Hume’s vendetta against the miracle is far from completion; he did not only use this proportioning of our belief to the evidence available to argue against miracles, he also created guidelines to judge the reliability of witnesses’ testimonies. He claimed that anyone rational would only trust the evidence of someone educated, and of high stature – with nothing to gain, but reputation to lose. That witnesses to miracles were often ‘barbarous’ or ignorant people. However, Hume was burdened with an eighteenth century world, in contemporary light, reported miracles are often researched by high profile, efficient scientists. A cutting example is the phenomenon of Lourdes. Here many individuals have claimed to have been miraculously cured of debilitating conditions by the power of God through the icon of the Virgin Mary. A team of scientists dedicated to investigating reports of miracle healings have found 68 inexplicable (but not necessarily permanently unexplainable) occurrences here, where no current scientific answer can be discovered. Now Hume’s arguments begin to suffer, as evidence supporting the appearance of natural laws being broken comes from reliable and experiential scrutiny. Furthermore Swinburne’s Principles of Testimony and Credulity could be used to counter Hume. The Principle of Testimony restates the principle by which our law system operates – ‘innocent until proven guilty’, maintaining that what is reported probably occurred. This is true unless operating under particularly suspect circumstances such as the witness is a known fraudster. The Principle of Credulity further states, that if we perceive X, then X is likely to exists, this counters challenges of witnesses being mistaken, that is not to say it rules out the potential for incorrect perceptions, for example we should be cautious if the witness was inebriated at the time of X. Swinburne supports this view by suggesting that otherwise we land in a cynical and (as Vardy puts it) ‘sceptical bog’. So Swinburne enters the realm of ‘fact’, we should have confidence in those who report miracles, and confidence that what they experienced was real, not illusory, that their tales of the supernatural reveal a truth in the concept of a miracle.
Hume also tosses the postulation of humankind loving and desiring the supernatural into the basket of his assault. Indeed, our greedy consumption of films, the boom in the video-game industry, our craving for fiction, all scheme to suggest that Hume is correct. However, again we look to the modern world, enthralled with the paranormal perhaps, but satisfied and distanced from it by the revolution of the film industry, television, novels, our dose of ‘descriptions of sea and land monsters…strange men, and uncouth manners’ are satiated. I’m not persuaded by this premise, it is based on little of the experiential evidence which Hume so fervently adulates, and instead is based inadequately on suggestion.
Lastly Hume claims that miracles are an irrational belief due to many religions claiming their basis lies as a result of divine intervention. This poses a large problem if separate religions base the truth of their religion on these, since they all have equal claims to truth. However, Christianity, Judaism and Islam would reply that they have never used miracles as a sole basis for faith. Nonetheless, Christianity will still take a blunder from Hume, as this is an inadequate response to the way Hume presents a slightly different argument. He contends that Christian belief is ultimately based on the gospel, ultimately based on a belief that Jesus, The Saviour, descended from heaven to aid the wounded world. In turn, belief in Jesus as this Saviour relies almost entirely on his performance of miracles. Today’s Christian’s must rely on the testimonies of the Apostles, to establish their belief that Jesus has come, that Jesus has cleared us of our sins, ultimately that God loves us. Without the Apostles testimonies of miracles that comprise the Gospel, Christians would have very little to hold their faith on. Here I believe Hume makes an interesting observation that has double impact. Firstly, the miracles onto which the religion is based are only reported through the Gospel, accounts of testimonies gone before, Hume draws our attention towards the high unreliability of these accounts. Secondly, if his other arguments succeed in destroying the notion of a miracle (as a breach in laws of nature) then he asserts that this religion is based on an untruth. However, I believe the weaknesses in his argument are that it only really counters this concept of Jesus, not of God. It would undermine the whole concept of faith - that it should be based on pure personal belief rather than proof, to assume that Christians wouldn’t believe in God if the New Testament did not exist, to speculate in Christians’ place more Jews would still await their messiah. Secondly Hume also presumes that New Testament’s miracles are to be taken literally, when much of the Bible is today interpreted as metaphorical. Undoubtedly many current Christians do not base their faith on the accurate occurrence of those Bible miracles. The weight of the miracles is that they are based on compassion, not on claims to any authority. Hume considers none of the above.
The power In Hume’s’ argument is that it draws attention to the issue of evidence, of proving that the epitome of improbability has occurred. His argument is epistemological, that is it doesn’t attempt to floor the physical possibility of miracles having ever occurred, instead he simply purports that we have no valid reason for supposing that they have occurred. Hume’s arguments do present a relatively strong case to assume that miracles cannot be construed as ‘fact’. The closest to fact we can reach externally is having no natural explanation for an event which has seemingly contravened scientific norms, but we cannot even be sure of this. We also have no way of affirming that these non-natural events are divinely inspired. So thus they must be a matter of faith.
Alas, even the notion of simply having ‘faith’ in the event miracles, defined as a violation of the laws of nature, is not a harmless stance for the theist. Instead it is damaging to the Judaeo-Christian concept of God, which is an omnipotent, omniscient, omni-benevolent, immutable, designer and creator. Maurice Wiles is the main proponent of this line of attack. He claims that ‘there are no good grounds for speaking of particular divine actions with respect to particular phenomena’. Rather, the world is a single act of God which encompasses the world as a whole, God does not, on an individual basis, interact with us. God’s interference would conflict with the cosmological and design arguments, which promote overall purpose and structure, reliant on regularity. Although to the theist this reasoning may irrelevant as their faith may not be based on any of these specific arguments, it still creates an inconsistency between a ‘designer’ God and apparently arbitrary miracles being performed. Wiles’ central argument is that, if there is a God who can intervene, then his failure to do so on more occasions raises questions about his morality. Why does he answer the prayers of some and ignore others? Why did he save the Jews from slavery in Egypt by the parting of the red sea but not at the Holocaust? Why does he work apparently trivial miracles but not stop major tragedies? This undermines the universal benevolence that is inherent in the Christian concept of God, but to counter this by suggesting His inability to act on all occasions obliterates His omnipotence and omnipresence. In short, Wiles’ powerful argument renders a God who performs miracles (defined as breaks in the laws of nature) morally bad and of questionable worship. Indeed, how can the believer overcome this gravely effective argument? Keith Ward has attempted by claiming that while God can act in the world whenever he wills he limits such action to occasional miracles in order not to disrupt the order of creation. Such acts, often in response to prayer, are intended to build faith rather than relieve suffering, he maintains. The aspect of Wiles’ argument which strikes me is its supposition that we as mere mortals can understand the nature of God. His arguments only work if we restrict the Deity to conformed ideas, he is right to do so in relation to Christianity specifically, as these are the characteristics proposed by this Church. However, in a wider scheme his argument isn’t necessarily applicable. How can we understand something that we can never know for certain? So then miracles can only be accepted in the light of faith, but yet they injure the God who is the root of this faith. The adversity lies in what we consider a ‘miracle’ to be.
Hume’s logic only tackles the interpretation of a Miracle as a ‘transgression in a law of nature’. Wiles does not reject another concept of what a miracle is. Logic can only deal in this realm of experiential absolutes which dictate concrete rules, thus deducing likely fictions. This is not the only definition of a miracle however. The second idea of the miracle is espoused by philosophers such as R.F. Holland, and Paul Tillich, Wiles’ is also an advocate of this view. Tillich asserts that just because an event does not breach the laws of nature, it does not mean it cannot be classed as a miracle. On the contrary, a miracle is ‘an event which is astonishing…without contradicting the rational structure of reality…an event which points to the mystery of being…which is received as a sign-event in an ecstatic experience’. So here Wiles’ avoids the detrimental effect that a science breaking miracle has on his God, instead making way for a new definition, ‘an unusual and striking event which evokes and mediates vivid awareness of God.’ This view is illustrated by R.F. Holland’s parable of the child on the rail track who manages to survive due to the driver fainting and the train automatically breaking, the train stops within meters of the child bringing about in the mother ‘vivid awareness of God.’
However, does this reinterpretation mean that we can simply define a ‘miracle’ into existence? If we were all permitted to simply alter the meaning of words to suit what we believe should be meant by them, then a simple conversation would become chaos. It is true that the term ‘miracle’ has become informalised, used colloquially to describe our surprise at unexpected events, and so in this respect perhaps the reforming of the word miracle is not so unjustified. This definition allows a miracle to be a coincidence, but that can only be construed as miraculous from a subjective viewpoint. No experiential evidence can be of service here, instead it is entirely ‘a matter of faith’ for the faithful in God. The atheist is unlikely to hold a God responsible for opportunistic coincidence, rather that is all the event was, an opportunistic coincidence that can be causally explained within science. These miracles are beyond the realm of fact.
Is the title quotation correct? For the theist, a miracle (as a violation of the laws of nature) is a double edged sword. On the one hand to claim acceptance or faith in God’s intervention would be a strong consolidation of your belief, a ‘sign’ from your Lord. Yet for those who do recognise miracles, it may seem more a matter of fact, and unquestionable….. Faith in a miracle establishes unquestionable faith in a God. However, few theists would contend that their faith is based on miracles, nevertheless belief in miracles must be based on faith. Yet simultaneously this will detract from that very same deity, rendering Him morally skewed or falsifying His supposed omnipotence and benevolence. So then how can miracles be ‘ a matter of faith’, if they ultimately devastate this concept? Then the only solution for the religious is a reinterpretation of the term ‘miracle’, forming it into R.F. Holland and Riley’s definition. However, surely this redefinition negates from the entire extraordinariness inherent in the term ‘miraculous’. Only theists will understand an event (defiant of science or otherwise) as miraculous, by definition a miracle involves a component of God. The atheist will always seek another explanation, and in this respect miracles are entirely a matter of faith.
Bibliography
Wade R. Miracles (web article) Probe Ministries 2003 ()
Wiles, Maurice God’s action in the world SCM Press 1986
Jordan, Anne Lockyer, Neil Tate, Edwin Philosophy of Religion for A Level Nelson Thornes 1999
Peterson, Michael et al. Oxford University Press Inc USA 1998
Hume, David of Miracles reprinted in Hume on miracles (Tweyman, Stanley, Thoemmes Press 1996)
Clack, Beverley Clack, Brian.R The philosophy of religion, a critical introduction Polity Press 1998
Thompson, Mel Teach yourself Philosophy of Religion Hodder Arnold 1997
Vardy, Peter The puzzle of God HarperCollins 1999
This example summarises, some difficulties with the concept of miracles. A plane holding 500 passengers crashes, leaving a single survivor. Many would classify such an event miraculous, indeed, to declare this requires a leap of faith, but none-the-less it is deemed a miracle. Instantly this renders the event, the ‘miracle’, a positive occurrence conducted by God. However, instantly this assumption hits hard against the concept of an all loving deity – firstly, why should God rescue just one individual, are we not all of equivalent worth? Surely, using your faith to announce this occurrence a miracle, condemns the very God you allege to have performed it. Furthermore, the survivor may continue to become a mass murderer - reeking more suffering, pain and death in the world, but this persons survival, the believer asserts, was an act of God. This is where the issue of evidence kicks into play. Whereas reasonably extensive research has been carried out on those incidences that report a breach in the laws of nature, the more subtle line, which suggests a colossally lucky coincidence, and can be deemed through faith as a miracle, has a sufficient lack of data. There a
e multiple reasons why this is the case: often it is only a personal acknowledgement, how precisely does one verify these as miracles? In my opinion, miracles such as these are only safe from seriously damaging implications for God, if each one ensures that no further harm is committed by them. Would I be more inclined to accept the intervention of a Deity if the individual who survived went on to find the cure for cancer? Certainly, but then Hume would quickly quip that my human mind seeks for such romanticism.
Bultmann, Rudolph, New Testament and Mythology
Hume, David, ‘Of Miracles’ from ‘Enquiries concerning Human understanding’ in ‘Hume on Miracles’ page 6
Swinburne, Richard, ‘The concept of Miracle’, in Clack & Clack’s, The philosophy of religion, a Critical introduction page 135
Hume, David, ‘Of Miracles’ from ‘Enquiries concerning Human understanding’ in ‘Hume on Miracles’ page 1
Hume, David, ‘Of Miracles’ from ‘Enquiries concerning Human understanding’ in ‘Hume on Miracles’ page 2
Vardy, Peter, ‘The puzzle of God’, page 205
Wade, R. Miracles Copyright © 2003 Probe Ministries
Swinburne, Richard Concept of Miracles in Peterson, Michael et al.
Vardy, Peter, ‘The puzzle of God’ page 117
Hume, David, ‘Of Miracles’ from ‘Enquiries concerning Human understanding’ in ‘Hume on Miracles’ page 7 - 8
Wiles, Maurice God’s action in the world page 34
Tillich, Paul in Clack & Clack’s, The philosophy of religion, a Critical introduction page 145
Hick, John Philosophy of Religion