(Burch & Moran 1985 p5-6)
In the Labour Party, the most striking change has been the decline of manual workers; indeed, the party has now practically ceased to be working class, with a significant growth in the proportion of MPs drawn from a professional occupation. An expanding educated contingent has accompanied this trend, with a marked rise in university educated MPs and those drawn from Oxbridge and a fall in MPs who only had an elementary and/or secondary education.
“The proportion of manual workers on the Labour benches fell steadily from 72 per cent between the wars to 36 per cent in the 1950s and fell further to 29 per cent in the 1980s and to a mere 13 per cent by 1997. Over the same period the proportion of graduates rose from 17 per cent between the wars to 66 per cent today. In 1997 four times as many Labour MPs were school teachers as miners”
(Budge et al 2001 p374)
The Parliamentary Labour Party has thus become increasingly white collar, university educated and more solidly middle class.
Many have argued that the above developments depict a convergence in the social composition of the two parties, and indeed, there is much evidence to support this view (Moran 1989 p157). In particular, it is true to say that the educational experiences of the two parties MPs have become increasingly alike.
“The Parliamentary Conservative and Labour parties are unrepresentative of both their members and voters. The MPs of both parties at the end of the 1990s were overwhelmingly middle-class, university educated and male. MPs of both parties in fact resembled each other much more than they did their party supporters”
(Budge et al 2001 p374)
Another factor consolidating education as a crucial channel of entry, has been the rise of the professional ‘career politician’. (King in Burch & Moran 1985 p5) This type of candidate moves via education, through local government, eventually living off a parliamentary salary and politically created work such as journalism, business consultancy and lobbying. In the case of Labour, the party itself was previously a way of achieving social mobility out of the working class when entering Parliament. Today, many MPs who join the party with working class origins also come via secondary school and university. Although this shows that the meritocratic system is functioning to a certain extent, it also has the implication that it is no longer possible just to be working class in order to become a representative in the political elite. It seems prospective members are now first required to assimilate middle class characteristics before pursuing a career in politics. Furthermore, the common belief that people have attained their position through merit has to a certain extent, legitimised the closure that evidently still exists within the Conservative Party. Of the Conservative MPs elected in 1997, 66 per cent attended public schools and 51 per cent attended Oxbridge, this does not represent a picture of a party dominated by meritocrats emerging from humble origins.
This highlights the fundamental differences remaining between the two parties, and these must be acknowledged before registering completely with this idea of a convergence. To begin with, the category of ‘middle class’ has been used by researchers to include all business, administration and professional positions, therefore incorporating both the upper class and the salaried middle classes in one definition (Scott 1986 p4). In terms of both educational experiences and occupational background, the middle class Labour MP is still quite different to its Conservative counterpart. He or she is more likely to attend a provincial university than Oxbridge, and descend from a less prestigious public sector profession such as teaching, than a higher status profession such as law or accountancy. In this respect, the two major parties are creating a two-tier middle class Parliament.
“The two Parliamentary parties do not so much comprise two social classes as two strata within the middle classes. Most Labour MPs come from the less privileged and moneyed middle classes: compared with their Conservative counterparts they are more likely to be first rather than second generation middle-class, educated at state rather than private schools, at the ‘new’ rather than ‘old’ universities (i.e., at the former polytechnics), at ‘red brick’ universities rather than Oxbridge and to have worked in the public sector and the new professions rather than the private sector and the traditional professions.”
(Budge et al 2001 p375)
Although the Conservatives have lost most of their aristocratic contingent, much of the party’s traditional make-up has remained relatively stable compared to the transitions of the Labour Party. However, this stability has also led to females remaining in a small minority, with women only constituting 8 per cent of current Conservative MPs, compared to 24 per cent of the Labour Party.. Perhaps this is the primary difference between the parties in modern times. Minority ethnic groups – Indo-Pakistani and Afro-Caribbean – remain substantially underrepresented in each party, composing just over one per cent of the membership of the House of Commons (Budge et al 2001 p375).
Recruiting the Judicial Elite
Information concerning the composition of the judicial elite is less detailed than that of politics, but significant features can be ascertained. Over the years, a number of studies regarding the social origins of the senior judiciary have highlighted the overwhelming dominance of the upper and upper-middle classes. This has led to its labelling as the most exclusive of all elite groups in Britain (Stanworth 1984 p253).
“Brock’s study shows that, whereas 67 per cent of High Court Judges sitting between 1820 and 1875 were of ‘upper’ or ‘upper-middle’ class backgrounds, the figure rose to 76.8 per cent for the period 1951-68. Since the relevant information was unavailable for 14 per cent of the total, this leaves only 9 per cent who originated from what were designated as of ‘lower-middle class’ (8 per cent) and working class (1 per cent) origin. These figures indicate a consistent and exclusive pattern of recruitment.”
(Stanworth 1984 p253)
Unsurprisingly, educational background is similarly privileged in nature, with public schools and Oxbridge remaining a persistent, if not increasing feature of the judicial elite’s experience.
“In 1975 Hugo Young analysed the educational background of 31 appointees to the High Court during the previous five years. He found that 68 per cent went to public schools and 74 per cent to Oxford or Cambridge…Of the 17 High Court judges appointed between 1 January 1980 and 1 May 1982, 76 per cent attended public schools and 88 per cent Oxford or Cambridge. In 1986, 29 out of 34 Law Lords and Lord Justices of Appeal had attended public schools and Oxford or Cambridge Universities.”
(Griffith 1991 p33)
Much of this elitism may stem from the way in which members of the senior judiciary are appointed. In order to be selected for a place on the ‘Bench’, one is normally required to be a highly experienced barrister and it is difficult for anyone without a private income to survive the first years of practice.
“To become a successful barrister…it is necessary to have financial support and so the background has to be that of the reasonably well-to-do family which, as a matter of course, sends its sons or daughters to public schools and then to Oxford or Cambridge.”
(Griffith 1991 p33)
However, the previously documented expansion in the availability of education and the increase in publicly financed legal aid, have meant that some people with little private income have been able to make a living at the bar (Griffith 1991 p35). However, no decline in the dominance of exclusive education seems apparent from the figures given above, and the judicial elite seems unaffected by the same changes that have altered the social composition of the political elite. Women and ethnic minorities have made little (if any) impact on the upper reaches of the judiciary. Recent figures show that 95 per cent of senior judges are men and 100 per cent are white (Budge et al 2001 p491).
Comparing Political and Judicial Elite Recruitment
One possible explanation for the evident contrasts in the composition of these two groups could be the typical age of their members when entering the elite. Due to the system of promotion in the senior judiciary, the average age of all those in office is around sixty, higher still in the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, around sixty-five and sixty-eight respectively (Griffith 1991 p33). The age of potential candidates for political office is much less restrictive, with a considerable number now becoming Members of Parliament in early middle age. This means that when assessing the impact of educational reform, it is not really a level playing field, as some members of these two groups are practically a generation apart. We must bear this time-delay in mind when looking for the consequences of social changes already felt in Parliament. Within the higher ranks of the senior judiciary, the effect of such changes may only just be breaking through. Nevertheless, even the political elite is still only a feeble reflection of society as a whole, remaining predominantly white, male and middle class.
For those who do not hold a selection of the above characteristics, the essential factor for a chance of gaining entry into the elite remains to be their educational experience. Oxbridge in particular appears to be an important avenue for the small number of ‘lower’ class individuals who have obtained top positions in these elites (Stanworth 1984 p262). Those already born to privilege and attended the top schools have weathered well under meritocratic selection and if anything it has worked to their advantage.
“The most outstanding schools have great advantages in meritocratic competition. Their pupils already come to them from privileged backgrounds. The schools strengthen these advantages with, literally, the best teachers that money can buy, an unrivalled acquaintance with the great universities, and a social atmosphere designed to promote qualities of confidence and leadership. In the last twenty years there has occurred in the best public schools a conscious adaptation to a more meritocratic world with increasing attention to academic standards.”
(Moran 1989 p175)
In summary, elite recruitment within politics and the judiciary has reflected differentially the principle of meritocracy. The upper middle class, typically educated at the top private schools and Oxbridge, dominate the senior judiciary. The upper ranks of politics are slightly more open, with a decline in Conservative recruitment from those who attended public schools, especially the most exclusive such as Eton. To accompany this trend, there are numerous candidates of lower middle class and some with working class origins within the Labour Party.
The Importance of Recruitment Patterns?
Despite the revelations outlined above, the general study of elite social origins, education and career patterns has been severely criticised in recent years. One such criticism concerns the narrow range of variables investigated within social background studies, usually dictated by what is available in standard directories and reference books rather than by any reasoned criteria of relevance (Burch & Moran 1985 p3). However, with the limited amount of information available on this subject matter, I feel it is better to cautiously apply the information we do have access to rather than use non at all.
Another criticism concerns the importance placed upon elites disproportionately drawn from certain classes or other stratum in society. If the political elite is converging someway towards a dominance of middle class derived representatives, does this necessarily mean that these candidates are acting purely in the interests of the middle classes? In addition, if the members of the senior judiciary are overwhelming drawn from the upper echelons of the class system, are they disposed towards upholding the values associated with this level of the social structure? It is the purpose of the following section to assess the validity of a correlation between social background, elite ideology and actual behaviour.
Structure: Elite Integration and Ideologies
In order to assess the values held by senior members of the elites in question, I first wish to draw attention to a more general elite culture that prevailed in Britain at the beginning of the twentieth-century.
The ‘Establishment’ and its Ethos
A hundred years ago, leading figures within politics, the judiciary and other significant institutions such as business and the Civil Service, formed a community largely congregated in central London, which overlapped considerably with upper class society (Moran 1989 p177). This small group of elites was often described in later years as the ‘Establishment’ (Budge et al 2001 p22). Many regarded those in elite positions as favouring the most privileged and wealthy, (including themselves) and mainly representing the interests of commerce, finance and those situated in the south east of England, with whom they could more easily relate. As a consequence, those dependent on manufacturing and the extractive industries, such as manual workers and those based in British peripheries, were not adequately represented within Britains major institutions and therefore at a formidable disadvantage.
“Respectable society dominated by landed wealth was far more open to the newly rich based in commerce and finance than those associated with manufacturing. City and estate were linked by their Anglicanism, their public school and Oxbridge education’s, and Tory politics. Industry in contrast, was often non-conformist, frequently provincial, and inclined towards the Liberals. Gentility was compatible with the financial and mercantile pursuits but not with manufacturing.”
(Rubinstein in Stanworth 1984 p275)
This community possessed a distinctive ethos based on the values and attitudes of landed wealth and agrarian capitalists who favoured among other things the maintenance of order and the status quo. This ethos developed along with the public school system in which it was taught and its influence still exists in many major institutions today.
“The institutional variations of this outlook…have a common stress. Firm leadership softened by a proper sense of service (paternalism), loyalty, conformity and initiative conditioned by self-restraint were highly valued. In all spheres technical expertise was regarded as inferior to the general all-round skills of the amateur…Such men expected the exercise of power to be governed by internalised norms rather than by explicit rules – by a gentlemanly consensus. This mirrored the consensual view of society, politics and the economy, and produced between the holders of power…a mutual comprehension, a sense of homogeneity and integration.”
(Stanworth 1984 p276)
This culture clearly manifested itself in many of the common assumptions shared by the political elite. For example, confidentiality was stressed as essential to good government and expressed in doctrines like ‘collective ministerial responsibility’. This obliged all ministers to defend government policy and conceal from the public the debates and divisions occurring inside government.
“The Political culture of the elite, therefore, allowed wide debate about the substance of policy but imposed great procedural restraints: government had to be carried on confidentially; the supremacy of Parliament could not be challenged; political debate had to b conducted in a ceremonial and ritualistic way governed by a ‘gentlemanly’ code.”
(Moran 1989 p179)
Elite Interconnections
Along with the similarly exclusive education of its members, the Establishment’s sense of community and the maintenance of its values were reinforced in various ways. A number of private clubs centred mainly in London facilitated direct ties of association, friendship and kinship. Furthermore, it was very common for individuals to hold more than one kind of elite position; for instance, it was perfectly possible to combine a successful career at the top of business and at the top of politics. This trend continued well into the twentieth-century; even in the 1970s approximately two-thirds of Conservative MPs were directors or equivalent in some kind of business enterprise (Roth in Stanworth 1984 p267). Another interconnection particularly relevant to this paper were the number of High Court judges whom formerly sat as MPs.
“H.J. Laski recorded that between 1832 and 1906, out of 139 judges appointed 80 were Members of the House of Commons at the time of their nomination and 11 others had been candidates for Parliament: that of the 80, 63 were appointed by their own party while in office; and 33 of them had been either Attorney-General or Solicitor General”
(Griffith 1991 p25)
Although this channel of entry is much less common than was once the case, this linkage was especially controversial as the appointment of judges lies solely in the hands of politicians. The Prime Minister appoints High Court and circuit judges and magistrates after consultation with the Lord Chancellor. Almost all High Court judges are appointed from the ranks of QCs (Queen’s Counsel), who are senior barristers (the Lord Chancellor decides which barristers are to become QCs). By 1990, Margaret Thatcher had appointed all the lord justices of appeal and all but one of the law lords when she was Prime Minister (Budge et al 2001 p490). However, it is now unlikely to base the appointment of senior judges on their political allegiance to the controlling party of the day.
“Since Lord Haldane was Lord Chancellor (1912 –15) appointments are believed to have been based on legal and professional qualities rather than political affiliation, as was the case in earlier years. Today being known as the supporter of a political party seems to be neither a qualification nor a disqualification for appointment.”
(Griffith in Budge et al 2001 p491)
Declining Integration
This shift in relations between the judicial and political elite is part of an overall decline in the connections of different elites over the latter part of the twentieth-century. A decrease in private club membership points to reduced social integration both within and between various elite groups.
“Of those High Court judges in office between 1900 and 1909, no less than 83 per cent were members of the Atheneum. However, of the 1960 to 1969 cohort, only 19 per cent enjoyed its hallowed portals. This, and other, data suggests a less specifically oriented club membership on the part of elites than in the past”
(Stanworth 1984 p269)
Another factor reducing cohesion and bringing change to the traditional organisation of elites has been the growth of specialisation, occurring as a result of the increased size of organisations in general. Consequently, the demands made on those at the top of big institutions – demands of time, skill and commitment – have increased (Moran 1989 p174). This is surely quite the opposite of the ‘all-round skills of the amateur’ prescribed as an ideal within the Establishment’s ethos.
“In the 1980s elites specialise increasingly in their own institutions and deal with each other in increasingly formal ways.”
(Moran 1989 p174)
A useful example of a more specialised elite member is the ‘career politician’ mentioned earlier in this paper. Because of their more focused activity, we may imagine these individuals to be less biased in their promotion of external interests, such as the preoccupation of business concerns in the field of politics. Another consequence of specialisation and declining integration that we might expect to see would be a weakening of the Establishments traditional ethos.
A Change in Elite Attitudes?
(i) The Judiciary’s Compliance
When examining the judicial elite, we may initially think that the values and attitudes held by its members would not be an issue, when as a body they are required to apply the law impartially. Indeed, judges themselves perceive the courts as neutral appliers of law, thinking of their function as ‘deciding disputes in accordance with law and with impartiality’ (Budge et al 2001 p491). However, a number of commentators have asserted that it is simply not possible for judges to execute the law impartially due to the nature of the position itself. As the main task of the senior judiciary is to maintain the order and stability of the state, they are acting in line with conservative values (with a small ‘c’) from the outset. This kind of attitude is likely to be reinforced by their recruitment from a social background with corresponding beliefs.
“Judges in the United Kingdom cannot be politically neutral…because their interpretation of what is in the public interest and therefore politically desirable is determined by the kind of people they are and the position they hold in our society; [and because] this position is part of established authority and so is necessarily conservative not liberal.”
(Griffith 1991 p36)
This orientation towards consensus and the status quo is in keeping with the traditional interests of the Establishment, with great emphasis placed on history and a customary way of doing things.
“It is certainly the case that judges (and lawyers generally) are professionally trained in notions of restraint, caution, restriction, respect for property and family, and obedience for law. Probably they also have a leaning towards conventional moral values.”
(Budge et al 2001 p493)
Indeed, the orthodox view in British law implies a significant respect for ‘precedents’. This means that present legal problems are often resolved using rules developed from decisions made on previous cases. In any case, the manner in which to apply such law is not always clear-cut and judges often have a wide area of discretion in which to enforce their personal ideologies. This is not necessarily a deliberate attempt by judges to impose their own views on the rest of us; moreover, it is a sign of weakness in the structure of our laws. Nevertheless, as we highlighted previously, a significant proportion of the senior judiciary descends from upper class privileged origins, and this socialisation regularly manifests in the kind of choices they have to make.
“In the absence of any other guidance judges are prone to making judgements in line with their own class and career socialisation…More often judges decide on the basis of their own values and these are generally conservative.”
(Budge et al 2001 p502)
(ii) Politics: An Assortment of Activities
In recent years, the political elite has applied a mix of values in respect to the traditionally favoured interests. The Conservative Party that dominated Parliament towards the end of the twentieth century shared similar strains in ideology to that of the upper class, favouring private enterprise, business concerns and a strengthening of the existing order. On the other hand, during this time the Far right pushed for a partial deconstruction of the Establishment’s philosophical legacy, with the view that its desire for the status quo was withholding progress. Nevertheless, the 1980s saw Conservative policy move towards a restoration of Britain as it has existed before the Second World War, and even the late nineteenth century. The industries that Labour had nationalised between 1945 and 1950 – steel, coal, gas, water, electricity, and rail – returned to private ownership. All the main defenders of working class welfare, higher spending and greater government intervention were defeated or sidelined during this time. By initiating the dismantle of the state coal industry in 1984-5, the Conservatives won a famous victory over the miners’ union, the NUM, and in turn weakened the trade union movement as a whole.
“The trade unions were pushed away from government to the marginal and politically suspect position they had occupied at the beginning of the century and the general predominance of financial interests was affirmed.”
(Budge et al 2001 p679).
Since coming into power in 1997, Labour have made some efforts to promote the interests of the more deprived, modestly increasing spending on welfare and education and enforcing anti-discrimination legislation in an attempt to reduce race and gender bias.
“There is little doubt that the employment schemes of 1997-8…or family credits…involve spending more money on the poor than Conservative governments would have done. Though the parties’ policies on the National Health Service hardly differ Labour has spent serious money on it. Labour also appears to be more concerned with the general problem of ‘social exclusion’…Similarly, the government has been more willing than its predecessors to intervene on behalf of minorities, whether this has resulted in extending anti-racial legislation to the police or incorporation of the European Bill of Human Rights into British law’.
(Budge et al 2001 p667)
Yet for the most part, Labour has accepted much of the Thatcherite agenda. It has not returned to nationalisation or to the previous level of spending on public services, education and housing, nor has it re-established its close political alliance with the unions. The traditional dominance of finance over manufacturing has thus been reinforced under Labour and the problems of the disadvantaged in society in no way appear to be their top priority.
“Labour have tried to conciliate big business – above all multinational firms and financial interests, although at the expense of some sectors of the manufacturing industry. In practical terms this has meant balanced budgets and high interest rates to restrict inflation. Higher regional unemployment has to be tolerated in pursuit of these aims, which are seen as promoting employment in the long term by attracting investment. Unions and traditional manufacturing industry that want immediate expansion are kept at a distance from policy making.”
(Budge et al 2001 p666)
The privileged upper class is not the only stratum to benefit from the prioritisation of financial interests; a significant proportion of the middle class are employed directly or indirectly by financial services. As we can see from the information above, this sector typically receives preferential treatment over the manufacturing and industry relied upon by many in the working class.
Comparing the Structure and Ideologies of the Political and Judicial Elite
Although the direct ties typical of the old Establishment seem to have disintegrated across elites in general, its ideological influence still prevails in the prioritisation of privileged interests by both of these elites. Whereas the judiciary has simply maintained its existing stance, politics has actively reverted away from the broad Welfare State it created following the Second World War. Although under Labour, the government has made some concessions to disadvantaged groups, their policy tends to be financially predictable and overall defends moneyed interests. In this respect, the political and judicial elites are becoming more alike. One cause of this may be their increasingly similar social background and educational experience, socialising their members in the key attitudes to be upheld. Yet before we can assert such a notion, it is also necessary to address the extent to which it is possible for the activities of these elites to purely be a reflection of their member’s social composition and personal values. In other words, how much power do these particular elites actually
possess to promote certain interests and how much are their actions a reflection of forces both internal and external to their institutions? It is the purpose of the following section to address such issues.
Power: Roles and Restrictions
Responsibilities and Actual Powers
(i) The Judiciary: An Increasingly Powerful Elite
Our courts clearly have enormous influence over the creation and execution of the rules we all have to obey in our relations with each other. Much of criminal law and most of civil law is founded on common law, which is overtly made by judges based on traditional precedents (as described earlier). Another significant power of the senior judiciary is in their interpretation or construction of the law, which is their view of what a law actually means.
“It is in interpreting the meaning of the act, often a matter of dealing with very vague or general phrases that judges have most of their power.”
(Budge et al 2001 p488)
Although the British judiciary does not have the power of Constitutional review, as a number of other countries such as the USA do, British judges still possess a number of important legislative powers. With the power of judicial review, they can scrutinise the actions of all public bodies to ensure that their decisions are legal, fair and reasonable. By examining the substance of decisions, they can control the powers given to ministers and authorities by Parliamentary acts, and where EU law is concerned they can even alter rules created by Parliament (Budge et al 2001 p498).
In recent years, the political elite has extended the supervisory and decision-making powers of the courts into new areas. In the 1980s, Conservative legislation somewhat controversially imposed numerous regulations on industrial relations and trade unions, then given to the courts as laws to be enforced. The current Labour government, with its policy of constitutional reform and the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights, has strengthened the political role of the courts even further (Budge et al 2001 p500).
(ii) Politics: The Emergence of the Core Executive
At the beginning of this paper I outlined the political elite as including Members of the House of Commons, government Ministers and the Prime Minister. This definition was based on both the formal authority assigned to these positions and the social esteem and status that they all offer. However, with the centralisation of the political system over recent years, the power of individual MPs has declined. As a result, debates concerning the distribution of power within the political elite have since revolved around an assessment of the Prime Minister’s power in relation to that of the Cabinet. There is no question that the British Prime Minister has considerable power, with an absence of formal rules and a series of strong Prime ministers since 1940 leading to an accumulation of powers in the office. Nor is there much doubt that the Cabinet can be a powerful body. It reasserted its power over Thatcher in 1990, and it is not a factor that even an authoritative leader such as Tony Blair can easily ignore (Budge et al 2001 p223). As neither seems to dominate the political agenda all the time, some commentators have stopped trying to contrast prime ministerial and cabinet government and have instead developed the concept of “the core executive” (Budge et al 2001 p224). This network at the apex of power consists of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and the individuals and organisations that circle closely around them. This is a more useful concept to employ as it draws attention to the wider network of power relations in both Whitehall and Westminster. It recognises the influence of un-elected personnel within the political elite, such as close advisors to the Prime Minister and also highlights the checks made on executive power by senior Civil Servants in departments such as the Treasury, the Foreign Office, the Home Office and the Lord Chancellor’s Department.
“…In the higher circles of the British polity…power is normally concentrated in the hands of the Prime Minister, often acting in conjunction with an inner circle of trusted advisors, usually drawn from the Cabinet but not operating significantly within the sphere of official Cabinet meetings, and associated with small numbers of Civil Service officials. This is not to suggest, of course, that these constitute an integrated circle with an internally consistent outlook; the power of Whitehall may be used to blunt ministerial initiatives that emanate from the Prime Minister.”
(Stanworth 1984 p283)
As explored earlier in the paper, the previously pervasive nature of the ‘gentlemanly’ code in Parliament allowed many of the political elite’s actions to go unscrutinised. However, with the move away from the old Establishment, much of this ceremony and secrecy have declined and disagreements between various factions are likely to be a lot more public than they were in the past. Nevertheless, the increasingly open atmosphere of government does not necessarily mean that the outcomes of decisions made today are any different than if they had been made behind closed doors. If anything, such openness reveals the decisive power that the political elite still exercise over controversial or minority interests. Recent debacles concerning the war in Iraq and the subsequent resignation of Clare Short clearly highlights that outward disagreement against the majority intention is simply not acceptable.
From the above information, it is clear that both the political and judicial elite have the capability to exercise a great deal of power. I now wish to assess how autonomously they are able to act as an elite and in turn the extent to which their decisions are a reflection of external forces acting upon them.
External Considerations
The Judiciary: A Relatively Free Reign?
Despite their appointment by the Lord Chancellor, it is now unlikely that a judge is selected specifically because of their political persuasion. Nevertheless, political agendas can still be of significance when they are being considered for further promotion.
“…the question is whether there are pressures on, particularly, High Court judges to act and to speak in court in certain ways rather than others…the answer is that such pressures do exist. For example, a judge who acquires a reputation among his seniors for being ‘soft’ in certain types of cases where the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the Rolls and other senior judges favour a hard line is as likely to damage his promotion prospects as he would if his appointment were found to be unfortunate on other more obvious grounds.”
(Griffith 1991 p36)
Although judges may consciously or unconsciously subserve the wider interests of government, the extent to which politicians can directly control the senior judiciary is still questionable. Indeed, a sign of their entrenched power was their successful fight against the proposed reforms of the legal profession in the early 1990s. Attempts to abolish the distinction between barristers and solicitors would have been detrimental to the elite’s interests, and were strongly resisted by judges and barristers until only minor changes remained. In this respect, it seems that politicians have the ability to extend the judiciary’s powers but not to take them away.
Another proposed challenge to the power and autonomy of British judges has been the increased power of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In fact, the opposite seems to be true and it has for example, given the judiciary the power to review and suspend Parliamentary legislation if they think it runs counter to EU treaties (Budge et al 2001 p501). The ‘progressive’ attitude of the ECJ has also pushed forward principles of equality, however national courts still possess the responsibility of deciding whether discrimination is actually taking place. Therefore, the outcome of this as with any law relies upon the interpretation or construction by the individual judge.
Politics: A Number of Considerations
Unlike other elites, acceptance into the world of politics is based upon the collective decisions of a given population. Regardless of the actions that the political elite may wish to exercise whilst in power, the awareness that their membership can be terminated in the following election is ever present. We established earlier in the paper that the Labour Party currently in power and the composition of Parliament overall was becoming more solidly middle class. We also established in the previous section that the behaviour of recent governments has favoured both the middle classes and those above them. With the dramatic growth of the middle classes over the latter half of the twentieth century, it is clearly not just their members’ social backgrounds that are reflected in their promotion of middle class interests.
“Post-war Britain therefore remains a remarkably unequal society. In contrast to the immediate post-war period, however, the middle classes are much more numerous. A vote of 40 per cent is enough to give a national party a majority in Parliament and to sustain a government. Thus groups that benefit from the current distribution of income and wealth are numerous enough to vote a government in, regardless of the situation of the approximately 20 per cent living in poverty.”
(Budge et al 2001 p15)
The dominance of the middle class within the electorate explains the long-term success of Conservative policies such as tax cutting and reduced government spending on social services. It also explains why Labour has continued with many of the policies that adversely affect the disadvantaged groups they previously represented.
Not only electoral considerations but international and institutional constraints limit what a government can do when in power. The two come together in the financial institutions and markets of the City of London (Budge et al 2001 p17). The major British financial institutions, such as banks, trust funds and insurance companies, conduct their world business here. The City is a major influence on what foreign lenders think about British economic prospects, as well as having a direct impact on them itself. The major way in which the City’s influence is felt is through the price it and other lenders charge the government for loans.
“British governments often spend more than they take in revenue. Any improvement in educational or health standards costs money, which has to be borrowed. So it is clear that even a Labour government is heavily dependant on the goodwill of the financial markets.”
(Budge et al 2001 p18)
The power to provoke immediate financial crisis means that the conditions favourable to financial interests are reflected in the economic policy enforced by the government. Even Labour has abandoned high-tax, high spending policies in favour of a stable currency and low inflation, which allows money to emerge in higher profits and increases the value of shares. This obviously conflicts with the requirements of the manufacturing industry who need a devaluation of currency to help their exports, and mildly rising inflation to give people more money to buy their products, to in turn create greater investment and employment in this sector. The long term demise of industry is also more acceptable to the middle class electorate than a rapid financial crisis, which is likely to shake their faith in the incumbent party. This situation works to the detriment of those reliant on manufacturing and industry, again the working class and many ethnic-minority groups. Therefore the upper classes involved in the financial sector and the significant proportion of the middle classes who are directly or indirectly employed by it are able to exert great pressure on the government, both electoral and financial, in a way that the disadvantaged in society simply cannot
“The City has been, and remains, the most important centre of wealth creation for the rich in Britain. Not only is the City the principle source of wealth for the upper classes, it also the main institutional location for the servicing of their wealth. The City has generally enjoyed a superior access and mutuality with the government when compared with industry”
(Stanworth 1984 p287)
One factor that might begin to counterbalance the currently dominant interests is Britain’s increasing integration into the European Union. As most other members of the EU have better social protection than Britain, the incorporation of European legislation gives the Labour party a better opportunity at enforcing it’s traditional type of policies. However, amongst others, members of the Conservative Party have argued that if Britain joins the Single European Market it would significantly reduce the autonomy of British government, by removing control of financial policy from the Treasury and placing it in the hands of a European central bank. Nevertheless, some financial and industrial interests do want to join the European Monetary Union, as many see British firms as being excluded from a lucrative and expanding market if they stand aloof.
“This situation provides an unprecedented opportunity for the Labour government to pursue its policies with the consent of both industrial and financial interests. By accepting EMU (as well as the Social Chapter, which the government signed on coming to power in 1997) Labour could advance its social policies without creating a crisis of confidence”
(Budge et al 2001 p23)
Comparing the Power of the Political and Judicial Elite
It is clear from the above discussion that both of these elites possess a considerable amount of power both within their own institutions and across society as a whole. The key difference between them is the kind of effect that other bodies have upon their ability to execute authority autonomously. The political elite has to consider a number of interests before it can act, with privileged groups able to exert much greater pressure than those already at a disadvantage can. In contrast, the judicial elite is able to fend off attempts to restrict its entrenched powers and has incorporated external influences in ways that have boosted its existing power base. Because of these differences, the extent to which their members’ social backgrounds and values influence their actions is also going to be very different. In the current social and political climate, the political elite can only make minor changes that go against the grain, and therefore the social make-up of a political party that wishes to stay in power is on the whole irrelevant. As the senior judiciary is typically drawn from privileged stratum, any decisions they make in line with their own values are likely to be in accordance with the wishes of the dominant position anyway.
Concluding Thoughts
The purpose of this paper was to examine the composition of the political and judicial elite in light of the British social structure. My preliminary analysis highlighted the ongoing dominance of privileged social groups across British elites in general, and for this reason, I decided to assess their particular influence upon these specific elites. An analysis of recruitment patterns revealed a relatively closed judicial elite, typically drawn from the upper echelons of society. The political elite was slightly more open, though recently it had become dominated by the middle classes. In terms of their structure and integration, there was an evident decline in the general elite culture that had prevailed at the beginning of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, there was still a clear correlation between the social make-up of both elites and the interests they favoured in their actions. The final section explored the validity of this correlation in more detail and assessed the influence of other forces upon their behaviour. This revealed that the political elite was being placed under a great deal of pressure to prioritise the interests associated with the upper and middle classes. On the other hand, the senior judiciary experienced much greater autonomy, possibly because their own personal culture intrinsically favours these groups anyway.
Therefore, across each dimension of the political and judicial elites’ composition, privileged groups within the social structure still appear to dominate. This creates the impression of a strong cycle of inheritance via education, maintenance via institutional values and influence on the execution of power that is very difficult for those without similar education, values or financial power to break. Furthermore, the exclusive access that certain groups have to elite membership and their ability to maintain a system that protects their existing interests is a core aspect of how we define privilege itself. Such a definition incorporates the discrimination experienced by many women and ethnic minority groups, as well as those within the working class. Indeed, I would have liked to explore the disparities of gender and race in more detail, however the information available concerning these groups in relation to elite positions was somewhat limited.
In Britain today, the only real prospect of severing this structural bias is greater European integration and the consequent adoption of fairer financial and social policy. However, the likelihood of changes so unfavourable to the current dominant interests being accepted into our system is somewhat questionable.