DISCUSSION
A Ford Subcompact is Born
Up until the 1960’s the Ford Motor Company was a well know and respected business that focused its efforts on the sale of trucks and medium and large sized cars. By the mid 1960’s it became apparent to automobile manufactures that the needs of their consumers had changed towards a more economical and fuel efficient vehicle commonly known as the subcompact. To date this market segment had been dominated by the European and Japanese car brands. In an effort to make inroads into this market, the Ford Motor Company decided to develop its own line of subcompacts in 1967 based on the advice of the then vice-president, Lee Iacocca.1
In 1968 Lee Iacocca became president of Ford. His first order of business was to develop a subcompact, which would later come to be known as the Pinto. Since the competition already had subcompact cars for sale, Iacocca turned up the heat on the Pinto project making it Ford’s top priority. In doing so, clear objectives were defined for the new automobile. According to Iacocca, “The Pinto was not to weigh an ounce over 2,000 pounds and not cost a cent over $2,000.”2 An article by Ford executive F.G. Olsen published by the Society of Automotive Engineers further defined the objectives to be met with the Pinto design: true subcompact, low cost of ownership, clear product superiority.3 It’s interesting to note that of all the objectives listed in the article, Olsen didn’t mention word one about the Pinto’s safety requirements. This may have been due to Iacocca’s influence who felt that “Safety doesn’t sell.”4
The Pinto’s Design was Flawed
To meet the stringent demands set forth in the objectives, corners had to be cut. This involved the downgrading of features on the Pinto that were considered standard for the other vehicles Ford sold. This included but was not limited to a flimsy bumper and the removal of steel longitudinal side and cross members, which would have added extra weight and cost to the automobile.5
Another downside to the car’s design was the placement of the Pinto’s fuel tank. Ford obtained the rights to a design patent in 1961 that detailed a layout for gas tanks to “straddle” the rear axle that was said to prevent the tanks “from possible puncture or damage as a result of the vehicle dropping into holes or hitting obstructions.”6 Although the technology was readily available to place the gas tank safely over the axle of the car, the fuel tank on the Pinto was placed behind the rear axle just six inches away from the “ornamental” bumper. The placement of the gas tank appears to have been decided upon by the styling department. The claim was that the vehicle needed sufficient trunk space to place two sets of golf clubs in it, which wasn’t possible with the saddle-type positioning.7
In addition to all these design flaws, the tube leading from the tank to the gas-tank cap called the filler pipe was also poorly engineered. Most cars of that era had filler pipes that would breakaway from the car bodies in the event of an accident. An additional safety design often used was to extend the filler pipe deep into the gas tank so that it wouldn’t pull out if it didn’t break free properly. The Pinto on the other hand, rigidly attached the filler pipe to the car body and it was just barely long enough to protrude into the tank. The reduced length was justified because of the cost savings involved with less material and the added fuel capacity due to less space being taken up by an extended hose within the tank.8
Ford’s Management Didn’t React
With all the problems surrounding the design of the Pinto why didn’t Ford take action to correct them until the release of the 1977 Pinto model? Was it simply a case of management being unaware of the flaws? This argument doesn’t hold water in this case due to all the evidence against such a claim. Actually it appears as though management was well aware of the issues with the Pinto and that greed and pride were the primary reasons for the lack of action.
Before the Pinto went into production, evidence suggests that there may have been indicators of safety concerns with the car’s design. The incident in question occurred with a prototype just one year before the car was released into production. To test the integrity of the fuel system among other systems that were tested as well, competitor’s cars were retrofitted with a fuel system resembling that of the proposed new Ford subcompact. In all the tests conducted, the fuel systems leaked when rear end crash test were simulated.9
Although this sounds rather alarming, the engineers didn’t consider the leaking fuel a significant problem. Since the tests conducted were with a prototype that only resembled the Pinto, it was thought that the true performance of the production vehicle might have been different. In addition, subcompact cars were considered cheap and thus inferior in design to more expensive cars. Therefore, the consumer was getting what they were paying for. Finally, there were no federal regulations in place regarding what should be considered acceptable fuel leakage after an accident occurred.10 Based on the principles of the intuition ethic and being an engineer myself, I’m sure the leaking fuel presented many questions in the minds of those performing the test that should have been red flags as to the safety of the pending production model.
Up to the time when the first Pinto was sold, it remains inconclusive as to whether or not the upper management at Ford was fully aware of the potential safety hazards presented with their new line of automobiles. Although the full ramifications may not have been understood, it does appear though Ford’s management was at least cognizant of the fuel leakage issues due to their reaction to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) announcement of strict proposals regarding gasoline spillage following rear-end crashes.
The NHTSA Steps In
Within days of the Pinto being introduced for sale in 1970, the NHTSA published a request that all automobiles be able to withstand a 20 mph crash without fuel leakage by 1972. This standard also required vehicles to have no gasoline spilled after a 30 mph crash by 1973.11 In a typical might-equals-right fashion, Ford lobbied against the proposition claiming that it was an overdramatic and unrealistic request. Even though Ford already had the capability meet and exceed the proposed regulations, based on crash test that were performed on slightly modified Pintos, they vehemently opposed the new standard.12
Ford’s arguments were based on a cost-benefit analysis that the NHTSA initially agreed with. According to the utilitarian type calculation, automobile manufacturers would have to spend approximately $137 million ($11 dollars per car times the 12.5 million vehicles sold annually in the U.S) to meet the proposed regulations versus the $49.5 million potential losses in human life.13 Therefore, it was considered cost prohibitive to adopt these measures because Ford felt the expense to modify the existing designs far outweighed the potential liability. As a result of this and other stall tactics, Ford was successful in delaying the NHTSA’s federal regulation on fuel leakage following an accident until 1977. Not surprisingly, the 1977 Pinto model passed the regulations with flying colors because Ford simply put into effect the safety measures that were already known to be effective.14
The Pinto’s Downfall
On the surface it may appear as though Ford was acting in accordance with its fiduciary responsibilities. Although this may have been Ford management’s intent, this in fact was not case. By waiting until the last minute to install the proper safety measures to prevent gasoline leaks from rear-end collisions Ford effectively sealed its fate. As a result of postponing the design changes, executives estimated that they would incur a cost savings of $20.9 million.15 Although this was the case, what they didn’t account for was the tarnished reputation and tens of millions of dollars that would have to be paid out to settle the lawsuits that resulted from such a decision. The public outcry became so great that Ford eventually succumbed to a voluntary recall of the 1971-76 model year Pintos in 1978 resulting in a further cash outlay of approximately $30 million dollars.16
If Ford’s management would have followed the proportionality ethic in weighing the “good and evil” consequences of their decisions we may never have associated the Pinto with the negative image it developed. I highly doubt the decision makers at Ford would have acted in such manners in their personal lives. Thus it seems as though the management of Ford was more comfortable in adopting the conventionalist ethic.
REFERENCES:
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Dowie, Mark. “Pinto Madness.” Mother Jones. http://www.motherjones. com/news/feature/1977/09/dowie.html (Sept. / Oct. 1977).
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“Ford Pinto.” Engineering.com. http://www.engineering.com/content/ ContentDisplay?contentId=41009014.
- Dowie, “Pinto Madness.”
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“Ford Pinto.” Engineering.com.
- Birsch, Douglas., & Fielder, H. John. “The Ford Pinto Case: A study in Applied Ethics, Business, and Technology.” NY: State University of New York, 1994, pp. 44-53.
- Birsch, & Fielder, “The Ford Pinto Case: A study in Applied Ethics, Business, and Technology.” p. 43.
- Dowie, “Pinto Madness.”
- Birsch, & Fielder, “The Ford Pinto Case: A study in Applied Ethics, Business, and Technology.” pp. 44-51.
- Birsch, & Fielder, “The Ford Pinto Case: A study in Applied Ethics, Business, and Technology.” p. 10.
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Barber, Nigel. "Ford Pinto." Encyclopedia of Ethics in Science and Technology. http://www.fofweb.com/Subscription/Science/Helicon.asp?SID=2&iPin =ethics0168 (2002).
- Birsch, & Fielder, “The Ford Pinto Case: A study in Applied Ethics, Business, and Technology.” p. 46.
- Dowie, “Pinto Madness.”
- Barber, "Ford Pinto."
- Birsch, & Fielder, “The Ford Pinto Case: A study in Applied Ethics, Business, and Technology.” p. 51.
- Birsch, & Fielder, “The Ford Pinto Case: A study in Applied Ethics, Business, and Technology.” p. 50.