- It was not until 1931 that it became obvious that this was different from other depressions: industrial production and unemployment were worse in the downturn of 1926 than at the end of 1930.
- The government and states were already playing important parts in the German economy before 1929.
- There was widespread resistance to government interference in the economy.
- The orthodox policies of budget surplus and deflation were adopted by GB and other western countries.
- Alternatives had not been fully developed: Keynes published his ‘General Theory’ in 1936.
RJ Overy
“For the government … it made much more sense to do as little as was necessary.”
2. The Müller Government
The ‘grand coalition’ that had operated in the latter half of the 1920s crumbled under the economic depression. The most damaging issue was unemployment benefit. In March 1930 the divisions caused the total collapse of the coalition, the parties that had joined the ‘great coalition’ could not agree on methods to overcome the economic problems of the depression. On March 27th, 1930, the Chancellor, Müller, resigned.
Sir J Wheeler-Bennett
“Thanks to the futility inherent in proportional representation, a multiplicity of political parties were returned at each election, no one of which could of itself command a majority in the Reichstag, and so carry into effect a clear Governmental programme.”
W Carr
“By the end of 1929 there were many alarming signs of impending crisis, mounting unemployment, falling tax receipts and a budget deficit of 1,700 million marks which called for drastic action.”
No action was possible when the parties could not agree. Perhaps the unwillingness of the political leadership to compromise caused Müller’s fall from office, but compromise ideas may not have solved the problems. Historians have seen Hitler’s rise to power starting with this failure to find solutions.
Sir J Wheeler-Bennett
“The result was parliamentary bankruptcy, the increasing discredit of democratic institutions, and the relapse of power into the hands of the bureaucracy.”
KD Bracher
“To be sure, the transition from parliamentary democracy to one-party state began with the overthrow of the Grand Coalition in the spring of 1930 – that is, with the failure of the two wings of the coalition to master the problems of political compromise.”
3. The Brüning Government
On March 28th, 1930, on the advice of army leaders, President Hindenburg appointed Heinrich Brüning as Chancellor. This was done without consulting the major parties, so Brüning had no automatic majority support in the Reichstag. At the time of appointment, Hindenburg made it clear to Brüning that he could rely on the presidential emergency powers to rule by decree if Reichstag support was not forthcoming.
W Carr
“Brüning seemed ideally suited to be ‘the army’s chancellor’; a highly intelligent, rather aloof man of authoritarian views.”
On July 7th, 1930, Brüning attempted to introduce his financial policies.
RJ Overy
“He ordered a 10% reduction of all wages, prices, rents and profits.”
AJ Nicholls
“Owing to the fall in the national income caused by the slump, tax receipts were falling … In July 1930 new taxes were imposed and a special levy placed on people in public employment.”
W Carr
“In July 1930 he presented a retrenchment budget featuring sharp tax increases and cuts in expenditure.”
Such a budget was not acceptable to the Reichstag. Thus, Brüning promulgated it using Article 48 of the Constitution. SPD members in the Reichstag introduced a motion demanding the budget’s withdrawal, which was passed. Brüning acted immediately, dissolving the Reichstag and ordering fresh elections.
Lord Bullock
“Brüning’s answer, much criticised subsequently, was to accept the challenge by dissolving the Reichstag and fixing new elections.”
The elections were held on 14th September 1930.* Turnout was high, at 81.4%, the highest since 1919.
SPD 8,577,700 votes 24.5% 143 seats
KPD 4,592,100 votes 13.1% 77 seats
ZP 4,127,900 votes 11.8% 68 seats
DNVP 2,458,300 votes 7.0% 41 seats
NSDAP 6,409,600 votes 18.3% 107 seats
The result was still not promising for Brüning, as the votes taken by extremist parties increased yet further. However, he was able to gain support from various groups, most importantly the Socialists.
W Carr
“The party was on the horns of a cruel dilemma. Support of Brüning meant acquiescence in deflationary policies bearing most heavily on the working class; their only alternative was to oppose Brüning and precipitate new elections certain to strengthen the Nazis.”
Faced with such a situation, it is not surprising that the SPD supported Brüning. The effect was to push more working class votes to the KPD, as the moderate SPD appeared to be ‘abandoning’ them.
W Carr
“He cut wages, salaries and public expenditure, increased consumer-goods taxes and ordered price cuts.”
AJ Nicholls
“While unemployment benefit was being cut, wages and salaries reduced and industrial prices forced down, the cost of bread and cereals was maintained at an artificially high level.”
Such policies created a despondent population: continually making sacrifices; with little hope for the future under Brüning. To overcome the worst effects of the depression, Brüning proposed in March 1931 that Germany and Austria should ‘unite’ to form a customs union (Curtius, the Foreign Minister proposed it first). The French government was not happy with this and forced the League of Nations to consider it. At the same time, Austria was forced to ask the League for a loan to combat the banking crisis of spring 1931. The French agreed to permit the loan only if the customs union idea was shelved.
League of Nations statement on 5th September 1931
“[Such a union] would have been incompatible with the Treaty of Versailles.”
This was seen as a failure for the German government, which lost the support of the nationalists. Brüning, therefore, attempted another foreign policy move to revive flagging support.
AJ Nicholls
“Brüning was determined to end reparations, both because of their damage to the German economy and because he thought that success in foreign policy would win his government the popular support it badly needed.”
Thus, in June 1931, he announced that Germany could not pay the sums demanded under the Young Plan despite the austere measures being followed. On June 20th, 1931, Hoover, President of the US, announced a moratorium on all inter-Allied debts on condition that World War I reparations were suspended. The Allies accepted this and stopped demanding payments from Germany. This success for Germany can be attributed to Stresemann’s policies before 1929 and Brüning’s stringent economic measures. In June - July 1932, at the Lausanne Conference, the Allies renounced 90% of their claims on Germany - after Brüning had fallen.
In March 1932, Hindenburg’s seven-year term as President ended.“The [78-year-] old man, now in a state of mental and physical decline, wanted to retire.”(W Carr) Brüning convinced him that unless he stood for re-election, Hitler would win. He attempted to ensure an unopposed re-election, but failed. Hindenburg was faced with Hitler, Düsterberg of the DNVP, and Thälmann of the KPD. He had to fight a second round after the first produced no clear winner; he eventually won, but his faith in Brüning was diminished.
In May 1932, Brüning drew up some modest reflation proposals, like public works. These included the break-up of some East Prussian estates and the settlement of 600,000 unemployed people on them.
AJ Nicholls
“Hindenburg, whose age was a serious handicap to his judgement. He was disturbed when the government drew up plans for a very moderate land reform in eastern Germany.”
Hindenburg was told by the army and the Junkers that Brüning was ‘an agrarian Bolshevik’. When he appeared in Hindenburg’s office with draft decrees for the changes the President refused them and told Brüning to write a letter of resignation. This he did, Hindenburg accepted it on May 30th.
In conclusion, then, Brüning’s government:
- was always dependent on the support of the President due to a lack of support in the Reichstag. When Brüning lost Hindenburg’s support, he lost power.
- achieved some economic success: trade deficit and budget deficit were turned into surpluses in 2 years.
- had achieved some foreign policy success, most notably the move towards ending reparations.
“The irony of Brüning’s dismissal was that circumstances were on the point of a sudden change. Even though reparations formed only a part of the problem, the outcome of the Lausanne Conference in June 1932 was a victory for the German government’s painstaking efforts to reduce the burden of war debt.” (RJ Overy)
- failed to stop the flow of support away from the moderates towards the extremists.
4. Presidential Election, 1932
Hindenburg, first elected to replace Ebert in 1925, faced re-election for a second term of office in 1932. At 84 he wanted to retire, but Brüning convinced him to stand for the country’s best interests. Hitler hesitated, heeding the advice of some in the party, viz. Strasser, that Hindenburg was undefeatable.
Lord Bullock
“Göbbels urged Hitler to stand, well aware that an electoral contest would make him, as head of the propaganda directorate, the most important of Hitler’s lieutenants – just as the tactics of negotiation and coalition would magnify Strasser’s role as head of the Party Organisation.”
Hitler had to become a German citizen in order to stand, and did this by accepting the post of Regierungsrat (senior civil servant) in the insignificant Nazi-controlled state of Brunswick.
KD Bracher
“Hitler’s decision to run for the presidency was his first venture into electoral politics … and meant a further broadening of his strategy.”
The electoral landscape had changed markedly since 1925. Now, the ‘republicans’ (the SPD etc.) supported Hindenburg, whereas his former supporters voted for Düsterberg, second in command of the Stahlhelm.
W Carr
“That the Socialists and Centre supported him [Hindenburg], while the German Nationalists ran a candidate against him, greatly upset the old man.”
The Nazis ran a smooth campaign.
Lord Bullock
“The walls of every town in Germany were plastered with Nazis posters, and films of Hitler and Göbbels were made and shown everywhere (an innovation in 1932).”
The SA crossed the country in lorries to march and countermarch. Nazi leaders toured the country, appearing at torchlight processions and mass-meetings. The first round produced no overall majority:
Hindenburg 18.5 million votes 46.6% Hitler 11.5 million votes 30.0%
Hindenburg fell just 200,000 votes short of a majority; a second round was called. Hitler stood once again. This time he hired a plane to take him from town to town (the ‘Hitler Over Germany’ campaign).
Lord Bullock
“Apart from its practical advantages, this unprecedented use of air travel, with its futuristic touch, made an extraordinary psychological impression.”
The second round results were as follows:
Hindenburg 19,359,000 votes Hitler 13,418,000 votes
Despite being defeated at the last, Hitler had gained a great deal.
KD Bracher
“The fact that Hitler received more than 1/3 of the total vote (36.8%), while Düsterberg … was badly beaten (6.8%), demonstrated the superiority of the Nazis over the Conservative-German National forces.”
Lord Bullock
“The Nazi success in more than doubling their 1930 election vote (13.4 compared with 6.5 millions) was what made the news.”
5. Kurt von Schleicher
Kurt von Schleicher was born on 7th April 1882 in Brandenburg, the son of an old local family. He joined the army in 1900 as a subaltern in the Third Foot Guards. Here he formed a strong friendship with Oskar von Hindenburg, son of Paulus. By 1929, he was in charge of an office in the Reichswehr ministry, ranked major general. Due to Paulus von Hindenburg’s army past, the President was in close contact with army leaders like Schleicher.
W Carr
“The leading figure among the unofficial advisers clustered round the President, and a man who came to exert great influence over the old warrior … was General von Schleicher, chief of the Ministeramt, a wily political soldier who acted as permanent liaison officer between the Reichswehr and the government.
With growing economic problems, and the breakdown of parliamentary government in the Reichstag after 1929, von Schleicher had his own views on the government of Germany.
Lord Bullock
“[Schleicher wished] to remove the last traces of the democratic regime and replace it with an upper-class authoritarian government, the majority of whom would be drawn from the old nobility.”
Originally, von Schleicher believed that Brüning was a good choice for Chancellor, but during 1931 von Schleicher changed his opinion, as it became clear that Brüning was unable to rally moderate support behind the ‘presidential system’, and probably because he was having to rely, to some extent, on socialist support. Hindenburg was already beginning to lose faith with Brüning by the end of 1931, then, in the presidential election of 1932, Brüning was unable to gain the support of the Nationalists for the 84-year-old war hero President. This convinced Hindenburg that Brüning was not working effectively.
W Carr
“The resignation of Brüning in May [1932] was very largely the work of Schleicher … The President was already out of sympathy with Brüning’s policies and lent a ready ear to the advice of Schleicher, eagerly reinforced by his son Oskar von Hindenburg. Early in May 1932, Schleicher overcame the president’s lingering doubts.”
On May 30th, 1932, Hindenburg accepted Brüning’s resignation.
Was von Schleicher devious?
W Carr
“Looking back over the years, it is only too apparent that Schleicher was a vain and self-confident intriguer.”
Sir J Wheeler-Bennett
“Not that Schleicher was an intriguer for the pure love of intrigue - he was too intelligent for that; his plots were always directed towards some larger end which would justify them if they failed or came to be discovered prematurely.”
6. The von Papen Government
After Brüning’s resignation, Hindenburg appointed Franz von Papen as Chancellor.
W Carr
“There could be no clearer sign of the bankruptcy of the political system than the appointment of Franz von Papen as Chancellor. A charming and accomplished socialite and close friend of von Schleicher.”
AJ Nicholls
“Franz von Papen, a protégé of von Schleicher who lacked political experience and parliamentary support.”
KD Bracher
“The new Cabinet of the Centre Party defector, Franz von Papen … despite its clear-cut right-wing orientation was lauded in even stronger terms as a ‘rational’ government above the parties.”
Papen was no obvious choice, and the ministers whom he appointed were businessmen, Junkers and army personnel – in fact, his opponents dubbed it ‘the Cabinet of Barons’. Papen and Schleicher were, in fact, collaborators in a plan to try and gain Nazi support for the government. They intended to:
- dissolve the Reichstag and call fresh elections;
- lift the ban on the SA that Brüning had implemented;
- eliminate the socialist-dominated Prussian government.
These measures would ensure Nazi support for Papen, whom Schleicher believed he could control.
Lord Bullock
“Von Schleicher saw von Papen in the role of a front man, who would do what he was told. When von Schleicher’s friends protested that von Papen was a man without a head, the General replied: ‘I don’t need a head, I need a hat’. Von Schleicher himself … would supply the head.”
a. Dissolution of the Reichstag
On June 4th, 1932, Papen dissolved the Reichstag after gaining Hindenburg’s agreement. This was done before the Reichstag could meet to vote upon the cabinet’s proposals. The elections were fixed for 30th July.
SPD 7,959,700 votes 21.6% 133 seats
KPD 5,282,600 votes 14.6% 89 seats
ZP 4,589,300 votes 12.5% 75 seats
Nationalists 2,177,400 votes 5.9% 37 seats
Nazis 13,745,800 votes 37.4% 230 seats
As leader of the largest party, Hitler had a ‘right’ to try to form a government. His demands were excessive:
- the Chancellorship for himself;
- a Nazi as Minister President of Prussia;
- a Nazi as Reich Minister of the Interior, with control of the police;
- a Nazi as Prussian Minister of the Interior;
- a Nazi as Reich Minister of Justice;
- Josef Göbbels as Minister of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, a new post;
- the right to govern by decree if the Reichstag would not accept his ‘bills’.
Hindenburg had no great love for Hitler as it was: he despised Hitler’s politics; Hindenburg was of the officer class, whereas Hitler had only been a corporal – the ‘Bohemian Corporal’, Hindenburg was known to call him. These proposals were too much for the President to accept, and he refused them flat out, offering him only the vice-chancellorship in a cabinet of von Papen’s choosing, plus the Prussian Ministry of the Interior for a Nazi. Hitler rejected this offer out of hand.
b. The Ban on the SA
KD Bracher
“The second hasty concession to the courted NSDAP, the recession of the SA ban on 16 June 1932 … resulted in street battles.”
This allowed the Nazis to restart the violent clashes with the KPD that had brought notoriety leading to the ban imposed by Gröner, Minister of the Interior under Brüning. The Nazis showed no gratitude to Papen.
AJ Nicholls
“On the contrary, having obtained their concessions the Nazis became rapidly more obstreperous.”
c. Elimination of the Prussian Government
The Prussian Cabinet, under Otto Braun, was dominated by the SPD, but had lost the support of the Land Parliament after the April local elections. This Cabinet was not following general guidelines laid down by central government, and the nationalist groupings wanted to remove it. In the event, the removal of the ban on the SA gave von Papen the pretext he needed to remove the Prussian government, which was unable to stop the escalating violence: in the five weeks prior to 20th July, there were some 550 clashes in which there were 99 deaths and some 1,125 people seriously injured. On 20th July 1932, von Papen removed the Prussian government by presidential decree.
W Carr
“Von Papen appointed himself Reichskommissar, and dismissed the Prussian ministers on the grounds that they… had failed to prevent fresh street violence.”
When Hindenburg and Hitler rejected each other’s terms, von Papen was re-appointed Chancellor. Again he knew that the Reichstag would be hostile to the Cabinet which he appointed so he again prepared himself with a dissolution decree. Unfortunately for von Papen, the Reichstag met on September 12th, 1932, and its first action was to elect Hermann Göring as President of the Reichstag (similar to the Speaker of the House of Commons). Göring allowed the Reichstag to vote on a motion of censure against the Cabinet and von Papen was defeated by 512 votes to 42. Von Papen dissolved the Reichstag once again, it having been in session for less than a day.
KD Bracher
“Von Papen induced Hindenburg to issue a new dissolution decree even before the opening session of this Reichstag – a truly unique development in the history of parliamentarianism.”
On November 6th, 1932, the German people trooped to the polls once more; the results were these:
SPD 7,248,000 votes 20.4% 121 seats
KPD 5,980,200 votes 16.9% 100 seats
ZP 4,230,600 votes 11.9% 70 seats
Nationalists 2,959,000 votes 8.8% 52 seats
Nazis 11,737,000 votes 33.1% 196 seats
The DNVP gained 800,000 votes, while the Nazis lost over 2 million votes and 34 seats. The KPD became the third largest party in the Reichstag (after the Nazis and SPD). Hitler once again demanded that he be appointed Chancellor. Hindenburg refused to accept this unless Hitler could secure a majority in the Reichstag. Hitler would not be drawn and refused. Papen was again asked to form a cabinet by Hindenburg.
W Carr
“So Papen reemerged from the wings, this time with a new plan. He proposed to declare martial law, dissolve the Reichstag, postpone elections and rule by decree [until the constitution was reformed].”
At this point, von Schleicher stepped in. Behind the scenes, he began to talk to his cabinet colleagues.
Lord Bullock
“As Minister of Defence he began to impress on the other members of the cabinet that von Papen’s continuation in office brought with it the danger of civil war.”
W Carr
“Schleicher played an ace. He informed the Cabinet that von Papen’s policy would lead to civil war, a general strike and probably a Polish invasion.”
At the first Cabinet meeting after von Papen resumed office (2nd December 1932), von Schleicher stated that the army no longer had confidence in the Chancellor. Von Papen submitted his resignation, hoping to prod Hindenburg into approving his authoritarian coup plans, but von Schleicher refused to assign troops to domestic duties as part of the plan and he won over the other Cabinet ministers. The President accepted von Papen’s resignation and appointed von Schleicher Chancellor.
7. The von Schleicher Government
On December 2nd, 1932, Kurt von Schleicher was appointed Chancellor.
AJ Nicholls
“It was an exposed position which he had not coveted.”
W Carr
“Schleicher became Chancellor, rather reluctantly, as he would have much preferred to continue his intrigues behind cover.”
Initially he attempted to gain Hitler’s support for the Cabinet, and probably included the offer of the vice-chancellorship again. This failed, at which point von Schleicher tried his second plan, to create support by cutting across normal party lines. Von Schleicher talked to Gregor Strasser, who showed some willingness to split from Hitler and support the Cabinet along with his followers from the Nazi Party. Hitler heard of Strasser’s plans, and forced him to resign all of his party offices on December 8th. After this failure, von Schleicher attempted to gain the support of the moderates and left-wing moderates.
W Carr
“Schleicher approached the left with a programme of public works, price fixing, restoration of wage- and relief-cuts, and land resettlement in East Prussia.”
He even tried to gain the support of the trade unions to put pressure on the SPD. The SPD refused to join a coalition, sure that support for the Nazis was on the decline. By 23rd January 1933, Schleicher had to admit defeat. Therefore, he asked Hindenburg for the right to rule by decree.
While von Schleicher was attempting to gain support for his government, von Papen was intriguing behind his back. On January 4th, 1933, von Papen met Hitler in a secret meeting.
Lord Bullock
“There was no love lost between them, but both showed themselves willing to sink their differences if they could get the better of von Schleicher.”
Hitler still insisted upon being Chancellor, but was now willing to join a coalition with Hugenberg’s Nationalists and Papen. Papen was convinced that Hitler was ‘controllable’ and suggested the possibility of Hitler as Chancellor to Hindenburg (whose confidence Papen had, despite von Schleicher’s attempt to have him sent to Paris as German Ambassador). At the same time, Hitler was attempting to convince the army leaders that the SA was no threat to them. Importantly, he convinced Oskar von Hindenburg that this was the case, and Hindenburg the younger convinced Hindenburg the elder as well.
On January 30th, 1933, Hitler was appointed Chancellor. There were only two other Nazis in the Cabinet, von Papen was Vice-Chancellor and Hugenberg’s Nationalists and other independents were the majority in the cabinet. Nevertheless, the NSDAP was in power.
* See Article 1) Election Statistics