A valid assertion, we shall now look at the line “the efforts of these brave people often resulted in waves of arrests and torture”. All resistance was dealt with swiftly and brutally by the regime, the SD (secret police section of the SS) and Gestapo and the fear they evoked from the people of Germany that any resistance was defeated by the people themselves; through informers and people working as willing spies, political resistance in this way was all but crushed before individual plans and propaganda “campaigns” had begun. As early as December 1933 the leaders of the Red Shock Troop were arrested and imprisoned in a concentration camp and in January 1935 the Gestapo arrested leaders of the committee behind the circulation of the Socialist newspaper entitled “Socialist action”. By 1939, the exiled SPD leadership on Britain etc. had decided that it was far too dangerous to concluded that underground resistance activities were concluded as deemed too dangerous. This is where the argument of Jackson falls short, giving the impression that the resistance groups gave risked life and limb for their cause; when the official SPD resistance had said basically they had had enough and were going to take a back step in their resistance campaigns. Though it could be argued that the SPD merely took this measure to ensure their own survival, so they could resist, even though at a less vigorous pace, the Nazis for longer. Most likely though, I think it was the work of the people that remained within Germany that caused the most upset to the Nazis, the people who worked against the regime according to their own beliefs, as there were those who were “prepared to risk their lives”. Communist was resistance was targeted by the regime from the outset. In March 1935 SS squads launched a series of brutal raids on the working classes in suburban working class areas of major cities were made. Those brave enough to engage in the resistance faced a “lonely, hopeless struggle, followed by a knock on the door from a member of the Gestapo, detention in a concentration camp and, in most cases, execution.” (Mc Donough). Despite a strong underground dimension, most communist activists did not elude the Gestapo for six months. Of the 422 people who had been salaried KPD officials in January 1933, 219 had been arrested, 125 were in exile and the Nazis had killed 24 by the end of 1935. A closer analysis of the Communist groups operating in Germany into the early 1940’s reveals a similar fate as the Gestapo hunted them down or they fell victim to denunciation by their fellow citizens. The Red Orchestra, a spy organisation for the USSR during the war, for instance is an example as they were defeated by the Nazi secret police and specialist forces.
There are a number of points at issue with the information contained in the source extract. In the first instance I would like to reinforce that we are informed that the university lecturer is an American writing in “Hitler and Nazi Germany, 1992” and so academically reliable as we can assume lots of historical research took place for Jackson to come to this judgement. The source should ideally be read in its original context. The book the extract comes from could be merely a general survey of key developments or a collection of related articles. The view is held in line with much certainty as revised representations by western historians some of whom accept that Communists, Socialists and workers played a more active role in resisting the regime than previously thought.
The author is correct in his/her view that the left, notably the Communists and Socialists were committed to resisting the regime. It should nevertheless be pointed out that Gestapo and SD action taken successfully against resistance outweighed the gains made by the extradited parties. Acts of resistance, in a survey, show a decline as the war of attrition by the Gestapo and the SD takes its toll. The KPD and in its various forms, the Red Orchestra and Uhrig group to name the more successful, were perhaps more resilient and it was in the period of 1941, with the beginning of operation Barborossa that revived communist resistance. However, the Nazis still hunted down these “terrorists” at the latter stages of the war.
In conclusion, the source evidence deals largely with the resistance (rather than the opposition) of the Communists and Socialists to the Nazi regime, giving a valid interpretation of this. In line with more recent representations the author is correct in affording credit to the brave people of the Socialist and Communist resistance to the regime. Though other powerful institutions resisted, the Church, military and various youth/student groups. Nevertheless, in spite of the enormous risks and the spectre of being arrested by the Gestapo, Communist resistance in particular never ceased inside Germany which is a testimony to the self sacrifice Communists were willing to endure to meet their objective of ridding Germany of the Nazi tyranny.
The second source deals with the army. There is little doubt that the army held Hitler with contempt, the army and other conservative elites strongly advocated resistance. Traditionally, the army maintained some autonomy from the Nazi party, over time however, with the Night of the Long Knives, June 1934, with the removal of Rohm, the radical leader who wanted the old Wehrmarcht replaced by the SA. From 1938 onwards, Hitler made changes in by then “his” military structure, replacing Blomberg and others with Nazis, so it became party dominated. However the contentious attitude of some of the conservative elites merely grew as Hitler, a mere Corporal, was now “Commander in Chief and Minister of War”.
There is an accepted view that the army as a group most likely played the part of most effective resistance group. The opposition came in severity when Germany started to lose the war, with the halt of the advance on the eastern front, the loss of the Battle of Britain, with the Italian Fascist dictator Mussolini’ incompetence (attacking Greece, so Hitler halted the Russian advance to aid Mussolini). It was these steps, when defeat loomed, that the army resistance revived. The Beck-Goerdeler group, the Foreign Office and the Abwehr (the state military intelligence unit) were both effective resistance groups. The 1944 Bomb Plot stands out as an example of this, where the attempt to topple Hitler with a bomb in a suitcase where he was to make a speech failed. It is fair to conclude that the “potentially” most effective opposition came from these groups. However, set against the repressive police state, what real chances did such opposition have?
The authors, Evans and Jenkins, make some valid interpretations but we should take into account the limitations of the source, editing, we do not know what is left out. The nature of the text, what is it designed for, or to portray? Finally context is an important issue, we do not have the scene or the idea that they are summarising fully. Similarly, we are not told how the army was most effective; no detail of what they did is given, or what they hoped to achieve in resisting. Mc Donough concludes that “…many of them withdrew support from Hitler only because his form of nationalism was more extreme than their own version, which was still expansionist and authoritarian.” This suggests that the army felt that he had gone/was going too far, and the army was determined to thwart him from power. Yet, little headway was gained, and until the tide of the war turned against Germany most accepted Hitler. So only sporadic resistance was made, achieving little. In the latter war years, it became more powerful an element within the army, and climaxed with the only attempt on Hitler’s life since his coming to power (1944, the Bomb Plot). Though a purge followed this, which crumbled most of the army’s resistance in to dust.
So the authors are correct in their views, “within the High Command there were those who considered Hitler an upstart”, this is a valid interpretation of the facts, and as the Conservative Elites had vast resources of their own and were in a position of power within the Nazi structure, they were in a powerful position to offer resistance to the Nazi regime. Yet their greatest strength was their greatest downfall, because of their wealth, status and position in society, they had far more to risk losing than the average (probably) destitute Communist resistor, and would have less means to go against Hitler, it would take more courage from them.
So, balancing the two sources up, we can see that the military were more likely the stronger force, but without the help of the others this group (and vice-versa, of course) would not have been encouraged if there was not other resistance going on somewhere, as there would be the feeling of loneliness, and of too great a risk. There are some circumstances where the two types overlap “the Red Orchestra” could be affiliated with the army and the KPD for instance.
