The exact classification of various virtues is debatable. The nonmoral virtues generally are considered as contributing to the moral life but also as more easily expropriated for immoral purposes.
Even though most of the virtue systems don’t deny that there are principles of action that serve as action guidelines. These entities are not the essence of morality. Likewise, even though it is sometimes appropriate to reason about what to do, such deliberating should also give significant attention to feelings such as sympathy and loyalty. The exemplar model of virtue ethics comes into focus in two different ways; either through an examination of ideal types of persons or through following someone that is an ideal type.
Some of the attractiveness that virtue theories enjoy is due to a misunderstanding of rival moral theories. Advocates of virtue ethics sometimes offer self-characterisations that make them appear to offer advantages that are in fact shared by rival, sophisticated moral theories. For example, some virtue theories tell us to habituate rule following, because we want to develop character, or an internalisation of the rules, a goal, which is allegedly unique to the virtue theory. But in fact this is hardly different from many rule-emphasis theories.
Once we commit ourselves to a particular kind of moral action, once we have habituated ourselves to choosing it, we typically find that it becomes relatively easy to follow. But this realisation is not solely the property of virtue ethics; rule-based ethical systems too seek habituation of rules for the formation of character.
As another example, consider that virtue theories often suggest that long lists of rules are impractical and that there is great simplicity or moral economy in offering a virtue-imperative. We might be told that "Love your wife!" requires much more of us than "Don't commit adultery, and spend time talking with your wife, and take your wife out on dates from time to time", etc., suggesting that typical rule-based theories simply cannot capture the full force of a virtue-imperative. The virtue of Love covers a wide range of imperatives so that telling someone to love his wife refers to a host of action-imperatives. Just as we will use an intuitive concept like "controlling the centre" in chess, a principle that has perhaps a great many applications and was gleaned from many experiences, so we can appeal to virtue-imperatives like "Be patient!" as a short-hand way to capture a large number of rules.
Thus, again, virtue ethics may initially appear to have advantages those closer reflection reveals to be unwarranted. A rule-based system could easily employ the same language.
At some point virtue ethics do part company with their rivals, typically classified as rule-based, rule-following, or action-imperative systems. Generally, rule-based theories offer a formula or calculus for determining what an appropriate course of action is given a certain situation. They often offer a general principle such as Kant's categorical imperative or Mill's utilitarian principle that can be applied to actions or descriptions of actions in an effort to decide their moral standing.
Mill tells us that those actions are moral which maximise happiness and minimise harm for the greatest number. So, if you are contemplating a particular action, but are not sure whether your decision is a moral one, you could readily employ Mill's principle by asking whether it would in fact promote the greatest happiness for the greatest number.
Virtue ethics wishes to avoid moral calculi for the determination of correct action. Virtue theorists emphasise the admitted difficulties of employing these formulae together with the suggestion that we ought to abandon them in favour of their alternative systems. We ought instead, we are told, to concentrate on the kinds of persons we ought to be, rather than the particular actions we should take. Since persons of appropriate moral character do good deeds, we would save ourselves the headaches of having to employ complicated theories especially if those theories do not often offer us very convincing results.
A virtue theorist will try to show us that rule-following systems are open to more objections than that they are difficult to employ. Secondly, he will tell us that virtue ethics makes the whole task of living a moral life a good deal simpler and quite intuitive.
