what were the roots of the british policy of appeasement?

There were many key events which took place in the build up to World War 2 and the policy of appeasement.

The first was German rearmament and the reoccupation of the Rhineland. In 1936 Hitler set up a four year plan in order to rearm Germany. He indicated that by 1940 Germany would be ready for war. It was German rearmament and the reoccupation of the Rhineland which broke the treaty of Versailles.

The Allies had been occupied with the crisis in Abyssinia.  “Allies were preoccupied with Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia”. The Rhineland had been ordered to be permanently demilitarized in the Treaty of Versailles. It was on the 2nd of March that Hitler issued the order and it was on the 7th of March that the troops moved into the Rhineland. The French were clearly not prepared for military confrontation. However, Winston Churchill later wrote   ”If the French had taken military action immediately, Britain would have been forced to lend France support.”  Many people say this was an opportunity missed because the German force was small and they could have been defeated.

The Hossbach Memorandum was help in 1937. Hitler arranged a secret meeting in order to reveal his plans for the acquisition of Lebensraum (living space) for the growing German population at the expense of the other nations in Europe (especially in the East). The meeting was attended by Hitler, Foreign Minister, Constantin von Neurath, Hermann Göring and Friedrich Hossbach who made a record of what was said at the conference.

Hitler had also always wanted an Anchluss (connection) with Austria. He attempted this before in 1934. In 1936 Germany and Italy came into the axis pact. They contributed jointly to the nationalist side in the Spanish civil war. By 1938 Hitler knew he could count on Mussolini’s (Italy Prime Minister) acquiescence in any further attempt to incorporate Austria into the Reich. On 12/02/1938 Von Schuschnigg, successor to Dolfuss, was summoned to Berchstgaden, Hitler’s private headquarters in Bavaria. Hitler insisted that Schuschnigg should include Nazis in his cabinet. Schuschnigg complied but announced shortly afterwards on the 9th March that a plebiscite would be held to enable for Austria to decide for themselves whether they wished to be joined by Germany. Hitler did not like this and so on the 11th March he gave instructions the German troops should march to Austria. Britain had little warning. Schuschnigg contacted Halifax to consult his advice and after consulting the Prime Minister he replied the government could not take the responsibility of advising the chancellor to take any course of action which might expose his country to dangers against which her majesties government was unable to guarantee protection. There was little the British Government could do beyond addressing a formal protest to Berlin and so the Anchluss was duly completed. This was a union between Germany and Austria      

After Austria it became clear that Hitler would turn his attention to Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia was surrounded on three sides by German territory – Germany, Austria, and the Sudeten Germans. The 3 million Sudeten Germans were getting restless and the Nazi party leader in this area (Henlein) was gaining more support. The British cabinet met on the 12th March to consider the Anchluss and Halifax raised the question of how to prevent similar action being taken in Czechoslovakia. The motives of the main participants in the Czechoslovakian crisis were different. Hitler wanted to improve conditions for Sudeten Germans by incorporating them into a racially homogenous Germany. Chamberlain had the same sympathy for the position of the Sudeten Germans and in his concern for peace was willing if the last resort was to see the Sudetenland handed back over to Germany provided this could be done by negotiation rather than force. France was linked by a Treaty to Czechoslovakia and was concerned that the countries economic and defensive viability was preserved, but would not act without a guarantee of British support. Italy had no direct interest in the Czech question, but was clearly not ready to face a European war in 1938 and Mussolini was therefore prepared to play the role of an honest broker. The Soviet Union was urged several times into action through the League of Nations or through the four power conference to restrain Germany. Czechoslovakia showed little inclination to seek Russia assistance and Britain was positively anxious to prevent Russia from getting involved.

The British cabinet’s solution to the problem in the Czechoslovakian Crisis was that an act called the Runciman mission. Britain did not want to become involved in a war with Germany. However, with tension rising in Czechoslovakia, the British Government came to the view that it could not stay out of the situation and then therefore sent an intermediary to Prague in the form of Runciman.

It came on the 13th of September that Henlein demanded complete separation of Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia.

The British Government decided to hold a meeting in order to ‘keep Hitler Guessing’. Chamberlain suggested to Simon Hoare and Halifax (Foreign Secretary) to visit Hitler personally. It turned out that three meeting were held. These were on: -

• 15th September, 1938 – Berchtesgaden
• 22nd September, 1938 – Bad Godesberg
• 29th September, 1938 – Munich

The meeting on the 15th September saw Chamberlain persuade the Czechs to hand over the Sudetenland. Hitler promised that ‘this was the last problem to be solved’. On the 22nd September Hitler made more demands at first Chamberlain refused but then decided that Czechoslovakia was not important to them no more. Britain and Germany made a pact in the third meeting at Munich and this was when the Sudetenland was finally handed over to the Germans.

In the declaration signed at the final meeting German and Britain stated that

  “We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another” again”.

 Hitler had got what he wanted and it was on the 1st of October that he demanded that the Sudetenland should be evacuated.

 Adolf Hitler presented Neville Chamberlain with his demands for Czechoslovakian territory at their meeting in Godesberg on 23 September 1938. From the map below you can see the areas Hitler wanted gain from the agreement.

Chamberlain is sometimes judged as a ‘guilty man’ for his policy of appeasement towards Germany. However, Chamberlain had people who supported appeasement as well as people who did not support his appeasement policy.  

There were many critics of the Munich Agreement. At the House of Commons, October 3rd, 1938 there was a British parliamentary debate on the Munich agreement. Duff Cooper was one of these critics.

“We would have taken away the defences of Czechoslovakia in the same breath as we have guaranteed them. As though you were to deal a man a mortal blow and at the same time ensure his life”

 Duff Cooper resigned from the cabinet in protest as he believed Britain had behaved in an underhand way.

Another critic in the British parliamentary debate on the Munich agreement was Clement Attlee (Labour) he believed that “This has not been a victory for reason and humanity; it has been a victory for brute force.”

Probably the most famous of the critics of the Munich crisis was Winston Churchill (Conservative). In the British parliamentary debate on the Munich agreement he stated that “We have suffered a total unmitigated defeat.” Churchill saw Munich as an overwhelming disaster. Churchill blamed the politicians involved for neither preventing Germany from failing to reform Britain. Another quote in this speech is that “they quarrelled with Italy without saving Ethiopia.” This clarifies that Winston Churchill saw the Munich agreement as a big failure. 

Chamberlain believed however in his Peace of our time speech given in defence of the Munich Agreement, 1938 that they had “Averted a catastrophe which would have ended civilisation as we know it.”

However, some historians have mixed views on the Munich Agreement. Take R J Overy for example. He Quotes that

“It represented a realistic attempt by the Chamberlain government to assess Britain’s vital interests and to balance those against reality of Western power.”

R J Overy believed that an element of stability might be restored to European affairs. Overy also criticises the Munich Agreement due to the fact that they had abandoned the Czechs. He did not see this as being moral.

Despite the criticism, the Munich Agreement was approved by 369 votes to 150. In my opinion I believe the government had thought that this was the only other alternative to preserve peace and avoid a war.  

However on 15th March 1931 there was a turning point and the Munich Agreement had been broken. Hitler’s troops entered Bohemia and Hitler spent the night in Prague after Hitler had threatened Czechoslovakia with the destruction of Prague unless they agreed to sign away Czechoslovakia.

This sparked a reaction in Britain. Chamberlain and the cabinet had not yet abandoned appeasement. Chamberlains reaction was that he recognised that is Czechoslovakia no longer existed then Britain could no longer be bound to guarantee. Halifax saw it as an end to an embarrassing commitment. By the end of March Chamberlain changed his tune somewhat. He said in Birmingham that he would give up everything for peace except his liberty. Chamberlain would not surrender. After March 1939 Chamberlain pursued appeasement without much conviction.

In my opinion the policy of appeasement seemed the only suitable option at the time for Chamberlain. We have hindsight to look at the events which followed to make a judgment of whether or not it was successful. Chamberlain along with the majority saw this as the only definable way to keep the country at peace. Let’s not forget that the country was still recovering from the losses from the First World War and the last thing the majority of the country wanted was to engage in another major war. After looking at the roots of the British Policy of Appeasement it is clear to say that there are mixed views on whether or not the policy was the right policy to undertake. Chamberlain wanted to keep peace in Europe. He attempted this with the Munich Agreement. However, from tracing back through the roots of appeasement it did not seem that Chamberlain had much interest in foreign policy. For example in the cases where Italy wanted to invade Abyssinia and the German Czech problem, he tried to negotiate to avoid war. However, when Italy did invade Abyssinia Chamberlain imposed sanctions on Italy to try and stop them. This failed. With Czechoslovakia, Chamberlain tried to get Germany and the Czech’s come up with some kind of agreement over the Sudetenland. Chamberlain was ignorant of German intentions and claimed when Germany did invade Czechoslovakia Chamberlain said “there is nothing France or we can do to help Czechoslovakia if Germany really wanted to invade.”

To conclude I believe in my opinion that Chamberlain's mistake was the failure to recognise that Britain was declining in power and prestige. He also missed the main factor that Germany had turned out to be an unappeasable country under Hitler. It however did seem the only policy the country could undertake due to the fact that no one in the country wanted a repeat of another World War. Chamberlain had believed he could keep Hitler guessing and keep him under control by accepting his demands but this only made Hitler hungrier for more. Neville Chamberlain admitted his defeat of the appeasement policy to the House of Commons on September 3rd 1939 ‘Everything I have worked for, everything I have hoped for, everything I have believed in during my public life, has crashed into ruins.’

This is the date Great Britain declared war on Germany  

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