Were the events which took place during the Night of the Long Knives (June 30th, 1934) a result of an ideological clash, or a shrewd struggle for power?

 Also, Röhm’s socialist views on the economy also contrasted with those of Hitler, who argued that “in business, ability alone must be decisive. The task of National Socialism is the safeguarding of the development of our people.” Hitler proposed this for two reasons. Firstly, he did so as he desired stability and economic prosperity in order to gain the support he needed to achieve total control of Germany. This task lay in the hands of the heavy industry, which in turn lay in the hands of these leading industrialists. By securing the support of these men, he acquired the potential prosperity that these industries would contribute to. This would prove vital to Hitler, and ascertain economic recovery. Secondly, losing the support of the heavy industries would also eliminate a source of income of the party itself. In 1933, the NSDAP received contributions which totaled 3.6 million Rentenmark. At risk of jeopardizing the support of the heavy industries and losing a source of income for the NSDAP, Hitler had yet another reason to eliminate Röhm.

Furthermore, Röhm frequently spoke of the army being integrated within, and thus becoming a subordinate organisation to the SA. One such example can be seen in Röhm’s letter to Walther von Reichenau, chief liaison officer between the German Army and the Nazi Party. In this letter, Röhm bluntly states that "I regard the Reichswehr now only as a training school for the German people. The conduct of war, and therefore of mobilization as well, in the future is the task of the SA.” This appeared only logical to Röhm, as the army was limited to 100,000 men by the Treaty of Versailles, whereas the SA amassed a membership total of over three million men. This was unacceptable to the army generals, since “to the regular Army High Command and its conservative supporters, this potential storm trooper army represented a threat to centuries old German military traditions and the privileges of rank.” This claim accounts for the views of millions of German people, as they were extremely proud of the army. Growing up surrounded by militarist ideologies, a sudden cease of existence of the army would be a severe blow to the pride of the Germans.

Hitler could not afford to lose the support of the army, as this was the only organisation in Germany which could end NSDAP rule through the enforcement of martial law. Indeed, President Hindenburg and Defence Minister Blomberg threatened Hitler with martial law lest he solve the SA problem. In addition to this, there was the threat that the army would combine with the bureaucracy and veto Hindenburg’s decision to appoint Hitler as his successor. The army could also dissuade Hindenburg from doing so, or even carry out a coup upon Hindenburg’s death. J. Noakes and G. Pridham believe that Hitler could easily end the coup with the help of the SA, however this would then make him obliged obey they SA and lock Germany into the ‘second revolution’ envisioned by Röhm.  Hitler was thus forced to eliminate Röhm and safeguard the army, or risk losing the presidency.

Moreover, Röhm took the clash of ideological differences to a whole new level by unflinchingly challenging and provoking Hitler to do as he wished, or to be forced into conflict with him. One such example can be seen in Röhm comments to Hermann Rauschning in May 1933, in which he says that “Adolf is a swine. He will give us all way. He only associates with reactionaries now. Adolf knows exactly what I want. Not a second edition of the old imperial army. Are we revolutionaries or aren't we? We've got to produce something new, don't you see? A new discipline. A new principle of organization. The generals are a lot of old fogies.” This outburst on behalf of Röhm can be attributed to his anger at the SA’s lack of substantial rewards as a payment for their aid to Hitler in the previous years, and also his feelings of betrayal by Hitler, who now sees the army as more important that the SA. Another example of Röhm directly challenging the Führer can be seen again from comments made by Röhm, this time to Kurt Ludecke in January 1934. On this occasion, Röhm again exposes the potential danger he is able to pose to Hitler, by saying that “Hitler can't walk over me as he might have done a year ago; I've seen to that. Don't forget that I have three million men, with every key position in the hands of my own people, Hitler knows that I have friends in the Reichswehr, you know! If Hitler is reasonable I shall settle the matter quietly; if he isn't I must be prepared to use force - not for my sake but for the sake of our revolution.” In this source, Röhm again notes his notion of his second revolution, acting the follow-up of the Nazi seizure of power. This time he even threatens Hitler. For Hitler to endure such slandering would make him appear susceptible to opposition, something which he could not afford to endure as this would open the doors for any Nazi critics to emerge. Hitler would then lose ground, and either be forced to commit repeated purges similar to the Night of the Long Knives, or forfeit his position as Führer to someone more ‘flawless’ than he appeared to be.

THE POWER STRUGGLE

Thus, Röhm’s ideas frequently opposed the ideas held by Hitler, but also by other groups in society. Röhm’s belligerent manner and his frequent outbursts of his views set him against almost all of the people who held a leading post in the party, but also those who were indirectly involved in Party matters, such as leaders of the Nazi party Goebbels, Himmler and Heydrich, along with leading industrialists. However, other sources, notably Hitler himself come to show that perhaps the conflict originated from a pure power struggle fought out between the leading figures of the Nazi party, each with something to gain from the downfall of their opponent.

Hitler promoted a policy of divide-and-rule within the party, which meant that he encouraged his subordinates to compete for positions .  One such example can be seen in the rivalry between the SA and the SS (Shutzstaffel). The SS was at this time incorporated and subordinate to the SA. The SS leader Heinrich Himmler and his second-in-command Reinard Heydrich wanted the SS to become a separate oragnisation, and sought to manipulate current circumstances. They, along with Hermann Goering, manufactured evidence that suggested that Röhm had been paid 12 million marks by the French to overthrow Hitler. In addition to this, General Reichneau, the right-hand man of the minister of Defence Blomberg, also appears to have been involved in the building up of tension between the army and the SA. The situation is accurately depicted in     Field-Marshal von Kleist’s testimony. In his testimony he says that “I as the army commander in Silesia was warned by the Chief of the General Staff (Heeresleitung) that an attack by the SA on the Army was imminent…I received a flood of reports and information which gave a picture of feverish preparations on the part of the SA. This information came from the most varied sources (the troops, the SA, old Stahlhelm types, SS, civilians and government authorities).’ In this source he also claims to have confronted the SA leader of Silesia and Police-President of Breslau, Obergruppenfuhrer Heines, and informed him that he knew of the preparations, to which the SA leader replied that “he knew all about my measures and had thought they were preparations for an attack on the SA.” Von Kleist also reveals that he personally said to General von Reichneau on 29 June that “I have the impression that we – Army and SA – are being egged on against each other by a third party,” whereupon Reichneau replied, “That may be true, but it’s too late now.” Reichneau saying this on the 29th of June is significant, as it shows that the events of the Night of the Long Knives (June 30th) were planned beforehand. Reichneau admits the validity of von Kleist’s statement, knowing that soon it will not be of any significance, as the SA will have been crippled by the assassination of its leaders. This source acts as undisputed proof that the Army did in fact play a significant role in the building up of tensions which led into The Night of the Long Knives.

However, a new school of thought has emerged, through the research of German historian Lothar Machtan. Machtan believes that Hitler worked to exterminate Röhm in order to protect his own past, as it included homosexual tendencies on behalf of the Führer. According to evidence unearthed by Machtan, Röhm made no secret of his homosexuality. He says that “…Röhm accepted himself as he was, and in 1929 he confided to those who cared to listen that he was ‘far from unhappy’ about his homosexuality. Indeed he was ‘perhaps even inwardly proud’ of it.” Röhm made no secret of his homosexuality, and this posed a threat to Hitler, as “rumours were circulating that Hitler himself had homosexual proclivities, and some, including Albert Grzesinski, the Berlin police chief, were convinced of their authenticity.” Hitler sought to protect Röhm, and himself, by saying to Hermann Rauschning that “I won’t spoil my men’s fun…I take on interest in their private lives, just as I won’t stand for people prying into my own.” However, Hitler “was urged on by the prospect of concealing his own homosexuality forever by the elimination of dangerous witnesses, and right at the top of the list of potential blackmailers was Ernst Röhm.” Various other sources also indicate homosexual tendencies amongst the ranks of the SA, for example the history website found at www.campusprogram.com. However, Machtan alone presents this homosexuality as a primary motive for Hitler to remove Röhm, as other reports simply show the SA being discredited in the eyes of the public because of the homosexuality rather than being a reflection upon their beloved Führer. This leads us to doubt Machtan’s claims, whilst nevertheless acknowledging his claim. The fact of the matter is that Hitler was encouraged in his purge of the SA by public disapproval of the proven homosexuality.

Another fact which shows the Night of the Long Knives as result of conflict derived from an extreme lust for power can be seen in the choice of victims of the purge, this time on Hitler’s behalf. Hitler seized the opportunity to silence critics of the regime, as well as eliminate those who had once attempted to prevent his rise to power. The extensive list of victims included Gregor Strasser, an old rival of Hitler, Gustav von Kahr, the former Bavarian State Commissioner who was responsible for the failure of Hitler’s 1923 putsch, and also General von Schleicher, who along with Strasser, had attempted to split the NSDAP two years before. Edgar Jung, the author of Papen’s ‘Marburg speech’, was also murdered, along with his editor von Bose. The removal of these people, along with the elimination of Röhm was the final step in Hitler’s consolidation of power, leaving no significant opposition worthy of a challenge, while at the same time securing the power bases he desired.

Finally, by eliminating the SA Hitler satisfied the public, which was discontent with the excessive use of violence by the SA. Proof of this can be seen in a circular sent out by Frick in which he warned that “SA leaders and SA men have independently carried out police actions either for which they had no authority whatever or which the carried out in a way that cannot be reconciled with the existing laws and regulations of the National Socialist Government.” This aggressive behaviour is also discussed by Kershaw, who claims that the behaviour of the SA was “deeply offensive to the sense of public order and morality of middle-class Germans.” Examples of the violence include “extorting money from local shop owners, driving around in fancy new cars showing off, often getting drunk, beating up and even murdering innocent civilians.” Kershaw’s depiction of the SA’s behaviour as offensive to the German people is extremely accurate. The bourgeois society had never become involved in the incessant street-fights which plagued Germany between the wars. As a result, they did not realise that the battle for control over Germany involved clashes with other non-political parties such as the Spartacists who attempted to seize centres of communication so as to overrun the country. They saw the behaviour of the SA as directed against the public, and against their precious Fatherland, something which was utterly intolerable to them. Hitler had to end this ongoing violence so as to make himself appear to the public as a protector of each German and at the same time present himself as having the best interests at heart for his supreme German Reich.

CONCLUSION

The events of June 30th allowed Hitler to entirely consolidate his position as Fuhrer, and demonstrate his assertion of vertical, absolute control within the NSDAP. The purge served as an example of Hitler’s zero-tolerance policy against any opposition to his rule. As a result of the Night of the Long Knives, all opposition, both within and outside the ranks of the party, was eliminated.

The sources place varying degrees of importance on the multiple perspectives regarding the true origins of the Night of the Long Knives. While it is true that Hitler seemed to act on the assumption that Röhm was intending to carry out a coup against him, this need to secure his position as Fuhrer can be derived from the differences in ideological matters which caused Röhm to clash with more than one group. Röhm’s socialist views, paralleled by the arrogant behaviour of the SA, brought the SA in conflict with the industry, the military and the public, and more importantly within NSDAP. By challenging those power bases which Hitler wished to secure, Röhm brought himself up against the direct authority of the Fuhrer, thus making a Hitler-Röhm standoff inevitable in Hitler’s struggle for absolute power as Hitler needed to eliminate all opposition in his quest for total power. Achieving power was impossible for Hitler if he did not have his own party under control, and Röhm had become nothing more than an obstacle to Hitler’s dominance.

Put simply, the ideological differences of Hitler, Röhm, and the other leading sectors of German politics turned the Night of the Long Knives into a power struggle. The acts of June 30th, 1934 left Hitler in the position to align the future of Germany so as to follow his own wishes.

However, certain issues developed throughout the investigation. It is odd that Röhm was an utterly loyal companion and even a friend of Hitler ever since their acquaintance in the early 1920’s. Röhm had urged Hitler to become involved in politics. Indeed, it can be argued that without Röhm, Hitler would not have risen through the ranks of society and would have remained as just another person in Germany, rather than the ultimate Fuhrer. It is striking to see Hitler’s unflinching change of allies in his quest for power.

Also, the time frame in which the Night of the Long Knives took place is perhaps more significant than one first gathers. Röhm had not kept his ideas secret before 1934. So why did Hitler purge the SA and Röhm at this time, and not earlier? The question of succession of the German President came into play; as Hindenburg was now well over age, all, and primarily Hitler, sensed that his succession would depend on who would make the greatest impression on Hindenburg. Thus Hitler had to satisfy Hindenburg, who under the influence of Defence Minister Blomberg, pushed for the elimination of the SA. Hitler no longer needed the SA as a driving force within his regime, as this post would soon be filled by the more loyal SS. Finally, Hitler chose to act at this particular time as the SA leaders were gathered at Bad Wiessee for a conference. Hitler was thus sure of their location, and was able to round up a large number of SA leaders with one move.

Finally, it is important to refer to the choice of victims, some of which had nothing to do with Röhm and the SA’s activities. Hitler had seized the opportunity to purge critics of the regime, including Catholic clergy, and sought to eliminate those who had thwarted him in the past. Amongst the victims were Gregor Strasser, General Kurt von Schleicher, Karl Ernst, the Berlin SA leader, Edgar Jung, the author of Papen’s Marburg speech of June 17th 1934 which criticised the regime, and Catholic leader Dr. Erich Klausener. The investigation bears evidence that less than half of those murdered were involved in the SA. Hitler again showed his ability to manipulate circumstances. The expansion of the purge to involve non-SA persons allowed him to eliminate even more opponents to the regime. Hitler was thus able to impose absolute, vertical control of the party. The events of June 30th 1934 left Hitler in the position to align the future of Germany so as to follow his envisioned path.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Written Sources

• Kershaw, I. (1987). The ‘Hitler Myth’. New York: Oxford University Press Inc.

ISBN 0-19-280206-2

• Noakes, J. and Pridham G. (1983). Nazism 1919-1945 Volume 1: The Rise To Power 1919-1934 A Documentary Reader. Exeter: University of Exeter Press
  ISBN 0-85989-472-X

• Jenkins, J and Feuchtwanger, E. (2000) Germany – A sourcebook. London: John Murray
  ISBN: 0719585546

• Evans, D and Jenkins, J. (1999). Years of Weimar & the Third Reich. Bristol: Hodder & Stoughton
  ISBN: 0-340-70474-8

• Other Sources

• The Night of the Long Knives http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/night_of_the_long_knives.htm            (16/05/04)

• Night of the Long Knives             http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/GERnight.htm                                       (14/05/04)

• Looksmart’s FindArticles – History Today – Hitler, Rohm and the Night of the Long Knives http://articles.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1373/is_11_51/ai_80163112/print (27/06/04)

• June 30th, 1934 – The Night of the Long Knives http://www.historyplace.com/worldwar2/timeline/roehm.htm                             (27/06/04)

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