The downing street Declaration, 1993, the Taoiseach, Mr. Albert Reynolds, TD and the Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. John Major MP, acknowledge that the most urgent and important issue facing the people of Ireland, North and South, and the British and Irish Governments together, is to remove the conflict, to overcome the legacy of history and to heal the divisions which have resulted, recognising the absence of a lasting and satisfactory settlement of relationships between the peoples of both islands has contributed to continuing tragedy and suffering. They believe that the development of an agreed framework for peace, which has been discussed between them since early last year, and which is based on a number of key principles articulated by the two Governments over the past 20 years, together with adaptation of other widely accepted principles, provides the starting point of a peace process designed to culminate in a political settlement. The Taoiseach and the Prime Minister are convinced of the inestimable value to both their peoples, and particularly for the next generation, of healing divisions in Ireland and of ending a conflict which has been so manifestly to the detriment of all. Both recognise that the ending of divisions can come about only through the agreement and co-operation of the people, North and South, representing both traditions in Ireland. They therefore make a solemn commitment to promote co-operation at all levels on the basis of the fundamental principles, undertakings, and obligations under international agreements, to which they have jointly committed themselves, and the guarantees which each Government has given and now reaffirms, including Northern Ireland's statutory constitutional guarantee. It is their aim to foster agreement and reconciliation, leading to a new political framework founded on consent and encompassing arrangements within Northern Ireland, for the whole island, and between these islands. They also consider that the development of Europe will, of itself, require new approaches to serve interests common to both parts of the island of Ireland, and to Ireland and the United Kingdom as partners in the European Union. The Prime Minister, on behalf of the British Government, reaffirms that they will uphold the democratic wish of the greater number of the people of Northern Ireland on the issue of whether they prefer to support the Union or a sovereign united Ireland. On this basis, he reiterates, on the behalf of the British Government, that they have no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland. Their primary interest is to see peace, stability and reconciliation established by agreement among all the people inhabit the island, and they will work together with the Irish Government to achieve such an agreement, which will embrace the totality of relationships. The role of the British Government will be to encourage, facilitate and enable the achievement of such agreement over a period through a process of dialogue and co-operation based on full respect for the rights and identities of both traditions in Ireland. They accept that such agreement may, as of right, take the form of agreed structures for the island as a whole, including a united Ireland achieved by peaceful means on the following basis. The British Government agree that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish. They reaffirm as a binding obligation that they will, for their part, introduce the necessary legislation to give effect to this, or equally to any measure of agreement on future relationships in Ireland which the people living in Ireland may themselves freely so determine without external impediment. They believe that the people of Britain would wish, in friendship to all sides, to enable the people of Ireland to reach agreement on how they may live together in harmony and in partnership, with respect for their diverse traditions, and with full recognition of the special links and the unique relationship which exist between the peoples of Britain and Ireland. The Taoiseach, on behalf of the Irish Government, considers that the lessons of Irish history, and especially of Northern Ireland, show that stability and well-being will not be found under any political system which is refused allegiance or rejected on grounds of identity by a significant minority of those governed by it. For this reason, it would be wrong to attempt to impose a united Ireland, in the absence of the freely given consent of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland. He accepts, on behalf of the Irish Government, that the democratic right of self-determination by the people of Ireland as a whole must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland and must, consistent with justice and equity, respect the democratic dignity and the civil rights and religious liberties of both communities, including: - the right of free political thought; - the right of freedom and expression of religion; - the right to pursue democratically national and political aspirations; - the right to seek constitutional change by peaceful and legitimate means; - the right to live wherever one chooses without hindrance; - the right to equal opportunity in all social and economic activity, regardless of class, creed, sex or colour. These would be reflected in any future political and constitutional arrangements emerging from a new and more broadly based agreement. The Irish Government would make their own arrangements within their jurisdiction to enable democratic parties to consult together and share in dialogue about the political future. The Taoiseach intention is that these arrangements could include the establishment, in consultation with other parties, of a Forum for Peace and Reconciliation to make recommendations on ways in which agreement and trust between both traditions can be promoted and established. The Sunningdale experiment of 1973 represented an imaginative Anglo-Irish attempt to accommodate both national identities in Northern Ireland. Its main provisions were a devolved assembly, a power-sharing executive and a cross-border institution, called the Council of Ireland. Although few of the provisions of the accord were brought into effect, a power-sharing government was established involving the Official Unionist Party (OUP), the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI). The executive, however, only lasted five months due to the Ulster Workers Council (UWC) strike of May 1974.
Objections to the Sunningdale accord from sections of the Unionist community centred on fears that the Council of Ireland would become a stepping stone to a united Ireland. Nevertheless, the experiment was a major development in Northern Ireland politics and Anglo-Irish relations. Many of the concepts and terms used in the Sunningdale agreement can be found in subsequent communiqués between the two governments, including the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement. The various elements of the Sunningdale agreement provided the parameters for subsequent political discussions, up to and including the 'peace process' of the 1990s.
Merlyn Rees, the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, published a White Paper in July 1974 outlining a plan for a Constitutional Convention. The United Ulster Unionist Council (UUUC) and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) took 46 and 17 seats respectively in the subsequent election. The Convention was unable to agree on a devolved form of government and voted for a return to the Stormont system. The British Government had rejected this with the introduction of direct rule in 1972, and the Convention expired in November 1975.
Roy Mason succeeded Rees as Secretary of State in September 1976 and sought to introduce another from of power-sharing through his 'interim devolution' scheme of 1977. This was based on the idea of a devolved non-legislating 78-seat assembly from which sub-committees would be drawn to deal with non-contentious issues such as health, social services and transport. Discussions dragged on for some months but the approach failed to attract much support. A similar fate awaited the Round Table Conference initiated by Conservative Secretary of State Humphrey Atkins in 1980, and Secretary of State James Prior's 'rolling devolution' scheme of 1982.
The focus of British policy shifted from Belfast to Dublin following the failure of Atkins' Round Table Conference in 1980. Margaret Thatcher led a high-powered delegation to Dublin and met the Taoiseach (Irish Prime Minister), Charles Haughey, in May 1980. The focus of the initiative was the relationship between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Republic of Ireland. A number of joint studies were commissioned concerning new institutional arrangements, security matters, economic co-operation and measures to encourage mutual understanding. The phrase 'totality of relationships between these islands' also entered the political vocabulary for the first time.
The joint studies have provided the back-bone of many of the developments in Anglo-Irish relations since 1981. More immediately, however, they resulted in the creation of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council, a series of intergovernmental contacts at various levels, and the non-governmental Anglo-Irish Encounter, primarily concerned with cultural and social issues.
It should be noted that much of the Thatcher / Haughey initiative was over-shadowed by the hunger strikes at the Maze prison. The hunger strikes concerned 'political status' of prisoners and resulted in ten republican prisoners dying from self-imposed starvation, including Bobby Sands MP (Member of Parliament), elected in a by-election in Fermanagh-South Tyrone. The hunger strikes were a major propaganda coup for Sinn Féin (SF) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and heralded the entry of Sinn Féin into electoral politics.
The New Ireland Forum was established by the FitzGerald Government and sat from May 1983 to May 1984. It was established partly in response to the rise of Sinn Féin (SF) following the hunger strikes. The final report has been described as 'the most authoritative restatement of the nationalist ideal in recent times' (Whyte, 1990). The Forum was attended by the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) from Northern Ireland, and the three main political parties in the Republic, Fianna Fáil (FF), Fine Gael (FG), and the Irish Labour Party. Other parties from Northern Ireland were invited to attend but declined. The Forum received 317 written and 31 oral submissions.
The New Ireland Forum Report concluded that 'a united Ireland in the form of a sovereign independent state to be achieved peacefully and by consent' was 'the best and most durable basis for peace and stability'. The Report also put forward a federal or confederal state, and joint authority as alternatives. The British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, in a famous press conference stated 'the unified Ireland was one solution - that is out. A second solution was a confederation of the two States - that is out. A third solution was joint authority - that is out'.
Nevertheless, sections of the Anglo-Irish Agreement draw heavily on the language and substance of the New Ireland Forum Report, and its influence can be seen throughout the Agreement. The Report also formed much of the basis for the negotiations leading to the signing of the Hillsborough Agreement. Reaction to the Anglo-Irish Agreement varied according to the various interpretations of its meaning. The Agreement meant different things to different people. Unionists regarded the Agreement as the beginning of the end of the Union, while republicans saw the continuation of British rule by other means. Even the framers of the document diverged in their interpretation. Britain's attempts to re-assure unionists contrasted with the Irish Government's need to defend the Agreement against republican critics. The reaction to the Anglo-Irish Agreement from the international community and public opinion in the Republic of Ireland and Britain was favourable. The traditional bi-partisan nature of party politics in the House of Commons towards Northern Ireland guaranteed its acquiescence. The Commons voted in favour of the Agreement by 473 votes to 47. The Agreement was also endorsed by a majority of members of the Oireachtas (Irish Parliament), with Fianna Fáil (FF) voting against. Support in Northern Ireland was limited to John Hume's Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), who had indirectly influenced its outcome through the New Ireland Forum and who been kept informed of negotiations through contact with the Irish Government.
Opposition to the Agreement emanated from traditional nationalists, or republicans, in both parts of Ireland, primarily Sinn Féin (SF) and Fianna Fáil (FF), and most vehemently, from the unionist politicians and population of Northern Ireland. Breakaway terrorist groups such as the Real IRA haven't agreed with the IRA's ceasefire.
They have carried on bombing in places like Omagh and London.
But on 28 July 2005 the IRA released a very important statement, saying that they were giving up violence for good.
They also promised to destroy all their weapons and told all their members to stop fighting as well.