Mazzini had been the political idealist able to catalyze the national spirit of the Italian people into a viable force, being one of the first to introduce the practical possibility of unification. He was very much the propagandist of Italian unity, however post 1848-9, in the wake of revolutionary failure the Mazzinian ideas which to a degree had instigated the popular unrest of the early nineteenth century, had been proven impractical and unworkable. Indeed Piedmont was the most promising tool for unification, which explains the significance of Cavour’s ambition, in that it provided the means with which others could achieve independence from foreign rule and unification. Garibaldi on the other hand complimented politics with military force and action capitalizing on Cavour’s and the King’s ignorance of situations in the South. As a master of guerrilla warfare he provided the necessary force to draw attention to Italy as a whole, rousing nationalist spirit and facilitating unification. Victor Emmanuel II, king of Piedmont, in effect completed the unification of Italy, and indeed supported such unification and the military conquests of Garibaldi in order to gain glory and prestige.
The drive for unification was not itself unified and saw the main, aforementioned, figureheads often in conflict of sorts. Mazzini consistently deplored that, despite introducing liberal reforms, Cavour and most politicians in Turin suspected or even disliked the objective of national unification. Such fears were well founded since Cavour had a very narrow form of patriotism, preoccupied by the ambition of dominating an enlarged state in northern Italy. This ambition however saw the modernization of the state, with improved infrastructure, and economic reforms vital in putting Piedmont ahead of other Italian states and subsequently advancing military power, inevitably furthering the cause for unification. Cavour was in effect a political opportunist intent on power for he disagreed greatly with Mazzini’s principles with the argument that Italians could not achieve independence by themselves, tactfully omitting the fact that if they did attempt a dangerous ‘levee en masse’, Piedmont’s conservative constitution and her dominant position in Italy would be greatly threatened and possibly destroyed. In order to ensure his position, he adopted certain underhand tactics such as falsely abetting with some of Mazzini’s party in order to undermine their efforts and exploit any success that they might achieve. Likewise, the actions of Garibaldi posed significant problems for Cavour and his vision of a north Italian state. He again employed a degree of sly secrecy in surreptitiously opposing Garibaldi’s actions so as to make certain of his and Piedmont’s security.
Mazzini’s impact on Unification had been asserted mainly prior to 1848 with numerous insurrections, staged in the hope of reform. He had propagated the pursuit of unification.
He had shone as the guiding light for many of the later figures in Italy’s unification and put forward many of the core principles in achieving independence, however he was now of lesser importance in the post 1848-9 climate. Italy was far too weak to size up to the might of Austria and isolated insurrections would never achieve popular reform. Therefore, though Mazzini had quite importantly cultivated popular protest and spirit for independence introducing political ideals he had achieved very few concrete gains and so was largely unsuccessful.
In contrast Victor Emmanuel II arrived late on the scene and though he managed foreign and internal affairs adequately, was overshadowed by Cavour, only asserting himself in the final years of the ‘Risorgimento’. He was a firm exponent of Italian Unification but by no means the most important for he simply pulled the trigger releasing the bullet that had been loaded by the likes of Mazzini and Garibaldi and Cavour. However his decision to keep the independent constitution of Piedmont and his liberal attitudes could be argued to be what had facilitated the growth and expansion of Piedmont. The king had secretly supported Garibaldi in his conquest of Sicily and Naples and had finally stayed true to his wish to unite Italy in his invasion of the Papal States with Cavour alongside.
In conclusion it seems that Garibaldi was the most important and successful exponent in the unification of Italy. His combination of political adeptness, charismatic leadership and military competence played a major role in first conquering and unifying the South then prompting the unification of Italy as a whole. In 1860 Garibaldi set sail for Sicily with his ‘thousand’, volunteer army in the name of Victor Emmanuel II in order that the unrest created would provoke Piedmont to commit to the impoverished South, which Cavour had failed to address previously. Garibaldi’s capture of Palermo, as well as arousing immense enthusiasm in public opinion, was proof that the Mazzinian idea of national unification might no longer be a utopian dream.
Cavour was not an exponent of Italian unification. He was merely pressurized into thinking on a broader more national level by Mazzini and Garibaldi who were vigorously intent on unification. If it were not for the sharp actions of Garibaldi and the legendary ‘thousand’ the north and south may not have been tied to form a unified Italian state so soon.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Mazzini – Dennis Mack Smith (GB 1994)
Cavour – Dennis Mack Smith (1985)
B.A. Haddock article – Italy: Independence and unification without power
Mazzini – Dennis Mack Smith (GB 1994) – Chapter Five
Mazzini – Dennis Mack Smith 5
Mazzini – D.M.Smith chapter six
