However, there are several claims that attempt to differentiate letting someone die from actually committing murder. First of all, there is the aspect of one’s motive. If someone intentionally murders someone, then their motive is obviously to kill. On the other hand, those who live in absolute affluence do not set out to kill the poor, as they do not actually want these people to die. Singer gives an example of a driver who is driving recklessly and ends up killing someone. The driver did not want to kill anyone, but the effect of his actions is the same as if he did, as a person is killed. The consequence is what Singer is concerned with.
The second difference between murdering someone and letting them die deals with the effort needed to accomplish each. It can be considered easy to kill someone and requires no moral strength. However, it takes moral heroics to go out of one’s way in order to save someone’s life. Singer mentions that “people are more aptly praised for above average generosity than blamed for giving less than they might” (228). One may consider it to be heroic if they donate $1000 to help the poor, but is it truly heroic if that person could easily afford to donate more? Singer would claim that, indeed, it is not, because if one examines the consequences, they must do what results in the best outcome.
The third difference is in regard to the certainty involved in each situation. If a person murders another, then they are fully aware of the definite outcome. Conversely, if someone spends money to acquire a luxury, that person is unaware of the direct consequences. While people know that their excess money could help those living in poverty, they are not certain of the particular effect. The fourth argument that Singer addresses is very similar. By killing someone, the person knows that the individual is dead. By not aiding the poor, one is not aware of any identifiable individuals who are affected by the action. For this argument, Singer uses an example of a person who sells tins which are known to cause cancer. Just because the person cannot point out specifically who will die or become affected because of the tins, he cannot just say that it is not his fault. The person is still guilty because of the result of his action.
The last difference that Singer recognizes between killing and letting someone die deals with one’s responsibility. The wealthy people do not cause the poor to live in absolute poverty, so how can they be responsible for poverty? Singer points out that utilitarianism places us responsible for our own actions. He notes, “If a consequence of my spending money on a luxury item is that someone dies, I am responsible for that death. It is true that the person would have died even if I had never existed…the fact is that I do exist” (226). No one is responsible for the fact that someone is born in a life of poverty. However, people who are able to aid those in poverty do exist, and therefore, should do so.
In conclusion, what is important to Singer is the fact that the consequences are the same in all of these situations. He is adamant that the effect of one’s actions or lack thereof, is what matters as opposed to the action itself. Although the intention my not be to kill the poor, the result is that death will follow either way, actively or passively. Intentions matter only to a point because it is ultimately the consequence that is what judges one’s morality, according to Singer. Therefore, intentionally killing someone or letting someone die of starvation while living a life of luxury involve the same guilt. Singer has similar beliefs of his fellow utilitarians, Mill and Bentham, as their main concern in morality is the consequence of the action. This idea is different from the viewpoint of Kant, who is concerned with the intentions of the person when judging morality. However, Singer does share a similar notion of Kant’s with his idea that it is a moral duty of the absolute affluence to donate to the absolute poverty. The idea of one’s duty is fundamental to Kant’s beliefs, as it is universally what people should do. Lastly, similar to Mill and Bentham, Singer tries to decrease the pain of the poor and increase their pleasures. Unfortunately, the outcome is that the affluent must always be negatively affected in order for the problem to be fixed.
Singer feels that if it is in one’s power to prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing something of comparable moral significance, one ought to do it. Since absolute poverty is bad and due to the fact that there is some absolute poverty that can be prevented without sacrificing something of comparable moral significance, some absolute poverty ought to be prevented. Singer offers the example that if he is on his way to give a lecture and comes across a child who is drowning; he should take the time to save the child if it is in his power to do so. There are consequences of stopping to save the child, for instance he will be late to his lecture and his clothes may get dirty; but they are not of comparable moral significance to saving the life of a child. Singer says, “We have an obligation to help those in absolute poverty that is no less strong than our obligation to rescue a drowning child from a pond. Not to help would be wrong, whether or not it is intrinsically equivalent to killing” (230). Similarly, parents are, for the most part, in charge of their own families: they are expected to feed their own children before others. However, this does not mean to forget about those who live in absolute poverty and are unable to care for their own children. Singer is not asking that people ignore the needs of their own families to help others. He reassures that, “to allow one’s own kin to sink into absolute poverty would be to sacrifice something of comparable significance” (233). As he stated before, one should help a situation only if it does not compromise something of comparable moral significance.
A common criticism of Singer’s argument is that people feel that taking care of their own kind, or country, is the first priority before attempting to worry about others’ problems. Singer agrees with this to a certain extent: “the question is not what we usually do, but what we ought to do, and it is difficult to see any sound moral justification for the view that distance, or community membership, makes a crucial difference to our obligations” (232). Therefore, the location or culture does not matter to Singer when discussing priorities. If absolute poverty exists, it should be prevented no matter what.
Another criticism of Singer’s idea brings up the issue of property rights. Robert Nozick poses an individualistic theory of rights: “provided one has acquired one’s property without the use of unjust means, one may be entitled to enormous wealth while others starve” (234). Singer maintains that even though one has the right to do what they please with their property, it can still be argued that you can do something else with it. He writes, “A theory of property rights can insist on our right to retain wealth without pronouncing on whether the rich ought to give to the poor” (234). People do have a right to their property, but Singer points out that people also have the right to survive.
A third criticism deals with the consideration of population growth. If one helps those living in poverty, the person could potentially be creating worse problems in the long run. The theory expresses that as they receive better health care and food, the poor would grow in number, the death rate would decrease, and the birth rate would remain the same. The increased number of poor people would continue to take more and more money from the wealthy. This would create a larger suffering population. This is compared to a situation where people in lifeboats are attempting to rescue those who are drowning, but by overcrowding the boats they all drown. Singer’s response is that as standards of living rise, “couples begin to realize that to have the same number of children surviving to maturity as in the past, they do not need to give birth to as many children as their parents did” (239). A reason why the poor have high fertility rates is because they need their children to provide economic support for their family. If more children are surviving, then fewer children need to be born. Singer feels that by improving the lives of the poor, both in economics and education, it would also cause the emancipation of women.
The last criticism is that if people focused on helping the poor, it would involve giving up things that are pleasurable. Susan Wolf lists activities that would not be done anymore if this kind of moral stance was taken, such as, “opera, gourmet cooking, elegant clothes, and professional sport” (244). In response, Singer gives an example of a doctor who has 100 victims of a train crash. If the doctor treats half of them and then leaves to go to an opera, “the life-or-death needs of others must take priority” before his own luxurious desires.
For the most part, I agree with Singer that we ought to prevent some absolute poverty. To a certain extent, people living in absolute affluence have an obligation to help those who are less fortunate. It is not fair that people are struggling to survive each day while others can experience a carefree life of luxury. On the other hand, I do not believe it is reasonable to claim that those living affluent lives have a duty to sacrifice every luxury they have or can attain. Additionally, I do not necessarily believe that people who are born in advanced nations are guilty, and as a result, have a duty to donate much of their income to poor and starving people in underdeveloped nations. The poverty and hunger in those nations are not the fault of people in successful nations; it is mostly the result of bad economic policies that the leadership has adopted. In the past, some poor nations have taken on rational economic policies and political regimes and have become advanced. It also seems to me that if money is transferred to poor nations from rich ones, it can actually hurt the poor nation also. If nations in absolute poverty can rely on the support of the nations of absolute affluence, then they have no incentive to reform: there is no enticement to adopt sensible policies that can lead to their progress. In this case, the hardworking people of affluent nations will earn less disposable income, while their money goes to “benefit programs” where the person does not even see the outcome. However, I conclude that I agree with Singer’s viewpoint that those living in absolute affluence ought to help those living in absolute poverty.
I would like to offer a few statistics that put world poverty into a better perspective. About 35,000 children die of hunger each day in our world. Additionally, one out of every five people in the world has an ample supply of water each day. The United States accounts for five percent of the world’s population, however, consumes two-thirds of the world’s natural resources. There are so many things in life that we take for granted, for example, using a telephone. Four-fifths of the world’s population has never made a phone call. The average family in the United States spends almost one-third of its income on luxuries (Church 4). So much of our income is spent on things that are not necessary to our lives and health. However, if the money was donated to an organization, it could mean the difference between survivals.
In his work, Practical Ethics, Singer explores whether it is moral to live without contributing money to help people who are dying from hunger, malnourishment, and disease. He recognizes that there are many people who can afford to donate to organizations, but the problem is that they do not do so. He states, “If allowing someone to die is not intrinsically different from killing someone, it would seem that we are all murderers” (222). Singer responded to the multiple claims of the difference between killing and letting someone die, and in conclusion, the consequences are the same: people die whether one intentionally kills someone or passively lets them die. Singer’s stance is that the problem is how the wealth is distributed in the world. There is no reason why some people should lead such luxurious lives, while worrying about nonessential lavishness, as opposed to one’s survival like those in absolute poverty do. As people who live in a country of absolute affluence, we are all in the situation where we can choose between sacrificing our luxuries to save a child versus living in excess and allowing the poor to die. What if everything that we take for granted was removed from our lives? We would then live day to day as a means to survive, and only then would we truly understand the lives of those in absolute poverty.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Denny, Father Jack. “The Church in Action.” Received in Theology class on April 1, 2004.
Singer, Peter. Practical Ethics. 2nd Edition. Cambridge University Press, 1993.
