registered as a medical practitioner2 and so this act leaves the establishment of death
entirely at the hands of doctors, as we see in the case Clarke v Hurst as the determination
of whether the patient was in an irreversible vegetative state or not could only be
determined by them.
In Clarke v Hurst the applicant’s husband (‘the patient’) had suffered a cardiac arrest in
1988 and had since then been in a persistent and irreversible vegetative state and was fed
artificially by means of a naso-gastric tube. The applicant applied to be appointed as
curatrix personae in respect of the patient, with powers in that capacity to authorize the
discontinuance of any treatment to which the patient was subjected specifically the
discontinuance of any naso-gastric or other non-natural feeding regime, and to act in this
manner not withstanding that the implementation of such a decision might hasten the
patients death. The patient a medical doctor was a life member of the SA voluntary
Euthanasia society and had signed a document headed ‘A Living Will’ directed to his
family and physician in which he requested that in the event of there being no reasonable
expectation of his recovery from extreme physical or mental disability he be allowed to
die and not kept alive by artificial means.
The court held that it was entitled, despite the opposition of the Attorney-General, to
exercise its discretion in an appropriate case in favour of declaring whether the adoption
by an applicant of a certain course of conduct would constitute a crime and that the
instant case was a proper one for the exercise of the courts discretion. The applicant, who
was facing an agonizing decision, was entitled to have the legal position dispassionately
and objectively determined by the court. Judged by the boni mores of society, it would be
reasonable to discontinue such artificial feeding and that the decision of that issue
depended on the quality of the life which remained to the patient.The patient’s brain had
permanently lost the capacity to induce a physical and mental existence at a level which
qualified as human life and that in these circumstances, judged by society’s legal
convictions, the feeding of the patient did not serve the purpose of supporting human life
as it is commonly known. The court held that the applicant appointed as curatix would act
reasonably and would be justified in authorizing the discontinuing of the artificial feeding
of the patient and would therefore not be acting wrongfully if she were to do so and
would be doing it in the best interests of the patient. Although the court approached the
interests of the patient with a strong predilection in favour of the preservation of life, it
however did not extend as far as requiring that life should be maintained at all costs
irrespective of its quality.
Under the present law, voluntary euthanasia would except in certain narrow
circumstances, be regarded as suicide in the patient who consents and murder in the
doctor who administers, even on a linient view most lawyers would say that it could not
be less than manslaughter in the doctor, the punishment for which, according to the
jurisdiction and the degree of manslaughter, can be anything up to imprisonment for life.
In S v Williams3 which influenced the courts decision in Clarke v Hurst the accused shot
the deceased in the neck with the result that his jugular vein and carotid artery were
severely damaged. Unconscious after loosing a lot of blood, patient was connected to a
respirator. After one day it was found that according to medical evidence the left side of
the brain was dead. He was kept ‘alive’ by artificial respiration for forty-eight hours after
which the respirator was disconnected on the instruction of the neurosurgeon, after
consultation with two other neurosurgeons. Ten minutes later no heartbeat could be
found. The question was whether the accused had in fact caused the death of the
deceased. The court found that death set in with the death of the brain stem and that it
was the accused who caused the death and not the doctor and that the doctor’s actions
were reasonable.
Many legal commentators have argued that brainstem death should b accepted and
recognized as a legal criterion of death4. The Commission however decided that it was
unnecessary for present purposes to choose or to justify one or the other of test to prove a
man’s death. It is enough to accept that death occurs irreversible cessation of spontaneous
respiratory and circulatory functions or with irreversible brainstem-death. Whether one or
the other has occurred is a question of fact and depends on clinical proof.
The reason why I dwell upon the proof of death or when a person is said to be dead is
because certainty of death is the only thing that constitutes or gives any reason for a
person to commit euthanasia. If the chances of survival of a human are in an irreversible
vegetative state as in Clarke v Hurst a person making such a decision has got very few
choices as to whether to go through with euthanasia. Establishing a person’s death also
differentiates euthanasia from actual murder and in cases of inheritance, it distinguishes
whether one is entitled to inherit or not as it is part of our common law that “The bloody
hand will not inherit.” Euthanasia is a situation that very few people would like to make a
decision on, especially upon a loved one but before being done must in my opinion be
carefully justified as in Clarke v Hurst because it is law that “Every one has the right to
life”5 and so the action of euthanasia must not be in-violation of this right. In Clarke v
Hurst the court justifies euthanasia against this right in that particular case with
determining the quality of the patients life, which in my opinion was a fair thing to do.
The fact that the patient was a member of SA Voluntary Euthanasia Society and had a
‘Living Will’ then has an amount of influence to the courts decision considering his
quality of life but I think as the court highlighted in its judgement that normally this
would not have been of any influence as the court would have been aiding the ends of
suicide which most find morally wrong and at on behalf of the person actually carrying
out the ‘euthanasia’ would be in reality an act of murder and this is why it is essential to
establish when a person is actually dead.
Considering all the facts of the argument above as well as the precedent set by the courts
in the above cases euthanasia can be used as legal defence in South African criminal law
but must be accordingly justified by determination of death so as to be distinguished from
murder. It can be done also if it is in best interests of a patient and should be treated with
a strict appriciation of life as it is clearly depicted in the judgement of the court in Clarke
v Hurst.
Name : Ndabezulu .T. Khumalo
Student Number : 0514425Y
Module : Introduction to South African law (laws 149)
Subject : Euthanasia
Due Date : 13/04/05
Bibliography
- Euthanasia and the artificial preservation of life, by South African law Commission
- Government Gazette of the Republic of South Africa
- Introduction to South African Law course pack
4.The Sanctity of life and the criminal law, by Glanville Williams
1 Clarke v Hurst No 1992 (4) SA 630 (D)
2 Section 3 (2) of the Act of Inter Alia
3 S v Williams 1986 4 SA 1188 (A)
4 Van Oosten status report 1024: The recognition and acceptance of brainstem death as a legal criterion for death would:
- remove brainstem dead patients from the realm of euthanasia and thus, narrow the scope of the euthanasia problem in respect of terminal patients to instances of patients in a conscious state who are connected to life-supporting medication and
- accord with medical practice in instances of
(i) the transplanting of vital organs and
(ii) the replacing of brainstem dead patients with patients with a prospect of recovery on respirators or ventilators in intensive care units where the demand for respirators or ventilators is greater than the supply.
5 Government Gazette-Chapter 2-Bill of Rights-Life-Section 11