Saranson (1978, cited in Murphy 1996) characterizes the attempts to solve social problems: “What we were after were those bedrock laws of social behaviour and process that would allow a society ‘really’ rationally to diagnose and solve its problems”. However laudable the aims were the utility of social psychology directed in this way depends on successful application, and Saranson goes on to describe the results as “[D]iscouraging because of the lack of intended outcomes and shattering because they call into question the appropriateness of the scientific-rational model of problem definition and solution in social action”, (p187).
There could be many reasons for this perceived lack of success. It may be that this is simply a perception that does not incorporate the subtle mechanisms of change or an appropriate time-frame. The process of discovery is slow even in established branches of knowledge, and the process of influence is even slower. For instance, medical science took centuries to establish itself as an authority on what is good for society, and even now political expediency restricts the medical profession from doing what is good for society. Equally, social psychology does not seem to be at the same evolutionary stage as medicine. The authority of medical science is predicated upon the acceptance of the reductionist credo which has ‘won out’ against holistic and spiritual approaches. This said, the ability to influence social policy may require social psychology to establish a dominant paradigm from the currently competing perspectives.
Saranson (Ibid., p187) proposes that the lack of success is due to the failure to recognise that there are ‘intractable’ social problems with no once-and-for-all solution. These intractable problems stem from universal existential realities, but manifest themselves differently across eras and cultures. He identifies death, aloneness and the need for others as the sources, but it might be useful to add the need to find a meaning of and for ourselves. Thus it can be argued that social psychology can be of best ‘use’ in recognising the manifestations of these existential issues within a particular culture, and at a ‘micro’ level assisting individuals to accommodate them. Indeed, historically social psychology has been more successful in doing this than in effecting large-scale change. The dissemination and popularisation of psychological language and concepts are testament to this.
In the postmodern era we see a decline of the traditional institutions of family, community and religion and an increase in secular individualism, which has psychological correlatives (i.e. no simple causal direction between individual and society) which could be considered to be reinterpreted manifestations of Saranson’s ‘intractable problems’. Gergen (1991, cited in Stevens and Wetherell 1996) describes this: “With the spread of postmodern consciousness, we see the demise of personal definition, reason, authority, commitment, trust, the sense of authenticity, sincerity, belief in leadership, depth of feeling, and faith in progress” (p347).
The task of problem recognition is undoubtedly easier than deciding whether help is required or what form that help might take. However, the reinterpretation of the intractable existential problems brings with it a reinterpretation of how to deal with them. Giddens (1991, cited in Stevens and Wetherell 1996, p350) points to a movement away from emancipatory politics towards ‘life politics’ and the corresponding questions of ‘how we should live’. Thus, social psychology may be useful to society by the consideration of appropriate evidence (with a wide definition), and by providing normative prescription of how to live.
If we accept this, we are posed the problem of identifying areas of social psychology that have the potential for normative prescription at the personal/interpersonal level. The experiential perspective is the most obvious provider of guidance to individuals on how to live. The existential focus on ‘authentic’ awareness and the humanistic drive towards autonomy and self-development seem to offer a valid template for tackling the problems of postmodern consciousness. However, it is recognised that this prima facie validity arises because the problems are construed here within an existential framework, and that the utility of social psychology is not served by ignoring other perspectives. This said, the first major prescription must be for individuals to become more aware of themselves and of the existential realities at the root of today’s ‘intractable problems’. In order that this call to awareness be more than a platitude, awareness must be defined in a manner that is inclusive of the multiple perspectives.
Stevens and Wetherell (1996, pp. 364-365) argue that there are some areas of ‘irreconcilable dispute’ between the perspectives over the issue of self-awareness. The existentialist notion of ‘situated freedom’ and its imperative to take responsibility and to change, conflict with the psychodynamic emphasis on unconscious processes and with the primary social constructionist concept of joint meaning creation. The answer to this may be simply to accept complexity as a part of the awareness that we are trying to instil. Encouraging people to understand a relational view of themselves and to accept that their conscious motives are not always what they seem, does not detract from ‘authenticity’. Further, what social psychology has to provide will always be interpreted individually in just the same way that religion or secular ideology is received. This individual ‘gnosis’ can only be aided by an honest presentation of competing views.
Whilst this prescription for awareness is the obvious starting point, without prescriptive advice for day-to-day living the utility of social psychology is nominal. There are a variety of ideas and evidence which may be of use to the individual particularly at the interpersonal level. Because of the emphasis placed on it across the perspectives the topic of relationships will be considered here as an example of the potential for the useful influence of social psychology.
As one would expect, the psychodynamic perspective places an emphasis on personal relationships that is difficult to over-estimate. At the heart of this is the notion of the ‘relational mind’, that introjected versions of other people are the building blocks of our minds. In this way, our experience of relationships shapes our internal representations of the world and our selves. The social constructionist position goes further in suggesting that the mutual influence people have on each other make the concept of the individual self meaningless. These two perspectives give a general urge to recognise the fundamental importance of relationships, whereas the experiential and experimental perspectives offer specific prescriptions.
A humanist approach would see relationships as important in tackling the problem of aloneness. Yalom (1980, cited in Stevens 1996) describes an ‘existential isolation’ or an awareness of “[The] unbridgeable gulf between oneself and any other being” (p359). In allowing connection between two people’s worlds relationships can offer escape from the anxiety caused by this isolation, but this needs to be managed. The ‘intersubjectivity’ of relationships must be enabled through effective communication which acknowledges the subjective reality of the other. Roger’s (1951, cited in Stevens 1996, p360) proposes that that this is facilitated through a climate of ‘non-evaluative warmth’ in which feelings are shared whilst judgement is suspended.
Experimental evidence can help individuals to understand the impact that relationships can have and the skills required to maintain them. Larson (1990, cited in Argyle 1996, p353) makes the general case for relationships in findings that we are most happy with friends, followed by family, and least happy when alone. These results translate from feelings of wellbeing, through stress to mental and physical health, and finally to mortality. Brown and Harris (1978, ibid., p353) expose the benefits of having intimate or close relationships, with findings that risk of reactive depression for women was mitigated by support from a partner or a close female confidante. Perhaps the most important prescription is that supportive relationships are ‘good for your health’. This is advocated by the findings of Berkman and Syme (1979, ibid., p354) that the greatest effect on mortality is found for marriage, and close friends and kin, but also for support from church and other organizations. Having established that we need good relationships, Argyle identifies the kinds of skills that people need in order to establish and maintain them: “Those who are socially isolated and have no friends are found to be very unrewarding, have poor non-verbal communication, and little conversational power. Some of the social skills of marriage are being rewarding, being good at negotiating and being prepared to compromise”, (ibid. p352).
What has been attempted by this essay is to make the case that in order to be ‘useful to society’ social psychology needs to embrace its moral aspect. The three major, related reasons for this have been set out. First, that even in past, more collective social eras, social psychology has failed to influence society at the ‘macro’ level through social policy. It follows from this that, given the trend towards a secular individualism, the success of social psychology as a political science is not likely to improve. Finally, it has been asserted that social psychology has not had an appropriate depth of focus, it has dealt with progressive manifestations of ‘intractable problems’ rather than address the root existential issues.
This is of course polemical. It can be argued that this position takes a unduly negative view of social policy and an over-optimistic view of social psychology’s ability to influence individual awareness. Further, that what is proposed is just a ‘new religion’ for the postmodern era which relenquishes its social science credibility when it offers normative prescription. The reader must decide between an optimistic but impure philosophy, and a discipline that may become marginalised with time.
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References
Argyle, M. (1996) ‘The experimental study of relationships’ in Miell, D. and Dallos, R. (ed.s) Social Interaction and Personal Relationships, Milton Keynes, The Open University.
Murpy, J. (1996) ‘Using social psychology’ in Sapsford, R. (ed.) Issues for Social Psychology, Milton Keynes, The Open University.
Stevens, R. (1996) ‘A humanistic approach to relationships’ in Miell, D. and Dallos, R. (ed.s) Social Interaction and Personal Relationships, Milton Keynes, The Open University.
Stevens, R. and Wetherell, M. (1996) ‘The self in the modern world: drawing together the threads’ in Stevens R. (ed.) Understanding the Self, Milton Keynes, The Open University.
