Although some fought against censorship of information, there was little to do apart from writing a few articles since the government controlled virtually all breaking security news and strict codes of objectivity stopped journalists from evaluating official statements. Also, anyone who contradicted policy statements was at risk of charges of subversion.
In addition to censorship of the press, broadcasting stations in the United States were also censored and private news crews were rarely sent to Korea. Instead, State Department agencies produced films for propaganda use which were then given to broadcasting stations.
There were conflicting reactions among the reporters on government censorship. Some reporters agreed that some information should be censored. On July 11, 1950, New York Times printed an editorial supporting censorship of delicate information in order to ensure the security of the US military.
Once China entered the war on November 26th 1950, MacArthur imposed full censorship on all outgoing information. All new reports and films were then forced to be submitted to Army and Air Force censors.
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Evaluation of Sources (325 words)
U.S. Television News and Cold War Propaganda, 1947-1960, by Nancy Bernhard, a “skilled and passionate” expert on Cold War propaganda, is a detailed study of the extent to which broadcasting stations were used by the US government in order to control information. Its purpose is to prove network collaboration with the U.S. government from 1947-1960. The book was published in 1999, giving the author the chance to consult a wide range of books, articles, oral histories and personal interviews in order to write a reliable, well structured and researched book. Even though the author has the advantage of hindsight, she did not live through the events of the Korean War and is therefore limited only to the sources she acquired. Also, in her analysis, she often seeks to show how “broadcasters […] duplicated totalitarian practices.” Hence, much of her analysis is biased towards this view point.
Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics, and Public Opinion, 1950-1953, by Steven Casey, a PhD in International Relations and expert on US foreign policy since 1933, is written with the same view as that of Bernhard and therefore both books serve as a complement to one another, thereby increasing their values. The purpose of Casey’s book is to look at the “attempts by the US military in Korea to shape, manipulate and mould the images and stories from the actual fighting fronts.” The book was published in 2008 and therefore gave the already well-respected author access to a wide range of sources including books, articles and personal interviews. The book has also been given rave reviews by many other respected historians such as Ralph B. Levering. However, Casey could be guilty of exaggerating the extent to which the US government tried to ‘sell’ the Korean War to its people. His ideas seem very one-sided and he often does not argue his case objectively. This causes for a certain degree of bias and slightly limits the value of the book.
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Analysis (772 words)
Although censorship was supposedly voluntary, a perplexing situation had occurred: officially there was no censorship, but reporters were warned not to reveal delicate information. In a press statement by MacArthur’s press officer, Colonel Echols, journalists were told that they were not to state “specific units, sizes, titles, places of landings, locations and troop movements” in their articles/stories.
Also, voluntary censorship came with problems. In theory, voluntary censorship gave maximum freedom for reporters to work. However, in reality reporters were never sure of the extent to which they should write. In a press conference, the US Eighth Army said that “unwarranted criticism of command decisions of the conduct of Allied soldiers on the battlefield will not be tolerated.” It also stated that it would be the “sole judge and jury” on what constitutes ‘unwarranted’ criticism leading to confusion and frustration amongst journalists.
Furthermore, any journalist who published a story containing potentially damaging information was subject to harassment or could even be forced to leave the area. John Jefferson of CBS (who had also been a war correspondent in WWII) accompanied the U.S. Marines in a 50-mile retreat from the Choisin Reservoir to the port of Hungnam of which he gave his eye-witness information of all the hardships of the Marines back to CBS who then published this report nationwide. After this report had been published, Jefferson’s career as a war correspondent was ended. Also, MacArthur’s aids had plenty of ways to hassle perennial critics, from expulsion to raids on houses, from “derogatory letters to employers” to being branded a ‘security risk.’
It was surprising that MacArthur should be loose towards censorship as he had a notorious reputation for seeking to control media output. For example, in World War II, MacArthur often forced newspapers to rely solely on his communiqués for war news. He was also known to be determined to censor any story that was “even slightly critical of the supreme commander.” Reporters did, however, agree not to divulge information that could threaten the security of US forces.
It is clear that MacArthur’s intentions were never to allow full access to information for journalists as all information was issued by the MacArthur team. Also, journalists who dug deeper into potentially critical stories were often harassed by MacArthur’s lieutenants, while those who practiced restraint were rewarded with a snippet of inside information.
The only other alternative was for journalists to go to the dangerous war zone. By the end of July 1950, six journalists had been killed, three wounded and one captured – as the industry journal Editor and Publisher reported – this was more war correspondent casualties than in an entire first year of the Second World War.
This threat of expulsion or being wounded in a war zone caused most correspondents to be unsure of their limits. The overall effect of this was that information being sent back to America was greatly distorted; fear of being discredited and repressed dictated that voluntary censorship was effectively no different from a normal system of censorship. Even worse, it caused for great discrepancy between media and military. MacArthur’s commanders often expressed dissatisfaction about reports being sent out and reporters complained that it was the military’s job to set clear directions on what was to be censored and what was to be allowed. As Daniel Fazio explains, “[MacArthur’s] idea of a voluntary code of censorship had overlooked a natural enemy – the fiercely competitive nature of newspaper writing.”
Back in the United States, it seemed that media stations did try and fight back against the suppression of information by printing cartoons and articles. For example, the cartoon “How the Government Conditions the Public to Ideas It Wants to Put Over” explains how the executive branch developed an ‘official line’ and then disseminated it through the press to the public. On the most part the cartoon is very accurate, however, it fails to acknowledge how much reporters relied on government information bureaus for their every day stories. For example, reporters from both the Chicago Tribune and the Daily Worker depended on the Office of Public Affairs (PA) for almost all their main stories. Also, reporters normally treated PA officers as primary sources of information.
The fact that most television networks obtained most of their film from government produced films allowed the US government to control the spread of public information. Therefore, even though there technically existed a voluntary censorship system, most information given to news agencies was already censored. However, many (such as reporters from the New York Times) felt that this censorship was crucial in ensuring military security.
The National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) also played a critical role in the spread of information in the United States. Shortly before the Korean War started, many (but not all) broadcasting stations associated themselves with the NAB. Justin Miller, president of the NAB stated that he thought it necessary to preserve the American way of life and therefore gave full cooperation to the American objective which undoubtedly led to censorship of information.
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Conclusion (72 words)
Technically, ‘voluntary censorship’ during the Korean War was the only type of censorship that existed. Also, many organizations, including the NAB, in the United States did practice voluntary censorship as they thought it necessary in order to protect the American people. However, in reality censorship started long before information was even given to the media. MacArthur ensured that information given to journalists was information that he considered safe enough to let out.
- Bibliography
Books
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Bernhard, N., U.S. Television News and Cold War Propaganda, 1947-1960, Cambridge University Press, 1999
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Bliss, E., Now the New: The Story of Broadcast Journalism, Columbia University Press, 1991
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Casey, S., Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics, and Public Opinion in the United States, 1950-1953, Oxford University Press, 2008
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Osgood, K., Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad, University Press of Kansas, 2006
Articles
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Fazio, D., Censorship in the Korean War: Press – Military Relations, June 1950 – January 1951, Australian Journal of American Studies (also available online at ) [Accessed April 26, 2009]
Online Sources
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[Accessed October 31, 2009]
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[Accessed April 24, 2009]
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[Accessed April 24, 2009]
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[Accessed April 24, 2009]
Bliss, E., Now the News: The Story of Broadcast Journalism, Columbia University Press, p.263.
Osgood, K., Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad, University Press of Kansas, 2006, p.17
Casey, S., Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics, and Public Opinion in the United States, 1950-1953, Oxford University Press, 2008, p.43
Date according to Casey, S., p.50
Bernhard, N., U.S. Television News and Cold War Propaganda, 1947-1960, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.72
Fazio, D., “Censorship in the Korean War: Press-Military Relations, June 1950-January, 1951”, Australian Journal of American Studies (December 2007), p.3
[Accessed October 31, 2009]
[Accessed April 24, 2009]
[Accessed April 24, 2009]
[Accessed April 24, 2009]
Ralph B. Levering author of The Cold War: A Post-Cold War History
