelming desire to be part of a united Ireland, despite the efforts of the peace process.
In England nationalism exists only at the margins. Its conventional form is insular, patriotic and euro-sceptic, finding expression best in the Conservative party. In its more negative form it is found on the fringe, particularly in some northern working class towns and southern middle class coastal towns. There has been some growth in recent years, fuelled largely by the issue of asylum seekers and race. It finds expression in the BNP, a party that has recently registered a little electoral success in Oldham and Burnley, but which invariably loses its deposits in parliamentary elections. A vociferous section of English football fans mix politics and sport, chanting ‘Two World Wars and One World Cup’ and wrecking cities abroad with some regularity; there has certainly been a resurgence of white racism. At the more conventional political level, there seems to be something of a backlash against devolution, with some demands for the establishment of an English parliament and for outright withdrawal from the EU.
