Scholars such as Hume, and scientists such as Dawkins, believe that ‘miracles’ have natural explanations and are only seen as miraculous due to ignorance (as science advances forward so faith retreats). They believe that there are no real miracles but events that can be better explained in scientific terms (the plagues, walking on water etc) or are simply fabricated.
The German scholar Rudolf Bultmann took a similarly sceptical view of miracles and argued that the world view of the Bible was unacceptable in a modern, scientific age. Bultmann reasoned that the Gospels had to ‘demythologised’ so that people could uncover the real lasting message of Christianity.
Another view dismisses miracles as nothing more than coincidences, that a prayer being answered (for a lottery win etc) is nothing more than a random event which should not be misconstrued as a miracle, although it could be noted that Archbishop William Temple once famously remarked ‘when I prey coincidences happen, when I don’t they don’t.’.
Perhaps the most famous sceptic of the miraculous, the ideas of David Hume are vital in the discussion of the miraculous. Hume, a rationalist child of the scientific revolution of the 17th century, defined a miracle as “a transgression of a law of nature brought about by a particular volition of a Deity, or by the interposition of an invisible agency”. Hume held the belief that these laws of nature were established by firm unalterable experience. Hume in his “Enquiry concerning human understanding” set out five arguments against believing in miracles, one of these a priori and the other four of a posteriori.
Hume’s a priori (philosophic) argument that “a miracle is a violation of the law of nature…” is widely seen as being his strongest argument against miracles. Here Hume reasons that it would be impossible for us to prove an event was miraculous because any such event would have to outweigh all of humanity’s accumulated experience (the experiences of millions of people over thousands of years). This can be criticised as a circular argument, which does not actually say that miracles do not happen just that Hume can’t believe it.
The first of Hume’s a posteriori (psychological) arguments, the argument from insufficient witness, argued that to believe in miracles it was necessary for there to be, a substantial number of witnesses, witnesses of higher credibility, of good sense, education, integrity etc. Hume reasoned that there was not a single miracle recorded in history by such witnesses as these.
In Hume’s second psychological argument, the argument from ignorance, Hume ascertained that miracles usually came from “ignorant and barbarous nations” and claimed this formed a “strong presumption against all supernatural and miraculous relations”.
Hume’s third psychological argument is that people are drawn towards the sensational, noting peoples tendency to exaggerate and that many had a desire to believe. Hume claimed that witnesses if miracles were guilty of wish fulfilment (in this subject his ideas anticipated those of Freud and Marx).
The last of the a posteriori (psychological) arguments, the conflicting claims argument, has a more philosophical edge to it, than the previous three arguments. Here, Hume said that miracles among different religions cancel each other out and noted that all gods cannot be true so there are no such things as miracles, merely religious propaganda.
Hume’s extensive argument against belief in miracles has been widely criticised on many fronts. His first argument that miracles go against the laws of nature has been criticised as being, weak and circular, effectively saying that miracles are unlikely as they do not occur very often, surely this is why they are known as ‘miracles’. Furthermore scientific laws are not ‘unalterable’ but are descriptive and provisional, they can be altered.
Hume’s first two a posteriori arguments can be criticised on a number of grounds. Firstly Hume is vague in his failure to explain how many witnesses would be sufficient evidence for a miracle. It might also be argued that Hume’s extensive criteria at proving miracles are unrealistic (Richard Whatley applied Hume’s criteria to the life of Napoleon Bonaparte and found that “according to the criteria, most events in Napoleon’s life should not be believed”.) Hume can also be challenged for his (arrogant, bordering on racist claim) that miracles take place in ignorant and barbarous nations as miracles have been claimed in all areas of the world, even in modern times (Lourdes, Toronto, 1960’s Scotland etc).
It should also be noted that in our own experience there tends to be an automatic distrust of things which are 'out of the ordinary' but this does not mean the events did not occur. It might be that Jesus rose from the dead just as it might be that there are crashed spaceships somewhere in the Nevada desert. The fact that someone testifies to the extraordinary does not mean their testimony should be discredited. Neither should it be discredited because they are not considered to be a 'wise man' (or woman). Culture and intelligence do not automatically make people wise nor produce people who are able to make critically aware assessments of each situation. Also it is simply arbitrary to assume that all witnesses exaggerate or fantasise.
Hume’s assertion that belief in miracles is not rational has also been widely criticised. Hume’s claim that miracles are effectively invalid if witnessed by people who do not meet his lofty criteria is unsound, as it is ignorant to think that people living 2000 years ago in Galilee knew any less than those living today that a virgin birth, or a man rising from the dead is not normally possible. In addition Hume can be criticised as dealing in generalisations, rather than specific examples. This is illustrated by Colin Brown’s comment that “In his treatment of miracles Hume was right to insist that belief was proportional to evidence, the problem is not that Hume was too empirical, he was not empirical enough.” Brown goes on to criticise Hume for discounting the possibility of physical evidence, concerning events such as the resurrection.
Hume’s conflicting claims challenge, that miracles among different religions cancel each other out, can also be criticised. Firstly, not all religions have miracles (they are not central to Buddhism). Secondly, many recognise false prophets and lastly, recognition of miracles does not necessarily lead to truth claims (Jesus played down their significance in his ministry). Perhaps the main invalidating argument to Hume’s challenge is John Hick’s reasoning that ‘all routes lead to God’, that miracles are caused by just one God that all religions lead up to.
There are several other arguments in defence of miracles. One such defence being that if there is reasonable evidence the existence of an omnipotent Christian God that governs natural laws, one such definition of a miracle, then a logical argument can be made for belief in miracles (although this opens up the question whether such a God does exist. Furthermore, if as Thomas Aquinas suggested, miracles might occur within the system of natural activity, then how are we to tell when a miracle has occurred. In addition to this it should be pointed out that scientific explanations do not rule out theological explanations.
I believe that the statement “By definition miracles do not occur” is simplistic and problematic for many reasons, as there is great difficulty in actually defining what a miracle is and the arguments that attempt to prove this, such as Hume’s a priori argument, are deeply flawed and open to much criticism. Thus I find it is impossible to dismiss Miracles as false by definition, but believe that the evidence must be looked at, “a good scientist looks at the evidence” (Polkinghorne).
