However, right-wing parties were by no means the only people who despised the Treaty of Versailles. The harsh terms of this agreement affected every person living in Germany, not least the phenomenal reparations bill of £6, 600 million. This was to compensate the Allied victors for the damage done to their countries in the war and had to be paid in instalments until 1984, consequently subjecting millions of innocent Germans to a lifetime of debt. The German economy was still in tatters in 1921 due to the war effort, yet instead of being allowed to pump any investment into rebuilding her own country, she had to send abroad huge sums of money that the German industry was not yet capable of earning. Many Germans felt that this enormous sum of money was just designed to ruin their country and starve their children. They also hated Clause 231; the War Guilt Clause, which stated that Germany alone must bear full responsibility for causing all the loss and damage of the war. By agreeing to comply with this term, it gave the Allies the moral right to punish Germany; it validated all the crippling terms the Treaty held. This was what every German and Hitler could not bear. Chancellor Ebert’s
predecessor, Frederick Schneidemann, had said ‘May the hand wither that signs this treaty’, and resigned rather than see his country at the mercy of Britain and France, and this was similar to how Hitler felt. He had fought bravely and risked his life for a powerful country, not for one that was prepared to surrender and admit defeat to its bitter enemies. This bitter resentment he felt towards the ‘November Criminals’ of the Weimar Republic, however, had the opposite effect to the one it had had on Schneidemann; it gave him the incentive to destroy the government that had, as far as he was concerned, betrayed him and his country. Hitler told the German people that he could destroy this Treaty that had disgraced their country and make Germany the most powerful, respected nation in the world, so of course they were going to support him. They were tired of the government’s meaningless, empty promises; one German citizen was quoted saying “I was a man of thirty-two, weary with disgust and disillusionment, a wanderer seeking a cause, a patriot seeking an outlet for his patriotism.” When along came this man who pledged to redeem Germany’s pride, he was like a ray of sunshine in a downpour of rain, and the German people believed he was their saviour.
However, the internal strengths of the Nazi party were counter-weight with the external weaknesses that helped its rise to power. Hitler and the Nazis were masters of propaganda. Through new use of technology, Hitler was able to use radio broadcasts to speak to the public. Josef Goebbels was in charge of all advertising and appealed to people’s feelings rather than by argument; there were millions of election posters all over the country, promoting the Nazis and their aims, and also through organised rallies, parades and marches. They found that the anti-Jewish message had the most appeal, so Hitler persuaded them through his barrage of propaganda that they were to blame for the state the country was in, and that he was their last hope for salvation. The fact that wealthy, communist-fearing businessmen and industrialists gave financial support to the Nazis also helped them wage their propaganda war against communists, Jews and the government. Hitler knew that enforcing and repeating popular subjects was a very effective way of drumming up support for himself and the Nazis; for example the anti-Communist stance was a favourite amongst the German people, so he stirred up violence at election meetings so the SA (or ‘Brownshirts’) could crush it and be seen as dealing with the communist threat. In this way Hitler and the Nazis developed a very sensitive system of propaganda; they learnt the skill of focusing on the issues that people considered important. This type of violence also played a part in drumming up success for the Nazi party. Hitler’s SA or ‘Brownshirts’ were used to intimidate opponents, such as the communists, in order to secure votes. Force, violence and rivalry were central to the Nazi philosophy of ‘survival of the fittest’.
Another great strength of the Nazi party was their promises to the voters and their flexibility. When Hitler introduced his Twenty-five Point Programme in 1920, it promised every level of society something - for the workers he promised jobs and an end to unemployment; for the employers he promised restored profits; for farmers, higher prices; for shopkeepers, protection against competition. No matter how rich or poor they were, every German was pledged a promise that Hitler would help them and regain the national pride. He was described as having “his finger on the pulse of Germany” and an adept understanding of the desires of ordinary people. The Nazis were also very flexible in their political strategy. In their all-out push for electoral success, they found that it didn’t matter what was promised to the German people, just as long as they were trusted. If they found that an idea was losing them support, such as the idea of nationalising industries, they dropped it because (in this case) it became evident that the big business leaders, who were their main source of financial backing, did not like it.
However, the Nazis trump card was Hitler himself. He was such a brilliant, rousing public speaker that it didn’t matter what he said, just the way he said it. His personality and skills were the focal points of all the campaigns. He was a driven, temperamental man who firmly believed that he had ‘been called by God to become dictator of Germany and rule the world’. This concept kept him going when other political figures might have given up. His resolute self-belief persuaded the German people to believe in him. His speeches were captivating and gave people scapegoats to blame for Germany’s downfall and the injustice she had suffered, such as the Allied victors of World War I, the condemned Treaty of Versailles, the ‘November Criminals’ who signed it, the Communists and the Jews. Karl Ludecke, an early follower of Hitler said in 1924, “He was holding the masses, and me with them, under an hypnotic spell by the sheer force of his beliefs. His words were like a whip. When he spoke of the disgrace of Germany, I felt ready to attack any enemy.” His eyes had a peculiar power over the German nation and he was a very skilled organiser and politician. Hitler built up the Nazi party so that he was the unquestioned leader, but many Nazi members had fought in the First World War like Hitler himself, and so also brought obedience, organisation and teamwork to the party. The various social groups within the Nazi party included skilled workers, businessmen, lower employees, unskilled workers, farmers, students and professionals. They were all well-trained and brought a standard of motivation and loyalty that the other parties did not possess. They were very weak and underestimated the power of the Nazis, preferring to dispute amongst themselves rather than unite to face the Nazis’ challenge.
However, in November 1923, Hitler decided on a course of action known as the Munich Putsch, aiming to overthrow the Weimar Republic. In September of the same year, the current Chancellor, Gustav Stresemann, had decided to call off passive resistance in the Ruhr and resume reparations payments to the French. Many Germans were outraged by this and saw it as a blatant act of betrayal, so Hitler felt himself capable of taking advantage of this enmity towards the government, especially when he considered the effects that hyperinflation had caused due to the occupation of the Ruhr that year. On the 9 November, Hitler and the 3,000 members of the Nazi party marched into the city centre of Munich with the hope of revolutionising the Reichstag. However, the revolt was quickly crushed by the army and police; sixteen rebels were shot dead and Hitler himself was injured, although managed to escape in a car. It seemed that the Nazi party would collapse when Hitler was prosecuted and sentenced to five years imprisonment, but the long-term consequences of the failure of the Munich Putsch proved very beneficial to the Nazis. Due to the enormous amount of publicity over his trial, Hitler and his beliefs became nationally famous and approved by many German people. One of the other significant outcomes of the Munich Putsch was the fact that the sixteen rebels who died became martyrs for their cause and became extremely useful in the Nazi propaganda campaigns. But the most important effect of the Munich Putsch was that Hitler was able to reconsider his political strategy whilst serving his prison sentence, which was actually only nine months. This failure made Hitler take the decision to abandon the idea of taking power by an armed revolt. Instead, he decided to make himself dictator by getting the public to legally elect him and the Nazis into power, although he was, in reality, opposed to this. As he was quoted, “Instead of working to achieve power by armed coup, we shall have to hold our noses and enter the Reichstag against the opposition deputies. If outvoting them takes longer than outshooting them, at least the results will be guaranteed by their own constitution.” He dictated all his ideas whilst in prison in his book, “Mein Kampf”, which was later published in 1925, and regarded by many Germans as their ‘bible’.
Yet the Nazis, despite their flourishing popularity, were still failing to win a majority of seats in the Reichstag. During the ‘Stresemann Years’, Germany was back on a high, the state of the economy was comfortable due to loans schemes such as the Dawes Plan, the tense relations with Europe eased and some of Germany’s pride had been restored through her joining the League of Nations alongside Britain and France. People were no longer in a position to look to extremist parties for help. But in 1929 that abruptly came to an end. Wall Street crashed and a worldwide depression set in. America called in the loans to Germany and, predictably, the German economy collapsed. Unemployment numbers rocketed and people starved on the streets. In the crisis, people were now again in the position to look for someone to blame and extremist solutions to their growing problems. This was Hitler’s big chance; he offered them both, and so Nazi success in the elections soared, through the desperation of the German people. The number of Nazi seats in the Reichstag increased from twelve seats in 1928, to two hundred and thirty in July 1932.
The Depression was the second major economic catastrophe for the Weimar Republic, and for the second time, it seemed that it could not be solved. Soon there was a political crisis, as in two years, the three Chancellors, Bruning, Schleicher, and Von Papen, were seen as incapable of solving Germany’s problems. Franz Von Papen, although a friend of President Hindenburg, could not obtain enough support in the Reichstag and both the President and the Chancellor were constantly having to rule by emergency decree. Hitler was perceived as ‘the last hope’, not only by ordinary Germans, but by Hindenburg as well. He offered Hitler the post of vice-Chancellor, with the condition that he gave him his full support. However, Hitler could see the deteriorating state the government was in and knew that if her were to come to power, now was the time. He thus refused this offer and demanded to be made Chancellor. Knowing the abundant amount of popularity Hitler possessed, Hindenburg and Von Papen decided to take a risk, under the impression that they could control him. On 30 January 1933, Adolf Hitler was recruited by President Hindenburg as Chancellor of Germany.
In conclusion, it is my opinion that although the extremely powerful internal strengths of Hitler and the Nazis were of immense avail to their succession, and that Hitler succeeded where another man might not have, the deciding reason Hitler was appointed Chancellor in 1933 was due to long-term factors. Those being the bitterness and resentment entrenched in the German people from the very beginning and the weakness of the Weimar Republic. If the German people had had a strong, stable government in which they could place their total faith, a man wanting to overturn the government into a dictatorship, no matter how brilliant a public speaker or propagandist, would not have succeeded. It is tempting to see it as a testament to Hitler’s cunning, but I do not believe that that is true. When you look back at the Stresemann Years, although they only lasted for five years, Hitler was, in essence, forgotten about. People were no longer deeply affected by his brilliant speeches and powerful propaganda campaigns; the government had stabilised and although Germany was neither as steadfast nor wealthy as she had been, the people were coping again. Hitler appealed to the masses because there was no other choice for the German people; no other opposition that appeared as strong or had as much self-belief and pride. I accept that there were factors outside of the government’s control, such as the Kapp Putsch, that weakened its esteem and reputation, but had its foundations been solid and reliable, it would have been able to bear those attacks and recover from them. There was no political figure in the Reichstag that was able, or prepared, to fight to stop this man. In the end, Hitler did not take power at all, he was given it.
