The key, according to Weber, was a strict version of the Protestant faith called Calvinism where, Weber believed, the origins of capitalism lay. The result of hard work and no pleasure was that Calvinists became very well off and amassed considerable amounts of wealth. Yet they had nothing to do with this money. They tended to be merchants and so were not interested in land, and they certainly did not want grandiose houses, jewels or clothes, so their wealth lay idle. What inventors and would-be manufacturers and industrialists needed most to develop their inventions and industries was capital fro investment. The Puritans had this and were inclined to lend their money for interest. They were prepared to do so because the new industries were not frivolous but would lead people to work hard. Industry flourished because of this injection of capital and so the Industrial Revolution began. Other world religions, such as Catholicism in Europe or Buddhism in Asia, did not create the correct conditions for entrepreneurial capitalism, and so industrialisation did not occur. Catholicism, for example, stresses that people can commit the worst crimes and lead the most debauched lives and still enter heaven as long as there is genuine remorse before death. The religion stresses the forgiving, loving nature of God and that there is no certainty of anyone being saved or condemned.
Weber has been criticised by Samuelson, who points out that Britain was not the only country in which Calvinism developed, so why did Calvinism lead to industrialisation in Britain? Secondly, Weber’s thesis ignores the enormous amounts of wealth brought to Britain by colonialism, piracy and international trade. This too was available to investors; although Spain and Portugal also had this wealth and did not develop industry in the same way, it could be argued in defence of Weber. Robinson has criticised Weber’s portrayal of the Hindu religion, which in fact did promote trade, a market economy, money and the division of labour. Robinson suggests that it was not religion alone that initiated or prevented the development of industrialisation, but other factors, such as war and colonialism.
The essential feature of Durkheim’s analysis of religion is its function to promote cohesion and stability. In The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Durkheim argues that religion divides objects into the sacred and the profane. The sacred objects are set apart from the normal world and treated with special respect. Durkheim argues that these sacred objects represent the society itself. Worshipping the totem, as the aborigines do, means worshipping society. Religion, therefore, really consists of reverence for the central values of any society. Every time a religious ceremony takes place, the group affirms its belief in the central values. Religion clearly involves a spiritual dimension, and the individual in ceremonies feels him/herself in contact with supernatural forces. In reality, Durkheim argues, this is the expression of the power of the collectivity of society over the individual. Religion also marks the rites of passage of any society. Key status changes into adulthood; marriage, death, etc are all marked by religious ceremonies, which publicly state the individual’s new status. Finally, Durkheim stresses that religion directs the ways in which individuals see the world and actually think about it, providing explanations for the nature of the physical world.
Durkheim’s analysis is primarily on the cohesion functions of religion, and he sees religion as a conservative force. Therefore there is little awareness of religion as an agency that brings about change. Durkheim does not see religion as having a dynamic, innovating role, but rather one that reflects social values. When it comes to social change, therefore, he accepts that religion will change, indeed he foresaw its decline, but as a response to wider social changes. Crucially, Durkheim differs from Marx in that he sees religion as a beneficial force, whereas for Marx, religion is a means of oppression. Following on from Durkheim, Parsons examines the positive aspects of religion for society. He suggests that the functions of religious beliefs provide the guidelines for action and that life consists of uncertainties and anxieties concerning unforeseen events. Religion helps to explain these random events, and provide an explanation, it gives meaning to life, and religion also creates and reinforces values to help provide harmony in society. The functionalist perspective emphasizes the positive contributions of religion to society and tends to ignore its more dysfunctional aspects. With its preoccupation with harmony, integration and solidarity, functionalism neglects the many instances where religion can be seen as a divisive and disruptive force. It bypasses the frequent examples of internal divisions within a community over questions of religious dogma and worship, divisions that can lead to open conflict. It gives little consideration to hostility between different religious groups within the same society, such as Catholics and Protestant in Northern Ireland of Hindus and Muslims in India. In such cases religion can be seen as a direct threat to social order. The Marxist perspective on religion provides an interesting contrast to functionalist views.
Unlike Durkheim, the American sociologists Stark and Bainbridge see religion as meeting the needs of individuals rather than those of society as a whole. Unlike Marx, they see religion as meeting universal human needs rather than those that stem from class inequality and exploitation. Furthermore they reject the view, shared by the classic sociologists of religion that the development of industrial capitalist societies would, one way or another, ultimately undermine religion. Stark and Bainbridge claim that religion helps to meet universal human needs. As such, changes in society cannot diminish its appeal. They start with the basic premise that people do what they believe will be good for them. This provides quite a straightforward basis for human decision-making but individuals may still face problems.
Stark and Bainbridge recognise that religion might not actually provide people with eternal life, but what it does offer is a ‘compensator’. A compensator is the belief that a reward will be obtained in the distant future or in some other context that cannot be verified. They are a type of IOU – if individuals act in particular way they will eventually be rewarded. In the absence of immediate rewards people are liable to turn to compensators. Some political activists would like society to be transformed. If there is little evidence that the transformation is likely, they may develop the belief in a future revolution as a compensator. Similarly a compensator is exchanged for a reward when a parent persuades a child that working hard now will eventually lead to future fame and riches. Some compensators are quite specific, for example the promise of a cured wart; others are more general. The promise of eternal life is an example of a general compensator. Stark and Bainbridge have provided the most recent comprehensive attempt to develop a sociological perspective on religion. Their work has provided a number of insights into religious organisations and religious change. However, Roy Wallis and Steve Bruce argue that the available evidence contradicts their theory. New religious movements have not gained sufficient recruits to replace those lost from more established religions. Wallis and Bruce also criticize Stark and Bainbridge for ignoring social and cultural influences on the questions that individuals ask and the rewards they seek. It is by no means inevitable that people seek the kinds of reward for which religion offers compensators. Society, culture and socialization might create the need for religion rather than universal human desires. By reducing their explanation of religion to supposedly universal needs Stark and Bainbridge neglect the social factors that help to create and sustain religion.
The work of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann is an important development in the sociology of religion. They have put forward a phenomenological view of religion: members of society subjectively interpreting and giving meaning to the physical and social world produce religion. They see the sociology of religion as part of a larger field – the sociology of knowledge – that is concerned with the meanings, and definitions of reality held by members of a society. Every society has its own body of knowledge: for example, traditional Eskimo society has a shared knowledge of life and the world that differs from other societies. This universe of meaning, as Berger and Luckmann term it, is socially derived; it is a product of society and in turn feeds back and helps produce society. Religion provides ultimate answers that cannot be questioned by those who believe. For instance, people observe that the sun rises every morning and, in some societies, this is confirmed and explained by the idea that the sun is controlled by supernatural powers. Religion also legitimates social institutions by locating them within a sacred and cosmic frame of reference. In this sense law is located in religion when a legal offence becomes a sin against God; authority is located in religion when kings speak for gods or become gods as in the case of the Pharaohs of ancient Egypt. In other words religion legitimates, and so supports, social institutions.
Each universe of meaning is grounded in a social base. This social base is called its plausibility structure. If his plausibility structure is destroyed, so is the universe of meaning. Neither can exist without the other. When the Spaniards destroyed the Inca Empire, the social base of Inca religion was shattered. Without its plausibility structure, Inca religion died. Berger and Luckmann argued that all certainty is basically uncertain; it has a very precarious foundation. Things are real because people believe they are real. Life is meaningful because of the meaning people give to it. Things make sense because they are defined in terms of common sense. However, this reality, these meanings, this sense are arbitrary. There is no universal standard or yardstick against which they can be measured and shown to be true. The universe of meaning is a social construction of reality. One society’s reality is another’s pretence; things are defined as meaningful in one society are meaningless in another; common sense in one society is nonsense in another. Because of the arbitrary nature of the universe of meaning, it is precarious, insecure and easily shattered. It therefore requires constant legitimation. Berger and Luckmann argue that religion is probably the most effective mechanism for the legitimation of universes of meaning. Unlike other sources of legitimation, only religion links meaning with ultimate reality. However, Berger and Luckmann’s views on religion are open to a number of criticisms. Rather like functionalists, they tend to assume that religion unites society and they neglect examples of societies where religion is divisive or causes conflict. Furthermore, they tend to think that religious beliefs are widely held, and they fail to account for the continued existence of societies where many members are indifferent to religion.
Religion can be a source of change. Despite the examples that can be used to support the functionalist and Marxist view that religion promotes stability, other examples contradict their claims. There are a number of cases where religion has undermined stability or promoted change, such as in Northern Ireland where Roman Catholicism has long been associated with Irish Republicanism, or in South Africa Archbishop Tutu was a prominent opponent of apartheid. Examples such as these lead to the conclusion that far from encouraging people to accept their place, religion can spearhead resistance and revolution. In many cases when religion has been a force for change in society, the society that results may be strongly influenced by that religion. Despite the considerable effort devoted to discussing Weber’s theory by historians and socialists alike, no argument has been reached about its accuracy. Nevertheless, whatever the merits of this particular study, I believe that Weber does successfully highlight the theoretical point that ideas, in this case religious ideas, can conceivably lead to economic change.
