'Miracles are a matter of faith, not fact', discuss.

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Carol Bhaskar                           ‘Miracles are a matter of faith, not fact’, discuss.

        Rudolh Bultmann once said ‘ It is impossible to use the electric light and the wireless and to avail ourselves to modern medical and surgical discoveries and at the same time to believe in the New Testament world of miracles’.  What is it to speak of ‘miracles’?  how can we define what Bultmann rejects?  The traditional perception of a miracle involves three clauses.  Firstly, a remarkable ‘transgression of a law of nature’, which is ‘by the particular volition of the Deity or by the interposition of some invisible agent’.  This is to borrow Hume’s stipulated definition, but Hume fails state the third clause mentioned.  This is a corollary of the presence of ‘a deity; that this event has some religious consequence.  Swinburne’s offered definition perhaps becomes helpful here; a miracle is ‘an event of an extraordinary kind, brought about by a god, and of religious significance’.  Bultmann’s standpoint is not of the title quotation, but instead moves beyond this, denying the very concept and basis for ‘faith’ in the light of the modern world, he as an absolute sceptic.          

Hume was an eighteenth century, Scottish philosopher and also a sceptic who was content with destroying the conception of God and, as subsidiary to this, attacked the notion of Miracles. The emphasis of his argument lies in the premise that miracles violate natural laws, so predictably his argument abides by his definition of a miracle.   Hume’s central line of reasoning employs a simple premise of logic; that ‘a weaker evidence can never destroy a stronger’.  Few would attempt to disagree with this assertion, as rational beings we will ‘proportion [our] belief to the evidence’.  Indeed, the more compelling the evidence, the more likely it is to capture my belief.  For example, to a person with no knowledge of science the concept of atoms may initially be altogether ridiculous, but if we were to use experiments and explanation to demonstrate the evidence which supports this theory they are likely to be far more convinced. Without evidence atoms are ridiculous, but in proportioning belief to the evidence available, they become a near certainty. Following from this Hume asserts we have past uniform experience which establishes scientific laws. These are based on massive numbers of past observation, thus our pure rationality can easily persuade us that these are infallible. As Vardy phrases it, ‘all our experience tells us that when people walk on water they sink, that the molecular structure of water cannot change into that of wine’. A miracle by definition must contravene scientific laws, the infinite evidence which proves the existence of these laws will always be more potent than that of the event which undermines them and so it is illogical, irrational, absurd even to be convinced of such an occurrence.  Therefore we must return to the original premise – and acknowledge that the evidence supporting scientific constants will always be the overpowering, will always be the ‘stronger’ evidence. This is an ingenious argument, as once you have accepted that very basic principle, that ‘a weaker evidence can never destroy a stronger’, it is awkward to question unless we query the infallibility of ‘natural laws’. It should be considered that what was identified as a law of nature one thousand years ago was quite clearly erroneous, for example the notion that the world was flat. It seems then that to presuppose that something is incontrovertibly a law of nature in the light of the history of science is perhaps an unsafe assumption. However, this deliberation as a challenge is not sufficiently satisfying – scientific research, techniques and equipment have vastly improved since the eighteenth century. We no longer exist under Newton’s assumptions, and we are increasingly more prudent as when to verify a discovery - one off counter-instances do not disprove natural laws which can be repeatedly verified.  Nonetheless, contemporary scientific opinion perceives the laws of nature as more fluid.  Miraculous events are therefore more easily acceptable, but still not necessarily divine.          The theist also has a terse reply to Hume’s assault. Hume’s view is based on the terms of naturalism (belief that there is no power higher than nature and thus no power that could supersede the laws of nature).  Naturalism is a philosophical assumption, and it cannot be proved by what is seen in nature itself. Following from this R.Wade argues ‘to undermine the possibility of miracles, naturalists must prove there is no God to perform them. On the other hand, if [theists] can show that non-natural events did or have occurred, the naturalist will have to find some explanation in his worldview for them.’   The theist who is in reverence of miracles, believes that God created this natural order and scientific regulation, and so can easily override it. Hume, and other objectors have failed to grasp their purpose, which demonstrates Gods power, presence and purpose.  My difficulty with this assertion is the pressure laid unto the naturalist to prove his contention, rather than the theist.  If an occurrence has no apparent rational explanation, to automatically assume that it was performed by God is logically incorrect.  Rather, (and this is Hume’s point) it is more probable that another undiscovered natural cause was to blame, and therefore, if theists are to contend that God has intervened, surely the burden of proof should fall onto them.  This begs the question, ‘can we find evidence that God has in fact intervened in the world’? Inexplicability does not follow through to the conclusion of divine intervention.  So how can we certify that this apparently science defying episode was an act of an enigmatic God?  Only if the event of an unexplainable event does suggest the existence of God (which is extremely debateable per se) then perhaps the burden of proof should fall onto the naturalist, or the sceptic.  In fact, can we even be in a position to label any event permanently unexplainable? If we cannot then Wade’s initial premise of a ‘non-natural event’ collapses.  There is always the scope to discover new information brought into light by scientific investigation which will force us to re-write our current natural laws in relation to any given occurrence. Our lack of predictive power leaves this argument much strength.  We cannot know what we will discover in the future.  Swinburne on the other hand,  suggests that that some natural laws are based on indisputable evidence, and are so strongly confirmed that modification of these to account for the one off counterinstance would be to debase the structure of science.  For example in the cases of ‘water being turned into wine without the assistance of special apparatus or chemical catalysts’, the applicable laws are so well established that to adapt them would be absurd.  Events such as these, Swinburne concludes, could thus be correctly held as enduringly unexplainable events.

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        Hume’s vendetta against the miracle is far from completion; he did not only use this proportioning of our belief to the evidence available to argue against miracles, he also created guidelines to judge the reliability of witnesses’ testimonies.  He claimed that anyone rational would only trust the evidence of someone educated, and of high stature – with nothing to gain, but reputation to lose.  That witnesses to miracles were often ‘barbarous’ or ignorant people.  However, Hume was burdened with an eighteenth century world, in contemporary light, reported miracles are often researched by high profile, efficient scientists.  A cutting example is ...

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