Russia provided an excuse for Germany to go to war with their actions. When they mobilised on the 30th of July, Germany chose to see it as a virtual equivalent of a declaration of war. This was due to the Schlieffen Plan, which stipulated that Germany had to mobilise immediately after Russia in order to defeat Belgium and France before Russia was ready to fight on its borders. However, this mistake could be seen as Germany’s, as Russia did not know of these plans and Germany was the only country in Europe for which mobilisation was war, and consequently it could be blamed on Germany’s military mismanagements.
Russia also provided Serbia with support, which encouraged them to defend themselves, and drew Russia into the conflict. Their mobilisation was evidence of this: even if Russia did not think they were causing war by doing it, they were showing they were ready and willing. This could be because Savonoz, the Russian foreign minister, interpreted Austria Hungary’s reaction as deliberate provocation of the whole Slav race. Whilst Austria Hungary may have been looking for war with Serbia, they were not necessarily looking to annoy all Slavs. Alternaitively, Russia’s actions could have been rooted in recent history, and a belief that if they did not support Serbia for a second time, they chose not to in1913, then they would lose credibility and status in the Balkans, an idea which can be accredited to James Joll, and draws together the long and short term reasons for war. It seems likely that Russia actions were based on a combination of these factors, and so although their mismanagement of the situation may have sparked off the conflict, it was partly due to longer term problems and situations that the mismanagement occurred.
France and Britain are the only countries that could be said to have had no hand in the mismanagement of the July crisis. Britain was simply a bystander who became involved on the 4th of August after war had broken out, and France was dragged in by a declaration of war on the 3rd of August from Germany based on a complete lie, an apparent bombing by France of Nuremberg, but which was necessary for Germany in order for them to carry out the Schlieffen Plan.
Remack however would disagree with this analysis. He would say that France was the most blameless, but must be held responsible for the ‘blank cheque’ of support that they gave Russia, and that Britain was slightly more to blame, as they should have made it clear to Germany that they would defend Belgium’s neutrality, as set out in the Treaty of London 1839. Nonetheless it seems reasonable to maintain the first interpretation of Britain’s actions as they did not necessarily know of Germany’s plans to attack Belgium and therefore had no reason to warn Germany. Conversely, it is a good point concerning France: if Germany can be held responsible for the unconditional support it gave Austria Hungary then surely the same should apply to France and its similar mismanagement.
As demonstrated above, the mismanagement of the crisis of 1914 would not have occurred without the longer term rivalries which contributed to the climate in which the decisions were made and the circumstances on which they were based. The most important cause was Weltpolitik, the aggressive expansionist foreign policy pursued by Germany between 1890 and 1914. This was possibly designed to placate the public, who were dissatisfied at Germany’s lack of an empire, which didn’t accord with their increased economic power, and in doing so hopefully break the constitutional deadlock in the Reichstag. However, the policy was never a success, it was plagued by heavy handed methods mixed with uncertain aims, and often served only to increase European mistrust and suspicion of Germany. This in turn, made Germany more paranoid and increased their fear of encirclement, whilst bringing home their unpopularity.
The first Moroccan crisis shows this effect. It occurred in the spring of 1909, when Germany over reacted to a French mission to Morocco, claiming the French were looking to make it a protectorate, and therefore damaging their commercial interests. However, the real motive behind the reaction is likely to have been a plan to weaken the Anglo French alliance, and make France realise she needed Germany, by putting France in a position where Britain would not support her. In this way, the crisis is linked to the alliance system, and the tension that this caused. However, despite Germany’s unspoken threat of war and increased and sustained pressure on France, when an international conference was called Britain backed France all the way, strengthening the alliance rather than weakening it. This incident only served to make France and Britain and the rest of Europe suspicious of Germany, and her unpredictability and tendency to over react.
The second Moroccan or Agadir crisis, which occurred in July 1911, was around the same issue. Germany was again trying to intimidate France, this time in return for compensation for the loss of its commercial interests as again the French were looking to make Morocco a protectorate. However, their demand for the whole of the Congo prevented a quick decision, and their silence when questioned by Britain about the crisis led to an Anglo German confrontation. An international conference was a result, and Germany only gained two small areas in the Congo. Weltpolitik had again failed, spectacularly, and only made the situation worse. France was now even more suspicious and resentful of Germany, as was Britain, and the German public were annoyed as they had been led to expect the whole French Congo. It also led to a Naval agreement between France and Britain, which strengthened the alliance further. All in all, Weltpolitik went a long way to create a climate of suspicion and fear of Germany in Europe and increase Germany’s resentment of other European countries, and so increase the possibility of war. It also increased reliance on alliances, and made them more important.
This leads to another long-term factor, the alliance system. There were two major groups within Europe, the Triple Entente that consisted of France, Britain and Russia and the Triple Alliance, which was made up of Germany, Austria Hungary and Italy. There are two interpretations of this factor, that it in itself caused tension and heightened the atmosphere of suspicion, or that it was merely a symptom of already existing problems. The aforementioned situation concerning Weltpolitik would seem to prove it as an effect of existing problem, but conversely the German policy was in some ways caused by a fear of encirclement, stemming from the alliance system. It would seem that although the alliance system was a cause of some tension, it was also a symptom of increased and prolonged friction. There are reasons for doubting its importance; for instance when war did break out in 1914, Italy did not join in, but remained neutral for two years before she swapped sides, and this weakens the argument that the alliances meant certain countries had to declare war because of alliance ties. It was never a condition of the alliances that this had to happen, and where they did become involved it was probably more influenced by self interest than duty. However, where the alliances were important was in the Balkans, where they meant the internationalising of a local problem.
This leads on to another long-term factor, Balkan Nationalism. This factor was very important, as without it the war probably would not have happened. The Balkans was the ‘powder keg’ of Europe as a result of the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Many countries were now independent, which resulted in increased nationalism, especially in Serbia, which was a huge problem for Austria Hungary. Within its borders, Austria Hungary had many races living side by side, and was ruled by a dual monarchy which did not take into account the large Slav population. They began to become dissatisfied, and encouraged by their fellow Slavs in Serbia, began to campaign for independence. This would rip Austria Hungary and its empire apart, and they would go to any lengths to avoid it and the diminishing of their status as a world power that it would cause. Added to this was the fact that Serbia was supported by Russia, and Austria Hungary by Germany, and inevitably this led to tension and violence, which was manifested in incidents such as the two Balkan Wars. Serbia won both wars, and this increased the threat felt by Austria Hungary, consequently increasing tension and the risk of conflict occurring again within the Balkans in the future. However, there was also restraint of the countries involved by their allies, which would imply that the alliance system was a positive thing rather than a cause of increased tension. It was the assassination in Serbia, which occurred because of these tensions that proved the catalyst for the war.
A less important factor was Imperialism. According to some, this contributed to the warlike atmosphere of Europe, which made the war possible. However, by 1914 most conflict concerning imperialism had been resolved, and this was demonstrated by the fact that France and Britain were on the same side in the war, although they had been at loggerheads for years before due to friction over colonies. Conversely, it could be said that Imperialism was a factor that contributed to the emergence of Weltpolitik, as it was rooted in German insecurity and feelings of inadequacy in terms of their empire. In this way Imperialism was important, but not in the manner commonly assumed.
The last two, least significant, factors were military plans and the arms and naval race, which could both be seen as results of the tensions already there rather than factors in themselves. Alternatively, it could be argued that the naval race which occurred between Britain and Germany until 1912 over Dreadnoughts soured relations between the countries considerably, and therefore increased the chances of war, and that the arms race which occurred between Germany, Russia, Austria Hungary and France did the same. Military Plans were also an issue, as although the Schlieffen Plan may not have been invented if it had not been for the existing problems, its existence meant that Germany had to declare war on Russian mobilisation, and therefore increased the possibility of a crisis turning into war. Equally, the fact that Russia’s plans meant that partial mobilisation was impossible caused problems.
It would seem that the First World War was a consequence of no one factor, or even one type of factor, long or short term, but instead the result of a culmination of many different long-term rivalries, which created a climate where war became possible, and dictated the actions of the great powers within the July 1914 crisis which amounted to mismanagement. As James Joll pointed out, every decision made concerning the crisis was restricted to some extent by previous events. Without the long-standing rivalries, there would have been no crisis, and without the crisis there would have been no war. Both factors were equally important, and the consequences inseparable.
WORD COUNT PART A 530
WORD COUNT PART B 2356
TOTAL 2886