Should George Bush Press Ahead with his Plans for National Missile Defence?

           Given the existence of these ‘rogue’ states, it is also often argued that they do not pose a credible threat to the USA. Especially since the start of the ‘war on terrorism’ the perceived threat has been from religious fundamentalism and not from nation states. As Wilkening writes; 

Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are not the primary threat to the United States, as events since September 11 demonstrate. Other homeland defence programs, especially civil defences against bio terrorism, are more important.

           Whether this is true or not, and it is certainly true that terrorism has claimed more lives on the US mainland than a missile attack, there a certain flaws to the logic of this argument. Simply because a specific type of threat exists, it does not mean that other threats cease to exist, and even though a country may be vulnerable to one kind of attack, it does not mean that it should not seek to defend itself against another. Considering the potential threat posed by these ‘rogue’ states, there have been significant differences of opinion within the security and intelligence community. In 1995, the US National Intelligence Estimate predicted the country would be free from threat for at least fifteen years. However, other reports have disagreed. In 1998, a commission headed by Donald Rumsfeld (now US Defence Secretary), found that some states, notably North Korea could have the ability to threaten the USA within five years. Not long after this report was published, its conclusions seemed to be accurate. North Korea test-fired, in August 1998, a three-stage ballistic missile called Taepo Dong 1. This flew over Japan and landed in the Pacific Ocean. The North Korean government claimed it was a failed satellite launch, and the US administration agreed (though this may have been in an effort to not seem surprised). However, whether it was a missile or satellite, the basic mechanics are the same. Therefore, if North Korea can launch a satellite, it can build an ICBM.

           During the Cold War, it was believed that the arsenals possessed by both the USA and USSR were roughly comparable. By the late 1980’s, it is estimated, that the USSR held over nine thousand ‘Strategic Nuclear Warheads’ capable of reaching the mainland of the USA. Any system of NMD would therefore require a great number of interceptors and the cost of this was deemed to great to pursue. This was the main reason that the predecessor to NMD, Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI ‘Star Wars’), espoused by President George Bush Snr., was not pursued to a great degree.  The preferred strategy of deterrence, which will be discussed more later, was cheaper and allowed offensive weapons to act as a defence. Also, small-scale missile defence that would have protected the military installations of the USA, to ensure a counter-strike, did not have the political will behind it to be implemented. However, since the end of the ‘Cold War’, many of the weapons on both sides have been decommissioned. The potential threat to the US mainland is from smaller states possessing only a handful, if any, of ICBMs. Thus, the cost of setting up a NMD system is lot less costly.

         Since 1945, following the end of WWII and the ensuing hostility between the two superpowers of the USA and USSR, both sides were locked in an ‘arms race’, one constantly trying to go ‘one-better’ militarily than the other. This resulted in both sides having more than enough nuclear weapons to totally obliterate the other many times over. Added to this the fact than a strike by either would still allow the other to respond by launching its own missiles, created a situation of ‘mutually assured destruction’ (MAD). This is the basic principle of deterrence, that no one state would launch missiles at another state with comparable capability, as this would result in both sides being destroyed. This situation during the ‘Cold War’ was locked in by the signing of treaties. The most relevant of these is the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, to the extent that President Clinton called the treaty, “a cornerstone of stability”. This act forbade either the USA or USSR from developing defensive systems to counter a missile attack. The logic being that if, for example, the USSR could defend itself from a counter-strike by the USA, thus throwing MAD out of the window, it would be more likely to attack the USA first. This principle is what many credit for the prevention of a third world war between the superpowers. ‘Deterrence theory’ dominated the thinking of USA foreign policy so much, that even after the end of the ‘Cold War’ it was still held by many to be the best option, “Deterrence worked throughout the cold war, it continues to work now, it will work well into the future”. Yet this is not the case. Deterrence did work in the ‘Cold War’, but that was a specific situation and it does not necessarily follow that the same applies to a post-Cold War era. For example, the USSR and USA had a direct means of communication, a ‘hot line’ connecting the White House in Washington DC with Moscow. This allowed for direct communication between the leaders in order to calm a situation that may develop, as happened during the ‘Cuban Missile Crisis’. Other assumptions that ‘Deterrence theory’ is guilty of are that all states’ leaders are rational, that they are well-informed and that there is a familiarity between the two opposing sides. While these were, to a certain degree, true during the Cold War, they are not always; indeed it is highly dubious whether any future situations will share many similarities to the Cold War. Also, the fact that deterrence worked for a certain amount of time does not mean it would have continued to work even if the USSR had not collapsed. In all military history, advances in offensive weapons have been followed by advances in defensive capability. Just as the sword led to amour and tanks led to anti-tank rockets, so Nuclear weapons have led to NMD.

          In recent years, the world has witnessed an increase in the action of the USA’s military forces outside its previous sphere. Actions in the Gulf War, and against the Taleban in Afghanistan, as a part of the ‘War on Terrorism’, do show this. Added to this, the seemingly inevitable forthcoming war with Iraq, which the Bush administration links with terrorism and it can be seen that a key part of US foreign policy is to engage militarily with forces with which it has disputes. A key aim of the Bush presidency, since the attacks of 11th September 2001, is to ensure “the most dangerous weapons” are not held by the “most dangerous states”. It is therefore essential to the USA that these, the ‘rogue’ states that were discussed earlier, are within its capacity to influence, by force if necessary. In relation to the need for NMD, the ability of the USA to act in varying regions of world is crucial. An operational NMD system prevents the USA from being struck by an ICBM attack by a state against which the USA wishes to use military force. Imagine, for example, that in 1990, Iraq possessed an ICMB capable of reaching the USA, or one of its allies in the Gulf War. Given this, and that the USA had no defence against such an attack, it is questionable whether it would have acted as to initiate the Gulf War. Even if it had, it is difficult to imagine that it would have built such a coalition as it did if Saddam Hussein could, even as a last act of revenge, launched missiles against the USA or its western European allies. Whether one agrees that the USA should attack Iraq, or that it should be able to act internationally without fear of attacks on its mainland is irrelevant. As it is clear that the USA continues to wish to do so, it seems clear that a NMD system is needed to protect its assets, civilian and military, on the mainland USA, its allies and its forces in operation around the globe.

One main argument against the deployment of a NMD system by the USA is that it would increase weapons proliferation around the world, mostly by states who currently could strike at the USA, China and Russia, as these would see their deterrent force diminished. This would result in another ‘arms race’ that would further destabilise the international security environment. At the same time, those ‘rogue’ states from which the USA seeks to defend itself against through NMD, may feel the need to increase its arsenal, and gain a capability of combating NMD, such as MERV. This is a system, which means one ballistic missile may have many ‘sub-missiles’ designed to distract a defensive systems tracking ability. However, complex discussions of this technology are neither feasible, nor relevant, at this time, but, suffice it to say; given a long enough period this technology could be developed. This means that a deployment of NMD could result in further destabilisation of international security. However, there are two key arguments to counter this. Firstly, even prior to the projected existence of NMD, during the heyday of ‘deterrence theory’ widespread proliferation of WMD occurred, partly because of the breakdown of the USSR and inevitable advances in technology. Programmes such as START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) and START II have served to reduce the number of weapons of the USA and Russia, but have had little effect on the smaller ‘rogue’ states, or the number of new states which have gained nuclear capacity, such as India and Pakistan. Also, programmes designed to reverse the proliferation by reducing the number of weapons in the world, miss the point that, as weapons such as this cannot be un-invented, and as long as power is the key determinant of international standing and a states ability to act, states will always seek to maximise their power through these weapons.

In addressing the question of whether George W. Bush should press ahead with plans for National Missile Defence, this essay has addressed just some of the many issues which may affect such a choice. Among these, are the ramifications for the USA’s allies abroad and their relations with the superpower, particularly Russia, a new found ‘friend’ of President Bush. Also, the various methods of NMD, regarding which the debate in the US security services still rages have not been discussed.

Regarding what has been discussed, this essay has shown quite strongly some of the reasons of why George Bush should press ahead with his plans. The potential threat from ‘rogue’ states, as acknowledged by most experts in the field, is a serious one and will only gain in severity over time. It has also been shown that, while previous plans for a form of NMD or SDI were unavailable due to the constraints of the ABM Treaty (1972), they were also held back by the costs involved. These costs have diminished since the end of the Cold War, and thus not only is NMD still a viable course of action, it is now more practicable then ever before. This piece has also attempted to show how the policies of the superpowers during the Cold War, namely deterrence, are no longer applicable to current security concerns. That the threat posed by ‘rogue’ states does not conform to the situations that allow deterrence to be successful. The USA will continue to act, or desire to act, in many regions of the world; this can be seen clearly. Given this, it has been shown how the need for NMD is crucial for the USA to retain its ability to do so, without threatening the lives of its citizens at home. Finally, it has been seen how one of the key arguments against NMD; that it will increase weapons proliferation, is inadequate. Proliferation existed throughout the Cold War and has accelerated since its end. The deployment of NMD will not stop proliferation of weapons, but neither will the status quo. Therefore for the reasons given, it can be seen why George Bush is right to press ahead with a National Missile Defence initiative.

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Bibliography

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Calvocoressi, P., World Politics 1945-2000, (London, Longman, 2001)

Goldstein, Joshua .S. International Relations. (4th Edition. New York: Longman, 2000)

Gray, C., The Second Nuclear Age, (Boulder & London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999)

Lewis, G., “National Missile Defence: And Indefensible System” (Foreign Policy, no.117)

Payne, K., “The Case for National Missile Defence” (Orbis, vol.44, no.2)

Sopko, J., “The Changing Proliferation Threat” (Foreign Policy, no.105, pp.3-20)

Thatcher, M., Statecraft, (London, Harper Collins, 2002)

Wilkening, Dean A, “Keeping  National Missile Defence In Perspective” (Science & Technology, Winter2001/2002, Vol. 18, Issue 2)

“Bush's Missile Defence Victory Signifies Changing Times” (CQ Weekly, Vol. 60 Issue 41) 

 

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