The Treaty of Versailles is said to be a ‘Carthaginian Peace’ and blamed for much of the political unrest of the era, although it is arguable that the real failure was that the Allies did not adapt it in the 1920’s to expand peace. However, there is truth in the claim that certain clauses caused anger towards anything related to the Treaty. The main two clauses responsible for this sentiment were the ‘War Guilt’ clause, as many Germans did not feel solely responsible for the Great War, and the hugely restricted army which had always been a source of national pride and an integral part of the nation’s warlike culture. Hindenburg, although previously agreeing that Germany could not win the war, directed the outrage against the founders of the Republic and branded them the ‘November Criminals’. He now claimed the army had been ‘stabbed in the back’ and prevented from winning the war. As many Germans accepted these accusations, radical right-wing parties who were against the Weimar Republic and ‘Treaty of Versailles’ gained support.
From the end of the war creeping inflation had always been a problem for Germany. This had been exacerbated by the severe reparations liability imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles. Things came to a head in 1923 when the French occupied the Ruhr when reparations payments were not fulfilled, sparking the occurrence of hyperinflation. However, the Weimar Republic survived this because Gustav Stresemann was able to use the Chancellorship powers effectively. He took a pragmatic and tough approach starting with cutting government expenditure. He then introduced a new currency and government bank which restored confidence.
The Weimar Republic suffered many attempted communist revolutions without any getting close to succeeding. The principal reason for the Left’s failure was that it never accounted for more than 15 percent of the vote in the polls. As a result, the radical Left never possessed sufficient mass appeal to generate the type of spontaneous support needed to overthrow the government, in contrast to their communist colleagues in Russia. In particular, most left wing support was rather more moderate than in Russia, with the relatively popular democratic SDP being committed to trade unions and ‘evolution rather than revolution’. However, the Left’s failure to gain greater influence can also be traced to a number of other reasons. First, the movement was poorly organised and unprofessional. Although it could count on the forceful leadership of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, who were able to unite many small left wing parties under the name of the German Communist Party (KPD), a number of revolts took place sometimes without leadership endorsement. The result was sporadic, disconnected uprisings which could be dealt with relatively easily by the Freikorps (a right-wing party of ex-soldiers). Even when successful, revolutions only succeeded in gaining power at a regional level for a short period of time as the government’s use of Article 48 allowed speedy transference of emergency powers to regional military units and commanders. Secondly, these revolutions by the KPD made it a prime target for the government who felt they were the main threat. The government felt compelled to gain military support and therefore struck a deal with General Gröner in return for supplies and support of the army. Although an unreliable law enforcer, the army was anti-democratic and deeply anti-socialist, as demonstrated by the murder of the KPD leaders. Finally, with the early murder of the KPD’s greatest leaders (Liebknecht and Luxemburg) the party lacked any real leadership or central purpose.
The far right had greater opportunities for “regime-change” because of the government’s pre-occupation with the communist threat. By 1920 a number of small right-wing parties had joined together to form a movement under the name of the Nazis but early attempts to undermine the government were not promising. The Kapp Putsch and similar attempts to overthrow the government seemed to lack any effective centralised co-ordination. At this early stage success might have been gained if the army had been supportive but the military leaders were yet to be convinced by the Far Right. In fact, it seems that the army was content to sit on the fence. When President Ebert asked Von Seeckt (leader of the Army) who the Army obeyed – the government or mutineers, he replied ‘Herr Reich President, the army stands behind me’. It was this uncertain attitude of the army which probably prevented any successful overthrow of the government by the right. However, it would be wrong to think that the lack of army support was the only reason for the right’s failure to acquire power in the 1920’s. First, there was the lack of support from the German Conservative Party - Von Seeckt had managed to sway its leader, Kahr, away from extremist activities, partly because the right was linked to thuggish and undisciplined behaviour. Clearly, if Kahr had offered support towards the Nazis the existence of the Republic would have been seriously threatened. Secondly, not only did the right not gain the support of the moderate majority, but its plans were thwarted by the left-centred parties. For example, the Kapp Putsch was ended when the strong trade unions in Berlin were able to call a general strike, closing down the provision of all central services such as electricity. Finally, the use of Article 48 by President Ebert was equally effective against the right and it was against the left-wing inspired uprisings. At no point was the government threatened at national level, whilst at regional level the military commanders had sufficient strength to restore social order.
The disorganised state of the far right and far left political parties, the wavering attitude of the army, the introduction and subsequent use of Article 48, and the general economic management skills displayed by the chancellorship, all combined to prevent any effective right or left-wing dominated government overthrow. However to survive the threats the government had to concede some factors (the alliance with the un-diplomatic army and thus commitment to the extreme right) which would harm it in the long run.
