Figures do not support any success in collectivisation theses figures taken from a history learning site from the UK: . This website shows that collectivisation was a disaster these figures show than by 1935 agricultural output was only just at the level in 1928 if not lower. Even though grain production is up livestock in the USSR had disastrously fallen to fractions of the 1928 level. These show that collectivisation had caused havoc and ravaged the soviet country side and caused chaos. Even if collectivisation was aimed at grain solely the figures do not support success there because surely grain figures should have skyrocketed by the way collectivisation was hyped by Stalin.
Grain measured in million of tons
Animals measured in millions of head
This source has clear validity because it is the results so it may illustrate the success of the policy. The utility of this source is good because it may have been produced by an historian who has the benefit of hindsight and the opening up of soviet records. So the historian would have access to the real figures. The sources motives are not dubious as they were put on a learning site so they would be used to educate not have any political motive. Also in being posted on a British site they would have no personal involvement in the event. In turn making this source trustworthy however, the reliability could still be questioned as the exact source of figures is not known.
This source supports collectivisation as a success because in the end it did complete what it set out to do these figures support this as a success because collective farms skyrocketed. From 1929 to 1940 the number of collective farms per 1000 has increased nearly five times. So depending on who you were collectivisation could be interpreted as a success for him as he got his collective farms and he now controlled agriculture. His officials controlled farming through fear so collectivisation was a success for the political aims of the party.
This source is figures taken from a table on a website which links you to these figures on webarchive.org. So the motives of this source are questionable if they really are from webarchive.org then the motives are not dubious but if they are from John D Clare’s website then they might be being used to promote his position. Despite this it appears to be an accurate portrayal because it seems to have both sides the argument.
This next historian a Mr. Service seems to be against collectivisation:
“With the exception of 1930, mass collectivisation meant that not until the mid 1950’s did agriculture regain the level of output achieved in the last years before the great war” – R. Service, A History of Twentieth-Century Russia 1997, pp. 181-82
Mr. Service is writing in 1997 and being an historian he has access to hindsight and greater resources giving this source good utility. There are no questionable motives behind this source as the historian does not seem to have direct involvement. Due to the tone it would seem to show this source is perhaps good analysed research.
First Five Year Plan 1928-32:
The first five year plan was put forward in 1928 by Stalin and his economists. With the aim of increasing soviet industry in the event of invasion so they would be ready. Although collectivisation did attribute to help urbanisation, the first five year plan was Stalin’s biggest goal as it started the rapid industrialisation of the mostly agrarian USSR. Stalin and his economic team developed hefty targets for Soviet industry and greater industrialisation aided by funds from collectivisation. There are issues with the first five year plan because some evidence is vague on figures. The figures from the first five year plan at its completion may have been altered by the communist party as a propaganda tool for soviet morale. Historians estimate that soviet officials increased the figures by about a third. The first five year plan did actually increase their industrial resources enough to help them wage war. According to these figures from a Western analysis:
These figures back up vast industrial increases and show that Stalin’s industrialisation was a successful venture as more tons of industrial production was produced. It shows a doubling of the industrial output of the Soviet Union representing this as a success. The source of the western analysis is hazy. It is untrustworthy as it is put in STALIN and KRUSHCHEV THE USSR, 1924-64 By Michael Lynch it does not attribute the source of the analysis. Henceforth not attributing a date or author. So it is impossible to determine when this analysis was made and who by. So the source is relevant but quite unreliable, although it was from an historian who had access to such information. So there could be dubious motives behind the production of this source as it is used in the book to back up the argument of Michael Lynch. So the motive behind the source could be the source being fabricated by Lynch to back up his argument and prove his worth.
This table showing worker traffic through Magnitogorsk illustrates a failing in the economic plans:
*It is possible that the figure of 67,000 for 1930 is typographical error and should have read 57,000
This table being produced at the time obviously has good utility and validity. However the mistake in the figures is significant as if a mistake can be made then perhaps the accuracy of these figures is questionable. Also being taken from official figures at the time the figures could have been changed. Despite this the table still shows a failing in the first plan as the worker’s leaving greatly increases year after year from 1930. This suggests that the first plan was a shambles causing discernment in the workers. Note that the leaving workers only level out with arrivals the start of the next five year plan supporting the second plan.
The opinion of the prominent soviet historian M. Lewin appears to corroborate this apparent chaos in the work place. “Thus workers, administrators, specialists, officials, party apparatus men, and in great masses, peasants were moving around and changing jobs, creating unwanted surpluses in some places and deaths in others, losing skills or failing to acquire them” – “Society, State and Ideology during the First Five Year Plan” 1976, in C. Ward(ed.),The Stalinist Dictatorship, 1998, pp. 178-79. The fact that although Polish, Lewin worked in a Kolkhoz and fought in the Red Army obliviously gives this source good utility being a first hand account. Writing in 1976 he could write truthfully without fear of reprisals however being an academic he may have taken positions to further his own career. This shows the first five year plan as badly disorganised economic migration of mass job movement illustrating a chaos.
The American J. Scott who went to work at Magnitogorsk also writes of a chaos there was in soviet industry. Writing about wages he says: “the average monthly wage for an unskilled worker in Magnitogorsk was something in the neighbourhood of 100 roubles, a skilled workers’ apprentice 200, a skilled worker, 300; an engineer with experience 600 to 800; administrators, directors etc., anywhere from 800 to 3000. The heavy differentiation…..” J. Scott, behind the Urals, 1942 p.49 The fact Scott was an American is significant because either he is writing as an impartial observer or that he was writing the book as capitalist propaganda. Scott working there is also important because he was directly in the middle of the events making this source useful. It also offers a rationalised view of industrialisation from the view point of an outsider.
“When the first piateletka (Five-Year Plan) was declared complete in December 1932 no major targets had been reached, but there were some dramatic advances” –C. Ward Stalin’s Russia, 1993, p. 81 Being written by a prominent Soviet historian this source has good credentials. Although written by an historian there is some capacity for tampering however this does not appear present in this source. Also being a historian then this area would have been well researched aided with hindsight creating a useful source.
Second Five Year Plan 1933-37, Third Five Year plan 1938-41:
(from official government figures. Note that historians have found that Stalin's statisticians overstated the increases by about a third - they dared not do anything else! It was the official line that Stalin had achieved a remarkable improvement, and a statistician who found otherwise would have been sent to Siberia.)
These are figures for the second five year plan taken from official soviet figures for the second five year plan. It shows a doubling or more in industry or more during the second five year plan showing this as a success. This source is relevant because is a primary source produced by the soviet government at the time of second five year plan. However the footnote dismisses these figures as exaggerated that they were purposely increased by a third. This makes the credibility of the source questionable. The source was created by John D Clare for his website so it may have been edited to show his point. Although however as an historian he benefits from hindsight and having greater access to sources since the soviet break-up.
“{The Purge] swept away…managers, technicians, statisticians, planners, even foremen, Everywhere there were said to be spies, wreckers, diversionists. There was a grave shortage of qualified personnel,” A. Nove, An Economic History of the USSR, 1917-1991, 1992 p.239 This source illustrates the badly managed nature of the USSR effectively and is a rationalised view from an historian. Being produced after the break-up the historian may have had better access to sources. Nove doesn’t appear to be directly involved in the situation showing no suggestion of ulterior motives.
“Furthermore the three cracking plants which now exist are to be turned into 120 by the end of the of the five year plan. This despite huge shortage of metal…” An Oil expert quoted by Isaac Babel. Isaac Babel was a respected Russian journalist and writer who were reporting on the industrialisation. Babel was in a prison camp for his last days because he spoke out against Stalinisation. Obviously somebody had something to hide hence his incarceration. Showing he may have reached the truth giving his works greater prominence. This source is significant as a first hand account of events. It shows that Stalinisation had very unrealistic targets.
“The Soviet Union enjoyed the “three good years” of 1934-36 and the achievements by 1937 were impressive.” – Chris Corin , Terry Fiehn, Communist Russia Under Lenin and Stalin 2002 p185 The book this source is taken from is a Schools History Project Official Text. This gives the text a good foundation to be based on plus credibility. This book contains a wide variety of sources showing the issue is well researched. This shows that despite its problems the latter five year plans were successful as massive growth was achieved.
Human Impact:
One of the major failings of Stalinist economics was the impact it had on the people of the countryside. The peasants suffered greatly: “I am a poor peasant. I have one hut, one barn, one horse, three dessyatins of land…. Isn’t it true that all the poor peasants and middle peasants do not want to go into the Kolkhoz at all, but you drive them in by force?......{In my village} poor peasants came out against it…. They did not want serfdom.”- Ivan Trofimovitch, Extract from peasants’ letters to Our Village, a peasant newspaper concerning the first collectivisation drives, 1929-30. These letters were not actually published in the newspaper.
This source is very useful as it offers a perspective taken from an ordinary person. It is in such a blunt and serious tone, it does not look manipulated but appears a statement from the heart. The footnote for this source indicates that it was not published that someone covered it up. Due to it being covered up it indicates that it contains something that someone had to hide. Making it a truthful statement, this statement helps proclaim economics as an idea to give Stalin more control over the countryside. It also illustrates the human effect that Stalinist economics made poverty worse rather than improving the human situation.
“In the terrible spring of 1933 I saw people dying of hunger. I saw women and children with distended bellies, turning blue, still breathing but with vacant lifeless eyes. And corpses-corpses in ragged sheepskin coats and cheap felt boots; corpses in peasant huts…” L.Kopelev, an activist who later went into exile, quoted in R. Conquest the Harvest of Sorrow, 1986 p.233 In being written by someone who actively was a member of the requisition squads this source has great utility. The fact that Kopelev was exiled is significant as he obviously thought what was going on was wrong. This is shown by the tone and language in which Kopelev describes the human impact so graphically. This source illustrates the vast suffering collectivisation caused through a famine. Showing the vast cost collectivisation caused.
“About 40 million people were affected by the food shortages including areas near Moscow where mortality rates increased by 50%. The center of the famine, however, was Ukraine and surrounding regions, including the , the , the and where the toll was one million dead. The countryside was affected more than cities, but 120,000 died in , 40,000 in and 20,000 in .” –Wikipedia.org 13:20, 20th January 2006. This statement illustrates the enormous extent to which collectivization was a human tragedy. Due to being taken from wikipedia the legitimacy of this source is questionable as wikipedia can be edited by anyone. Despite this wikipedia is useful as with the onset of the internet there is greater access to information so whoever wrote this probably researched it before producing it.
Things weren’t much better for city dwellers than they were for the peasants. “The workers’ barracks were described as overcrowded and in a state of extreme disrepair with water streaming from the ceiling “straight onto workers beds”. Heat was rarely provided in the barracks; bedding went unchanged; and sanitary work was almost non existent”-M. Fainsod, Smolensk under Soviet Rule, 1958 p. 322,describing living conditions for unskilled workers in 1937. Having written this in a book Fainsod would appear to be a historian, which means this issue would have been well researched. There is no indication of Fainsod’s nationality so it unsure whether he may have been involved or not, which raises questions of the sources credibility. It seems written in quite a formal descriptive tone however which might suggest no feelings on the part of Fainsod.
Stalin himself acknowledges the true extent of suffering in one of speeches which indicates his views on the matter. One of the most famous quotes by Stalin illustrates this “A single is a tragedy; a million deaths is a statistic”-Joseph Stalin This quote illustrates the situation that even Stalin accepted it. As one question rises why would Stalin say this if he wasn’t trying to justify what he was doing? It shows acceptance of what he is doing and shows his content. As it is straight from the horse’s mouth so to speak then this source has good value as a source. Despite this the motives of that phrase are questionable.
Conclusion:
Taking into account my sources I can conclude that Stalin’s economic policy was a success as it did achieve much in a few short years. From my sources I can conclude Collectivisation was a chaotic disaster which caused much human suffering due to the figures showing that although grain production remained a constant it eliminated much livestock. Taken from my human impact section the economic policies caused much famine as illustrated by collectivisation. The economic drive created much dead and famine and shortages in the USSR. In the rapid growing urban societies living conditions were abysmal, so there was not much good for normal people. Despite falling short of its targets even the first plan which can be classified as a disaster in contrast the second and third five year plans created the infrastructure to which the USSR would emerge as a superpower. It laid down industrial structure and many improvements were laid down.
