It can be shown in source two that when the government did allow peasant initiative, the peasants did well displayed by Sergei Semenov. Though this provides a positive account of Russia’s agricultural policy, it is important to take into account the province of this extract. Source two’s first extract outlines Stolypin’s policy, a “wager…on the sturdy and the strong”. These people became the Kulak, the richer peasants, thus would have a positive experience under Stolypin. However, the second extract in the source indicates peasants’ hostility to the reforms. We can infer from this that Stolypin’s reforms were not beneficial for the vast majority of the peasants, due to the tsarist official’s generalisation of the peasants’ attitude to the reforms. We can also infer that there was minor resistance to it. The peasants the tsarist official refers to, represent the not so sturdy and strong peasants. Since only a minority of the peasant population became Kulaks, we can see that overall, Stolypin’s policies failed. Stolypin often referred to needing twenty years for his ‘wager on the strong’ to show dividends. However, his sudden death in 1911 allowed him only five years, with the war in 1914, allowing Russia only eight.
Continuity of peasant resistance is implicitly presented in source three. Stalin refers to the “greatest trouble” of his policy was to “explain” it to the peasants. From hindsight, we can see that this ‘explaining’ went beyond just talking, but dealing with resistance very severely. This is suggested later on in the source, but is subtle as a distortion of the actual truth. Stalin refers to giving some of the Kulak “land of their own to cultivate” in the provinces of Tomsk and Irkutuk. This is a very subtle way of expressing that peasants who opposed were sent into Siberian exile. Relating back to source one, we can see the continuity of quickly getting rid of resistance by Siberian exile, though source one expresses it much more explicitly. Stalin also refers to the “great bulk” of the Kulaks being unpopular and wiped out by their “labourers”. This is an obvious distortion of the truth. These “labourers” were actually government workers carrying out Stalin’s wishes, to get rid of anyone who stood in his way. The source needs to be treated with caution as it narrates a conversation between Winston Churchill and Stalin during the Second World War. We can infer from the source’s province that Churchill had to be very careful what he said as to keep the Soviet Union an ally to Britain during the war. This explains the source’s obvious distortion of the truth. Though we can see more advancement of agriculture under Stalin in source three than under Tsarism, Stalin had got rid of the most able peasants, the most likely to use their initiative, which we can see from source six, the peasants are lacking under Krushchev. We can see how collectivisation was a success for Stalin as he was able to exercise greater control of the peasants. Relating to source one, continuity is shown, as emancipation was a success for the Tsar in the same way. Source one states Alexander II is seen by Soviet historiography as a “cunning hypocrite” giving freedom to the serfs within a set boundary in order to maintain some element of control over them.
Evidence from source five clearly displays the government’s failure to produce policies, which were realistic and achievable. Agricultural Output during the seven-year plan should have increased by 70 per cent. There was an improvement, however nowhere near the estimate of 1958. The source indicates that in total, crops and livestock had only increased by 14 per cent. While this source appears to provide reasonably reliable data, there is no indication of where this source comes from. We cannot tell if true figures have been disguised. However, source four may give us an idea that source five does represent true figures. Source four highlights the failure of Krushchev’s “poorly organised” virgin land scheme. The source claims the scheme was popular, but the leadership made a mess of it, “stupid decisions…ill-conceived strategies”. However, this is one person’s interpretation, the interpretation of Shevardnadse, who may be biased in his view maybe having a go at previous leaders to make himself and Gorbachev look better and show they will not make the same mistakes. Source six contradicts Shevardnadse highlighting that the Harvests were “badly affected by adverse weather”. Leaders of course cannot control the weather. Despite this, the government was wrong to set unrealistically high aims.
In conclusion, it is clear to see that Russian government policy on agriculture was a failure and that peasants consistently resisted it. However it was more of a failure for peasants, who suffered the worst of the policies.
