“The police view that they had on their hands an armed uprising led by the IRA was incorrect.”
By this time it was too late. The Provisional IRA had already responded with a bombing campaign. This could well be seen as retaliation to protect Catholics, so we can see why no Catholic would want to see the IRA hand in their weapons.
The IRA is still supported by many ordinary Catholics, who can have links within the organisation. This is shown in a 1999 newspaper report:
“…betrayal of the ‘cause’ can mean betrayal of family and friends.”
- Sinn Fein leaders cannot force the IRA to follow their peace moves. This was first apparent after the 1921 treaty. A 1995 newspaper report clarifies Sinn Fein’s recent position, in decommissioning talks:
“…Sinn Fein has emphasised that it is not speaking on behalf of the IRA…”
This means that when Sinn Fein put their views forward, they are not the views of the IRA.
The wording of a 1996 cartoon also demonstrates the delicate relationship between the IRA and Sinn Fein:
“Unless there is progress towards real, inclusive and substantial talks, my invisible friend (the IRA) may explode!”
I have hi-lighted ‘friend’ because this shows that Sinn Fein has some influence over the IRA as well as close links yet the word ‘may’ shows that Sinn Fein don’t really have any idea as to what the IRA might do: - they are unpredictable.
- The IRA itself is organised into local brigades and small active service units. It has been difficult for army council leaders to persuade these groups to stop fighting. ‘Britain between the Wars’ by C. L. Mowat describes what happened to the IRA after the 1921 treaty:
“…recruits flocked in for the IRA…The old tight organisation had broken up. Whatever the ideas of the gunmen, the war would not be restarted.”
This tells that the IRA grew very quickly and as a result fell in to disarray. These long- term origins show that even in 1921 the organisation of the IRA was such that it was difficult trying to keep control of it all. The covert organisation that exists today is still difficult to control, despite attempts to re-organise:
“After the collapse of the ceasefire in 1996, it was decided to establish a number of sub committees within the IRA’s two commands…Security sources believe this will make a fresh IRA ceasefire less likely because more junior IRA members tend to be more militant.”
The collapse of the ceasefire shows how difficult it must be to keep all the different factions single-minded.
Unionists/Loyalists
It has taken the Unionists so long to agree to power sharing for numerous reasons.
- Power sharing with Nationalists has never been their main aim. For over 100 years Unionists have wanted to either rule the North themselves or to be ruled by Britain. This idea is deeply rooted into Protestant tradition. When the Catholic king of England, James the II was dethroned, he tried to take it back by using Ireland as a base to invade England. He lost to William of Orange at the battle of Boyne. After this the Protestants made sure they had complete control of Ireland. This is demonstrated in Penal laws passed at the time:
“No Catholic may bequeath his lands as a whole but must divide it amongst his sons. But if one of these sons becomes Protestant he will inherit the whole estate.
No Catholic can buy land or lease it for more than 31 years.
No Catholic shall be allowed to vote or become a member of Parliament or a town councillor.
No Catholic shall join the civil service.
No Catholic may be a solicitor or lawyer.
No Catholic may join the army or the navy
No Catholic may possess a horse of greater value than £5. Any Protestant offering that sum may take possession of a horse of his Catholic neighbour.
Catholics keeping guns are liable to a whipping.
Catholics may not receive higher education or take professional jobs.”
These laws must have been exceptionally restrictive on Catholics. Through these laws, Protestants would have had complete control over almost every aspect of a Catholic’s life. This is shown in land ownership. In 1603, Catholics owned 90% of land in Ireland. By 1778 they owned about 5% and Protestants owned the rest. Protestants must have become used to having control of Ireland and I think that this is reflected later on when Orangemen ruled the North from 1921-70. During this time they used different methods (Gerrymandering of local elections rather than brute force) to achieve the same result-control over the Catholics. Through this they were able to give Unionists better jobs and better homes than Catholics. This lack of commitment for power sharing today is clearly shown in a wall painting, which reads:
“…we (UDA/UDF) will never, never (in any way) consent to the rule of the Irish.”
- They have found it difficult to trust the Nationalists. Long term origins of this lie in the 1641-9 rebellions. Catholics felt angry and cheated when land was taken from them to form plantations. Many Protestant settlers were killed until the arrival of Oliver Cromwell. These killings were remembered as late as 1969 by Protestant politicians such as Ian Paisley:
“In 1641 the Roman Catholic Church decided to exterminate the Protestants in Ulster and there took place one of the most bloody massacres in Irish history. It was led by the priests of the Roman Catholics and the rivers of Ulster ran red with Protestant blood.”
Ian Paisley obviously refuses to forget this passage in history and so it must bear some influence on his view of Catholics and the idea of power sharing with them. If this had been an isolated incident, maybe Protestants would be more willing to agree to power sharing, but continued rebellions from 1790-1867 could have made them even less trusting.
After partition in 1921, many people were killed in street fighting in Belfast. This increased fears amongst Protestants about the support that the Catholics had from Southern Ireland. As defence against the IRA they created the ‘B’ specials.
More recently, in 1974 and 1982 the British made two attempts to set up a new power sharing government in Northern Ireland. Ordinary Protestants bitterly objected to the first attempts, but in 1982 the Catholics refused to go.
- They have found it difficult to trust the British and have feared the British would do a deal for a united Ireland behind their backs. The origins of this lie in the rise of Parliamentary Nationalists from 1820-1914. They were successful in gaining a separate parliament in Dublin. This scared the Protestants who thought that the British would bring in home rule, dominated by Catholics. This nearly happened in 1914, and so Protestants decided to stand and fight against it. Over 400,000 Protestants signed up and £1 million was raised. Arms were bought in from Germany. The British government now had a difficult situation on their hands: it could either go against the Protestants and grant home rule or it could go against the Catholics and deny home rule. Both had powerful armies at this point. If it hadn’t been for the War, the situation could have escalated out of control. As it was, the North and South were split.
In 1985, the Anglo-Irish agreement upset many Unionists because they saw it as a betrayal. They thought it was a way for the South to exercise some control over the North and that the British had gone behind their backs. Ian Paisley demonstrated this view in a 1985 speech:
“The hearts of Ulster have been stricken with the deepest of sorrows. Mrs Thatcher tells us that the Republic has got a say in this province. We say never, never…”
Short-term examples of this mistrust can be found in a 1995 newspaper article:
“London and Dublin have drawn up a framework document which envisages a joint North-South Irish authority with radical powers, according to a leaked report last night…Unionist MP John Taylor said: ‘If it is true it is a denial of the democratic rights of the Unionist people…and a total capitulation by Downing Street to the demands of the IRA’.”
Why have Unionists and Loyalists found it difficult to agree to stop fighting and hand over their weapons?
- The Unionists have long been used to controlling weapons and the police. Long-term examples of this are the ‘B’ Specials. From 1921-69 they gained a reputation as anti-Catholic and very brutal. The Protestants had complete control over them and through the Special Powers Act they were able to carry out violence ‘legally’. For instance, from 1968-9 they attacked civil rights marches. The ‘B’ Specials were disbanded in 1970.
More recent examples of Protestants dominating the police forces are shown with the RUC and the UDR. Both were meant to have even numbers of Catholics and Protestants yet the RUC was 90% Protestant. The UDR was over 97% Protestant. This shows that the Protestants basically had (until the RUC was disbanded) complete monopoly over the security forces in Northern Ireland.
- The Loyalists do not trust the British or the Nationalists. They see their weapons as an important method of defence for the Protestant Community. This has important roots with William of Orange who they believe saved them from the Catholics. They kept, and may always keep, looking back to this victory and it may be what keeps them determined to fight. This is demonstrated in an early 1800s toast:
“To the glorious memory of King William III, who saved us from slaves and slavery. Knaves and knavery, Popes and popery.”
Unionists also look back to 1912 when the UVF was able to quash the idea of home rule. This is demonstrated by a speech from Ian Paisley, made in 1981:
“These men are ready to fight…They are prepared to defend their province in the same way as Lord Carson and the men of the Ulster Volunteer Force!”
Ian Paisley was referring to 500 men parading from a private Protestant army. This shows that they have a very defensive attitude against the Catholics.
Ian Paisley better demonstrates this defensive attitude in another statement in 1982:
“If we cannot arrest the IRA and disarm them they are going to kill us. We have not the right but the duty to kill them before they kill me, my family and others.
The ordinary Ulster man is not going to surrender to the IRA or be betrayed into a united Ireland or put his neck under the jackboot of popery.”
More recent examples of the Unionists defensive attitude is shown in a 1999 newspaper report about decommissioning:
“Ulster Unionists three months ago rejected The Way Forward, the British and Irish governments’ blueprint for immediate devolution with the IRA decommissioning to follow quickly afterwards, because they felt they were being asked to take all the risks.”
Basically it means that the Ulster Unionists are not prepared to disarm before the IRA. This shows that Protestants are not prepared to ‘take their fingers off the trigger’, so to speak.
British Government
British Governments have found it difficult to agree to power sharing in Ulster for numerous reasons.
- A power sharing government has not been their main aim until recently. They have always been content to leave power in the hands of the Unionists. This is a deeply rooted concept in history, and has happened ever since the Protestants first arrived in Ireland. Because the British ‘planted’ them there, they feel compelled to protect them. This was first shown when the British Government helped the Protestants to gain control by taking land off the Catholic noblemen and giving it to the Protestants. This shows that at first they took an active role in giving power to the Protestants.
A later example is shown in the Penal Laws of 1697-1727 (‘No Catholic may bequeath his lands as a whole but must divide it amongst his sons…’). These laws were set up in complete favour of the Protestants. This shows that the Protestants of the time had complete control of Ireland, and therefore must have had support from the British Government to do so, otherwise it wouldn’t have happened.
A lot of the recent troubles have been caused by the fact that the Orangemen ruled the North from 1921 to 1970. The British did not openly condone the discrimination against Catholics, yet they refused to acknowledge the unfairness (i.e.: Vote rigging) of the mainly Protestant Government and they neglected the rights of the Catholics.
Recently, there has been a change of ideas. This is mainly because the Catholics have more actively disputed the Protestant rule (such as the re-ignition of the IRA bombing campaign in 1969). The British Government however has responded by bringing in direct rule from 1972. Attempts were made at power sharing in 1974 and 1982 but they both failed. Underneath though, there is still a hint of this duty to rest more power with the Unionists. This can be seen in the RUC, which was nearly all Protestant. The British Government left the RUC in military control of Northern Ireland. This shows active discrimination against Catholics.
- They have not been willing to trust Sinn Fein or the IRA and as a result, have not negotiated with them in good faith. Recent examples of this are shown during IRA ceasefires. During the 1972 ceasefire, the British Government took a tough stance, and would only agree to one demand- political status for IRA prisoners. This shows for a start their willingness to negotiate. In 1975 the British Government used their time during the ceasefire to try and penetrate the IRA with agents instead of negotiating. This demonstrates that they didn’t think they could negotiate and instead tried to solve the problem by other means. Another ceasefire in 1980 was also destroyed because the British would not negotiate with them.
More recent examples of British treachery are summarised in a 1996 newspaper article:
“…the British have in the past an unbroken track record in bad faith…the British Government’s representative told McGuinness (of the IRA) that ‘the final solution was union…the island would be one…the Unionists would have to change’. The contacts ended in ignominious failure, mutual recrimination, a scattering of falsified documents and outright British denial.”
This shows that the British Government is prepared to lie to try and prevent the public from knowing about the ‘secret’ peace talks they have with the IRA. It also shows that what they must say to the IRA and Sinn Fein during these talks is false and misleading.
Why has the British Government found it difficult to agree to power sharing without a weapons handover first?
- They have looked on the IRA as terrorists and have been determined to defeat them. Long term origins of this idea can be seen in previous rebellions: (overleaf)
1649, Protestant settlers murdered by angry Catholics. Stopped by Oliver Cromwell.
1798, Rebellion lead by Wolfe Tone, stopped by British.
1848, The Young Ireland Revolt, stopped by British.
1867, Fenian uprising, stopped by British.
1916, Easter rising, stopped by British.
1919-21, Irish War of Independence, partly successful.
What is significant is that the British were able to defeat them all with the exception of the ones lead by the IRA. I think that the British might bear a grudge because of this, which makes them even more determined to disable the IRA.
More recent evidence of this determination to defeat the IRA can be seen in the recent peace process. The British Government are insistent on weapons decommissioning and are letting it interfere with peace talks. This is shown in a 1999 newspaper article:
“From the beginning the peace process has been crippled by the question of decommissioning terrorist weapons. It stopped the process in its tracks under the last Conservative government and still threatens to destroy it.”
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They have given in to armed and unarmed threats by Unionists. A past example of this is the campaign for home rule in 1912. When the Nationalists looked certain to gain a separate parliament in Dublin, the Ulster Unionists organised their own private army to fight it. The Conservatives gave them full support and the Government had to break its promise of a free Irish state. This is backed up in a 1998 newspaper report:
“Unionists eventually saw off home rule with guns…”
A more recent example, this time an unarmed threat, the 1974 Ulster Workers Strike was designed to bring the North to a standstill in opposition to power sharing. The British Government gave in to the strikes and thus the idea of power sharing was destroyed.
A 1995 Cartoon seems to suggest that the Unionists almost control the Government:
The Unionist is grabbing the British Government by the testicles and this shows that the artist thinks the Unionists ultimately control the British Government and their moves, just like 1912.
Irish Government
The Irish Government has found it difficult to agree to power sharing in Ulster for numerous reasons.
- A power sharing government has never been their main aim. Since partition in 1921 they have wanted to reunite the North and South of Ireland. Long term evidence of this desire can be seen in a 1921 statement by Eamon de Valera:
“We cannot admit the right of the British government to mutilate our country.”
Even more evidence can be seen in the 1937 constitution:
“The National territory consists of the whole of Ireland…”
The wording of this shows that the Irish Government even refused to accept the existence of Northern Ireland and saw the island as a whole rather than split.
However, recently the Irish Government has changed its approach. This is shown in a 1999 newspaper report:
“…Irish politicians, north and south, met yesterday…to lay to rest those unquiet ghosts of 1916 by removing the Republic’s claim to the North from the Irish Constitution.”
This means that the Irish Government has changed the constitution so that they are no longer staking a claim to the North.
Why has the Irish Government found it difficult to agree to a weapons handover by the IRA?
They remember times when Irish Catholics have needed to protect themselves from brutal protestant forces, and feel that if another violent struggle ensued, the Catholics would need to protect themselves again. Long term examples of the need to protect themselves can be seen in the Irish War of Independence. Black &Tans gained a reputation for brutality against Catholics, and the Catholics responded with the IRA.
Relatively short term examples were the 1968-9 attacks on civil rights marchers by Protestant police. I think that the effect these events had were that they made the Irish Government feel more protective towards the Catholics ‘stranded’ on the other side of the border. I think that the only way the Irish Government could respond was to give full support to the IRA, as they could not resort to physical force themselves. This idea is an echo of an earlier statement by Eamon de Valera:
“However we do not plan to use force against Northern Protestants.”
So, after the treaty they weren’t prepared to resort to violent methods, yet they sometimes supported the IRA in their campaign.
Conclusion
Were some groups more important in delaying/preventing the peace process than others?
I think that there are two very different answers to this question, one short term and one long term.
Short term (the recent troubles, 1968 onwards)
Although each group did contribute towards the delays in the peace process, I think that ultimately the Unionists and the Nationalists were both more important in preventing the peace process than either the British or Irish governments. There has to be four reasons for this, each one representing the groups concerned:
- The Unionists did not really want to be a part of any sort of power sharing with Nationalists and did not try hard enough to make it work. Evidence of this appears in the form of the wrecking of the 1974 Power Sharing Government, ‘Smash Sinn Fein’ campaign of 1985 and Unionists walking out of 1992 Peace Talks.
- The Nationalists have not been prepared to stop their campaign of violence or decommission weapons in favour of power sharing. Evidence of this appears in the form of the Long War (1969-1994), the wrecking of the 1982 Power Sharing Government and no decommissioning by February 2000.
On the other hand…
- The British Government has pushed to get all other three groups to agree to some sort of power sharing (even if it did fail) and has set up peace talks. Evidence of this appears in the form of 1974 & 1982 Power Sharing Governments, 1985 Anglo-Irish agreement, 1991 Peace Talk suggestions, 1993 Downing Street Declaration, 1998 Good Friday agreement and New Power Sharing Assembly, 2000.
- The Irish Government, despite being initially in favour of the IRA campaign of violence, has now reformed its ideas and is pushing for peace. Evidence of this appears in the form of 1980 talks with the British about the peace plan, Anglo-Irish agreement, 1992 agreement that there should be no changes unless Protestants agree, 1993 Downing Street Declaration (offer Sinn Fein peace talks) and their 1999 change of the constitution (Northern Ireland has a right to exist).
Of course, there are exceptions to all this. For instance, the fact that the British Government allowed ten hunger strikers to die in 1980 can hardly be termed as helpful towards the peace process, but on balance I think both they and the Irish Government have been more committed towards peaceful solutions than the Nationalists and Unionists have.
Long term (1690 [first colonies]-1967)
Long term, I think that the British Government has been more to blame than the Nationalists, Unionists or the Irish Government (for a start, the Irish Government didn’t even exist before 1918). The British Government was the one after all who first settled Ireland and so it might be said that this was the root of all the problems relating to Northern Ireland. This view is backed up by numerous sources:
“…today’s problems in Ireland are merely a symptom of many years of British misrule and interference in a country where it does not belong.”-Internet Discussion Group
“We robbed, colonised and persecuted the Irish…We invaded Ireland and fought our own battles there.”-The Guardian
Both sources suggest that not only did we invade a country that wasn’t ours to take, but we also ‘interfered’, ‘robbed’, ‘persecuted’ etc. This caused yet more problems and so it escalated into the hatred that is experienced between Protestants and Catholics today.
Were any Reasons/Groups linked in delaying the peace process?
I think that many reasons and groups influenced decisions and bore consequence on what would happen in later time. The way the Unionists reminded themselves of 1912 when they were against the Anglo-Irish agreement is an example of them not forgetting the past. As the Nationalist politician noted, ‘We are all prisoners of history here’.
I think that the decisions of other parties have also influenced groups in their decisions. For instance, the IRA declared a ceasefire in August 1994, and in October of the same year, there was announced a Loyalist ceasefire. I think that these were too close together to be a coincidence. In actual fact, I think that the Unionists saw that there had been an IRA ceasefire and as a token gesture towards peace, they did the same. Of course, this sort of reciprocation could, and I think did, work towards the opposite effect (violence and hostility). For example, when the Anglo-Irish agreement was signed in 1985 and just after, the Unionists started the ‘Smash Sinn Fein’ campaign. I think this was their idea of retaliation, as echoed in a statement by Ian Paisley:
“Mrs Thatcher tells us that the Republic has got a say in this province. We say never, never, never, never.”
Looking at mistakes made in the past, how could the issues be resolved?
In order to progress with peace talks, I think that several issues would need to be
resolved:
- In the past, Unionists have felt threatened by Nationalist weapons and the IRA. This is demonstrated in a statement by Ian Paisley:
“We have not the right but the duty to kill them before they kill me, my family and others”.
So, the IRA would need to disarm, yet as suggested by Kevin Toolis, ‘victorious armies do not hand over their guns’. To solve this, they would have to be made to feel as if they had lost nothing. To do this, I think both sides would have to disarm at the same time, so neither feel threatened or betrayed.
- The British would have to take a more balanced view rather than take sides. In the past, the British Government has always given in to the Unionists. For instance, the 1974 Ulster Workers Strike was designed to bring the North to a standstill in opposition to power sharing. The British Government gave in to the strikes and thus the idea of power sharing was destroyed. They would need to take more of a central stance.
- The Unionists need to be less racist in their approach and accept that the Nationalists have a right to share power in Ireland. An example of this racial hatred can be seen in a relatively modern Protestant fighting song:
‘If guns are made for shooting,
Then skulls are made to crack.
You’ve never seen a better Taig
Than with a bullet in his back.’
Most importantly though, the factor which is at the root of all these problems can be defined as history. All the problems in Northern Ireland can be attributed to history, and the fact that people refuse to forget what has happened. Examples are:
- IRA remember the victory of 1921
- Orangemen remember William III and his victory
- Catholics remember Protestant forces, and their brutality. i.e: Black & Tans, ‘B’ Specials, RUC.
- Unionists remember 1912 and Power Sharing
The list could go on forever, because the truth is that everyone needs a historical event to base their opinions on. History cannot be changed, so the only way forward is to deal with what has happened in the past and try to get on with solving a future. As Nicholas Frayling, a writer for the Guardian suggested:
“The way to deal with pain and resentment is to remember and change”.
